


**THE UNIVERSITY
OF ILLINOIS
LIBRARY**

901
T32
v.2

~~100~~
~~100~~
~~100~~



Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2025 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Alternates

<https://archive.org/details/ideasthathaveinf02unse>



LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
URBANA.

THE
IDEAS
THAT HAVE INFLUENCED
CIVILIZATION
IN THE
ORIGINAL DOCUMENTS

OLIVER J. THATCHER, PH. D.

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

AUTHOR OF "EUROPE IN THE MIDDLE AGE" (WITH F. SCHWILL),
"A SHORT HISTORY OF MEDIAEVAL EUROPE," "A GEN-
ERAL HISTORY OF EUROPE" (WITH F. SCHWILL),
"A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF
THE APOSTOLIC CHURCH,"

EDITOR

TEN VOLUMES

VOL. II

THE GREEK WORLD

BOSTON

CHICAGO

THE ROBERTS-MANCHESTER PUBLISHING CO.
MILWAUKEE

RECEIVED
LIBRARY OF THE
MUSEUM OF
ART AND HISTORY
NEW YORK

Grand de Lure Edition

LIMITED TO 1000 COMPLETE SETS, OF WHICH THIS IS

No. _____

COPYRIGHT 1901
BY
ROBERTS-MANCHESTER PUBLISHING CO.

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

THE DAWE PRESS

7132
v. 2

EDITOR'S ACKNOWLEDGMENT

ALTHOUGH THE EDITOR only is responsible for the matter included in this set of books, yet he has been greatly assisted by the suggestions he has received from specialists in their own fields. As the editing of the last volumes is not yet finished, it is impossible to give full credit for such advice, but the editor takes this opportunity to acknowledge the important counsel or additional suggestions received from:

- A. H. SAYCE, LL. D., D. D.,
PROFESSOR OF ASSYRIOLOGY, QUEEN'S COLLEGE, OXFORD UNIVERSITY.
- CRAWFORD H. TOY, A. M., LL. D.,
PROFESSOR OF ORIENTAL LANGUAGES, HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
- ROBERT FRANCIS HARPER, PH. D.,
PROFESSOR OF SEMITIC LANGUAGES AND LITERATURES,
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
- WALTER MILLER, A. M.,
PROFESSOR OF CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY,
THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY.
- EDWARD CAPPS, PH. D.,
PROFESSOR OF GREEK, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
- HENRY RUSHTON FAIRCLOUGH, PH. D.,
PROFESSOR OF CLASSICAL LITERATURE,
THE LELAND STANFORD JUNIOR UNIVERSITY.
- FRANK FROST ABBOTT, PH. D.,
PROFESSOR OF LATIN, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
- JOHN CAREW ROLFE, PH. D.,
PROFESSOR OF LATIN, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
- DANA C. MONRO, A. M.,
DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.
- EDWARD G. BOURNE, PH. D.,
PROFESSOR OF HISTORY, YALE UNIVERSITY.
- FERDINAND SCHWILL, PH. D.,
DEPARTMENT OF MODERN HISTORY, UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.
- HARRY BURNS HUTCHINS, LL. D.,
DEAN OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LAW, UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN.
- WILLIAM H. WELCH, M. D., LL. D.,
DEAN OF THE MEDICAL FACULTY, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY.
- THEODORE WILLIAM RICHARDS, PH. D.,
DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY, HARVARD UNIVERSITY.
- PAUL REINSCH, PH. D.,
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN.
- H. H. MANCHESTER, A. B.,
MANAGING EDITOR FOR THE ROBERTS-MANCHESTER PUBLISHING CO.

ILLUSTRATIONS

VOLUME II.

	PAGE
ARCHAIC GREEK BRONZE (SIXTH CENTURY)	Frontispiece
DYING WARRIOR ON THE TEMPLE AT EGINA	3
DISCOBOLUS, BY MYRON (492 B. C.—430 B. C.)	35
HEAD OF PERICLES, BY KRESILAS (480 B. C.—410 B. C.)	54
DORYPHORUS, BY POLYCLEITUS (Fl. 450 B. C.—420 B. C.)	105
AMAZON, BY POLYCLEITUS	136
LEMNIAN ATHENA, BY PHIDIAS (488 B. C.—432 B. C.)	190
BOLOGNA HEAD, BY PHIDIAS	249
HERACLES, BY LYSIPPUS (Fl. 350 B. C.)	344
HERMES, BY PRAXITELES (Fl. 350 B. C.)	426

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME II.

RELIGION	3
THE BEGINNING OF THINGS	3
The Theogony of Hesiod	4
The Works and Days	26
IDEAS OF THE FUTURE LIFE	35
Odysseus' Descent into Hades	35
Elysium	49
Second Olympian Ode	50
Happiness of the Departed	52
The Mysteries	52
INSTITUTIONS	
ATHENS	
Aristotle on the Athenian Constitution	54
SPARTA	
Lycurgus	105
EARLY GREEK THINKERS	
THALES	138
ANAXIMANDER	140
ANAXIMENES	143
PYTHAGORAS	145
XENOPHANES	146
HERAKLEITOS	148
PARAMENIDES	156
EMPEDOKLES	160

ANAXAGORAS	175
ZENO OF ELEA	175
MELISSOS	182
THE PYTHAGOREANS	185
SOCRATES	187
LEUKIPPOS AND DEMOKRITOS	187
 PLATO	 190
THEAETETUS	191
PARMENIDES	239
PHAEDO	249
THE IDEAL STATE (Republic)	311
Origin and Education	
Community in the State	
 DIOGENES THE CYNIC	 339
CHARACTERISTIC SAYINGS	339
 ARISTOTLE	 344
FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS IN LOGIC	345
Enumeration of the Categories	
Of Substance	
Of Proposition, Term, Syllogism and its Elements	
AN EXAMINATION INTO EXISTENCE	352
THE BASIS OF ETHICS	364
POLITICAL IDEAS	383
Origin of the State	
The Ideal State	
 ZENO THE STOIC	 418
CHARACTERISTICS	418
 EPICURUS	 426
LETTER ON HAPPINESS	426



GREEK RELIGIOUS IDEAS

THE BIBLES OF THE GREEKS were the works of Homer and Hesiod. We have shown the Greek ideas concerning the origin of the gods and the world in Hesiod's *Theogony* and his *Works and Days*. These contain, also, the stories of the wars of the gods, the bringing of fire to man and the consequent punishment of Prometheus, of Pandora and the beginning of evil, and of the five ages of the world. The Greek ideas of the future life in Hades and Elysium are best represented in the descriptions of Homer and Pindar, while we have given a glimpse of the Mysteries, and the hopes of immortality which they gave to the initiated, in those few paragraphs of Isocrates which stand practically alone in all Greek literature in explaining these influential but reverently unspoken-of rites.

THE BEGINNINGS OF THINGS

THE THEOGONY OF HESIOD

BEGIN we to sing with the Heliconian Muses, who keep safe the spacious and divine mount of Helicon, and also with delicate feet dance about the violet-hued fount and altars of the mighty son of Cronos: and likewise having bathed their soft skins in the Permessus, or Hippocrene, or sacred Olmius, are wont to institute on the top of Helicon choral dances, beautiful and lovely, and move nimbly with their feet. Then starting thence, shrouded in thick darkness, by night they are wont to wend their way, uttering sounds exceeding sweet, while they celebrate ægis-bearing Jove, and majestic Juno, the Argive goddess, treading-proudly in golden sandals; and gleaming-eyed Athene, daughter of ægis-bearing Jove; Phœbus Apollo; Artemis, arrow-queen; and earth-encompassing, earth-shaking Poseidon; august Themis; Aphrodite shooting lovely-glances; and Hebe of-the-golden-crown; and fair Dione; Aurora, and the great Sun, and the resplendent Moon; Latona, and Iapetus, and wily Cronos; Earth, mighty Ocean, and dark Night, and the holy race of other ever-living immortals, who erst taught Hesiod a lovely song, as he fed his lambs beneath divine Helicon. But first of all the goddesses, the Olympian Muses, daughters of ægis-bearing Jove, addressed me in a speech such as this:

“Ye shepherds, dwelling a-field, base subjects for reproach, nought but gluttons, we know to sing many fictions like to truths, and we know, when we will, to speak what is true.”

Thus said the daughters, ready-in-speech, of mighty Jove, and gave me as a staff a branch of very luxuriant olive to pluck, (a branch) wondrous to behold; and breathed into me a voice divine, that I might sing of both the future and the past.

And they bade me hymn the race of ever-living blessed gods, but first and last ever to sing of themselves. Yet why should these tales be told by me touching the sacred oak, or rock? Come thou! Begin we with the Muses, who, as they sing, delight the great spirit of Jove, their sire, within Olympus, telling of the present, and the future, and

the past, according in their voice; and from their lips sweet speech flows ceaselessly, whilst the halls of loud-thundering Jove, their sire, are glad at the delicate utterance of the goddesses, as it is diffused around: and the top of snowy Olympus rings, and the mansions of the immortals. They then uttering divine sounds first celebrate in song the august race of the gods, whom from the beginning Earth and broad Heaven produced: the gods who sprang from these, givers of good gifts; and the next, Jove, sire of gods and men likewise, the goddesses chaunt as they begin, and chaunting him cease from their song, how most excellent he is of the gods, and mightiest in strength. And next the Olympian Muses, daughters of ægis-bearing Jove, gladden Jove's spirit within Olympus, by singing of the race of heroes, and mighty giants; the Muses I say, whom Mnemosyne, guardian over the corn-lands of Eleuther, bare, after union with their sire, the son of Cronus, in Pieria, to be a means of oblivion of ills, and a rest from cares. For during nine nights did the counsellor Jove associate with her, apart from the other immortals, ascending her holy bed: but when at length, I ween, it was the year, and the seasons had revolved towards the end of the months, and many days had been completed, then she bare nine accordant daughters, whose care is song, possessing, as they do, in their bosoms a mind at ease, but a little distance from the highest peak of snowy Olympus, where are their bright spots-for-dancing and fair abodes. And besides them the Graces and Cupid too have dwellings at festivals, and pouring through their lips a lovely voice, they chaunt the attributes, and celebrate the wise ways of all the immortals, uttering an exceeding-lovely voice.

And they then went to Olympus, exulting in their beautiful voice, in their immortal song, and around them, as they sang, dark earth was re-echoing, and a winsome sound arose from their feet, as they wended to their sire: But he reigns in Olympus, having in his own disposal the thunder and the glowing bolt, since he hath conquered by might his father, Cronus. And duly to the immortals hath he arranged each office at once, and declared their prerogatives.

Thus, I wot, the Muses tenanting Olympian homes are wont to sing, nine daughters born of mighty Jove, Clio, Euterpe, Thalia, and Melpomene, Terpsichore and Erato; Polymnia, Urania, and Calliope: and she is eldest of them all. For she also attends in the company of august kings. Whomsoever of Jove-reared sovereigns the daughters of great Jove shall have honoured and looked upon at his birth, on the tongue of such an one they shed a honeyed dew, and from his lips

drop gentle words ; so then the peoples all look to him, as he decideth questions of law with righteous judgments ; and he speaketh-counsels unerringly, and quickly stays with wisdom a strife however great. For therefore are kings wise, in that for their peoples, when misled in the forum, they easily accomplish the reversal of their acts, exhorting them with soft words. And as he goes through the city they propitiate him as a god with gentle awe, and he is conspicuous among them when assembled, as is the sacred gift of the Muses among men. Since from the Muses and far-shooting Apollo are men of song, and harpers over the earth, but from Jove spring kings : yet happy he whomsoever the Muses shall have loved ; sweet is the sound that flows from his mouth. For suppose one, even having grief in his fresh sorrowing spirit, pines away troubled at heart, yet if a minstrel, servant of the Muses, shall have chaunted the glories of men of yore, and the blessed gods, who hold Olympus, quickly does he forget his melancholy, nor does he at all remember his cares ; and quickly have the gifts of the gods diverted them.

Hail ! daughters of Jove ; and give the lovely song. And sing the sacred race of immortals ever-existing, who sprang from Earth and starry Heaven, and murky Night, whom the briny Deep nourished. Say, too, how at the first the gods and earth were born, and rivers and boundless deep, rushing with swollen stream, and shining stars, and the broad Heaven above ; and the gods who were sprung from these, givers of good gifts ; and say how they divided their wealth, and how they apportioned their honours, and how at the first they occupied Olympus with-its-many-ravines. Tell me these things, ye Muses, abiding in Olympian homes from the beginning, and say we what was the first of them that rose.

In truth then foremost sprang Chaos, and next broad-bosomed Earth, ever secure seat of all the immortals, who inhabit the peaks of snow-capt Olympus, and dark dim Tartarus in a recess of Earth having-broad-ways, and Love, who is most beautiful among immortal gods, Love that relaxes the limbs, and in the breasts of all gods and all men, subdues their reason and prudent counsel. But from Chaos were born Erebus and black Night ; and from Night again sprang forth Æther and Day, whom she bare after having conceived, by union with Erebus in love. And Earth, in sooth, bare first indeed like to herself (in size) stàrry Heaven, that he might shelter her around on all sides, that so she might be ever a secure seat for the blessed gods : and she brought forth vast mountains, lovely haunts of deities, the Nymphs

who dwell along the woodland hills. She too bare also the barren Sea, rushing with swollen stream, the Deep, I mean, without delightful love: but afterward, having bedded with Heaven, she bare deep-eddying Ocean, Cæus and Crius, Hyperion and Iapetus, Thea and Rhea, Themis, Mnemosyne, and Phœbe with golden coronet, and lovely Tethys. And after these was born, youngest, wily Cronus, most savage of their children; and he hated his vigour-giving sire. Then brought she forth next the Cyclops, having an over-bearing spirit, Brontes, and Steropes, and stout-hearted Arges, who both gave to Jove his thunder, and forged his lightnings. Now these, in sooth, were in other respects, it is true, like to gods, but a single eye was fixed in their mid-foreheads. And they from immortals grew up speaking mortals, and Cyclops was their appropriate name, because, I wot, in their foreheads one circular eye was fixed. Strength, force, and contrivances were in their works. But again, from Earth and Heaven sprung other three sons, great and mighty, scarce to be mentioned, Cottus and Briareus and Gyes, children exceeding proud. From the shoulders of these moved actively an hundred hands, not brooking approach, and to each above sturdy limbs there grew fifty heads from their shoulders. Now monstrous strength is powerful, joined with vast size. For of as many sons as were born of Earth and Heaven, they were the fiercest, and were hated by their sire from the very first: as soon as any of these was born, he would hide them all, and not send them up to the light, in a cave of the earth, and Heaven exulted over the work of mischief, whilst huge Earth inly groaned, straitened as she was; and she devised a subtle and evil scheme. For quickly having produced a stock of white iron, she forged a large sickle, and gave the word to her children, and said encouragingly, though troubled in her heart: "Children of me and of a sire madly violent, if ye would obey me, we shall avenge the baneful injury of your father; for he was the first that devised acts of indignity." So spake she, but fear seized on them all, I wot, nor did any of them speak; till, having gathered courage, great and wily Cronus bespake his dear mother thus in reply:

"Mother, this deed at any rate I will undertake and accomplish, since for our sire, in sooth, of-detested-name, I care not; for he was the first that devised acts of indignity."

Thus spake he, and huge Earth rejoiced much at heart, and hid and planted him in ambush: in his hand she placed a sickle with jagged teeth, and suggested to him all the stratagem.

Then came vast Heaven bringing Night with him, and, eager for love, brooded around Earth, and lay stretched, I wot, on all sides: but his son from out his ambush grasped at him with his left hand, whilst in his right he took the huge sickle, long and jagged-toothed, and hastily moved off the genitals of his sire, and threw them back to be carried away behind him. In nowise vainly slipped they from his hand; for as many gory drops as ran thence, Earth received them all; and when the years rolled round, she gave birth to stern Furies, and mighty giants, gleaming in arms, with long spears in hand, and Nymphs whom men call Ashnymphs, (*Meliæ*.) over the boundless earth. But the genitals, as after first severing them with the steel he had cast them into the heaving sea from the continent, so kept drifting long time up and down the deep, and all round kept rising a white foam from the immortal flesh; and in it a maiden was nourished; first she drew nigh divine Cythera, and thence came next to wave-washed Cyprus. Then forth stepped an awful, beauteous goddess; and beneath her delicate feet the verdure thrrove around: her gods and men name Aphrodite, the foam-sprung goddess, and fair-wreathed Cytherea—the first because she was nursed in foam, but Cytherea, because she touched at Cythera; and Cyprus-born, because she was born in wave-dashed Cyprus.

And her Eros accompanied and fair Desire followed, when first she was born, and came into the host of the gods. And from the beginning this honour hath she, and this part hath she obtained by lot among men and immortal gods, the amorous converse of maidens, their smiles and wiles, their sweet delights, their love, and blandishment. Now those sons, their father, mighty Heaven, called by surname Titans, upbraiding those whom he had himself begotten; and he was wont to say that, out-stretching their hands in infatuation, they had wrought a grave act, but that for it there should be vengeance hereafter.

Night bare also hateful Destiny, and black Fate, and Death: she bare Sleep likewise, she bare the tribe of dreams; these did the goddess, gloomy Night, bear after union with none. Next again Momus, and Care full-of-woes, and the Hesperides, whose care are the fair golden apples beyond the famous ocean, and trees yielding fruit; and she produced the Destinies, and ruthlessly punished Fates, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, who assign to men at their births to have good and evil; who also pursue transgressions both of men and gods, nor do the goddesses ever cease from dread wrath, before that, I wot, they have repaid sore vengeance to him, whosoever shall have sinned. Then

bare pernicious Night Nemesis also, a woe to mortal men: and after her she brought forth Fraud, and Wanton-love, and mischievous Old Age, and stubborn-hearted Strife. But odious Strife gave birth to grievous Trouble, and Oblivion, and Famine, and tearful Woes, Contests and Slaughters, Fights and Homicides, Contentions, Falsehoods, Words, Disputes, Lawlessness and Ruin, intimates one of the other, and the Oath, which most hurts men on the earth, whensoever one has sworn voluntarily a perjured oath.

And Pontus begat trusty and truthful Nereus, eldest indeed of his children, but men call him old, because he is unerring as well as mild, neither doth he forget the laws, but knoweth just and gentle purposes. And next again, by union with Earth, great Thaumās, and strong Phorcys, and Ceto with fair-cheek, and Eurybia, having in her breast a soul of adamant.

From Nereus and fair-haired Doris, daughter of Ocean, perfect stream, sprung lovely daughters of goddesses in the barren sea, Proto, Eucrante, Sao, and Amphitrite; Eudora, Thetis, Galene, Glauce, Cymothoe, Spio, Thoe, and charming Halia; graceful Melita, and Eulimene, and Agave, Pasithea, Erato and rosy-armed Eunice, Doto and Proto, Pherusa, and Dynamene, Nesæa, and Actæa, and Protomedia, Doris and Panope, and beauteous Galatea, lovely Hippothoe, and rosy-armed Hipponoe, and Cymothoe, who along with Cymatolege, and neat-ankled Amphitrite, calms with ease the waves on the misty sea, and the blasts of violent winds; Cymo and Eione, and Halimede with beauteous wreath, and blithe Glauconome, and Pontoporia, Liagore, Evagore, Laomedia, Polynome, Autonoe, and Lysianassa, and Evarne, both lovely in shape and in beauty faultless, and Psamathe, graceful in person, and divine Menippe, Neso, Eupompe, Themisto, Pronoe, and Nemertes, who hath the mind of her immortal sire. These were born of blameless Nereus, fifty maidens, versed in blameless labours.

And Thaumās wedded Electra, daughter of deep-flowing Ocean: she bare rapid Iris, and the fair-tressed Harpies, Aello and Oeypete, who, I ween, accompany the wind-blasts and birds, with swift wings, for they are wont to fly high above the earth. But to Phorcys next Ceto of-fair-cheek bare the Grææ, gray from their birth, whom in truth immortal gods as well as men walking on the ground call Grææ; namely, Pephredo handsomely-clad, and Enyo of saffron-vestment, and the Gorgons, who dwell beyond famous Ocean, in the most remote quarter night-ward, where are the clear-voiced Hesperides, Stheno, Euryale, and Medusa having-suffered sadly. The latter was mortal,

but they, the other two, were immortal and ageless, and it was with the one (Medusa) that the azure-haired god lay in the soft meadow, and amid the flowers of spring. From her too when, as the tale is, Perseus had cut off the head, up sprang huge Chrysaor and the steed Pegasus. To the latter came his name, because I wot he was born near the springs of Ocean, whilst the other had a golden falchion in his hands. And he indeed, winging his flight away, left Earth, the mother of flocks, and came to the immortals; in Jove's house he dwells, bearing to counsellor Jove thunder and lightning. But Chrysaor, by union with Callirhoe, daughter of famous Ocean, begat three-headed Geryon. Him indeed then mighty Hercules spoiled, amidst his trailing-footed oxen in sea-girt Erythia, even on that day when he drove the broad-browed oxen to sacred Tiryns, having crossed the path of Ocean, and having slain beyond famous Ocean Orthus, and the herdsmen Eurytion in a dusky stall.

And she brought forth another monster, irresistible, nowise like to mortal men, or immortal gods, in a hollow cavern; the divine stubborn-hearted Echidna, [half nymph, with dark eyes and fair cheeks; and half, on the other hand, a serpent huge, and terrible, and vast,] speckled, and flesh-devouring, 'neath caves of sacred Earth. For there is her cavern, deep under a hollow rock, afar from immortal gods as well as mortal men: there I ween have the gods assigned to her famous mansions to inhabit. But she, the destructive Echidna, was confined in Arima beneath the earth, a nymph immortal, and all her days insensible to age. With her they say that Typhaon associated, in love, a terrible and lawless ravisher for the dark-eyed maid. And she, having conceived, bare fierce-hearted children. The dog Orthus first she bare for Geryon, and next, in the second place, she brought forth the irresistible and ineffable flesh-devourer Cerberus, dog of hell, with brazen voice and with fifty heads, a bold and strong beast. Thirdly, again she gave birth to the Lernæan Hydra subtle in destruction, whom Juno, white-armed goddess, reared, implacably hating the mighty Hercules. And it Jove's son, Hercules, named of Amphitryon, along with warlike Iolaus, and by the counsels of Pallas the despoiler, slaughtered with ruthless sword. But she (Echidna) bare Chimæra, breathing resistless fire, fierce and huge, fleet-footed as well as strong: this monster had three heads: one indeed of a grim-visaged lion, one of a goat, and another of a serpent, a fierce dragon; in front a lion, a dragon behind, and in the midst a goat; breathing forth the dread strength of burning fire. Her Pegasus slew and brave Bellerophon.

But she, compelled by Orthus, brought forth in sooth the destructive Spinx, a destruction to the Cadmæans; and the Nemæan lion, whom I wot Juno, Jove's glorious consort, reared, and settled in the corn-lands of Nemæa, a woe to mankind. There abiding truly used he to devour the tribes of men, whilst he held sway over Tretus of Nemæa, and over Apesas: but him the might of strong Hercules subdued. And Ceto mingling in love with Phorcys, brought forth, as youngest-born, a terrible serpent, which in hiding-places of dark earth, guards all-golden apples, in wide bounds. Such then is the brood of Ceto and Phorcys. But Tethys to Oceanus bare eddying rivers, Nile and Alpheus, and deep-eddying Eridanus, Strymon, and Mæander and Ister of-fair-stream, Phasis, Rhesus, and Achelous with silvery-tide, Nessus, and Rhodius, Haliacmon and Heptaporus, Granicus, Æsepus, and divine Simois, Peneus, Hermus, and pleasant-flowing Caicus; and vast Sangarius, Ladon, Parthenius, Evenus, and Ardescus and divine Scamander. And she bare a sacred race of daughters, who with King Apollo and the rivers all earth over bring up men to manhood, and have this prerogative from Jupiter, namely, Pitho, Admete, Ianthe, Electra, Doris and Prymno, and goddess-like Urania, Hippo, and Clymene, Rhodia, and Callirhoe, Zeuxo, and Clytia, Idya and Pasithoe, Plexaure, Galaxaure, lovely Dione, Melobosis, and Thos, and fair Polydora, and Circeis in nature amiable, and bright-eyed Pluto, Perseis, Ianira, Acaste, and Xanthe, and winsome Petræa, Menesto, and Europa, Metis, Eurynome, and saffron-robed Telesto, Crenæis, Asia as well as desire-kindling Calypso, Eudora, Tyche, Amphiro, and Ocyroe, and Styx, who truly is eldest of them all.

Now these were born eldest daughters of Oceanus and Tethys; there are, however, many others also: for thrice a thousand are the tapering-ankled Ocean-nymphs, who truly spreading far and near, bright children of the gods, haunt everywhere alike earth and the depths of the lake. And again, as many other rivers flowing with a ringing noise, sons of Ocean, whom august Tethys bare: of all of whom 'twere difficult for mortal man to tell the names, but each individual knows them, of as many as dwell around them. And Thia, overcome in the embrace of Hyperion, brought forth the great Sun, and bright Moon, and Morn, that shines for all that-dwell-on-the-earth, and for immortal gods, who occupy broad heaven. Eurybia too, a goddess among goddesses, bare to Crius, after union in love, huge Astræus, and Pallas, and Perses, who was transcendent in all sciences. And to Astæus Morn brought forth the strong-spirited winds, Arges-

tes, Zephyr, swift-speeding Boreas, and Notus, when she, a goddess, had mingled in love with a god. And after them the goddess of morning produced the star Lucifer, and the brilliant stars wherewith the heaven is crowned.

And Styx, daughter of Ocean, after union with Pallas, bare within the house Zelus and beauteous-ankled Victory; and she gave birth to Strength and Force, illustrious children, whose mansion is not apart from Jove, nor is there any seat, or any way, where the god does not go before them; but ever sit they beside deep-thundering Jupiter. For thus counselled Styx, imprishable Ocean-nymph, what time the Olympian Lightener summoned all the immortal gods to broad Olympus, and said that whoso of the gods would fight with him against the Titans, none of them would he rob of his rewards, but each should have the honour, to wit, that which he had aforetime among the immortal gods. And he said that him, who was unhonoured or ungifted by Cronus, he would establish in honour, and rewards, according to justice. Then first I wot came imperishable Styx to Olympus along with her children through the counsels of her sire. And Jove honoured her, and gave her exceeding gifts.

For her he ordained to be the great Oath-witness of the gods, and her children to be dwellers-with-her all their days. And even in such wise as he promised, he performed to them all for ever: for he hath power and reigns mightily.

And next Phœbe came to the much-beloved couch of Cœus: then in truth having conceived, a goddess by love of a god, she bare dark-robed Latona, ever mild, gentle to mortals and immortal gods, mild from the beginning, most kindly within Olympus. And she bare renowned Asteria, whom erst Perses led to an ample palace to be called his bride. And she, becoming pregnant, brought forth Hecate, whom Jove, the son of Cronus, honoured beyond all: and provided for her splendid gifts, to wit, to hold a share of earth and of barren sea. But she has obtained honour also from starry Heaven, and has been honoured chiefly by immortal gods. For even now when anywhere some one of men upon-the-earth duly propitiates them by doing worthy sacrifice, he calls on Hecate: and abundant honour very speedily attends him, whose vows the goddess shall receive, that is to say, graciously, yea, and to him she presents wealth, for she has the power. For as many as were born of Earth and Heaven, and received a share of honour, of all these she has the lot, neither did the son of Cronus force any portion from her, nor did he take away as many honours as she

had obtained by lot, among the elder gods, the Titans, but she hath them, as at the first the distribution was from the beginning. Nor, because she is sole-begotten, has the goddess obtained less of honour, and her prerogative on earth, and in heaven, and sea, but even still much more, seeing that Jove honours her. And to whom she wills, she is greatly present, and benefits him, and he is distinguished, whom she may will, in the forum among the people; and when men arm for mortal-destroying war, then the goddess draws nigh to whom she will, kindly to proffer victory and to extend renown to them: and in judgment she sits beside august kings: and propitiously again, when men contend in the games, there the goddess stands near these also, and helps them.

And when he has conquered by strength and might, a man carries with ease a noble prize, and rejoicingly presents glory to his parents. Propitious is she also to be present with horsemen, whom she will; and to them who ply the rough silvery main; and they pray to Hecate and the loud-sounding Earth-shaker. Easily too the glorious goddess presents an ample spoil, and easily is she wont to withdraw it when it is shown, that is, if she is so disposed in her mind. And (propitious along with Mercury to increase the flock in the folds) the herds of cattle, and the droves, and broad herds of goats, and flocks of fleecy sheep, if she choose in her heart, she makes great from small, and is wont to make less from being many. Thus, in truth, though being sole-begotten from her mother, she has been honoured with rewards amidst all the immortals. And the son of Cronus made her the nursing-mother-of-children, who after her have beheld with their eyes the light of far-seeing Morn. Thus is she from the beginning nursing-mother, and such are her honours.

Rhea too, embraced by Cronus, bare renowned children, Vesta, Demeter, and Here of-the-golden-sandals, and mighty Hades, who inhabits halls beneath the earth, having a ruthless heart; and loud-resounding Neptune, and counsellor Jupiter, father of gods as well as men, by whose thunder also the broad earth quakes. And them indeed did huge Cronus devour, namely, every one who came to the mother's knees from her holy womb, with this intent, that none other of the illustrious heaven-born might hold royal honour among the immortals. For he had heard from Earth and starry Heaven that it was fated for him, strong though he was, to be subdued by his own child, through the counsels of mighty Jove: wherefore he did not keep a careless watch, but lying in wait for them, kept devouring his own

sons ; whilst a grief not-to-be-forgotten possessed Rhea. But at length she was about to bear Jove, the sire of gods as well as men, then it was that she essayed to supplicate her parents dear, Earth and starry Heaven, to contrive a plan how she might without observation bring forth her son, and take vengeance on the furies of their sire, against his children, whom great and wily Cronus devoured.

But they duly heard and complied with their dear daughter, and explained to her as much as it had been fated should come to pass concerning king Cronus, and his strong-hearted son. And they sent her to Lyctus, to the fertile tract of Crete, when I wot she was about to bear the youngest of her sons, mighty Jove ; whom indeed vast Earth received from her to rear and nurture in broad Crete. Thereupon indeed came she, bearing him through the swift dark night, to Lyctus first, and took him in her hands and hid him in a deep cave, 'neath the recesses of the divine earth, in the dense and wooded Ægean mount. But to the great prince, the son of Heaven, former sovereign of the gods, she gave a huge stone, having wrapped it in swathes : which he then took in his hands, and stowed away into his belly, wretch as he was, nor did he consider in his mind that against him for the future his own invincible and untroubled son was left instead of a stone, who was shortly about to subdue him by strength of hand, and to drive him from his honours, and himself to reign among the immortals.

Quickly then, I ween, throve the spirit and beauteous limbs of the king, and, as years came round, having been beguiled by the wise counsels of Earth, huge Cronus, wily counsellor, let loose again his offspring, having been conquered by the arts and strength of his son. And first he disgorged the stone, since he swallowed it last. This stone Jove fixed down upon the earth with-its-broad-ways, in divine Pytho, beneath the clefts of Parnassus, to be a monument thereafter, a marvel to mortal men. Then he loosed from destructive bonds his father's brethren, the sons of Heaven, whom his sire had bound in his folly. Who showed gratitude to him for his kindnesses, and gave him the thunder, and the smoking bolt, and lightning ; but aforetime huge Earth had hidden them : trusting on these, he rules over mortals and immortals.

Iapetus, moreover, wedded the damsel Clymene, a fair-ankled Oceanid, and ascended into a common bed. And she bare him Atlas, a stout-hearted son, and brought forth exceeding-famous Menætiús, and artful Prometheus, full of various wiles, and Epimetheus of-erring-mind, who was from the first an evil to gain-seeking men : for he first,

I wot, received from Jove the clay-formed woman, a virgin. But the insolent Menæti^{us} wide-seeing Jove thrust down to Erebus, having stricken him with flaming lightning, on account of his arrogance, and overweening strength.

But Atlas upholds broad Heaven by strong necessity, before the clear-voiced Hesperides, standing on earth's verge, with head and unwearied hands. For this lot counselling Jove apportioned to him. And wily-minded Prometheus he bound in indissoluble bonds, with painful chains, having thrust them through the middle of a column. And he urged against him an eagle with-wings-ou^tspread: but it kept feeding on his immortal liver, whilst it would increase to a like size allround by night, to what the eagle with-wings-ou^tspread had eaten during the whole day before. This bird indeed, I wot, Hercules, valiant son of fair-ankled Alc^{me}ne, slew, and repelled from the son of Iapetus the baneful pest and released him from his anxieties, not against the wishes of high-reigning Olympian Jove, that so the renown of Thebes-sprung Hercules might be yet more than afore time over the many-feeding earth. Thus, I wot, he honours his very famous son, through veneration for him: and though incensed, ceased from the wrath which he was before cherishing, because he strove in plans against the almighty son of Cronus. For when gods and mortal men were contending at Mecome, then did he set before him a huge ox, having divided it with ready mind, studying to deceive the wisdom of Jove. For here, on the one hand, he deposited the flesh and entrails with rich fat on the hide, having covered it with the belly of the ox; and there, on the other hand, he laid down, having well disposed them with subtle art, the white bones of the ox, covering them with white fat. Then it was that the sire of gods and men addressed him, "Son of Iapetus, far-famed among all kings, how unfairly, good friend, you have divided the portions." Thus spake rebukingly Jupiter, skilled in imperishable counsels. And him in his turn wily Prometheus addressed, laughing low, but he was not forgetful of subtle art: "Most glorious Jove, greatest of ever-living gods, choose which of these your inclination within your breast bids you." He spake, I ween, in subtlety: but Jove knowing imperishable counsels was aware, in sooth, and not ignorant of his guile; and was boding in his heart evils to mortal men, which also were about to find accomplishment. Then with both hands lifted he up the white fat. But he was incensed in mind, and wrath came around him in spirit, when he saw the white bones of the ox arranged with guileful art. And thenceforth the tribes of men

on the earth burn to the immortals white bones on fragrant altars. Then cloud-compelling Jove addressed him, greatly displeased: "Son of Iapetus, skilled in wise plans beyond all, you do not, good sir, I wot, yet forget subtle art." Thus spake in his wrath Jove knowing imperishable counsels: from that time forward in truth, ever mindful of the fraud, he did not give the strength of untiring fire to wretched mortal men, who dwell upon the earth.

But the good son of Iapetus cheated him, and stole the far-seen splendour of untiring fire in a hollow fennel-stalk; but it stung high-thundering Jove to his heart's core, and incensed his spirit, when he saw the radiance of fire conspicuous among men. Forthwith then wrought he evil for men in requital for the fire bestowed. For from the earth the famous Vulcan, halting in both feet, fashioned the image of a modest maiden, through the counsels of the son of Cronus. And the goddess glancing-eyed Minerva girded and arrayed her in silver-white raiment; and from her head she held with her hands a curiously embroidered veil, a marvel to look upon: and Pallas Athene placed around her about her head lovely garlands fresh-budding with meadow-flowers, and around her head she set a golden coronet, which renowned Vulcan lame with both feet had made himself, having wrought it carefully by hand, out of compliment to Jove his sire. On it had been wrought many curious monsters, a marvel to view, as many as in great abundance the continent and the sea maintain. Many of these he introduced, (and much elegance beamed from it,) of wondrous beauty, like to living animals gifted with sounds.

But when he had wrought a beauteous evil instead of good, he led her forth even where were the rest of gods and men, exulting as she was in the adornment of the gleaming-eyed daughter-of-a-strong-father: and wonder seized immortal gods as well as mortal men, when they beheld a deep snare, against which man's arts are vain. Now from her is the race of tender women. For from her is a pernicious race, and tribes of women, a great source of hurt, dwell along with mortal men, helpmates not of consuming poverty, but of surfeit. And as when in close-roofed hives bees feed drones, sharers in bad works, the former through the whole day till sunset are busy day by day, and make white combs, whilst the latter, remaining within in the close-roofed hives, reap the labours of others for their own maws.

Just so to mortal men high-thundering Jove gave women as an evil, helpmates of painful toils: another evil too did he provide instead of good; to wit, whosoever shunning marriage and the ills that women

work, declines to marry, and has come to old age pernicious, through want of one to tend his latter days; he lives not, it is true, in lack of subsistence, but, when he is dead, distant kindred divide his possessions: whilst to whomsoever, on the other hand, the lot of marriage shall have fallen, and he has had a good wife congenial to his heart, to him then for ever ill contends with good to be with him: but whose finds a baneful breed, lives with an incessant care to spirit and heart within his breast, and is in irremediable woe.

Thus it is not possible to deceive or overreach the mind of Jove, for neither did Prometheus, guileless son of Iapetus, escape from beneath his severe wrath; but a great chain, by necessity, constrains him, very knowing though he is.

But when first their sire became wroth in spirit against Briareus, Cottus, and Gyes, he bound them with a strong bond, admiring their overweening courage, and also their form and bulk; and he made them dwell beneath the roomy earth: then they in sooth in grief dwelling 'neath the earth, sat at the verge, on the extremities of vast Earth, very long, afflicted, having a great woe at heart; but them the son of Cronus, and other immortal gods, whom fair-haired Rhea bare in the embrace of Cronus, by the counsels of Earth brought up again to light: for she recounted to them at large everything, how that they should along with those (Titans) gain victory and splendid glory. Long time then they fought, incurring soul-vexing toil, the Titan gods and as many as were born from Cronus, in opposition to each other in stout conflicts; the one side, the glorious Titans from lofty Othrys, and the other, I wot, the gods, givers of good things, whom Rhea the fair-haired had borne to Cronus, in union with him, from Olympus. They then, I ween, in soul-distressing battle, one party with the other, were fighting continuously more than ten years. Nor was there any rid-dance or end of severe contention to either party, and the completion of the war was extended equally to either. But when at length Jove set before them all things agreeable, to wit, nectar and ambrosia, on which the gods themselves fed, a noble spirit grew in the breasts of all. And when they had tasted the nectar and delightful ambrosia, then at length the sire of gods and men addressed them: "Hear me, illustrious children of Earth and Heaven, that I may speak what my spirit within my breast prompts me to speak. For now a very long space are we fighting, each in opposition to other, concerning victory and power, all our days, the Titan gods and as many of us as are sprung from Cronus. Now do ye show against the Titans in deadly

fight both mighty force and hands invincible, in gratitude for our mild loving-kindness, namely, after how many sufferings ye came back again to the light, from afflictive bondage, through our counsels, from the murky gloom." Thus he spake; and him again the blameless Cottus addressed in answer: "Excellent Lord, thou dost not tell things unlearnt by us: but we too are aware that thy wisdom is excellent, and excellent thine intellect, and that thou hast been to the immortals an averter of terrible destruction. And back again, from harsh bonds, have we come from the murky darkness, through thy thoughtful care, O royal son of Cronus, having experienced treatment unhopèd-for. Wherefore also now with stedfast purpose and prudent counsel we will protect thy might in dread conflict, fighting with the Titans in stout battles." Thus spake he: and the gods, givers of good, applauded, when they had heard his speech: and their spirit was eager for battle still more than before, and they stirred up unhappy strife all of them, female as well as male, on that day, both Titan gods, and as many as had sprung from Cronus, and they whom Jove sent up to light from Erebus, beneath the earth, terrible and strong, having overweening force. From the shoulders of these a hundred hands outsprung to all alike, and to each fifty heads grew from their shoulders over their sturdy limbs. They then were pitted against the Titans in deadly combat, holding huge rocks in their sturdy hands. But the Titans on the other side made strong their squadrons with alacrity, and both parties were showing work of hand and force at the same time, and the boundless sea re-echoed terribly, and earth resounded loudly, and broad heaven groaned, being shaken, and vast Olympus was convulsed from its base under the violence of the immortals, and a severe quaking came to murky Tartarus, namely, a hollow sound of countless chase of feet, and of strong battle-strokes: to such an extent, I ween, did they hurl groan-causing weapons. And the voice of both parties reached to starry heaven, as they cheered; for they came together with a great war-cry.

Nor longer, in truth, did Jove restrain his fury, but then forthwith his heart was filled with fierceness, and he began also to exhibit all his force: then, I wot, from heaven and from Olympus together he went forth lightening continually: and the bolts close together with thunder and lightning flew duly from his sturdy hand, whirling a sacred flash, in frequent succession, while all-around life-giving Earth was crashing in conflagration, and the immense forests on all sides crackled loudly with fire. All land was boiling, and Ocean's

streams, and the barren sea: warm vapour was circling the earth-born Titans, and the incessant blaze reached the divine dense-atmosphere, whilst flashing radiance of thunderbolt and lightning was bereaving their eyes of sight, strong heroes though they were. Fearful heat likewise possessed Chaos: and it seemed, to look at, face to face, with the eye, and to hear the sound with the ear, just as if earth and broad heaven above were threatening to meet: (for such an exceeding crash would have arisen from earth falling in ruins, and heaven dashing it down from above.) Such a din there rose when the gods clashed in strife. The winds too at the same time were stirring up quaking and dust together, thunder and lightning and smoking bolt, shafts of the mighty Jove; and they were bearing shout and battle-cry into the midst, one of another, then a terrible noise of dreadful strife was roused, strength of prowess was put forth, and the battle was inclined: but before that time assailing one another, they were fighting incessantly in stern conflict. Now the others, I wot, among the first ranks roused the keen fight, Cottus, Briareus, and Gyes insatiable in war, who truly were hurling from sturdy hands three hundred rocks close upon each other, and they had overshadowed the Titans with missiles, sent them 'neath the broad-wayed earth, and bound them in irksome bonds, (having conquered them with their hands, over-haughty though they were) as far beneath under earth as heaven is from the earth, for equal is the space from earth to murky Tartarus. For nine nights and days also would a brazen anvil be descending from the heaven, and come on the tenth to the earth: and nine days as well as nights again would a brazen anvil be descending from the earth, to reach on the tenth to Tartarus. Around it moreover a brazen fence has been forged: and about it Night is poured in three rows around the neck; but above spring the roots of Earth and barren Sea. There, under murky darkness, the Titan gods lie hidden by the counsels of cloud-compelling Jupiter in a dark, drear place, where are the extremities of vast Earth. These may not go forth, for Neptune has placed above them brazen gates, and a wall goes round them on both sides. There dwell Gyes, and Cottus, and high-spirited Briareus, faithful guards of ægis-bearing Jove. And there are the sources and boundaries of dusky Earth, of murky Tartarus, of barren Sea, and starry Heaven, all in their order: boundaries oppressive and gloomy, which also even gods abhor, a vast chasm, not even for a whole round of a year would one reach the pavement, after having first been within the gates: but hurricane would bear him onward hither and thither, distressing him,

and dreadful even to immortal gods is this prodigy, and there the dread abodes of gloomy Night stand shrouded in dark clouds. In front of these the son of Iapetus stands and holds broad Heaven, with his head and unwearied hands, unmovedly, where Night and Day also drawing nigh are wont to salute each other, as they cross the vast brazen threshold. The one is about to go down within, whilst the other comes forth abroad, nor ever doth the abode constrain both within; but constantly one at any rate being outside the dwelling, wanders over the earth, while the other again being within the abode, awaits the season of her journey, until it come; the one having a far-seeing light for men-on-the-earth, and the other, destructive Night, having Sleep, the brother of Death, in its hands, being shrouded in hazy mist.

And there the sons of obscure Night hold their habitation, Sleep and Death, dread gods: nor ever doth the bright sun look upon them with his rays, as he ascends the heaven, or descends from the heaven. Of whom indeed the one tarries on the earth and the broad surface of the sea, silently and soothingly to men; but of the other, iron is the heart, and brazen is his ruthless soul within his breast; and whomsoever of men he may have first caught, he holdeth: and he is hostile even to immortal gods. There in the front stand the resounding mansions of the infernal god, of mighty Hades, and awful Persephone besides; and a fierce dog keeps guard in front, a ruthless dog; and he has an evil trick: those who enter he fawns upon with his tail and both ears alike, yet he suffers them not to go forth back again, but lies in wait and devours whomsoever he may have caught going forth without the gates of strong Hades and dread Persephone. There too dwells a goddess odious to immortals, dread Styx, eldest daughter of back-flowing Ocean: and apart from the gods she inhabits renowned dwellings vaulted by huge rocks; and round about on all sides they are strengthened to Heaven by silver columns. And seldom goes the fleet-footed daughter of Thaumas, Iris, on a message over the broad back of the sea, namely, when haply strife and quarrel shall have arisen among the immortals: and whosoever, I wot, of them that hold Olympian dwellings, utters falsehood, then also Jove is wont to send Iris to bring from far in a golden ewer the great oath of the gods, the renowned water, cold as it is, which also runs down from a steep and lofty rock; but in abundance beneath the roomy Earth flows a branch of Ocean from the sacred river through black Night; and a tenth portion has been assigned to it. In nine portions indeed, roll-

ing around Earth and also the broad back of the Sea with silver whirlpools, he (Ocean) falls into the brine; but the other one part flows forth from a rock, a great bane to the gods. Whosoever of immortals that occupy the top of snowy Olympus, shall have offered of this as a libation, and sworn over it a false oath, lies breathless until the completion of a year, nor ever comes near the repast of nectar and ambrosia, but also lies breathless and speechless on a strawn couch, and a baneful stupor over-shrouds him. But when he has fulfilled his malady until the full year, then another after another severer trouble succeeds for him. And for nine years he is parted from the ever-living gods; nor ever does he mix with them in council nor in feasts for nine whole years; but in the tenth he mingles again in the assemblies of the gods immortal, who occupy Olympian dwellings. Such a grave oath, I wot, have the gods made the imperishable water or Styx, that ancient water, which also runs through a very rugged tract. There too are the sources and boundaries of dusky Earth, and murky Tartarus, and barren Sea, and starry Heaven, all in order; boundaries oppressive and gloomy, which also even gods abhor. And there are gleaming gates and a brazen threshold, unshaken and fixed upon far-extending foundations, self-growing; and before it, outside of all the gods, beyond gloomy Chaos, the Titans dwell. But the famed allies of loud-crashing Jove inhabit dwellings under the foundations of the Ocean, namely, Cottus and Gyes. Briareus indeed, for his part, strong as he was, deep-sounding Earth-shaker made his son-in-law, and gave him to wife his daughter Cymopolia.

But when Jove had driven the Titans out from Heaven, huge Earth bare her youngest-born son, Typhoeus, by the embrace of Tartarus, through golden Aphrodite. Whose hands, indeed, are apt for deeds on the score of strength, and untiring the feet of the strong god; and from his shoulders there were a hundred heads of a serpent, a fierce dragon, playing with dusky tongues, and from the eyes in his wondrous heads fire sparkled beneath the brows: whilst from all his heads fire was gleaming, as he looked keenly. In all his terrible heads, too, were voices sending forth every kind of sound ineffable. For one while indeed they would utter sounds, so as for the gods to understand, and at another time again the voice of a loud-bellowing bull, untameable in force, and proud in utterance; at another time, again, that of a lion possessing a daring spirit; at another yet again they would sound like to wheeps, wondrous to hear; and at another he would hiss, and the lofty mountains resound. And, in sooth, then

would there have been done a deed past remedy, and he, even he, would have reigned over mortals and immortals, unless, I wot, the sire of gods and men had quickly observed him. Harshly then he thundered, and heavily, and terribly the earth re-echoed around; and the broad heaven above, and the sea, and streams of ocean, and the abysses of earth. But beneath his immortal feet vast Olympus trembled, as the king uprose, and earth groaned beneath. And the heat from both caught the dark-coloured sea, both of the thunder and lightning, and fire from the monster, the heat arising from the thunder-storms, winds, and burning lightning. And all earth and heaven and sea were boiling; and huge billows roared around the shores about and around, beneath the violence of gods; and unallayed quaking arose. Pluto trembled, monarch over the dead beneath; and the Titans under Tartarus, standing about Cronus, trembled also, on account of the unceasing tumult and dreadful contention. But Jove, when in truth he had raised high his wrath, and had taken his arms, his thunder and lightning, and smoking belt, leapt up, and smote him from Olympus, and scorched all-around all the wondrous heads of the terrible monster.

But when at length he had quelled it, after having smitten it with blows, the monster fell down lamed, and huge Earth groaned. But the flame from the lightning-blasted monster flashed forth in the mountain hollows, hidden and rugged, when he was stricken, and much was the vast earth burnt and melted by the boundless vapour, like as pewter, heated by the art of youths, and by the well-bored melting-pit; or iron, which is the hardest of metals, subdued in the dells of the mountain by blazing fire, melts in the sacred earth beneath the hands of Vulcan. So, I wot, was earth melted in the glare of burning fire. Then, troubled in spirit, he hurled him into wide Tartarus.

Now from Typhoeus is the strength of winds moist-blowing, except the south-west, the north, and Argestes, and Zephyr, who also indeed are a race from the gods, a great blessing to mortals. But the others, being random gusts, breathe over the sea. And these in truth falling upon the darksome deep, rage with baneful hurricane, a great hurt to mortals; and now here, now there they blow, and scatter barks, and destroy sailors: nor is there any succour from ill to men, who encounter them on the ocean. But these again even o'er the boundless flowery earth spoil the pleasant works of earth-born men, filling them with dust and wearisome uproar. But when, I wot, the blessed gods had fulfilled their labour, and contended with the Titans

perforce on the score of honours, then it was, I say, that they urged far-seeing Jove, by the advice of Earth, to rule and reign over immortals: and he duly distributed honours amongst them.

And Jupiter, king of the gods, made Metis first his wife; Metis, most wise of deities as well as mortal men. But when now at length she was about to give birth to Minerva, gleaming-eyed goddess, then it was that having by deceit beguiled her mind with flattering words, he placed her within his own belly by the advice of Earth, and of starry Heaven. For thus they persuaded him, lest other of everliving gods should possess sovereign honour in the room of Jove. For of her it was fated that wise children should be born: first the glancing-eyed Tritonian maiden, having equal might and prudent counsel with her sire; and then, I ween, she was going to give-birth-to a son, as king of gods and men, with an overbearing spirit, but that in sooth Jove deposited her first in his own belly, that the goddess might indicate to him both good and bad. Next he wedded bright Themis, who bare the Hours, Eunomia, Dice, and blooming Peace, who care for their works for mortal men; and the Parcæ, to whom counselling Jove gave most honour, Clotho, Lachesis, and Atropos, who also give to men good and evil to possess. And Eurynome, daughter of Ocean, having a very lovely form, bare him the fair-cheeked Graces, Aglaia, and Euphrosyne, and winsome Thalia; from whose eyelids also as they gazed dropped Love, unnerving limbs, and sweetly too look they under their brows. But he came to the couch of much-nourishing Demeter, who bare him white-armed Proserpine; her whom Pluto ravished from her mother: and sage Jupiter gave her. And next he was enamoured of beautiful-haired Mnemosyne, of whom were born to him the Muses nine, with-golden-fillets, to whom festivals, and the delight of song, are wont to be a pleasure.

But Apollo and Artemis, rejoicing-in-arrows, a lovely offspring beyond all the heavenly-beings, Latona in sooth brought forth, after union in love with ægis-bearing Jove. And last made he blooming Juno his spouse. She bare Hebe, and Mars, and Lucina, having been united in love with the king of gods and men. But by himself, from his head, he produced glancing-eyed Tritonis, fierce, strife-stirring, army-leading, unsubdued, and awful, to whom dins, and wars, and battles are a delight. And Juno, without having been united in love, brought forth famous Vulcan, and put out all her strength, and strove with her husband; Vulcan, distinguished in arts from amongst all the heaven-born.

But from Amphitrite and the loud-roaring Earth-shaker sprang great and widely-powerful Triton, who occupies the depth of the sea, and inhabits golden houses beside his dear mother and his royal sire, being a terrible god. To shield-piercing Mars, however, Cytherea bare Fear and Terror, formidable deities, even they who route dense phalanxes of men in horrid war, with the help of city-spoiler Mars; and Harmonia, whom high-spirited Cadmus made his spouse.

Then to Jove, I wot, Maia, daughter of Atlas, bare glorious Hermes, herald of immortals, having ascended his holy couch. And to him, in sooth, Semele, daughter of Cadmus, bare an illustrious son, even jocund Bacchus, after union in love, mortal though she was, an immortal. But now both are deities. And Alcmena, after union in love with cloud-compelling Jove, bare Hercules the strong.

But Vulcan, far-famed, crippled god, took to wife blooming Aglaia, youngest of the Graces. And Bacchus, of golden hair, took for his blooming bride auburn-tressed Ariadne, daughter of Minos. And her the son of Cronus made immortal, and unsusceptible of old age for him. And fair-ankled Alcmena's valiant son, mighty Hercules, having accomplished grievous toils, made Hebe, daughter of mighty Jove and Juno-with-golden-sandals, his bashful wife in snowy Olympus: happy hero, who having achieved a great work, dwells among the immortals uninjured and ageless evermore. To the unwearied Sun the famous Oceanid, Perseis, bare Circe and king Oeetes. And Oeetes, son of man-enlightening Sun, wedded beauteous-cheeked Idyia, daughter of Ocean, perfect river, by the will of the gods. But she then, subdued in love through golden Aphrodite, brought forth to him fair-ankled Medea.

Now fare ye well, gods dwelling in Olympian mansions; [Islands and Continents, and briny Sea within;] and now Olympian Muses, sweet of speech, daughters of ægis-bearing Jove, sing ye the tribe of goddesses, as many as in truth having been united, though immortal, with mortal men, gave birth to children resembling gods.

Ceres, divine among goddesses, after union in delightful love, bare Plutus to the hero Iasius, in a thrice-ploughed fallow, in the fertile country of Crete, a kind god, who goes over all the earth, and the broad surface of the sea; and to him that has chanced upon him, and into whose hands he may have come, him, I say, he is wont to make rich, and presents to him much wealth. And to Cadmus, Harmonia, daughter of golden Aphrodite, bare Ino, Semele, and fair-cheeked Agave, and Autonoe, whom Aristæus of-clustering-locks

wedded, and Polydorus in tower-circled Thebes.

But Callirhoe, daughter of Ocean, united to **brave-hearted Chrysaor** in union of all-golden Aphrodite, bare a son the strongest of all mortals, Geryon, whom mighty Hercules slew, for the sake of the trailing-foot oxen in island Erythea. And to Tithonus Aurora bare Memmon with-brazen-helm, king of the Æthiopians, and the sovereign Hemathion. But to Cephalus in truth she produced an illustrious son, the brave Phaethon, a man like to the gods, whom, I wot, when young, in the tender flower of glorious youth, a lad, conscious but of young fancies, laughter-loving Aphrodite snatched up, and rushed away, and she made him, in her sacred fanes, her nightly temple-keeper, a divine Genius. And the daughter of Oeetes, Jove-descended king, Jason, son of Æson, by the counsels of ever-living gods, carried off from Oeetes, after he had fulfilled the grievous toils, which, being many in number, the great and overbearing king, insolent and infatuated Pelias, doer of deeds of violence, imposed upon him. Which having achieved, after having toiled much, the son of Æson arrived at Iolchos, bearing in his fleet ship a dark-eyed maiden, and her he made his blooming bride. Yes, and she, having been yoked with Jason, shepherd of his people, bore a son Medeus, whom Chiron, son of Philyra, reared on the mountains; whilst the purpose of mighty Jove was being fulfilled. But of the daughters of Nereus, ancient sea-god, Psamathe in truth, divine among goddesses, bare Phocus in the embrace of Æacus, through golden Aphrodite: and the goddess Thetis, of the silver feet, yielding to Peleus, gave birth to Achilles the lion-hearted, who-broke-the-ranks-of-men.

Fair-wreathed Cytherea too, I wot, blending in delightful love with the hero Anchises, bare Æneas on the peaks of many-valleyed, woody Ida. But Circe, daughter of the Sun, born-of-Hyperion, by the love of Ulysses of-enduring-heart, gave birth to Agrius and blameless and strong Latinus; Telegonus also she bare through golden Aphrodite. Now these in truth very far in a recess of sacred isles, reigned over all the very far-renowned Tyrrhenians. But Calypso, divine among goddesses, bore to Ulysses Nausithous and Nausinous after union in delightful love. These, though immortal, having been united with mortal men, gave birth to children like unto the gods. And now sing ye the tribe of women, ye sweet-spoken Olympian Muses, daughters of ægis-bearing Jove.

THE WORKS AND DAYS

Ye Muses from Pieria, celebrating in songs, come speak of Jove, and chaunt your sire, through whom mortal men are alike famed and fameless, named and nameless, by the will of mighty Jove. For with ease indeed he maketh strong, and with ease bringeth low the strong: and easily he minisheth the illustrious, and increaseth the obscure: easily too doth high-thundering Jove, who dwelleth in mansions highest, straighten the crooked, and blast the proud of heart. Hear and behold and heed, and direct the judgments righteously, O thou! Now would I narrate what is true, O Perses.

Not, I ween, was there one kind only of Contention, but there are two upon the earth: the one a sensible man would commend, but the other is blameworthy: and they have spirits minded different ways. For the one fosters evil war and discord, cruel as she is: her at any rate no mortal loves, but of necessity, by the counsels of the immortals, they honour harsh Strife. The other, however, gloomy Night bare first, and her, by far the best, the high-throned son of Cronos, dwelling in the heavens, placed at earth's roots and among men: 'tis she also who still rouses a man to work, even though he be inactive. For any one when idle having looked upon another being rich, he, I say, makes haste to plough and to plant, and well to order his house; for neighbour rivals neighbour, when hastening toward riches; but this contention is good for mortals. Both potter is jealous of potter, and craftsman of craftsman; and poor man has a grudge against poor man, and poet against poet.

But do thou, Perses, lay up these things in thy mind, nor let Contention rejoicing-in-ills hinder thy mind from work, whilst it gapes at strifes, and is a listener in the forum. For rare indeed is the time for contentions and suits-in-the-forum to him, whose substance is not yearly stored up within, in season, substance which Earth bears, the gift of Ceres.

When thou hast satisfied thyself with these, then, and not till then, further contentions and strife concerning the possessions of others: but it will never again be allowed you to do thus: let us however forthwith put an end to the dispute by righteous judgments which are the best from Jove. For already in sooth have we divided the inheritance, and thou didst carry off much by plunder: flattering much

the bribe-swallowing judges, whose will it is to give judgment thus. Fools! and they know neither how much half exceeds the whole, nor how great advantage is in mallow and asphodel.

Now the gods keep hidden for men their means of subsistence: for else easily mightest thou even in one day have wrought, so that thou shouldest have enough for the year, even though being idle; else straightway wouldest thou lay-by the rudder above the smoke, and the labours of oxen and of toil-enduring mules would be undone. But Jove in wrath at his heart concealed it, because wily Prometheus had beguiled him. Therefore, I ween, he devised baneful cares for men. And fire he hid, which indeed the good son of Iapetus stole back for mankind from counsellor Jove in a hollow fennel-stalk, after he had escaped the notice of Jove delighting in the thunderbolt.

Him then cloud-compelling Jove addressed in wrath: "O son of Iapetus, knowing beyond all in counsels, thou exuldest in having stolen fire, and deceived my wisdom, a severe woe to thyself and to men that shall come after. To them now will I give evil instead of fire, wherewith all may delight themselves at heart, hugging their own evil." So spake he: and out-laughed the sire of men and gods: but he bade Vulcan the illustrious with all speed mix earth with water, and endue it with man's voice and strength, and to liken in countenance to immortal goddesses the fair, lovely beauty of a maiden: then he bade Minerva teach her work, to weave the highly wrought web; and golden Aphrodite to shed around her head grace, and painful desire, and cares that-waste-the-limbs: but to endue her with a shameless mind and tricky manners he charged the conductor, Argicide Mercury.

So he bade: but they obeyed Jove, the sovereign of Cronus: and forthwith out of the earth the famous crippled-god fashioned one like unto a modest maiden, through the counsels of Jove, the son of Cronus: and the goddess, gleaming-eyed Minerva, girdled and arrayed her: and around her skin the goddess Graces and august Persuasion hung golden chains, whilst fair-tressed Hours crowned her about with flowers of spring: and Pallas Minerva adapted every ornament to her person. But in her breast, I wot, conductor Mercury wrought falsehoods, and wily speeches, and tricky manners, by the counsels of deep-thundering Jove: and the herald of the gods placed within her, I ween, a winning voice: and this woman he called Pandora, because all, inhabiting Olympian mansions, bestowed on her a gift, a mischief to inventive men.

But when he had perfected the dire inextricable snare, father Jove proceeded to send to Epimetheus the famous slayer-of-Argus, swift messenger of the gods, carrying her as a gift: nor did Epimetheus consider how Prometheus had told him never to accept a gift from Olympian Jove, but to send it back, lest haply any ill should arise to mortals. But he, after receiving it, felt the evil, when now he possessed it.

Now aforetime indeed the races of men were wont to live on the earth apart and free from ills, and without harsh labour, and painful diseases, which have brought death on mortals. [For in wretchedness men presently grow old] But the woman having with her hands removed the great lid from the vessel, dispersed them: then contrived she baneful cares for men. And Hope alone there in unbroken abode kept remaining within, beneath the verge of the vessel, nor did it flit forth abroad: for before that, she had placed-on the lid of the vessel, by the counsels of ægis-bearing, cloud-compeller Jove. But myriad other ills have roamed forth among men. For full indeed is earth of woes, and full the sea: and in the day as well as at night diseases unbidden haunt mankind, silently bearing ills to men, for counsellor Jove hath taken from them their voice. Thus not in any way is it possible to escape the will of Jove.

But if you will, another tale will I briefly-tell you well and skilfully, and do you ponder it in your mind, that from the same origin are sprung gods and mortal men. First-of-all the immortals holding the mansions of Olympus made a golden race of speaking men. [They indeed were under Cronus, what time he ruled in heaven.] And as gods they were wont to live, with a life void-of-care, apart from, and without labours and trouble: nor was wretched old age at all impending, but, ever the same in hands and feet, did they delight themselves in festivals out of the reach of all ills: and they died, as if o'ercome by sleep; all blessings were theirs; of-its-own-will the fruitful field would bare them fruit, much and ample: and they gladly used to reap the labours of their hands in quietness along with many good things, being rich in flocks, and dear to the blessed gods. But after that Earth had covered this generation by the hests of mighty Jove, they indeed are dæmons, kindly, haunting-earth, guardians of mortal men, who, I ween, watch both the decisions of justice, and harsh deeds, going-to-and-fro everywhere over the earth, having wrapt themselves in mist, givers of riches as they are: and this is a kingly function which they have.

Afterwards again the dwellers in Olympian mansions formed a second race of silver, far inferior; like unto the golden neither in shape nor mind: but for a hundred years indeed a boy was reared and grew up beside his wise mother, in her house, being quite childish: but when one happened to come to age and reached the stature of manhood, for but a brief space used they to live, suffering griefs through their imprudences: for they could not keep off rash insult one from the other, nor were they willing to worship the gods, nor to sacrifice at the holy altars of the blessed, as it is right men should in their abodes. Them indeed afterwards, Jove, son of Cronus, buried in his wrath, because they gave not due honours to the blessed gods, who occupy Olympus. Now when earth had ingulfed this race also, they, beneath the ground, are called blessed mortals, second in rank; but still honour attends these also.

And yet a third race of speech-gifted men formed father Jove of brass, not at all like unto the silver, formidable and mighty by reason of their ashen-spears: whose care was the mournful deeds of Mars, and insults: neither did they at all eat wheaten food only, but had stout-spirited hearts of adamant; unapproachable. Now vast force and hands unvanquished grew from their shoulders upon sturdy limbs. These had brazen arms, and likewise brazen houses, and with brass they wrought: for there was not yet dark iron. They indeed subdued beneath their own hands, entered the squalid abode of chilling Hades, inglorious: for terrible though they were, black Death seized them, and they quitted the bright sunlight.

But when earth had covered this race also, again Jove, son of Cronus, wrought yet another, a fourth, on the many-nourishing ground, more just and more worthy, a godlike race of hero-men, who are called by the former age demi-gods over the boundless earth. And these baneful war, as well as the dire battle-din, destroyed, a part fighting before seven-gated Thebes, in the Cadmean land, for the flocks of Oedipus, and part also in ships beyond the vast depths of the sea, when it had led them to Troy for hair-haired Helen's sake. There indeed the end of death enshrouded them; but to them Jove, the son of Cronus, their sire, having given life and settlements apart from men, made them to dwell at the confines of earth, afar from the immortals. Among these Cronus rules. And they indeed dwell with careless spirit in the Isles of the Blest, beside deep-eddying Ocean; blest heroes, for whom thrice in a year doth the fertile soil bear blooming fruits as-sweet-as-honey.

Would that then I had not mingled with the fifth race of men, but had either died before, or been born afterward. For now in truth is the iron race, neither will they ever cease by day, nor at all by night, from toil and wretchedness, corrupt as they are: but the gods will give them severe cares: yet nevertheless even for these shall good be mingled with ills. But Jove will destroy this race also of men endowed with speech, as soon as, immediately after having been born, they become silvery-templed. Nor will sire be like-minded to sons, nor sons at all to parent, nor guest to host, nor comrade to comrade, nor will brother be dear, even as it was aforetime, to brother. But quickly will they dishonour parents growing old, and will blame them, I ween, addressing them with harsh words, being impious, and unaware of the vengeance of the gods; not to aged parents would these pay back the price of their nurture, using the right of might: and one will sack the city of another: nor will there be any favour to the trusty, nor the just, nor the good, but rather they will honour a man that doeth evil and is overbearing; and justice and shame will not be in their hands, and the bad will injure the better man, speaking in perverse speeches, and will swear a false oath. But on all wretched mortals envy with-its-tongue-of-malice, exulting-in-ills, will attend with hateful look. Then also in truth to Olympus from earth with-its-broad-ways shall Shame and Retribution, having abandoned men, depart, when they have clad their fair skin in white raiment, to the tribe of the immortals: but the baneful griefs shall remain behind, and against evil there shall be no resource.

Now then will I speak a fable to kings, wise even though they are. Thus the hawk addressed the nightingale of variegated-throat, as he carried her in his talons, when he had caught her, very high in the clouds.

She then, pierced on all sides by his crooked talons, was wailing piteously, whilst he victoriously addressed his speech to her. "Wretch, wherefore criest thou? 'tis a much stronger that holds thee. Thou wilt go that way by which I may lead thee, songstress though thou art: and my supper, if I choose, I shall make, or shall let go. But senseless is he who chooses to contend against them that are stronger, and he is robbed of victory, and suffers griefs in addition to indignities."

So spake the fleet-flying hawk, broad-pinioned bird. But do thou, Perses, hear the right, nor help-on wrong: for wrong is both ill to a poor mortal, nor in truth can a well-to-do man easily bear it, for he is

also weighed down by it, having fallen upon the penalties of crime; the better way is to arrive at what is right in the contrary path; and justice surmounts injury, when it has reached to the end. When he has suffered, the senseless man learns this. For along with crooked judgments straight runs the avenger of perjury; and a resistless course is that of Justice, though she be dragged whithersoever bribe-swallowing men may lead her, and with perverse judgments decide upon the existing rights. And she follows lamenting city and settlements of peoples, clad in mist, bringing ill on men, who shall have driven her out, and dispense not a fair decision. But whoso give fair judgments to strangers and to citizens, and do not overstep aught of justice, for these a city blooms, and her people flourish within her: peace rears her young men through the land, nor even to them doth wide-seeing Jove ordain troublous war: nor ever doth famine, nor ruin, company with men who judge the right, but in festivals they enjoy the fruit of carefully-tended works. For them bears Earth much substance: on the mountains the oak at its top indeed yields acorns, and midway bees: the wooly sheep are weighed down with fleeces; women bear children like unto their sires: in blessings they flourish still: nor ever travel they on board ship; but the fertile field yields its increase. But they, to whom evil, wrong, and hard deeds are a care, to them wide-seeing Jove, the son of Cronus, destines punishment. Oft hath even a whole city reaped the evil fruit of a bad man, who sins and puts in practice deeds of infatuation.

On them then from heaven the son of Cronus is wont to bring great calamity, famine and pestilence at the same time: so the peoples waste away. Neither do the women bear children: and houses come to nought, by the counsels of Olympian Jove; and at other times again the son of Cronus either destroys their wide army, or he lays low their walls, or in the deep he punishes their ships.

Now do ye too, ye judges, ponder likewise yourselves this vengeance: for being among men and nigh unto them, the immortals observe as many as with perverse judgments wear-and-waste each other, disregarding the punishment of the gods. For on the many-nurturing earth are thrice ten thousand immortals, Jove's watchers over mortal men; who, I ween, watch both just judgments and daring acts, clad in misty-darkness, and haunting everywhere over the earth. And Jove's virgin daughter, Justice, besides, is a watcher, illustrious and venerable, with the gods who occupy Olympus. Yes, and whenever any one wrongs her by perversely railing at her, forthwith taking

her seat beside Jove, son of Cronus, her sire, she speaks of the unjust mind of mortals, that so the people may atone for the infatuations of kings, who, with pernicious intents, turn her the wrong way by speaking judgments perversely. Heeding these things, ye judges, swallowers-of-the-bribe, make straight your sentiments, and entirely forget crooked judgments. For himself doth a man work evil, in working evils for another, and the evil counsel is worst to him that hath devised it. Jove's eye, having seen all things, and observed all things, also regards these things, if he so please, nor does it escape him, of what nature, in truth, is this justice, which the city encloses within. Now might in truth neither I myself, nor my son, be just among men, since to be a just man is an evil, if so be that the more unjust man is to have the stronger justice. But this I hope that Jove, delighting in thunders, will not yet bring about.

Yet, O Perses, do thou ponder these things in thine heart, and heed justice in sooth, and forget violence entirely. For this law hath the son of Cronus ordained for men, for fishes indeed and beasts, and winged fowls to eat each other, since justice is not among them: but to men hath he given justice, which is far best. For if a man choose to know and speak out what is just, to him also wide-seeing Jove gives felicity; but whoso in his testimony, wilfully having sworn a false oath, shall have lied, and by it having marred justice, shall have gone astray incurably, of him then the race is left more obscure for the future. Of a man, however, of-true-oath, the generation is more excellent thereafter.

Now will I speak to thee with good intent, thou exceeding foolish Perses. Badness, look you, you may choose easily in a heap: level is the path, and right near it dwells. But before virtue the immortal gods have set exertion: and long and steep and rugged at the first is the way to it, but when one shall have reached the summit, then truly it is easy, difficult though it be before.

This man, indeed, is far-best, who shall have understood everything for himself, after having devised what may be best afterward and unto the end: and good again is he likewise who shall have complied with one advising him well: but whoso neither himself hath understanding, nor when he hears another, lays it to heart, he on the other hand is a worthless man. Do thou then, ever mindful of my precept, work-on, Perses, of stock divine, that so famine may hate, and fair-chapleted Demeter love thee, august as she is, and fill thy garner with substance. For famine, look you, is ever the sluggard's

companion.

And with him gods and men are indignant, who lives a sluggard's life, like in temper to stingless drones, which lazily consume the labour of bees, by devouring it: but to thee let it be a pleasure to set in order seemly works, that so thy garners may be full of seasonable substance. From works men become both rich-in-flocks and wealthy: by working too, thou wilt be dearer far to immortals and to mortals. For greatly do they hate sluggards. Now work is no disgrace, but sloth is a disgrace. And if thou shouldst work, quickly will the sluggard envy thee growing rich: for esteem and glory accompany wealth. So to a sensible man, as thou wert, to labour is best, if having turned a witless mind from the possessions of others towards work, thou wouldst study thy subsistence, as I recommend thee.

But a false shame possesses a needy man, shame which greatly hurts or helps men. Shame, look you, is beside wretchedness, but confidence beside wealth; and possessions not gotten-by-plunder, but given-by-the-gods, are far best. For if any one even with his hands shall have taken great wealth by violence, or if he for his part shall have plundered it by his tongue, even as often happens, as soon as in truth gain hath deceived the minds of men, and shamelessness comes suddenly on shame, then, I say, easily do the gods darken his name: the family of such a man is minished, and but for a brief space doth his wealth accompany him.

And alike he who shall have done evil to suppliant and to guest, and he who mounts the couch of his kinsman, for stealthy union with his wife, doing acts unseemly; and whoso through the senselessness of any one wrongs orphan children, and whoso reproaches an aged parent on the threshold of wretched age, assailing him with severe words; against such an one, I say in truth, Jove himself is wroth, and at the last, in requital for wrong deeds, lays on him a bitter penalty. Then keep thou wholly a witless mind from these deeds. But after thy power do sacrifice to the immortal gods, holily and purely, and moreover sleek thighs of victims, and at other times propitiate them with libations, and incense, both when you go to rest, and when the holy light shall have risen: that so to thee they may entertain a propitious heart and spirit, that thou mayest buy the land of others, not others thine. Invite the man that loves thee to a feast, but let alone thine enemy: and especially invite him that dwelleth near thee: for if, mark you, anything strange shall have happened at home, neighbours are wont to come ungirt, but kinsfolk gird themselves first. A bad

neighbour is as great a misfortune as a good one is a great blessing. Who gains a worthy neighbour, hath truly gained a meed of honour: neither would an ox perish, if there were not a bad neighbour. Duly measure when thou borrowest from a neighbour, and duly repay, in the very measure, and better still, if thou canst, that so when in want thou mayest find that which may be relied on in future.

Gain not base gains: base gains are equal to losses. Love him that loves thee; and be nigh him that attaches himself to thee: and give to him who may have given: give not to him that hath not given. To a giver on the one hand some have given: but to the withholder none give. A gift is good: but plunder evil,—a dealer of death. For whatsoever man shall have given willingly, he too would give much. He exults in his gift, and is pleased in his spirit. But whoso shall have seized, in compliance with his shamelessness, even though it be but a little, yet that little curdles his heart's blood. For if thou shouldst lay up even a little upon a little, and shouldst do this often, soon would even this become great. He who brings, in addition to what is in store, this man shall escape dark hunger: nor does that at least which is laid up in the house distress a man. Better is it that it should be at home, since that which is without is attended with loss. 'Tis good to take from what is at hand, but a woe to the spirit to want of that which is far from you: which truths I bid thee ponder. At the beginning too of the cask, and at the end, take thy fill, but spare it in the middle: for sparingness is too late at the bottom. Let the recompence fixed for a friend be sufficient, and, as in sport, with a brother even call in witnesses: for trust, I wot, look you, as well as mistrusts, has ruined men. Nor let a woman with sweeping train beguile thy mind, winningly coaxing, and seeking after thy dwelling: for who trusts a woman, that man, I wot, trusts knaves. And let there be one only-son to tend his father's house: for so shall wealth increase in the dwelling. But if old, you may die and leave another son. For easily to more might Jove provide vast wealth. For of many greater is the care, and greater the gain. Now if thy spirit desires wealth in thy mind, thus do, and moreover do work upon work.

TRANSLATION OF J. BANKS.



DISCOBOLUS

After Myron. In the Palazzo Lancelotti, Rome.



MYRON lived about 480-430 B. C. He was born at Eleutheral, on the borders of Attica, and studied under Ageladas of Argos. He worked mostly in bronze, and his statues were physically realistic. The Discobolus and Marsyas are extant in good ancient copies.

IDEAS OF THE FUTURE LIFE

ODYSSEUS, HIS DESCENT INTO HELL, AND DISCOURSES WITH THE GHOSTS OF THE DECEASED HEROES

'NOW WHEN we had gone down to the ship and to the sea, first of all we drew the ship unto the fair salt water, and placed the mast and sails in the black ship, and took those sheep and put them therein, and ourselves too climbed on board, sorrowing, and shedding big tears. And in the wake of our dark-prowed ship she sent a favouring wind that filled the sails, a kindly escort,—even Circe of the braided tresses, a dread goddess of human speech. And we set in order all the gear throughout the ship and sat us down; and the wind and the helmsman guided our barque. And all day long her sails were stretched in her seafaring; and the sun sank and all the ways were darkened.

'She came to the limits of the world, to the deepflowing Oceanus. There is the land and the city of the Cimmerians, shrouded in mist and cloud, and never does the shining sun look down on them with his rays, neither when he climbs up the starry heavens, nor when again he turns earthward from the firmament, but deadly night is outspread over miserable mortals. Thither we came and ran the ship ashore and took out the sheep; but for our part we held on our way along the stream of Oceanus, till we came to the place which Circe had declared to us.

'There Perimedes and Eurylochus held the victims, but I drew my sharp sword from my thigh, and dug a pit, as it were a cubit in length and breadth, and about it poured a drink-offering to all the dead, first with mead and thereafter with sweet wine, and for the third time with water. And I sprinkled white meal thereon, and entreated with many prayers the strengthless heads of the dead, and promised that on my return to Ithaca I would offer in my halls a barren heifer, the best I had, and fill the pyre with treasure, and apart unto Teiresias alone sacrifice a black ram without spot, the fairest of my flock. But when I had besought the tribes of the dead

with **vows and prayers**, I took the sheep and cut their throats **over the trench**, and the dark blood flowed forth, and lo, the spirits of the dead that be departed gathered them from out of Erebus. Brides and youths unwed, and old men of many and evil days, and tender maidens with grief yet fresh at heart; and many there were, wounded with bronze-shod spears, men slain in fight with their bloody mail about them. And these many ghosts flocked together from every side about the trench with a wondrous cry, and pale fear gat hold on me. Then did I speak to my company and command them to flay the sheep that lay slain by the pitiless sword, and to consume them with fire, and to make prayer to the gods, to mighty Hades and to dread Persephone, and myself I drew the sharp sword from my thigh and sat there, suffering not the strengthless heads of the dead to draw night to the blood, ere I had word of Teiresias.

‘And first came the soul of Elpenor, my companion, that had not yet been buried beneath the wide-wayed earth; for we left the corpse behind us in the hall of Circe, unwept and unburied, seeing that another task was instant on us. At the sight of him I wept and had compassion on him, and uttering my voice spake to him winged words: “Elpenor, how hast thou come beneath the darkness and the shadow? Thou hast come fleeter on foot than I in my black ship.”

‘So spake I, and with a moan he answered me, saying: “Son of Laertes, of the seed of Zeus, Odysseus of many devices, an evil doom of some god was my bane and wine out of measure. When I laid me down on the house-top of Circe I minded me not to descend again by the way of the tall ladder, but fell right down from the roof, and my neck was broken off from the bones of the spine, and my spirit went down to the house of Hades. And now I pray thee in the name of those whom we left, who are no more with us, thy wife, and thy sire who cherished thee when as yet thou wert a little one, and Telemachus, whom thou didst leave in thy halls alone; forasmuch as I know that on thy way hence from out the dwelling of Hades, thou wilt stay thy well-wrought ship at the isle Aeaean, even then, my lord, I charge thee to think on me. Leave me not unwept and unburied as thou goest hence, nor turn thy back upon me, lest haply I bring on thee the anger of the gods. Nay, burn me there with mine armour, all that is mine, and pile me a barrow on the shore of the grey sea, the grave of a luckless man, that even men unborn may hear my story. Fulfill me this and plant upon the barrow mine oar, wherewith I rowed in the days of my life, while yet I was among my

fellows."

'Even so he spake, and I answered him saying: "All this, luckless man, will I perform for thee and do."

'Even so we twain were sitting holding sad discourse, I on the one side, stretching forth my sword over the blood, while on the other side the ghost of my friend told all his tale.

'Anon came up the soul of my mother dead, Anticleia, the daughter of Autolycus the great-hearted, whom I left alive when I departed for sacred Ilios. At the sight of her I wept, and was moved with compassion, yet even so, for all my sore grief, I suffered her not to draw nigh to the blood, ere I had word of Teiresias.

'Anon came the soul of Theban Teiresias, with a golden sceptre in his hand, and he knew me and spake unto me: "Son of Laertes, of the seed of Zeus, Odysseus of many devices, what seekest thou *now*, wretched man, wherefore hast thou left the sunlight and come hither to behold the dead and a land desolate of joy? Nay, hold off from the ditch and draw back thy sharp sword, that I may drink of the blood and tell thee sooth."

'So spake he and I put up my silver-studded sword into the sheath, and when he had drunk the dark blood, even then did the noble seer speak unto me, saying: "Thou art asking of thy sweet returning, great Odysseus, but that will the god make hard for thee; for methinks thou shalt not pass unheeded by the Shaker of the Earth, who hath laid up wrath in his heart against thee, for rage at the blinding of his dear son. Yet even so, through many troubles, ye may come home, if thou wilt restrain thy spirit and the spirit of thy men so soon as thou shalt bring thy well-wrought ship nigh to the isle Thrinacia, fleeing the sea of violet blue, when ye find the herds of Helios grazing and his brave flocks, of Helios who overseeth all and overheareth all things. If thou doest these no hurt, being heedful of thy return, so may ye yet reach Ithaca, albeit in evil case. But if thou hurtest them, I foreshow ruin for thy ship and for thy men, and even though thou shalt thyself escape, late shalt thou return in evil plight, with the loss of all thy company, on board the ship of strangers, and thou shalt find sorrows in thy house, even proud men that devour thy living, while they woo thy godlike wife and offer the gifts of wooing. Yet I tell thee, on thy coming thou shalt avenge their violence. But when thou hast slain the wooers in thy halls, whether by guile, or openly with the edge of the sword, thereafter go thy way, taking with thee a shapen oar, till thou shalt

come to such men as know not the sea, neither eat meat savoured with salt; yea, nor have they knowledge of ships of purple cheek, nor shapen oars which serve for wings to ships. And I will give thee a most manifest token, which cannot escape thee. In the day when another wayfarer shall meet thee and say that thou hast a winnowing fan on thy stout shoulder, even then make fast thy shapen oar in the earth and do goodly sacrifice to the lord Poseidon, even with a ram and a bull and a boar, the mate of swine, and depart for home and offer holy hecatombs to the deathless gods that keep the wide heaven, to each in order due. And from the sea shall thine own death come, the gentlest death that may be, which shall end thee fore-done with smooth old age, and the folk shall dwell happily around thee. This that I say is sooth."

'So spake he, and I answered him, saying: "Teiresias, all these threads, methinks, the gods themselves have spun. But come, declare me this and plainly tell me all. I see here the spirit of my mother dead; lo, she sits in silence near the blood, nor deigns to look her son in the face nor speak to him! Tell me, prince, how may she know me again that I am he?"

'So spake I, and anon he answered me, and said: "I will tell thee an easy saying, and will put it in thy heart. Whomsoever of the dead that be departed thou shalt suffer to draw nigh to the blood, he shall tell thee sooth; but if thou shalt grudge any, that one shall go to his own place again." Therewith the spirit of the prince Teiresias went back within the house of Hades, when he had told all his oracles. But I abode there steadfastly, till my mother drew nigh and drank the dark blood; and at once she knew me, and bewailing herself spake to me winged words:

"Dear child, how didst thou come beneath the darkness and the shadow, thou that art a living man? Grievous is the sight of these things to the living, for between us and you are great rivers and dreadful streams; first, Oceanus, which can no wise be crossed on foot, but only if one have a well-wrought ship. Art thou but now come hither with thy ship and thy company in thy long wanderings from Troy? and hast thou not yet reached Ithaca, nor seen thy wife in thy halls?"

'Even so she spake, and I answered her, and said: "O my mother, necessity was on me to come down to the house of Hades to seek to the spirit of Theban Teiresias. For not yet have I drawn near to the Achaean shore, nor yet have I set foot on mine own country,

but have been wandering evermore in affliction, from the day that first I went with goodly Agamemnon to Ilios of the fair steeds, to do battle with the Trojans. But come, declare me this and plainly tell it all. What doom overcame thee of death that lays men at their length? Was it a slow disease, or did Artemis the archer slay thee with the visitation of her gentle shafts? And tell me of my father and my son, that I left behind me; doth my honour yet abide with them, or hath another already taken it, while they say that I shall come home no more? And tell me of my wedded wife, of her counsel and her purpose, doth she abide with her son and keep all secure, or hath she already wedded the best of the Achaeans?"

'Even so I spake, and anon my lady mother answered me: "Yea verily, she abideth with steadfast spirit in thy halls; and wearily for her the nights wane always and the days in shedding of tears. But the fair honour that is thine no man hath yet taken; but Telemachus sits at peace on his demesne, and feasts at equal banquets, whereof it is meet that a judge partake, for all men bid him to their house. And thy father abides there in the field, and goes not down to the town, nor lies he on bedding or rags or shining blankets, but all the winter he sleeps, where sleep the thralls in the house, in the ashes by the fire, and is clad in sorry raiment. But when the summer comes and the rich harvest-tide, his beds of fallen leaves are strewn lowly all about the knoll of his vineyard plot. There he lies sorrowing and nurses his mighty grief, for long desire of thy return, and old age withal comes heavy upon him. Yea and even so did I too perish and meet my doom. It was not the archer goddess of the keen sight, who slew me in my halls with the visitation of her gentle shafts, nor did any sickness come upon me, such as chiefly with a sad wasting draws the spirit from the limbs; nay, it was my sore longing for thee, and for thy counsels, great Odysseus, and for thy loving-kindness, that reft me of sweet life."

'So spake she, and I mused in my heart and would fain have embraced the spirit of my mother dead. Thrice I sprang towards her, and was minded to embrace her; thrice she flitted from my hands as a shadow or even as a dream, and grief waxed ever the sharper at my heart. And uttering my voice I spake to her winged words:

"Mother mine, wherefore dost thou not abide me who am eager to clasp thee, that even in Hades we twain may cast our arms each about the other, and have our fill of chill lament? Is this but a

phantom that the high goddess Persephone hath sent me, to the end that I may groan for more exceeding sorrow?"

'So spake I, and my lady mother answered me anon: "Ah me, my child, of all men most ill-fated, Persephone, the daughter of Zeus, doth in no wise deceive thee, but even on this wise it is with mortals when they die. For the sinews no more bind together the flesh and the bones, but the great force of burning fire, abolishes these, so soon as the life hath left the white bones, and the spirit like a dream flies forth and hovers near. But haste with all thine heart toward the sunlight, and mark all this, that even hereafter thou mayest tell it to thy wife."

'Thus we twain held discourse together; and lo, the women came up, for the high goddess Persephone sent them forth, all they that had been the wives and daughters of mighty men. And they gathered and flocked about the black blood, and I took counsel how I might question them each one. And this was the counsel that showed best in my sight. I drew my long hanger from my stalwart thigh, and suffered them not all at one time to drink of the dark blood. So they drew nigh one by one, and each declared her lineage, and I made question of all.

'Then verily did I first see Tyro, sprung of a noble sire, who said that she was the child of noble Salmoneus, and declared herself the wife of Cretheus, son of Aeolus. She loved a river, the divine Enipeus, far the fairest of the floods that run upon the earth, and she would resort to the fair streams of Enipeus. And it came to pass that the girdler of the world, the Earth-shaker, put on the shape of the god, and lay by the lady at the mouths of the whirling stream. Then the dark wave stood around them like a hill-side bowed, and hid the god and the mortal woman. And he undid her maiden girdle, and shed a slumber over her. Now when the god had done the work of love, he clasped her hand and spake and hailed her:

"Woman, be glad in our love, and when the year comes round thou shalt give birth to glorious children,—for not weak are the embraces of the gods,—and do thou keep and cherish them. And now go home and hold thy peace, and tell it not: but behold, I am Poseidon, shaker of the earth."

'Therewith he plunged beneath the heaving deep. And she conceived and bare Pelias and Neleus, who both grew to be mighty men, servants of Zeus. Pelias dwelt in wide Iolcos, and was rich in flocks; and that other abode in sandy Pylos. And the queen of women bare

yet other sons to Cretheus, even Aeson and Pheres and Amythaon, whose joy was in chariots.

‘And after her I saw Antiope, daughter of Asopus, and her boast was that she had slept even in the arms of Zeus, and she bare two sons, Amphion and Zethus, who founded first the place of seven-gated Thebes, and they made of it a fenced city, for they might not dwell in spacious Thebes unfenced, for all their valiancy.

‘Next to her I saw Alcmene, wife of Amphitryon, who lay in the arms of mighty Zeus, and bare Heracles of the lion-heart, steadfast in the fight. And I saw Megara, daughter of Creon, haughty of heart, whom the strong and tireless son of Amphitryon had to wife.

‘And I saw the mother of Oedipodes, fair Epicaste, who wrought a dread deed unwittingly, being wedded to her own son, and he that had slain his own father wedded her, and straightway the gods made these things known to men. Yet he abode in pain in pleasant Thebes, ruling the Cadmaeans, by reason of the deadly counsels of the gods. But she went down to the house of Hades, the mighty warder; yea, she tied a noose from the high beam aloft, being fast holden in sorrow; while for him she left pains behind full many, even all that the Avengers of a mother bring to pass.

‘And I saw lovely Chloris, whom Neleus wedded on a time for her beauty, and brought gifts of wooing past number. She was the youngest daughter of Amphion, son of Iasus, who once ruled mightily in Minyan Orchomenus. And she was queen of Pylos, and bare glorious children to her lord, Nestor and Chromius, and princely Periclymenus, and stately Pero too, the wonder of all men. All that dwelt around were her wooers; but Neleus would not give her, save to him who should drive off from Phylace the kine of mighty Iphicles, with shambling gait and broad of brow, hard cattle to drive. And none but the noble seer took in hand to drive them; but a grievous fate from the gods fettered him, even hard bonds and the herdsmen of the wild. But when at length the months and days were being fulfilled, as the year returned upon his course, and the seasons came round, then did mighty Iphicles set him free, when he had spoken out all the oracles; and herein was the counsel of Zeus being accomplished.

‘And I saw Lede, the famous bed-fellow of Tyndareus who bare to Tyndareus two sons, hardy of heart, Castor tamer of steeds, and Polydeuces the boxer. These twain yet live, but the quickening earth is over them; and even in the nether world they have honour at the

hand of Zeus. And they possess their life in turn, living one day and dying the next, and they have gotten worship even as the gods.

‘And after her I beheld Iphimedeia, bed-fellow of Aloeus, who said that she had lain with Poseidon, and she bare children twain, but short of life were they, godlike Otus and far-famed Ephialtes. Now these were the tallest men that earth, the graingiver, ever reared, and far the goodliest after the renowned Orion. At nine seasons old they were of breadth nine cubits, and nine fathoms in height. They it was who threatened to raise even against the immortals in Olympus the din of stormy wear. They strove to pile Ossa on Olympus, and on Ossa Pelion with the trembling forest leaves, that there might be a pathway to the sky. Yea, and they would have accomplished it, had they reached the full measure of manhood. But the son of Zeus, whom Leto of the fair locks bare, destroyed the twain, ere the down had bloomed beneath their temples, and darkened their chins with the blossom of youth.

‘And Phaedra and Procris I saw, and fair Ariadne, the daughter of wizard Minos, whom Theseus on a time was bearing from Crete to the hill of sacred Athens, yet had he no joy of her; for Artemis slew her ere that in sea-girt Dia, by reason of the witness of Dionysus.

‘And Maera and Clymene I saw, and hateful Eriphyle, who took fine gold for the price of her dear lord’s life. But I cannot tell or name all the wives and daughters of the heroes that I saw; ere that, the immortal night would wane. Nay, it is even now time to sleep, whether I go to the swift ship to my company or abide here: and for my convoy you and the gods will care.’

So spake he, and dead silence fell on all, and they were spell-bound throughout the shadowy halls. Then Arete of the white arms first spake among them: ‘Phaeacians, what think you of this man for comeliness and stature, and within for wisdom of heart? Moreover he is my guest, though every one of you hath his share in this honour. Wherefore haste not to send him hence, and stint not these your gifts for one that stands in such sore need of them; for ye have much treasure stored in your halls by the grace of the gods.’

Then too spake among them the old man, lord Echeus, that was an elder among the Phaeacians: ‘Friends, behold, the speech of our wise queen is not wide of the mark, nor far from our deeming, so hearken ye thereto. But on Alcinous here both word and work depend.’

Then Alcinous made answer, and spake unto him: ‘Yea, the

word that she hath spoken shall hold, if indeed I am yet to live and bear rule among the Phaeacians, masters of the oar. Howbeit let the stranger, for all his craving to return, nevertheless endure to abide until the morrow, till I make up the full measure of the gift; and men shall care for his convoy, all men, but I in chief, for mine is the lordship in the land.'

And Odysseus of many counsels answered him, saying: 'My lord Alcinous, most notable of all the people, if ye bade me tarry here even for a year, and would speed my convoy and give me splendid gifts, even that I would choose; and better would it be for me to come with a fuller hand to mine own dear country, so should I get more love and worship in the eyes of all men, whoso should see me after I was returned to Ithaca.'

And Alcinous answered him, saying: 'Odysseus, in no wise do we deem thee, we that look on thee, to be a knave or a cheat, even as the dark earth rears many such broadcast, fashioning lies whence none can even see his way therein. But beauty crowns thy words, and wisdom is within thee; and thy tale, as when a minstrel sings, thou hast told with skill, the weary woes of all the Argives and of thine own self. But come, declare me this and plainly tell it all. Didst thou see any of thy godlike company who went up at the same time with thee to Ilios and there met their doom? Behold, the night is of great length, unspeakable, and the time for sleep in the hall is not yet; tell me therefore of those wondrous deeds. I could abide even till the bright dawn, so long as thou couldst endure to rehearse me these woes of thine in the hall.'

And Odysseus of many counsels answered him, saying: 'My lord Alcinous, most notable of all the people, there is a time for many words and there is a time for sleep. But if thou art eager still to listen, I would not for my part grudge to tell thee of other things more pitiful still, even the woes of my comrades, those that perished afterward, for they had escaped with their lives from the dread war-cry of the Trojans, but perished in returning by the will of an evil woman.

'Now when holy Persephone had scattered this way and that the spirits of the women folk, thereafter came to the soul of Agamemnon, son of Atreus, sorrowing; and round him others were gathered, the ghosts of them who had died with him in the house of Aegisthus and met their doom. And he knew me straightway when he had drunk the dark blood, yea, and he wept aloud, and shed

big tears as he stretched forth his hands in his longing to reach me. But it might not be, for he had now no steadfast strength nor power at all to move, such as was aforetime in his supple limbs.

‘At the sight of him I wept and was moved with compassion, and uttering my voice, spake to him winged words: “Most renowned son of Atreus, Agamemnon, king of men, say what doom overcame thee of death that lays men at their length? Did Poseidon smite thee in thy ships, raising the dolorous blast of contrary winds, or did unfriendly men do thee hurt upon the land, whilst thou wert cutting off their oxen and fair flocks of sheep, or fighting to win a city and the women thereof?”

‘So spake I, and straightway he answered, and said unto me: “Son of Laertes, of the seed of Zeus, Odysseus of many devices, it was not Poseidon that smote me in my ships, and raised the dolorous blast of contrary winds, nor did unfriendly men do me hurt upon the land, but Aegisthus it was that wrought me death and doom and slew me, with the aid of my accursed wife, as one slays an ox at the stall, after he had bidden me to his house, and entertained me at a feast. Even so I died by a death most pitiful, and round me my company likewise were slain without ceasing, like swine with glittering tusks which are slaughtered in the house of a rich and mighty man, whether at a wedding banquet or a joint-feast or a rich claudrinking. Ere now hast thou been at the slaying of many a man, killed in single fight, or in strong battle, yet thou wouldst have sorrowed the most at this sight, how we lay in the hall round the mixing-bowl and the laden boards, and the floor all ran with blood. And most pitiful of all that I heard was the voice of the daughter of Priam, of Cassandra, whom hard by me the crafty Clytemnestra slew. Then I strove to raise my hands as I was dying upon the sword, but to earth they fell. And that shameless one turned her back upon me, and had not the heart to draw down my eyelids with her fingers nor to close my mouth. So surely is there nought more terrible and shameless than a woman who imagines such evil in her heart, even as she too planned a foul deed, fashioning death for her gentle lord. Verily I had thought to come home most welcome to my children and my thralls; but she, out of the depth of her evil knowledge, hath shed shame on herself and on all womankind, which shall be for ever, even on the upright.’

‘Even so he spake, but I answered him, saying: “Lo now, in very sooth, hath Zeus of the far-borne voice wreaked wondrous

hatred on the seed of Atreus through the counsels of woman from of old. For Helen's sake so many of us perished, and now Clytemnestra hath practised treason against thee, while yet thou wast afar off."

'Even so I spake, and anon he answered me, saying: "Wherefore do thou too, never henceforth be soft even to thy wife, neither show her all the counsel that thou knowest, but a part declare and let part be hid. Yet shalt not thou, Odysseus, find death at the hand of thy wife, for she is very discreet and prudent in all her ways, the wise Penelope, daughter of Icarius. Verily we left her a bride new wed when we went to the war, and a child was at her breast, who now, methinks, sits in the ranks of men, happy in his lot, for his dear father shall behold him on his coming, and he shall embrace his sire as is meet. But as for my wife, she suffered me not so much as to have my fill of gazing on my son; ere that she slew me, even her lord. And yet another thing will I tell thee, and do thou ponder it in thy heart. Put thy ship to land in secret, and not openly, on the shore of thy dear country; for there is no more faith in woman. But come, declare me this and plainly tell it all, if haply ye hear of my son as yet living, either, it may be, in Orchomenus or in sandy Pylos, or perhaps with Menelaus in wide Sparta, for goodly Orestes hath not yet perished on the earth."

'Even so he spake, but I answered him, saying: "Son of Atreus, wherefore dost thou ask me straitly of these things? Nay I know not at all, whether he be alive or dead; it is ill to speak words light as wind."

'Thus we twain stood sorrowing, holding sad discourse, while the big tears fell fast: and therewithal came the soul of Achilles, son of Peleus, and of Patroclus and of noble Antilochus and of Aias, who in face and form was goodliest of all the Danaans, after the noble son of Peleus. And the spirit of the son of Aeacus, fleet of foot, knew me again, and making lament spake to me winged words:

"Son of Laertes, of the seed of Zeus, Odysseus of many devices, man overbold, what new deed and hardier than this wilt thou devise in thy heart? How durst thou come down to the house of Hades, where dwell the senseless dead, the phantoms of men outworn?"

'So he spake, but I answered him: "Achilles, son of Peleus, mightiest far of the Achaeans, I am come hither to seek to Teiresias, if he may tell me any counsel, how I may come to rugged Ithaca. For not yet have I come nigh the Achaean land, nor set foot on mine

own soil, but am still in evil case; while as for thee, Achilles, none other than thou wast heretofore the most blessed of men, nor shall any be hereafter. For of old in the days of thy life, we Argives gave thee one honour with the gods, and now thou art a great prince here among the dead. Wherefore let not thy death be any grief to thee, Achilles."

'Even so I spake, and he straightway answered me, and said: "Nay, speak not comfortably to me of death, oh great Odysseus. Rather would I live on ground as the hireling of another, with a landless man who had no great livelihood, than bear sway among all the dead that be departed. But come, tell me tidings of that lordly son of mine—did he follow to the war to be a leader or not? And tell me of noble Peleus, if thou hast heard aught,—is he yet held in worship among the Myrmidons, or do they dishonour him from Hellas to Phthia, for that old age binds him hand and foot? For I am no longer his champion under the sun, so mighty a man as once I was, when in wide Troy I slew the best of the host, and succoured the Argives. Ah! could I but come for an hour to my father's house as then I was, so would I make my might and hands invincible, to be hateful to many an one of those who do him despite and keep him from his honour."

'Even so he spake, but I answered him saying: "As for noble Peleus, verily I have heard nought of him; but concerning thy dear son Neoptolemus, I will tell thee all the truth, according to thy word. It was I that led him up out of Scyros' in my good hollow ship, in the wake of the goodly-greaved Achaeans. Now oft as we took counsel around Troy town, he was ever the first to speak, and no word missed the mark; the godlike Nestor and I alone surpassed him. But whensoever we Achaeans did battle on the plain of Troy, he never tarried behind in the throng or the press of men, but ran out far before us all, yielding to none in that might of his. And many men he slew in warfare dread; but I could not tell of all or name their names, even all the host he slew in succouring the Argives, save only how he smote with the sword that son of Telephus, the hero Eurpylus, and many Ceteians of his company were slain around him, by reason of a woman's bribe. He truly was the comeliest man that ever I saw, next to goodly Memnon. And again when we, the best of the Argives, were about to go down into the horse which Epeus wrought, and the charge of all was laid on me, both to open the door of our good ambush and to shut the same, then did the

other princes and counsellors of the Danaans wipe away the tears, and the limbs of each one trembled beneath him, but never once did I see thy son's fair face wax pale, nor did he wipe the tears from his cheeks: but he besought me often to let him go forth from the horse, and kept handling his sword-hilt, and his heavy bronze-shod spear, and he was set on mischief against the Trojans. But after we had sacked the steep city of Priam, he embarked unscathed with his share of the spoil, and with a noble prize; he was not smitten with the sharp spear, and got no wound in close fight: and many such chances there be in war, for Ares rageth confusedly."

'So I spake, and the spirit of the son of Aeacus, fleet of foot, passed with great strides along the mead of asphodel, rejoicing in that I had told him of his son's renown.

'But lo, other spirits of the dead that be departed stood sorrowing, and each one asked of those that were dear to them. The soul of Aias son of Telamon, alone stood apart being still angry for the victory wherein I prevailed against him, in the suit by the ships concerning the arms of Achilles, that his lady mother had set for a prize; and the sons of the Trojans made award and Pallas Athene. Would that I had never prevailed and won such a prize? So goodly a head hath the earth closed over, for the sake of those arms, even over Aias, who in beauty and in feats of war was of a mould above all the other Danaans, next to the noble son of Peleus. To him then I spake softly, saying:

"Aias, son of noble Telamon, so art thou not even in death to forget thy wrath against me, by reason of those arms accursed, which the gods set to be the bane of the Argives? What a tower of strength fell in thy fall, and we Achaeans cease not to sorrow for thee, even as for the life of Achilles, son of Peleus! Nay, there is none other to blame, but Zeus, who hath borne wondrous hate to the army of the Danaan spearmen, and laid on thee thy doom. Nay, come hither, master thy wrath and thy proud spirit."

'So I spake, but he answered me not a word and passed to Erebus after the other spirits of the dead that be departed. Even then, despite his anger, would he have spoken to me or I to him, but my heart within me was minded to see the spirits of these others that were departed.

'There then I saw Minos, glorious son of Zeus, wielding a golden sceptre, giving sentence from his throne to the dead, while they sat and stood around the prince, asking his dooms through the wide-gated

house of Hades.

‘And after him I marked the mighty Orion driving the wild beasts together over the mead of asphodel, the very beasts that himself had slain on the lonely hills, with a strong mace all of bronze in his hands, that is ever unbroken.

‘And I saw Tityos, son of renowned Earth, lying on a levelled ground, and he covered nine roods as he lay, and vultures twain beset him one on either side, and gnawed at his liver, piercing even to the caul, but he drave them not away with his hands. For he had dealt violently with Leto, the famous bedfellow of Zeus, as she went up to Pytho through the fair lawns of Panopeus.

‘Moreover I beheld Tantalus in grievous torment, standing in a mere and the water came nigh unto his chin. And he stood straining as one athirst, but he might not attain to the water to drink of it. For often as that old man stooped down in his eagerness to drink, so often the water was swallowed up and it vanished away, and the black earth still showed at his feet, for some god parched it evermore. And tall trees flowering shed their fruit overhead, pears and pomegranates and apple trees with bright fruit, and swept figs and olives in their bloom, whereat when that old man reached out his hands to clutch them, the wind would toss them to the shadowy clouds.

‘Yea and I beheld Sisyphus in strong torment, grasping a monstrous stone with both his hands. He was pressing thereat with hands and feet, and trying to roll the stone upward toward the brow of the hill. But oft as he was about to hurl it over the top, the weight would drive him back, so once again to the plain rolled the stone, the shameless thing. And he once more kept heaving and straining, and the sweat the while was pouring down his limbs, and the dust rose upwards from his head.

‘And after him I descried the mighty Heracles, his phantom, I say; but as for himself he hath joy at the banquet among the deathless gods, and hath to wife Hebe of the fair ankles, child of great Zeus, and of Here of the golden sandals. And all about him there was a clamour of the dead, as it were fowls flying every way in fear, and he like black Night, with bow uncased, and shaft upon the string, fiercely glancing around, like one in the act to shoot. And about his breast was an awful belt, a baldric of gold, whereon wondrous things were wrought, bears and wild boars and lions with flashing eyes, and strife and battles and slaughters and murders of men. Nay, now that he hath fashioned this, never another may he fashion, whoso stored

in his craft the device of that belt! And anon he knew me when his eyes beheld me, and making lament he spake unto me winged words:

“Son of Laertes, of the seed of Zeus, Odysseus of many devices: ah! wretched one, dost thou too lead such a life of evil doom, as I endured beneath the rays of the sun? I was the son of Zeus Cronion, yet had I trouble beyond measure, for I was subdued unto a man far worse than I. And he enjoined on me hard adventures, yea and on a time he sent me hither to bring back the hound of hell; for he devised no harder task for me than this. I lifted the hound and brought him forth from out of the house of Hades; and Hermes sped me on my way and the grey-eyed Athene.”

‘Therewith he departed again into the house of Hades, but I abode there still, if perchance some one of the hero folk besides might come, who died in old time. Yea and I should have seen the men of old, whom I was fain to look on, Theseus and Peirithous, renowned children of the gods. But ere that might be the myriad tribes of the dead thronged up together with wondrous clamour: and pale fear gat hold of me, lest the high goddess Persephone should send me the head of the Gorgon, that dread monster, from out of Hades.

‘Straightway then I went to the ship, and bade my men mount the vessel, and loose the hawsers. So speedily they went on board, and sat upon the benches. And the wave of the flood bore the barque down the stream of Oceanus, we rowing first, and afterwards the fair wind was our convoy.—Odyssey, XI.

TRANSLATION OF BUTCHER AND LANG.

ELYSIUM

But thou, Menelaus, son of Zeus, art not ordained to die and meet thy fate in Argos, the pasture-land of horses, but the deathless gods will convey thee to the Elysian plain and the world’s end, where is Rhadamanthus of the fair hair, where life is easiest for men. No snow is there, nor yet great storm, nor any rain; but always ocean sendeth forth the breeze of the shrill West to blow cool on men: yea, for thou hast Helen to wife, and thereby they deem thee to be son of Zeus.”—Odyssey, IV.

TRANSLATION OF BUTCHER AND LANG.

SECOND OLYMPIAN ODE

PINDAR, 522-443 B. C.

ANTISTROPHE III.

Alone in famed Olympia's sand
 The victor's chaplet Theron wore;
 But with him on the Isthmian strand,
 On sweet Castalia's shore,
 The verdant crowns, the proud reward
 Of victory his brother shared,
 Copartner in immortal praise,
 As warmed with equal zeal
 The light-foot courser's generous breed to raise,
 'And whirl around the goal the fervid wheel.
 The painful strife Olympia's wreath repays:
 But wealth with nobler virtue joined
 The means and fair occasions must procure;
 In glory's chase must aid the mind,
 Expense and toil and danger to endure;
 With mingling rays they feed each other's flame,
 'And shine the brightest lamp in all the sphere of fame.

EPODE III.

The happy mortal, who these treasures shares,
 Well knows what fate attends his generous cares;
 Knows, that beyond the verge of life and light,
 In the sad regions of infernal night,
 The fierce, impracticable, churlish mind
 'Avenging gods and penal woes shall find;
 Where strict inquiring justice shall bewray
 The crimes committed in the realms of day.
 The impartial judge the rigid law declares,
 No more to be reversed by penitence or prayers.

STROPHE IV.

But in the happy fields of light,
 Where Phœbus with an equal ray

Illuminates the balmy night,
 And gilds the cloudless day,
 In peaceful, unmolested joy,
 The good their smiling hours employ.
 Them no uneasy wants constrain
 To vex the ungrateful soil,
 To tempt the dangers of the billowy main,
 And break their strength with unabating toil,
 A frail disastrous being to maintain.
 But in their joyous calm abodes,
 The recompense of justice they receive;
 And in the fellowship of gods,
 Without a tear, eternal ages live.
 While banished by the fates from joy and rest,
 Intolerable woes the impious soul infest.

ANTISTROPHE IV.

But they who, in true virtue strong,
 The third purgation can endure;
 And keep their minds from fraudulent wrong
 And guilt's contagion, pure;
 They through the starry paths of Jove
 To Saturn's blissful seat remove:
 Where fragrant breezes, vernal airs,
 Sweet children of the main,
 Purge the blest island from corroding cares,
 And fan the bosom of each verdant plain:
 Whose fertile soil immortal fruitage bears:
 Trees, from whose flaming branches flow,
 Arrayed in golden bloom, refulgent beams;
 And flowers of golden hue, that blow
 On the fresh borders of their parent streams.
 These by the blest in solemn triumph worn,
 Their unpolluted hands and clustering locks adorn.

EPODE IV.

Such is the righteous will, the high behest
 Or Rhadamanthus, ruler of the blest;
 The just assessor of the throne divine,
 On which, high raised above all gods, recline,

Linked in the golden bands of wedded love,
 The great progenitors of thundering Jove.
 There, in the number of the blest enrolled,
 Live Cadmus, Peleus, heroes famed of old;
 And young Achilles, to those isles removed,
 Soon as, by Thetis won, relenting Jove approved.

TRANSLATION OF GILBERT WEST.

HAPPINESS OF THE DEPARTED

For them the night all through,
 In that broad realm below,
 The splendor of the sun spreads endless light;
 'Mid rosy meadows bright,
 Their city of the tombs with incense-trees,
 And golden chalices
 Of flowers, and fruitage fair,
 Scenting the breezy air,
 Is laden. There with horses and with play,
 With games and lyres, they while the hours away.
 On every side around
 Pure happiness is found,
 With all the blooming beauty of the world;
 There fragrant smoke, upcurled
 From altars where the blazing fire is dense
 With perfumed frankincense,
 Burned unto gods in heaven,
 Through all the land is driven,
 Making its pleasant places odorous
 With scented gales and sweet airs amorous.

PINDAR, TRANSLATION OF J. A. SYMONDS.

ISOCRATES ON THE MYSTERIES

But the benefits which we have conferred on others require a deduction of much greater length; for to show the merits of our services, we must run over the annals of our history and record from the beginning the transactions of our ancestors. We shall find that

it is to Athens the Greeks owe their all, whether with regard to war or political institutions, or the arts which polish life and render it agreeable. In this deduction you are not to expect a detail of those less considerable services which time has obliterated or obscured and which your orators have forgotten or disdained; but of those signal benefits known to all, neglected by none, and celebrated in every age and country.

To begin with the first and most necessary demand of human nature you will find that our ancestors were they who supplied it. Though what I am going to relate may be disfigured by tradition or fable, the substance of it is not the less deserving of your regard. When Ceres wandered from one country to another in quest of her daughter, who had been carried off by violence, she received in Attica the most favorable treatment, and those particular good offices which it is lawful to make known only to the initiated. The goddess was not ungrateful for such favors, but in return conferred on our ancestors the two most valuable presents which either Heaven can bestow or mankind can receive; the practice of agriculture, which delivered us from the fierce and precarious manner of life common to us with wild animals; and the knowledge of those sacred mysteries which fortify the initiated against all the terrors of death and inspire them with the pleasing hopes of an happy immortality. Our ancestors discovered as much benevolence in dispensing these favours, as piety in obtaining them; for their humanity communicated what their virtue had acquired. The mysteries were annually unveiled to all desirous to receive them; and the practice, the means, the advantages of agriculture, were diffused over all Greece.

INSTITUTIONS

ATHENS

ARISTOTLE

ON THE

ATHENIAN CONSTITUTION

[THE 'ALCMEONIDAE were tried] by a court empanelled from among the noble families, and sworn upon the sacrifices. The part of accuser was taken by Myron. They were found guilty of the sacrilege, and their dead were cast out of their graves and their race banished for evermore. Moreover, in addition to this, Epimenides the Cretan performed a purification of the city.

2. After this event there was contention for a long time between the upper classes and the populace. Not only was the constitution at this time oligarchical in every respect, but the poorer classes, men, women, and children, were in absolute slavery to the rich. They were known as Pelatae and also as Hectemori, because they cultivated the lands of the rich for a sixth part of the produce. The whole country was in the hands of a few persons, and if the tenants failed to pay their rent they were liable to be haled into slavery, and their children with them. Their persons were mortgaged to their creditors, a custom which prevailed until the time of Solon, who was the first to appear as a leader of the people. But the hardest and bitterest part of the condition of the masses was the fact that they had no share in the offices then existing under the constitution. At the same time they

HEAD OF PERICLES

by Kresilas

480 (?) B. C. — 410 (?) B. C.



were discontented with every other feature of their lot; for, to speak generally, they had no part nor share in anything.

3. Now the ancient constitution, as it existed before the time of Draco, was organized as follows. The magistrates were elected according to qualifications of birth and wealth. At first they governed for life, but subsequently for terms of ten years. The first magistrates, both in date and in importance, were the King, the Polemarch [=commander in war], and the Archon. The earliest of these offices was that of the King, which existed from the very beginning. To this was added, secondly, the office of Polemarch, on account of some of the kings being feeble in war; for which reason Ion was invited to accept the post on an occasion of pressing need. The last of these three offices was that of the Archon, which most authorities state to have come into existence in the time of Medon. Others assign it to the time of Acastus, and adduce as proof the fact that the nine Archons take oath to administer the state "as in the days of Acastus," which seems to suggest that it was in his reign that the descendants of Codrus abandoned a part of their prerogative in favour of the Archon. It is not a matter of much importance, however, and in any case the office came into existence about that period; but that it was the last of these magistracies to be created is shown by the fact that the Archon has no part in the ancestral sacrifices, as the King and the Polemarch have, but only in those of later origin. So it is only at a comparatively late date that the office of Archon has become of great importance, by successive accretions of power. The Thesmothetae were appointed many years afterwards, when these offices had already become annual; and the object of their creation was that they might record in writing all legal decisions, and act as guardians of them with a view to executing judgment upon transgressors of the law. Accordingly their office, alone of those which have been mentioned, was never of more than annual duration.

So far, then, do these magistrates precede all others in point of date. At that time the nine Archons did not all live together. The King occupied the building now known as the Bucolium, near the Prytaneum, as may be seen from the fact that even to the present day the marriage of the King's wife to Dionysus takes place there. The Archon lived in the Prytaneum, the Polemarch in the Epilyceum. The latter building was formerly called the Polemarcheum, but after Epilycus, during his term of office as Polemarch, had rebuilt it and fitted it up, it was called the Epilyceum. The Thesmothetae occupied

the Thesmotheteum. In the time of Solon, however, they all came together into the Thesmotheteum. They had power to decide cases finally on their own authority, not, as now, merely to hold a preliminary hearing. Such, then, was the arrangement of the magistracies. The Council of Areopagus had as its constitutionally assigned duty the protection of the laws; but in point of fact it administered the greater and most important part of the government of the state, and inflicted personal punishment and fines summarily upon all who misbehaved themselves. This was the natural consequence of the facts that the Archons were elected under qualifications of birth and wealth, and that the Areopagus was composed of those who had served as Archons; for which latter reason the membership of the Areopagus is the only office which has continued to be a life-magistracy to the present day.

4. Such was, in outline, the first constitution; but not very long after the events above recorded, in the archonship of Aristaichmes, Draco drew up his legislation. The organization he established had the following form. The franchise was given to all who could furnish themselves with a military equipment. The nine Archons and the Treasurers were elected by this body from persons possessing an unencumbered property of not less than ten minas, the less important officials from those who could furnish themselves with a military equipment, and the generals [Strategi] and commanders of the cavalry [Hipparchi] from those who could show an unencumbered property of not less than a hundred minas, and had children born in lawful wedlock over ten years of age. This qualification was to apply to the Prytanes, the Strategi, and the Hipparchi, . . . There was also to be a Council, consisting of four hundred and one members, elected by lot from among those who possessed the franchise. Both for this and for the other magistracies the lot was cast among those who were over thirty years of age; and no one might hold office twice until everyone else had had his turn, after which they were to cast the lot afresh. If any member of the Council failed to attend when there was a sitting of the Council or of the Assembly, he paid a fine, to the amount of three drachmas, if he was a Pentacosiomèdimnus, two if he was a Knight, and one if he was a Zeugites. The Council of Areopagus was guardian of the laws, and kept watch over the magistrates to see that they executed their offices in accordance with the laws. Any person who felt himself wronged, might lay an information before the Council of Areopagus, on declaring what law was broken by the

wrong done to him. But, as has been said before, the persons of the people were mortgaged to their creditors, and the land was in the hands of a few.

5. Now seeing that such was the organization of the constitution, and that the many were in slavery to the few, the people rose against the upper class. The strife was keen, and for a long time the two parties were face to face with one another, till at last, by common consent, they appointed Solon to be mediator and Archon, and committed the whole constitution to his hands. The immediate cause of his appointment was his poem, which begins with the words,—

I see, and within my heart deep sadness has claimed its place,
As I look on the oldest home of the ancient Ionian race:

and so he continues, fighting and disputing on behalf of each party in turn against the other, and finally he advises them to come to terms and put an end to the quarrel existing between them. By birth and reputation Solon was one of the foremost men of the day, but in wealth and position he was of the middle class, as is manifest from many circumstances, and especially from his own evidence in these poems, where he exhorts the wealthy not to be grasping.

But ye who have store of good, who are sated and overflow,
Restrain your swelling soul, and still it and keep it low:
Let the heart that is great within you be trained in a lowlier way:
Ye shall not have all at your will, and we will not for ever obey.

Indeed, he constantly ascribes the origin of the conflict to the rich; and accordingly at the beginning of the poem he says that he fears "the love of wealth and an overweening mind," evidently meaning that it was through these that the quarrel arose.

6. As soon as he was at the head of affairs, Solon liberated the people once and for all, by prohibiting all loans on the security of the person of the debtor: and at the same time he made laws by which he cancelled all debts, public and private. This measure is commonly called the *Seisachtheia* [=removal of burdens], since thereby the people had their loads removed from them. In connection with it some persons try to traduce the character of Solon. It so happened that, when he was about to enact the *Seisachtheia*, he announced his intention to some members of the upper class, and then, as the partisans of the popular party say, his friends stole a march on him, while those who wish to attack his character maintain that he too had a

share in the fraud himself. For these persons borrowed money and bought up a large amount of land, and so, when, a short time afterwards, all debts were cancelled, they became wealthy; and this, they say, was the origin of the families which were afterwards looked on as possessing wealth from primeval times. However, the story of the popular party is by far the most probable. A man like Solon, who was so moderate and just in all his other actions, that although he might have put the laws beneath his feet and have established himself as tyrant, he preferred instead to incur the hostility of both parties by placing his honour and the general welfare above his personal aggrandisement, is not likely to have consented to defile his hands by such a petty and unworthy transaction. That he had this absolute power and that he remedied the diseases of the body politic, he both testifies himself repeatedly in his poems, and it is admitted by all; and therefore we are bound to consider this accusation to be false.

7. Next Solon drew up a constitution and enacted new laws; and the statutes of Draco ceased to be used with the exception of those relating to murder. The laws were inscribed on the pillars, and set up in the King's Porch, and all swore to obey them; and the nine Archons made oath upon the stone and declared that they would dedicate a golden statute if they should transgress any of them. This is the origin of the oath to that effect which they take to the present day. Solon ratified his laws for a hundred years; and the following was the fashion of his organization of the constitution. He made a division of all rateable property into four classes, just as it had been divided before, namely, Pentacosimedimni, Knights, Zeugitae, and Thetes. The various magistracies, namely, the nine Archons, the Treasurers, the Commissioners for Public Contracts [Poletae], the Eleven, and the Exchequer Clerks [Colacretae], he assigned to the Pentacosimedimni, the Knights, and the Zeugitae, giving offices to each class in proportion to the value of their rateable property. To those who ranked among the Thetes he gave nothing but a place in the Assembly and in the juries. A man had to rank as a Pentacosimedimnus if he made, from his own land, five hundred measures, whether liquid or solid. Those ranked as Knights who made three hundred measures, or, as some say, those who were able to maintain a horse. In support of the latter definition they adduce the name of the class, which may be supposed to be derived from this fact, and also some votive offerings of early times; for in the Acropolis there is a votive offering, a statue of Diphilus, bearing this inscription:—

The son of Diphilus, Anthemion hight,
Raised from the Thetes and become a Knight,
Did to the gods this sculptured charger bring,
For his promotion a thank-offering.

And a horse stands beside the man, which seems to show that this was what was meant by belonging to the rank of Knight. At the same time it seems more reasonable to suppose that this class, like the Pentacosiomedimni, was defined by the possession of an income of a certain number of measures. Those ranked as Zeugitae who made two hundred measures, liquid or solid; and the rest ranked as Thetes, and were not eligible for any office. Hence it is that even at the present day, when a candidate for any office is asked to what rank he belongs, no one would think of saying that he belonged to the Thetes.

8. The elections to the various offices Solon enacted should be by lot, out of candidates selected by each of the tribes. Each tribe selected ten candidates for the nine archonships, and among these the lot was cast. Hence it is still the custom for each tribe to choose ten candidates by lot, and then the lot is again cast among these. A proof that Solon regulated the elections to office according to the property classes may be found in the law which is still in force for the election of the Treasurers, which enacts that they shall be chosen from the Pentacosiomedimni. Such was Solon's legislation with respect to the nine Archons; whereas in early times the Council of Areopagus summoned suitable persons according to its own judgment and appointed them for the year to the several offices. There were four tribes, as before, and four tribe-kings. Each tribe was divided into three Trittyes [=Thirds], with twelve Naucraries in each; and the Naucraries had officers of their own, called Naucrari, whose duty it was to superintend the current receipts and expenditure. Hence among the laws of Solon now (as is natural) obsolete, it is written that the Naucrari are to receive and spend out of the Naucratic fund. Solon also appointed a Council of four hundred, a hundred from each tribe; but he still assigned to the Areopagus the duty of superintending the laws. It continued, as before, to be the guardian of the constitution in general; it kept watch over the citizens in all the most important matters, and corrected offenders, having full powers to inflict either fines or personal punishment. The money received in fines it brought up into the Acropolis, without assigning the reason for the punishment; and Solon also gave it the power to try those

who conspired for the overthrow of the state. Such were Solon's regulations concerning the Areopagus. Further, since he saw the state often engaged in internal disputes, while many of the citizens from sheer indifference waited to see what would turn up, he made a few with express reference to such persons, enacting that anyone who, in a time of civil factions, did not take up arms with either party, should lose his rights as a citizen and cease to have any part in the state.

9. Such, then, was his legislation concerning the magistrates of the state. There are three points in the constitution of Solon which appear to be its most democratic features: first and most important, the prohibition of loans on the security of the debtor's person; secondly, the right of every person who so willed to bring an action on behalf of anyone to whom wrong was being done; thirdly, the institution of the appeal to the law-courts; and it is by means of this last, they say, that the masses have gained strength most of all, since, when the democracy is master of the voting-power, it is master of the constitution. Moreover, since the laws were not drawn up in simple and explicit terms (but like the one concerning inheritances and wards of state), disputes inevitably occurred, and the courts had to decide in every matter, whether public or private. Some persons in fact believe that Solon deliberately made the laws indefinite, in order that the people might have something left to its final decision. This, however, is not at all probable, and the reason no doubt was that it was impossible to attain ideal perfection when framing a law in general terms; for we must judge of his intentions, not from the actual results in the present day, but from the general tenor of the rest of his legislation.

10. These seem to be the democratic features of his laws; but in addition, before the period of his legislation, he made his abolition of debts, and after it his increase in the standards of weights and measures, and of the currency. During his term of office the measures were made larger than those of Pheidon, and the mina, which previously contained about seventy drachmas, was raised to the full hundred. The standard coin in earlier times was the two-drachma piece. He also appointed as the standard of currency the proportion of sixty minas to the talent, and the mina was also distributed into staters and the other values.

11. When he had completed his organization of the constitution in the manner that has been described, he found himself beset by

people coming to him and harassing him concerning his laws, criticising here and questioning there, till, as he neither wished to alter what he had decided on nor yet to be an object of ill-will to everyone by remaining in Athens, he set off on a journey to Egypt, to the neighbourhood of the city of Canopus, for ten years, with the combined objects of trade and travel. He considered that there was no call for him to expound the laws personally, but that everyone should obey them just as they were written. Moreover, his position at this time was such that many members of the upper class had been estranged from him on account of his abolition of debts, and both parties were alienated through their disappointment at the condition of things which he had created. The mass of the people had expected him to make a complete redistribution of all property, and the upper class hoped he would restore everything to its former position; and since he disappointed these expectations he was regarded with hostility by both classes. He might have made himself a despot by attaching himself to whichever party he chose, but he preferred, though at the cost of incurring the enmity of both, to save the country and establish the best laws that were possible.

12. The truth of this view of Solon's policy is established alike by the common consent of all, and by the mention which he has himself made of it in his poems. Thus:—

I gave to the mass of the people such rank as befitted their need,
I took not away their honour, and I granted naught to their greed;
But those who were rich in power, who in wealth were glorious and
great,

I bethought me that naught should befall them unworthy their splendour and state:

And I stood with my shield outstretched, and both were safe in its sight,
And I would not that either should triumph, when the triumph was
not with right.

Again he declares how the mass of the people ought to be treated:—

But thus will the people best the voice of their leaders obey,
When neither too slack is the rein, nor violence holdeth the sway;
For satiety breedeth a child, the presumption that spurns control,
When riches too great are poured upon men of unbalanced soul.
And again elsewhere he speaks about the persons who wished to
redistribute the land:—

So they came in search of plunder, and their cravings knew no bound,
 Every one among them deeming endless wealth would here be found,
 And that I with glozing smoothness hid a cruel mind within.
 Fondly then and vainly dreamt they; now they raise an angry din,
 And they glare askance in anger, and the light within their eyes
 Burns with hostile flames upon me. Yet therein no justice lies.
 All I promised, fully wrought I with the gods at hand to cheer,
 Naught beyond of folly ventured. Never to my soul was dear
 With a tyrant's force to govern, nor to see the good and base
 Side by side in equal portion share the rich home of our race.
 Once more he speaks of the destitution of the poorer classes and of
 those who before were in servitude, but were released owing to the
 Seisachtheia:—

Wherefore I freed the racked and tortured crowd
 From all the evils that beset their lot,
 Thou, when slow time brings justice in its train,
 O mighty mother of the Olympian gods,
 Dark Earth, thou best canst witness, from whose breast
 I swept the pillars broad-cast planted there,
 And made thee free, who hadst been slave of yore.
 And many a man whom fraud or law had sold
 Far from his god-built land, an outcast slave,
 I brought again to Athens; yea, and some,
 Exiles from home through debt's oppressive load,
 Speaking no more the dear Athenian tongue,
 But wandering far and wide, I brought again;
 And those that here in vilest slavery
 Crouched 'neath a master's frown, I set them free.
 Thus might and right were yoked in harmony,
 Since by the force of law I won my ends
 And kept my promise. Equal laws I gave
 To evil and to good, with even hand
 Drawing straight justice for the lot of each.
 But had another held the goad as I,
 One in whose heart was guile and greediness,
 He had not kept the people back from strife.
 For had I granted, now what pleased the one,
 Then what their foes devised within their hearts,
 Of many a man this state had been bereft.
 Therefore I took me strength from every side

And turned at bay like wolf among the hounds.

And again he reviles both parties for their grumblings in the times that followed:—

Nay, if one must lay blame where blame is due,
Wer't not for me, the people ne'er had set
Their eyes upon these blessings e'en in dreams:—
But greater men, the men of wealthier life,
Should praise me and should court me as their friend.

For had any other man, he says, received this exalted post,—

He had not kept the people back, nor ceased
Till he had robbed the richness of the milk.
But I stood forth, a landmark in the midst,
And barred the foes from battle.

13. Such, then, were Solon's reasons for his departure from the country. After his retirement the city was still torn by divisions. For four years, indeed, they lived in peace; but in the fifth year after Solon's government they were unable to elect an Archon on account of the dissensions, and again four years later they elected no Archon for the same reason. Subsequently, after a similar period had elapsed, Damasias was elected Archon; and he governed for two years and two months, until he was forcibly expelled from his office. After this it was agreed, on account of the dissensions, to elect ten Archons, five from the Eupatridae, three from the Agroeci, and two from the Demiurgi; and these officers ruled for the year following Damassias. It is clear from this that the Archon was at that time the magistrate who possessed the greatest power, since it is always in connection with this office that conflicts are seen to arise. But altogether they were in a continual state of internal disorder. Some found the cause and justification of their discontent in the abolition of debts, because thereby they had been reduced to poverty; others were dissatisfied with the political constitution, because it had undergone a revolutionary change; while with others the motive was found in personal rivalries among themselves. The parties at this time were three in number. First there was the party of the Shore, whose leader was Megacles the son of Alcmeon, which was considered to aim at a moderate form of government; then there were the men of the Plain, who desired an oligarchy and were led by Lycurgus; and thirdly there were the men of the Highlands, at the head of whom was Pisistratus, who was looked on as an extreme democrat. To this latter party were attached those who had been deprived of

the debts due to them, from motives of poverty, and those who were not of pure descent, from motives of personal apprehension. A proof of this is seen in the fact that after the tyranny was overthrown a resolution was passed to the effect that many persons were partaking in the franchise without having a right to it. The names given to the respective parties were derived from the districts in which they held their lands.

14. Pisistratus had the reputation of being an extreme democrat, and he also had distinguished himself greatly in the war with Megara. Taking advantage of this, he wounded himself, and by representing that his injuries had been inflicted on him by his political rivals, he persuaded the people, through a motion proposed by Aristion, to grant him a body-guard. After he had got these "club-bearers," as they were called, he made an attack with them on the people and seized the Acropolis. This happened in the archonship of Comeas, thirty-one years after the legislation of Solon. It is related that, when Pisistratus asked for his body-guard, Solon opposed the request, and declared that in so doing he proved himself wiser than half the people and braver than the rest,—wiser than those who did not see that Pisistratus designed to make himself tyrant, and braver than those who saw it and kept silence. But when all his words availed nothing he carried forth his armour and set it up in front of his house, saying that he had helped his country so far as lay in his power (he was already a very old man), and that he called on all others to do the same. Solon's exhortations, however, proved fruitless, and Pisistratus assumed the sovereignty. His administration was far more like a constitutional government than the rule of a tyrant; but before his power was firmly established, the adherents of Megacles and Lycurgus made a coalition and drove him out. This took place in the archonship of Hegesias, five years after the first establishment of his rule. Eleven years later Megacles, being in difficulties in a party struggle, again opened negotiations with Pisistratus, proposing that the latter should marry his daughter; and on these terms he brought him back to Athens, by a very primitive and simple-minded device. He first spread abroad a rumour that Athena was bringing back Pisistratus, and then, having found a woman of great stature and beauty, named Phye (according to Herodotus, of the deme of Paeania, but as others say a Thracian flower-seller of the deme of Colyttus), he dressed her in garb resembling that of the goddess and brought her into the city with Pisistratus. The latter

drove in on a chariot with the woman beside him, and the inhabitants of the city, struck with awe, received him with adoration.

15. In this manner did his first return take place. He did not, however, hold his power long, for about six years after his return he was again expelled. He refused to treat the daughter of Megacles as his wife, and being afraid, in consequence, of a combination of the two opposing parties, he retired from the country. First he led a colony to a place called Rhaicelus, in the region of the Thermaic gulf; and thence he passed to the country in the neighbourhood of Mt. Pangaeus. Here he acquired wealth and hired mercenaries; and not till ten years had elapsed did he descend on Eretria and make an attempt to recover the government by force. In this he had the assistance of many allies, notably the Thebans and Lygdamis of Naxos, and also the Knights who held the supreme power in the constitution of Eretria. After his victory in the battle at Pallene he recovered the sovereignty, and when he had disarmed the people he at last established his tyranny securely, and was able to proceed to Naxos and set up Lygdamis as ruler there. He effected the disarmament of the people in the following manner. He held a review in full armour in the Theseum, and began to make a speech to the people. He spoke, however, in a low voice; and when the people called out that they could not hear him, he bade them come up to the entrance of the Acropolis, in order that his voice might be better heard. Then, while he continued to speak to them at great length, men whom he had appointed for the purpose collected the arms and locked them up in the neighbouring chambers of the Theseum, and came and made a signal to him. Pisistratus accordingly, when he had finished the rest of what he had to say, told the people also what had happened to their arms; and he exhorted them not to be surprised or alarmed, but to go home and attend to their private affairs, while he would for the future manage all the business of the state.

16. Such was the origin and such the vicissitudes of the tyranny of Pisistratus. His administration was temperate, as has been said before, and more like constitutional government than a tyranny. Not only was he in every respect humane and mild and ready to forgive those who offended, but, in addition, he advanced money to the poorer people to help them in their labours, so that they might make their living by agriculture. In this he had two objects, first that they might not spend their time in the city but might be scattered over all the face of the country, and second that, being moderately well off and

occupied with their own business, they might have neither the wish nor the time to attend to public affairs. At the same time his revenues were increased by the thorough cultivation of the country, since he imposed a tax of one tenth on all the produce. For the same reasons he instituted the local justices, and often made expeditions in person into the country to inspect it and to settle disputes between individuals, that they might not come into the city and neglect their farms. It was in one of these progresses that, as the story goes, Pisistratus had his adventure with the man in the district of Hymettus, who was cultivating the spot afterwards known as "Tax-free Farm." He saw a man digging and working at a very stony piece of ground with a stake, and being surprised at his implement he sent and asked what he got out of this plot of land. "Aches and pains," said the man; "and out of these Pisistratus has got to have his tenth." The man spoke without knowing who his questioner was; but Pisistratus was so pleased with his frank speech and his industry that he granted him exemption from all taxes. And so in matters in general he burdened the people as little as possible with his government, but always cultivated peace and kept them in all quietness. Hence the tyranny of Pisistratus was often spoken of proverbially as "the age of gold"; since later the government became much harsher, owing to the excesses of his sons. The quality which gave most satisfaction of all was his popular and kindly disposition. In his whole administration he was accustomed to observe the laws, without giving himself any exceptional privileges. Once he was summoned on a charge of homicide before the Areopagus, and he appeared in person to make his defence; but the prosecutor was afraid to present himself and abandoned the case. For these reasons his government continued long, and whenever he was expelled he regained his position easily. The majority alike of the upper class and of the people were in his favour; the former he won by his social intercourse with them, the latter by the assistance which he gave to their private purses, and his nature fitted him to win the hearts of both. Moreover, the laws in reference to tyrants at that time in force at Athens were very mild, especially the one which applies more particularly to the subject. The law ran as follows: "These are the ancestral statutes of the Athenians; if any persons shall make an attempt to establish a tyranny, or if any person shall join in setting up a tyranny, he shall lose his civic rights, both himself and his whole house."

17. Thus did Pisistratus grow old in the possession of power, and he died a natural death in the archonship of Philoneos, three and thirty years from the time at which he first established himself as tyrant, during nineteen of which he was in the possession of power; the rest he spent in exile. It is evident from this that the story is mere gossip which states that Pisistratus was the youthful favourite of Solon and commanded in the war against Megara for the recovery of Salamis. It will not harmonize with their respective ages, as anyone may see who will reckon up the years of the life of each of them, and the dates at which they died. After the death of Pisistratus his sons took up the government, and conducted it on the same system. He had two sons by his first and legitimate wife, Hippias and Hipparchus, and two by his Argive consort, Iophon and Hegesistratus, who had the surname of Thessalus. For Pisistratus took a wife from Argos, of the name of Timonassa, the daughter of a man of Argos, named Gorgilus; she had previously been the wife of Archinus of Ambracia, one of the descendants of Cypselus. This was the origin of his friendship with the Argives, and a thousand of them were brought over by Hegesistratus and fought on his side in the battle at Pallene. Some authorities say that this marriage took place after his first expulsion from Athens, others while he was in possession of the government.

18. Hippias and Hipparchus assumed the control of affairs on grounds alike of standing and of age; but Hippias, as being the elder and being also naturally of a statesmanlike and shrewd disposition, was really the head of the government. Hipparchus was youthful in disposition, amorous, and fond of literature, and it was he who invited to Athens Anacreon, Simonides, and the other poets. Thessalus was much junior in age, and was violent and headstrong in his behaviour. It was from the character of Hipparchus that all the evils arose which befell the house. He became enamoured of Harmodius, and, since he failed to win his affection, he lost all restraint upon his passion, and after several other insults he finally manifested his rage by forbidding the sister of Harmodius to take the part of a basket-bearer in the Panathenaic procession, insulting Harmodius at the same time by alleging as his reason that he was a person of loose life. The result of this was that Harmodius and Aristogeiton, in a frenzy of wrath, did their celebrated deed, in conjunction with a number of other citizens. But while they were watching Hippias in the Acrop-

olis during the Panathenaea (Hippias, at this moment, was initiating the sacrifice, while Hipparchus was organizing the procession) they saw one of the persons privy to the plot talking familiarly with him. Thinking that he was betraying them, and desiring to do something before they were arrested, they rushed down and made their attempt without waiting for the rest of their confederates, and killed Hipparchus near the Leocoreum while he was engaged in arranging the procession. This, however, ruined the design as a whole; and, of the two leaders, Harmodius was killed on the spot by the guards, while Aristogeiton was arrested later, and perished after suffering long tortures. While under the torture he accused many persons who belonged by birth to the most distinguished families and were also personal friends of the tyrants. At first the government could find no clue to the conspiracy; for the current story, that Hippias made all who were taking part in the procession leave their arms, and then detected those who were carrying secret daggers, cannot be true, since at that time they did not bear arms in the processions, this being a custom instituted at a later period by the democracy. According to the story of the popular party, Aristogeiton accused the friends of the tyrants **with** the deliberate intention that the latter might commit an impious act, and at the same time weaken themselves by putting to death innocent men who were their own friends; others say that he told no falsehood, but was betraying the actual accomplices. At last, when for all his efforts he could not obtain release by death, he promised to give further information against a number of other persons; and, having induced Hippias to give him his hand to confirm his word, as soon as he had hold of it he reviled him for giving his hand to the murderer of his brother, till Hippias, in a frenzy of rage, lost control of himself and drew out his dagger and despatched him.

19. After this event the tyranny became much harsher. In consequence of his vengeance for his brother, and of the execution and banishment of a large number of persons, Hippias became a distrustful and an embittered man. About three years after the death of Hipparchus, finding his position in the city insecure, he set about fortifying Munychia, with the intention of removing thither. While he was still engaged on this work, however, he was expelled by Cleomenes, king of Lacedaemon, in consequence of the Spartans being continually warned by oracles to overthrow the tyranny. The oracles were obtained in the following way. The Athenian exiles, headed by the Alcmeonidae, could not by their own power effect their return,

but failed continually in their attempts. Among their other failures, they fortified a post in Attica, Lipsydrium, above Mt. Parnes, and were there joined by some partisans from the city; but they were besieged by the tyrants and reduced to surrender. After this disaster the following became a popular drinking song:—

Ah! for Lipsydrium, name of woe
And treachery; ah! for the men laid low,
Nobly born and great in deed;
Well did they prove themselves at need
Of noble sires a noble seed.

Having failed, then, in every other method, they took the contract for rebuilding the temple at Delphi, using for that purpose the considerable wealth which they possessed, with the view of securing the help of the Lacedaemonians. The Pythia accordingly was continually enjoining on the Lacedaemonians who came to consult the oracle, that they must free Athens; and very soon she succeeded in turning the Spartans in that direction, although the house of Pisistratus was connected with them by ties of hospitality. At the same time the resolution of the Lacedaemonians was at least equally due to the friendship which had been formed between the house of Pisistratus and Argos. Accordingly they first sent Anchimolus by sea at the head of an army; but he was defeated and killed, through the arrival of Cineas of Thessaly to support the sons of Pisistratus with a force of a thousand horsemen. Then, being roused to anger by this disaster, they sent their king, Cleomenes, by land at the head of a larger force; and he, after defeating the Thessalian cavalry when they attempted to intercept his march into Attica, shut up Hippias within what was known as the Pelargic wall and blockaded him there with the assistance of the Athenians. While he was sitting down before the place, it so happened that the sons of the Pisistratidae were captured in an attempt to make their escape from the country; upon which the tyrants capitulated on condition of the safety of their children, and surrendered the Acropolis to the Athenians, five days being first allowed them to remove their effects. This took place in the archonship of Harpactides, after they had held the tyranny for about seventeen years since their father's death, or in all, including the period of their father's rule, for nine and forty years.

20. After the overthrow of the tyranny, the rival leaders in the state were Isagoras son of Tisander, a partisan of the tyrants, and

Cleisthenes, who belonged to the family of the Alcmeonidae. Cleisthenes, being beaten in the political clubs, attracted the people to his side by giving the franchise to the masses. Thereupon Isagoras, finding himself left inferior in power, invited Cleomenes, who was united to him by ties of hospitality, to return to Athens, and persuaded him to "drive out the pollution," a plea derived from the fact that the Alcmeonidae were supposed to be under the curse of pollution. On this, Cleisthenes, with a few of his adherents, retired from the country, and Cleomenes expelled, as polluted, seven hundred Athenian families. Having effected this, he next attempted to dissolve the Council, and to set up Isagoras and three hundred of his partisans as the supreme power in the state. The Council, however, resisted, the populace flocked together, and Cleomenes and Isagoras, with their adherents, took refuge in the Acropolis. Here the people sat down and besieged them for two days; and on the third they agreed to let Cleomenes and all his followers depart, while they sent to summon Cleisthenes and the other exiles back to Athens. When the people had thus obtained the command of affairs, Cleisthenes was their chief and the leader of the people. And this was natural; for the Alcmeonidae were perhaps the chief cause of the expulsion of the tyrants, and for the greater part of their rule they were at perpetual war with them. But even earlier than the attempts of the Alcmeonidae, Cedon made an attack on the tyrants; whence there was also a popular drinking song, addressed to him:—

Pour a health yet again, boy, to Cedon; forget not this duty to do,
If a health is an honour befitting the name of a good man and true.

21. The people, therefore, had good reason to place confidence in Cleisthenes. Accordingly when, at this time, he found himself at the head of the masses, three years after the expulsion of the tyrants, in the archonship of Isagoras, his first step was to distribute the whole population into ten tribes in place of the existing four, with the object of intermixing the members of the different tribes, so that more persons might have a share in the franchise. From this arose the saying "do not look at the tribes," addressed to those who wished to scrutinize the lists of the clans. Next he made the Council to consist of five hundred members instead of four hundred, each tribe now contributing fifty, whereas formerly each had sent a hundred. The reason why he did not organize the people into twelve tribes was that he might not have to divide them according to the already existing

Trittyes; for the four tribes had twelve Trittyes, so that he would not have achieved his object of redistributing the population in fresh combinations. Further, he divided the country by demes into thirty parts, ten from the districts about the city, ten from the coast, and ten from the interior. These he called Trittyes; and he assigned three of them by lot to each tribe, in such a way that each should have one portion in each of these three divisions. All who lived in any given deme he declared fellow-demesmen, to the end that the new citizens might not be exposed by the habitual use of family names, but that men might be known by the names of their demes; and accordingly it is by the names of their demes that the Athenians still speak of one another. He also instituted Demarchs, who had the same duties as the previously existing Naucrari,—the demes being made to take the place of the naucraries. He gave names to the demes, some from the localities to which they belonged, some from the persons who founded them, since some of them no longer corresponded to localities possessing names. On the other hand he allowed everyone to retain his family and clan and religious rites according to ancestral custom. The names given to the tribes were the ten which the Pythia appointed out of the hundred selected national heroes.

22. By these reforms the constitution became much more democratic than that of Solon. The laws of Solon had been obliterated by disuse during the period of the tyranny, while those which replaced them were drawn up by Cleisthenes with the object of securing the goodwill of the masses. Among these was the law concerning ostracism. Four years after the establishment of this system, in the archonship of Hermoucreon, they first imposed upon the Council of Five Hundred the oath which they take to the present day. Next they began to elect the generals according to tribes, one from each tribe, while the Polemarch was the commander of the whole army. Then, eleven years later, they won the victory of Marathon, in the archonship of Phaenippus; and two years after this victory, when the people had now gained self-confidence, they for the first time made use of the law of ostracism. It was originally passed as a precaution against men in high office, because Pisistratus took advantage of his position as a popular leader and general to make himself tyrant; and the first person ostracised was one of his relatives, Hipparchus son of Charmus, of the deme of Colyttus, the very person on whose account especially Cleisthenes had passed the law, as he wished to get rid of him. Hitherto, however, he had escaped; for the Athenians,

with the usual leniency of the democracy, allowed all the partisans of the tyrants, who had not joined in their evil deeds in the time of the troubles, to remain in the city; and the chief and leader of these was Hipparchus. Then in the very next year, in the archonship of Telesinus, they for the first time since the tyranny elected the nine Archons by lot out of the five hundred candidates selected by the demes, all the earlier ones having been elected by vote; and in the same year Megacles son of Hippocrates, of the deme of Alopece, was ostracised. Thus for three years they continued to ostracise the friends of the tyrants, on whose account the law had been passed; but in the following year they began to remove others as well, including anyone who seemed to be more powerful than was expedient. The first person unconnected with the tyrants who was ostracised was Xanthippus son of Ariphron. Two years later, in the archonship of Nicodemus, the mines of Maroneia were discovered, and the state made a profit of a hundred talents from the working of them. Some persons advised the people to make a distribution of the money among themselves, but this was prevented by Themistocles. He refused to say on what he proposed to spend the money, but he bade them lend it to the hundred richest men in Athens, one talent to each, and then, if the manner in which it was employed pleased the people, the expenditure should be charged to the state, but otherwise the state should receive the sum back from those to whom it was lent. On these terms he received the money and with it he had a hundred triremes built, each of the hundred individuals building one; and it was with these ships that they fought the battle of Salamis against the barbarians. About this time Aristides the son of Lysimachus was ostracised. Three years later, however, in the archonship of Hypsichides, all the ostracised persons were recalled, on account of the advance of the army of Xerxes; and it was laid down for the future that persons under sentence of ostracism must live between Geraestus and Scyllaeum, on pain of losing their civic rights irrevocably.

23. Up to this point had the city progressed by this time in gradual growth, the democracy growing with it; but after the Persian wars the Council of Areopagus once more developed strength and assumed the control of the state. It did not acquire this supremacy by virtue of any formal decree, but because it had been the cause of the battle of Salamis being fought. When the generals were utterly at a loss how to meet the crisis and made proclamation that everyone

must see to his own safety, the Areopagus provided a donation of money, distributing eight drachmas to each member of the ships' crews, and so prevailed on them to go on board. On these grounds it obtained a great advance in public estimation; and during this period Athens was well administered. At this time they devoted themselves to the prosecution of the war and were in high repute among the Greeks, and the command by sea was conferred upon them, in spite of the opposition of the Lacedaemonians. The leaders of the people during this period were Aristides, son of Lysimachus, and Themistocles, son of Neocles, of whom the latter devoted himself to the conduct of war, while the former had the reputation of being a clever statesman and the most upright man of his time. Accordingly the one was usually employed as general, the other as a political adviser. The rebuilding of the fortifications they conducted in combination, although they were political opponents; but it was Aristides who guided the public policy in the matter of the defection of the Ionian states and the alliance with Sparta, seizing the opportunity afforded by the discredit brought upon the Lacedaemonians by the misconduct of Pausanias. It follows that it was he who arranged the tribute from the various allied states, which was first instituted two years after the battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Timosthenes; and it was he who took the oath of offensive and defensive alliance with the Ionians, on which occasion they cast the masses of iron into the sea.

24. After this, seeing the state growing in confidence and much wealth accumulated, he advised the people to lay hold of the leadership of the league, and to quit the country districts and settle in the city. He pointed out to them that all would be able to gain a living there, some by service in the army, others in the garrisons, others by taking a part in public affairs; and in this way they would secure the leadership. This advice was taken; and when the people had assumed the supreme control they proceeded to treat their allies in a more imperious fashion, with the exception of the Chians, Lesbians, and Samians. These they maintained to protect their empire, leaving their constitutions untouched, and allowing them to retain whatever dominion they then possessed. They also secured an ample maintenance for the mass of the population in the way which Aristides had pointed out to them. Out of the proceeds of the tributes and the taxes and the contributions of the allies more than twenty thousand persons were maintained. There were 600 jurymen, 1,600 bow-

men, 1,200 Knights, 500 members of the Council, 500 guards of the dockyards, besides fifty guards in the city. There were some 700 magistrates within the city, and some 700 whose jurisdiction lay outside of it. Further, when they subsequently went to war, there were in addition 2,500 heavy armed troops, twenty guard-ships, and other ships which collected the tributes, with crews amounting to 2,000 men, selected by lot; and besides these there were the persons maintained at the Prytaneum, and orphans, and gaolers, since all these were supported by the state.

25. In this way the people earned their livelihood. The supremacy of the Areopagus lasted, however, for about seventeen years after the Persian wars, although gradually declining. But as the strength of the masses increased, Ephialtes, son of Sophonides, a man with a reputation for incorruptibility and possessing a high public character, who had become the leader of the people, made an attack upon that Council. First of all he caused the destruction of many of its members by bringing actions against them with reference to their administration. Then, in the archonship of Conon, he stripped the Council of all the acquired prerogatives from which it derived its guardianship of the constitution, and assigned some of them to the Council of Five Hundred, and others to the Assembly and the law-courts. In this revolution he was assisted by Themistocles, who was himself a member of the Areopagus, but was expecting to be tried before it on a charge of treasonable dealings with Persia. This made him anxious that it should be overthrown, and accordingly he warned Ephialtes that the Council intended to arrest him, while at the same time he informed the Areopagites that he would reveal to them certain persons who were conspiring to subvert the constitution. He then conducted the representatives delegated by the Council to the residence of Ephialtes, promising to show them the conspirators who assembled there, and proceeded to converse with them in an earnest manner. Ephialtes, seeing this, was seized with alarm and took refuge in suppliant guise at the altar. Everyone was astounded at the occurrence, and presently, when the Council of Five Hundred met, Ephialtes and Themistocles together proceeded to denounce the Areopagus to them. This they repeated in similar fashion in the Assembly, until they succeeded in depriving it of its power. Not long afterwards, however, Ephialtes was assassinated by Aristodicus of Tanagra. In this way was the Council of Areopagus deprived of its guardianship of the state.

26. After this revolution the administration of the state became more and more lax, in consequence of the eager rivalry of candidates for popular favour. During this period the moderate party, as it happened, had no real chief, their leader being Cimon son of Miltiades, who was a comparatively young man, and also was late in entering public life; and at the same time the mass of the people suffered great losses by war. The soldiers for active service were selected at that time from the roll of citizens, and as the generals were men of no military experience, who owed their position solely to their family standing, it continually happened that some two or three thousand of the troops perished on an expedition; and in this way the best men alike of the lower and the upper classes were exhausted. The result was that in most matters of administration less heed was paid to the laws than had formerly been the case. No alteration, however, was made in the method of election of the nine Archons, except that five years after the death of Ephialtes it was decided that the candidates to be submitted to the lot for that office might be selected from the Zeugitae as well as from the higher classes. The first Archon from that class was Mnesitheides; up to this time all the Archons had been taken from the Pentacosiomedimni and Knights, while the Zeugitae were confined to the ordinary magistracies, save where an evasion of the law was overlooked. Four years later, in the archonship of Lysicrates, the thirty "local justices," as they were called, were re-established; and two years afterwards, in the archonship of Antidotus, in consequence of the great increase in the number of citizens, it was resolved, on the motion of Pericles, that no one should be admitted to the franchise who was not of citizen birth by both parents.

27. After this Pericles assumed the position of popular leader, having first distinguished himself while still a young man by prosecuting Cimon on the audit of his official accounts as general. Under his auspices the constitution became still more democratic. He took away some of the privileges of the Areopagus, and, above all, he turned the policy of the state in the direction of naval dominion, which caused the masses to acquire confidence in themselves and consequently to take the conduct of affairs more and more into their own hands. Moreover, forty-eight years after the battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Pythodorus, the Peloponnesian war broke out, during which the populace was shut up in the city and became accustomed to gain its livelihood by military service, and so, partly

voluntarily and partly involuntarily, determined to assume the administration of the state itself. Pericles was also the first to institute pay for service in the law-courts, as a bid for popular favour to counterbalance the wealth of Cimon. The latter, having private possessions of royal splendour, not only performed the regular public services magnificently, but also maintained a large number of his fellow-demesmen. Any member of the deme of Laciadae could go every day to Cimon's house and there receive a reasonable provision; and his estate was guarded by no fences, so that anyone who liked might help himself to the fruit from it. Pericles' private property was quite unequal to this magnificence, and accordingly he took the advice of Damonides of Oia (who was commonly supposed to be the person who prompted Pericles in most of his measures, and was therefore subsequently ostracised), which was that, as he was beaten in the matter of private possessions, he should make presents to the people from their own property; and accordingly he instituted pay for the members of the juries. Some persons accuse him of thereby causing a deterioration in the character of the juries, since it was always the inferior people who were anxious to submit themselves for selection as jurors, rather than the men of better position. Moreover, bribery came into existence after this, the first person to introduce it being Anytus, after his command at Pylus. He was prosecuted by certain individuals on account of his loss of Pylus, but escaped by bribing the jury.

28. So long, however, as Pericles was leader of the people, things went tolerably well with the state; but when he was dead there was a great change for the worse. Then for the first time did the people choose a leader who was of no reputation among people of good standing, whereas up to this time men of good standing were always found as leaders of the democracy. The first leader of the people, in the very beginning of things, was Solon, and the second was Pisistratus, both of them men of birth and position. After the overthrow of the tyrants there was Cleisthenes, a member of the house of the Alcmeonidae; and he had no rival opposed to him after the expulsion of the party of Isagoras. After this Xanthippus was the leader of the people, and Miltiades of the upper class. Then came Themistocles and Aristides, and after them Ephialtes as leader of the people, and Cimon son of Miltiades of the wealthier class. Pericles followed as leader of the people, and Thucydides, who was connected by marriage with Cimon, of the opposition. After the

death of Pericles, Nicias, who subsequently fell in Sicily, appeared as leader of the aristocracy, and Cleon son of Cleaenetus as that of the people. The latter seems, more than anyone else, to have been the cause of the corruption of the democracy by his wild undertakings; and he was the first to use unseemly shouting and coarse abuse on the Bema, and to harangue the people with his cloak girt up short about him, whereas all his predecessors had spoken decently and in order. These were succeeded by Theramenes son of Hagnon as leader of the one party, and Cleophon the lyre-maker of the people. It was Cleophon who first granted the two-obol donation for the theatrical performances, and for some time he continued to give it; but then Callicrates of Paeania ousted him by promising to add a third obol to the sum. Both of these persons were subsequently condemned to death; for the people, even if they are deceived for a time, in the end generally come to detest those who have beguiled them into any unworthy action. After Cleophon the popular leadership was occupied successively by the men who chose to talk the biggest and pander to the tastes of the majority, with their eyes fixed only on the interests of the moment. The best of the statemen at Athens, after those of early times, seem to have been Nicias, Thucydides, and Theramenes. As to Nicias and Thucydides, nearly everyone also statesmen, and that they acted in all their public life in a manner worthy of their ancestry. On the merits of Theramenes opinion is divided, because it so happened that in his time public affairs were in a very stormy state. But those who give their opinion deliberately find him, not, as his critics falsely assert, overthrowing every kind of constitution, but supporting every kind so long as it did not transgress the laws; thus showing that he was able, as every good citizen should be, to live under any form of constitution, while he refused to countenance illegality and was its constant enemy.

29. So long as the fortune of the war continued even, the Athenians preserved the democracy; but after the disaster in Sicily, when the Lacedaemonians had gained the upper hand through their alliance with the king of Persia, they were compelled to abolish the democracy and establish in its place the constitution of the Four Hundred. The speech recommending this course before the vote was made by Melobius, and the motion was drawn up by Pythodorus; but the real argument which persuaded the majority was the belief that the king of Persia was more likely to form an alliance with them if they should establish an oligarchy. The motion of Pytho-

dorus was to the following effect. The popular Assembly was to elect twenty persons, over forty years of age, who, in conjunction with the existing ten members of the Committee of Public Safety, should take an oath that they would frame such proposals as they thought best for the state, and should then draw up proposals for the public safety. In addition, any other person was free to make any proposition he liked, so that the people might be able to choose the best of all the courses suggested to them. Cleitophon concurred with the motion of Pythodorus, but proposed that the committee should also investigate the ancient laws drawn up by Cleisthenes when he created the democracy, in order that they might have these too before them before deciding on what was the best; his suggestion being that the constitution of Cleisthenes was not really democratical, but closely akin to that of Solon. When the committee was elected, their first proposal was that the Prytanes should be compelled to put to the vote any motion that was offered on behalf of the public safety. Next they abolished all indictments for illegal proposals, all impeachments and public prosecutions, in order that every Athenian should be free to give his counsel on the situation, if he chose; and they decreed that if any person imposed a fine on any other for his acts in this respect, or prosecuted him or summoned him before the courts, he should, on an information being laid against him, be summarily arrested and brought before the generals, who should deliver him to the Eleven to be put to death. After these preliminary measures, they drew up the constitution in the following manner. The revenues of the state were not to be spent on any purpose except the war. All magistrates should serve without remuneration, so long as the war should last, except the nine Archons and the Prytanes for the time being, who should each receive three obols a day. The general franchise was to be committed, so long as the war should last, to all Athenians who were most capable of serving the state personally or pecuniarily, to the number of not less than five thousand. This body was to have full powers, to the extent even of making treaties with whomever they willed; and ten men, over forty years of age, were to be elected out of each tribe to draw up the list of the Five Thousand, after taking an oath on a full and perfect sacrifice.

30. These were the proposals put forward by the committee; and when they had been ratified the Five Thousand elected from their own number a hundred commissioners to draw up the constitution. They, on their appointment, drew up and produced the following

propositions. There should be a Council, holding office for a year, consisting of men over thirty years of age, serving without pay. To this body should belong the Generals, the nine Archons, the Amphictyonic Register [Hieromnemon], the Taxiarchs, the Hipparchs, the Phylarchs, the commanders of garrisons, the Treasurers of Athena and the other gods, ten in number, the Hellenic Treasurers [Hellenotamiae], the Treasurers of the other non-sacred moneys, to the number of twenty, the ten Commissioners of Sacrifices [Hieropoei] and the ten Superintendents of the mysteries. All these were to be appointed from a larger number of selected candidates, chosen from the members of the Council for the time being. The other offices were all to be filled by lot, and not from the members of the Council. The Hellenic Treasurers who actually administered the funds were not to be members of the Council. As regards the future, four Councils were to be created, of men of the age already mentioned, and one of these was to be chosen by lot to take office at once, while the others were to receive it in turn, in the order decided by the lot. For this purpose the hundred commissioners were to distribute themselves and the other three hundred as equally as possible into four parts, and cast lots for precedence, and the selected body should hold office for a year. They were to administer that office as seemed to them best, both with reference to the safe custody and due expenditure of the finances, and generally with all other matters to the best of their ability. If they desired to take a larger number of persons into counsel, each member might call in one assistant of his own choice, subject to the same qualification of age. The Council was to sit once every five days, unless there was any special need for more frequent sittings. The casting of the lot for the Council was to be held by the nine Archons; votes on divisions were to be counted by five persons chosen by lot from the members of the Council, and of these one was to be selected by lot every day to act as president. These five persons were to cast lots for precedence between the parties wishing to appear before the Council, giving the first place to sacred matters, the second to heralds, the third to embassies, and the fourth to all other subjects; but matters concerning the war might be dealt with, on the motion of the generals, whenever there was need, without balloting. Any member of the Council who did not enter the Council-house at the time named should be fined a drachma for each day, unless he was away on leave of absence from the Council.

31. Such was the constitution which they drew up for the time

to come, but for the immediate present they devised the following scheme. There should be a Council of Four Hundred, as in the ancient constitution, forty from each tribe, chosen out of candidates of more than thirty years of age, selected by the members of the tribes. This Council should appoint the magistrates and draw up the form of oath which they were to take; and in all that concerned the laws, in the examination of official accounts, and in other matters generally, it might act according to its discretion. It must, however, observe the laws that might be enacted with reference to the constitution of the state, and had no power to alter them nor to pass others. The generals should be provisionally elected from the whole body of the Five Thousand, but so soon as the Council came into existence it was to hold an examination of military equipments, and thereon elect ten persons, together with a secretary, and the persons thus elected should hold office during the coming year with full powers, and should have the right, whenever they desired it, of joining in the deliberations of the Council. The Five Thousand was also to elect a single Hipparch and ten Phylarchs; but for the future the Council was to elect these officers according to the regulations above laid down. Neither these offices nor any others, except those of member of the Council and of General, might be held more than once, either by the first occupants or by their successors. With reference to the future distribution of the Four Hundred into the four successive sections, the hundred commissioners must divide them whenever the citizens shall be admitted to a share in the Council along with the rest.

32. The hundred commissioners appointed by the Five Thousand drew up the constitution as just stated; and after it had been ratified by the general voice, under the presidency of Aristomachus, the Council was dissolved before it had completed its term of office. It was dissolved on the fourteenth day of the month Thargelion, in the archonship of Callias, and the Four Hundred entered into office on the twenty-first; whereas the regular Council, elected by lot, ought to have entered into office on the fourteenth of Sciropodion. Thus was the oligarchy established, in the archonship of Callias, just about a hundred years after the expulsion of the tyrants. The chief promoters of the revolution were Pisander, Antiphon, and Theramenes, all of them men of good birth and with high reputations for ability and judgment. When, however, this constitution had been established, the Five Thousand were only nominally selected, and the Four

Hundred, together with the ten officers on whom full powers had been conferred, occupied the Council-house and really administered the government. They began by sending ambassadors to the Lacedaemonians proposing a cessation of the war on the terms of the status quo; but as the Lacedaemonians refused to listen to them unless they would also abandon their maritime empire, they abandoned the negotiations.

33. For about four months the constitution of the Four Hundred continued, and Mnasilochus held office as Archon of their nomination for two months of the year of Theopompus, who was Archon for the remaining ten. After the loss of the naval battle of Eretria, however, and the revolt of the whole of Euboea except Oreum, the indignation of the people was greater than at any of the earlier disasters, since they drew far more supplies at this time from Euboea than from Attica itself. Accordingly they deposed the Four Hundred and committed the management of affairs to the Five Thousand, who consisted of persons possessing a military equipment. At the same time they voted that pay should not be given for any public office. The persons chiefly responsible for the revolution were Aristocrates and Theramenes, who disapproved of the action of the Four Hundred in retaining the direction of affairs entirely in their own hands, and referring nothing to the Five Thousand. The constitution of the state seems to have been admirable during this period, since it was a time of war and the franchise was in the hands of those who possessed a military equipment.

34. The people, however, in a very short time deprived the Five Thousand of their monopoly of the franchise. Then, six years after the overthrow of the Four Hundred, in the archonship of Callias of Angele, the battle of Arginusae took place, of which the results were, first, that the ten generals who had gained the victory were all condemned by a single vote, owing to the people being led astray by persons who aroused their indignation; though, as a matter of fact, some of the generals had actually taken no part in the battle, and others were themselves picked up by other vessels. Secondly, when the Lacedaemonians proposed to evacuate Decelea and make peace on terms of the status quo, although some of the Athenians supported this proposal, the majority refused to listen to them. In this they were led astray by Cleophon, who appeared in the Assembly drunk and wearing his breast-plate, and prevented peace being made, declaring that he would never accept peace unless the Lacedaemonians

abandoned their claims on all the cities allied with them. They mis-managed their opportunity then, and in a very short time they learnt their mistake. The next year, in the archonship of Alexias, they suffered the disaster of Aegospotami, the result of which was that Lysander became master of the city, and set up the Thirty as its governors. He did so in the following manner. One of the terms of peace stipulated that the state should be governed according to "the ancient constitution." Accordingly the popular party tried to preserve the democracy, while that part of the upper class which belonged to the political clubs, together with the exiles who had returned since the peace, desired an oligarchy, and those who were not members of any club, though in other respects they held a position in the state inferior to none, were anxious to restore the ancient constitution. The latter class included Archinus, Anytus, Cleitophon, Phormisius, and many others, but their most prominent leader was Theramenes. Lysander, however, threw his influence on the side of the oligarchical party, and the popular Assembly was compelled by sheer intimidation to pass a vote establishing the oligarchy. The motion to this effect was proposed by Dracontides of Aphidna.

35. In this way were the Thirty established in power, in the archonship of Pythodorus. As soon, however, as they were masters of the city, they ignored all the votes which had been passed relating to the organization of the constitution, but appointed a Council of Five Hundred and the other magistrates out of the thousand selected candidates, associated with themselves ten archons in Piraeus, eleven superintendents of the prison, and three hundred "lash bearers" as attendants, and with the help of these they kept the city under their control. At first, indeed, they behaved with moderation towards the citizens and pretended to administer the state according to the ancient constitution. In pursuance of this policy they took down from the hill of Areopagus the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratus relating to the Areopagite Council; they also repealed such of the statutes of Solon as were obscure, and abolished the supreme power of the law-courts. In this they claimed to be restoring the constitution and freeing it from obscurities; as, for instance, by making the testator free once for all to leave his property as he pleased, and abolishing the existing limitations in cases of insanity, old age, and undue female influence, in order that no opening might be left for professional accusers. In other matters also their conduct was similar. At first, then, they acted on these lines, and they destroyed the professional accusers

and those mischievous and evil-minded persons who, to the great detriment of the democracy, had attached themselves to it in order to curry favour with it. With all of this the city was much pleased, and thought that the Thirty did it with the best of motives. But so soon as they had got a firmer hold on the city, they spared no class of citizens, but put to death any persons who were eminent for wealth or birth and character. Herein they aimed at removing all whom they had reason to fear, and they also wished to lay hands on their possessions; and in a short time they put to death not less than fifteen hundred persons.

36. Theramenes, however, seeing the city thus falling into ruin, was displeased with their proceedings, and counselled them to cease such unprincipled conduct and let the better classes have a share in the government. At first they opposed his suggestions, but when his proposals came to be known abroad, and the masses began to be on friendly terms with him, they were seized with alarm lest he should make himself a popular leader and destroy their despotic power. Accordingly they drew up a list of three thousand citizens, to whom they proposed to give a share in the constitution. Theramenes, however, criticised this scheme also, first on the ground that, while proposing to give all the respectable classes a share in the constitution, they were actually giving it only to three thousand persons, as if all merit were confined within that number; and secondly because they were doing two inconsistent things, since they made the government rest on the basis of force, and yet made the governors inferior in strength to the governed. However, they took no notice of his criticisms, and for a long time put off the publication of the list of the Three Thousand and kept to themselves the names of those who had been placed on it; and whenever they did decide to publish it they proceeded to strike out some of those who had been included in it, and insert others from outside.

37. Now when winter had set in, Thrasybulus and the exiles occupied Phyle, and the force which the Thirty led out to attack them met with a reverse. Thereupon the Thirty decided to disarm the bulk of the population and to get rid of Theramenes; which they did in the following way. They introduced two laws into the Council, which they commanded it to pass; the first of them gave the Thirty absolute power to put to death any citizen who was not included in the list of the Three Thousand, while the second incapacitated all persons from participation in the franchise who should have assisted

in the demolition of the fort of Eetioneia, or have acted in any way against the Four Hundred or against those who had organized the previous oligarchy. Theramenes had done both, and accordingly, when these laws were ratified, he became excluded from the franchise and the Thirty had full power to put him to death. Theramenes having been thus removed, they disarmed all the people except the Three Thousand, and in every respect showed a great advance in cruelty and crime. They also sent ambassadors to Lacedaemon to blacken the character of Theramenes and to ask for help; and the Lacedaemonians, in answer to their appeal, sent Callibius as harmost with about seven hundred troops, who came and occupied the Acropolis.

38. These events were followed by the occupation of Munychia by the exiles from Phyle, and their victory over the Thirty and their partisans. After the fight the party of the city retreated, and next day they held a meeting in the market-place and deposed the Thirty, and elected ten citizens, on whom they conferred full powers to bring the war to a termination. When, however, the Ten had taken over the government they did nothing towards the object for which they were elected, but sent envoys to Lacedaemon to ask for help and to borrow money. Further, finding that those who possessed the franchise were displeased at their proceedings, they were afraid lest they should be deposed, and consequently, in order to strike terror into them (in which design they succeeded), they arrested . . . emaretus, one of the most eminent citizens, and put him to death. This gave them a firm hold on the government, and they also had the support of Callibius and his Peloponnesians, together with several of the Knights; for some of the members of this class were the most zealous among the citizens to prevent the return of the exiles from Phyle. When, however, the exiles in Piraeus and Munychia began to gain the upper hand in the war, through the defection of the whole people to them, the party in the city deposed the original Ten, and elected another Ten, consisting of the men who possessed the highest character. Under their administration, and with their active and zealous co-operation, the treaty of reconciliation was made and the democracy returned to the city. The most prominent members of this board were Rhinon of Paeania and Phayllus of Acherdus, who, even before the arrival of Pausanias, opened negotiations with the party in Piraeus, and after his arrival seconded his efforts to bring about the return of the exiles. For it was Pausanias, the king of the Lacedaemonians, who brought the peace and reconciliation to a fulfilment, in conjunction with the

ten commissioners of arbitration who arrived later from Lacedaemon, chiefly at his earnest request. Rhinon and his colleagues received a vote of thanks for the good will shown by them to the democracy, and though they received their charge under an oligarchy and handed in their accounts under a democracy, no one, either of the party that had stayed in the city or of the exiles that had returned from the Piraeus, brought any complaint against them. On the contrary, Rhinon was immediately elected general on account of his conduct in this office.

39. The following were the terms on which the reconciliation was effected, in the archonship of Eucleides. All persons who, having remained in the city during the troubles, were now anxious to leave it, were to be free to settle at Eleusis, retaining their civil rights and possessing full and independent powers of self-government, and with the free enjoyment of their own personal property. The temple at Eleusis should be common ground for both parties, and should be under the superintendence of the Ceryces and the Eumolpidae, according to primitive custom. The settlers at Eleusis should not be allowed to enter Athens, nor the people of Athens to enter Eleusis, except at the season of the mysteries, when both parties should be free from these restrictions. The secessionists should pay their share to the fund for the common defence out of their revenues, just like all the other Athenians. If any of the seceding party wished to take a house in Eleusis, the people would help them to obtain the consent of the owner; but if they could not come to terms, they should appoint three valuers on either side, and the owner should receive whatever price they should appoint. Of the inhabitants of Eleusis, those whom the secessionists wished to remain should be allowed to do so. The list of those who desired to secede should be made up within seven days after the taking of the oaths in the case of persons already in the country, and their actual departure should take place within twenty days; persons at present out of the country should have the same terms allowed to them after their return. No one who settled at Eleusis should be capable of holding any office in Athens until he should again be inscribed on the roll as a resident in the city. Trials for homicide should be conducted according to the primitive fashion, which required that any person who killed another should pay a penalty, which he consecrated to the gods. There should be an universal amnesty concerning past events towards all persons, except the Thirty, the Ten, the Eleven, and the magistrates in Piraeus; and these too should

be included if they should submit their accounts in the usual way. Such accounts should be given by the magistrates in Piraeus for all matters coming within the limits of Piraeus, and by the magistrates in the city for all that came within the limits of the city. On these terms those who wished to do so might secede. Each party was to repay separately the money which it had borrowed for the war.

40. When the reconciliation had taken place on these terms, those who had fought on the side of the Thirty felt considerable apprehensions, and a large number intended to secede. But as they put off entering their names till the last moment, as people will do, Archinus, observing their numbers, and being anxious to retain them as citizens, cut off the remaining days during which the list should have remained open; and in this way many persons were compelled to remain, though they were very unwilling to do so until they recovered confidence. This is one point in which Archinus appears to have acted in a most statesmanlike manner, and another was his prosecution of Thrasybulus on the charge of illegality, for a motion by which he proposed to confer the franchise on all who had taken part in the return from Piraeus, although some of them were notoriously slaves. And yet a third such action was when one of the returned exiles began to violate the amnesty, whereupon Archinus haled him to the Council and persuaded them to execute him without trial, telling them that now they had an opportunity of showing whether they wished to preserve the democracy and abide by the oaths they had taken; for if they let this man escape they would encourage others to imitate him, while if they executed him they would set an example to all men. And this was exactly what happened; for after this man had been put to death no one ever again broke the amnesty. On the contrary, the Athenians, seem, both in public and in private, to have behaved in the most unprecedentedly admirable and public-spirited way with reference to the preceding troubles. Not only did they blot out all memory of former offenses, but they even repaid to the Lacedaemonians out of the public purse the money which the Thirty had borrowed for the war, although the treaty required each party, the party of the city and the party of Piraeus, to pay its own debts separately. This they did because they thought it was a necessary first step in the direction of restoring harmony; but in other states, so far from the democratic parties making advances from their own possessions, they rather make a general re-distribution of the land. A further reconciliation was made with the secessionists at Eleusis two years after the secession,

in the archonship of Xenaenetus.

41. This, however, took place at a later date; at the time of which we are speaking the people, having secured the control of the state, established the constitution which exists at the present day. Pythodorus was archon at the time, but the democracy seems to have assumed the supreme power with perfect justice, since it had effected its own return by its own exertions. This was the eleventh change which had taken place in the constitution of Athens. First of all came the original establishment by Ion and those who assisted him in forming the settlement, when the people was first divided into the four tribes, and the tribe-kings were created. Next, and the first organization of the constitution following this, was that which took place in the reign of Theseus, consisting in a slight deviation from absolute monarchy. After this came the constitution formed under Draco, when the first code of laws was drawn up. The third was that which followed the civil war, in the time of Solon; from this the democracy took its rise. The fourth was the tyranny of Pisistratus; the fifth the constitution of Cleisthenes, after the overthrow of the tyrants, of a more democratic character than that of Solon. The sixth was that which followed on the Persian wars, when the Council of Areopagus had the direction of the state. The seventh, succeeding this, was the constitution which Aristides sketched out, and which Ephialtes brought to completion by overthrowing the Areopagite Council; under this the nation, misled by the demagogues, made the most serious mistakes on account of its maritime empire. The eighth was the establishment of the Four Hundred, followed by the ninth, the restored democracy. The tenth was the tyranny of the Thirty and the Ten. The eleventh was that which followed the return from Phyle and Piraeus; and this has continued from that day to this, with continual accretions of power to the masses. The democracy has made itself master of everything and administers everything by its votes in the Assembly and by the law-courts, in which it holds the supreme power. Even the jurisdiction of the Council has passed into the hands of the people at large; and this appears to be a judicious change, since small bodies are more open to corruption, whether by actual money or by influence, than large ones. At first they refused to allow payment for attendance at the Assembly; but the result was that people did not attend, and often votes were passed by the Prytanes alone. Consequently, in order to induce the populace to come and ratify the votes, Agyrrhius, in the first instance, made a provision of one obol a day, which Heracleides

of Clazomenae, nicknamed "the king," increased to two obols, and Agyrrhius again to three.

42. The present state of the constitution is as follows. The franchise is open to all who are of citizen-birth by both parents. They are enrolled among the demesmen at the age of eighteen. On the occasion of their enrolment the demesmen give their votes on oath, first as to whether they appear to be of the age prescribed by the law (if not, they are dismissed back into the ranks of the boys), and secondly as to whether the candidate is free born and of such parentage as the law requires. Then if they decide that he is not a free man, he appeals to the law-courts, and the demesmen appoint five of their own number to act as accusers; and if the court decides that he has no right to be enrolled, he is sold by the state as a slave, but if he wins his case he has a right to be enrolled among the demesmen without further question. After this the Council examines those who have been enrolled, and if it comes to the conclusion that any of them is less than eighteen years of age, it fines the demesmen who enrolled him. When the youths [Ephebi] have passed this examination, their fathers meet by their tribes, and appoint on oath three of their fellow tribesmen, over forty years of age, who, in their opinion, are the best and most suitable persons to have charge of the youths; and of these the Assembly elects one from each tribe as guardian, together with a superintendent, chosen from the general body of Athenians, to control the whole. These persons take charge of the youths, and first of all they make the circuit of the temples; then they proceed to Piraeus, and some of them garrison Munychia and some the south shore. The Assembly also elects two trainers, with subordinate instructors, who teach them to fight in heavy armour, to use the bow and javelin, and to discharge a catapult. The guardians receive from the state a drachma apiece for their keep, and the youths four obols apiece. Each guardian receives the allowance for all the members of his tribe and buys the necessary provisions for the common stock (since they mess together by tribes), and generally superintends everything. In this way they spend the first year. The next year, when the Assembly is held in the theatre, after giving a public display of their military evolutions, they receive a shield and spear from the state; after which they patrol the country and spend their time in the forts. For these two years they are on garrison duty, and wear the military cloak, and during this time they are exempt from all taxes. They also can neither bring an action at law, nor have one brought against them, in order that they may

not be mixed up in civil business; though exception is made in cases of actions concerning inheritances and wards of state, or of any sacrificial ceremony connected with the clan of any individual. When the two years have elapsed they at once take their position among the other citizens. Such is the manner of the enrolment of the citizens and the training of the youths.

43. All the magistrates that are concerned with the ordinary routine of administration are elected by lot, except the Military Treasurer, the Commissioners of the Theoric fund, and the Superintendent of Springs. These are elected by vote, and the magistrates thus elected hold office from one Panathenaic festival to another. All military officers are also elected by vote. The Council of Five Hundred is elected by lot, fifty from each tribe. Each tribe holds the office of Prytanes in turn, the order being determined by lot; the first four serve for thirty-six days each, the last six for thirty-five, since the reckoning is by lunar years. The Prytanes for the time being, in the first place, mess together in the Tholus, and receive a sum of money from the state for their maintenance; and, secondly, they convene the meetings of the Council and the Assembly. The Council they convene every day, unless it is a holiday, the Assembly four times in each prytany. It is also their duty to draw up the programme of the matters with which the Council has to deal, and to decide what subjects are to be dealt with on each particular day, and what are not within its competence. They also draw up the programme for the meetings of the Assembly. The first of these in each prytany is called the "sovereign" Assembly; in this the people have to vote on the question whether the magistrates are performing their duties properly, and to consider the supply of corn and the defence of the country. On this day, too, impeachments are introduced by those who wish to do so, the lists of property confiscated by the state are read, and also applications for inheritances and wards of state, so that nothing may pass without the cognizance of any person concerned. In the sixth prytany, in addition to the business just stated, the question is also put to the vote whether it is desirable to hold a vote of ostracism or not; and complaints against professional accusers, whether Athenian or aliens domiciled in Athens, are received, to the number of not more than three of either class, together with cases in which an individual has made some promise to the people and has not performed it. The second Assembly of the prytany is assigned to suppliants, and at this meeting anyone is free, on depositing the sup-

pliant's olive branch, to speak to the people concerning any matter, public or private. The two other meetings are occupied with the remaining subjects, and the laws require them to deal with three questions connected with religion, three connected with heralds and embassies, and three on secular subjects. Sometimes questions are brought forward without the Assembly first voting them precedence. Heralds and envoys appear first before the Prytanes, and the bearers of despatches also deliver them to the same officials.

44. There is a single President of the Prytanes, elected by lot, who presides for a night and a day; he may not hold the office for more than that time, nor may the same individual hold it twice. He keeps the keys of the sanctuaries in which the treasures and public records of the state are preserved, and also the public seal; and he is bound to remain in the Tholus, together with one third of the Prytanes, named by himself. Whenever the Prytanes convene a meeting of the Council or Assembly, he appoints by lot nine Proedri, one from each tribe except that which holds the office of Prytanes for the time being; and out of these nine he similarly appoints one as President, and hands over the programme for the meeting to them. They take it and see to the preservation of order, and put forward the various subjects which are to be considered, decide the results of the votings, and direct the proceedings generally. They also have power to dismiss the meeting. No one may act as President more than once in the year, but he may be a Proedrus once in each prytany. Elections to the offices of General and Hipparch and all other military posts are held in the Assembly, in such manner as the people decide; and they are held after the sixth prytany by the first board of Prytanes in whose term of office the omens are favourable. There has, however, to be a preliminary consideration by the Council in this case also.

45. In former times the Council had full powers to inflict fines and imprisonment and death; and it was when it had dragged off Lysimachus to the executioner, and he was sitting in the immediate expectation of death, that Eumeleides of Alopece deprived it of its powers, maintaining that no citizen ought to be put to death except after a hearing by a court of law. Accordingly there was a trial in a law-court, and Lysimachus was acquitted, receiving henceforth the nickname of "the man from the drum-head"; and the people deprived the Council thenceforth of the power to inflict death or imprisonment or fine, passing a law that if the Council condemn any person for an

offence or inflict a fine, the Thesmothetae shall bring the sentence or fine before the law-court, and the decision of the jurors shall be the final judgment in the matter. The Council passes judgment on nearly all magistrates, especially those who have the control of money; its judgment, however, is not final, but is subject to an appeal to the law-courts. Private individuals, also, may impeach any magistrate they please for not obeying the laws, but here too there is an appeal to the law-courts if the Council declare the charge proved. The Council also examines those who are to be its members for the ensuing year, and also the nine Archons. Formerly the Council had full power to reject candidates for office as unsuitable, but now these too have an appeal to the law-courts. In all these matters, therefore, the Council has no final jurisdiction. It has, however, a preliminary consideration of all matters brought before the Assembly, and the Assembly cannot vote on any question unless it has first been considered by the Council and placed on the programme by the Prytanes; since a person who carries a motion in the Assembly is liable to an action for illegal proposal on these grounds.

46. The Council also superintends the triremes that are already in existence, with their tackle and sheds, and builds new triremes or quadriremes, whichever the Assembly votes, with tackle and sheds to match. The Assembly appoints master-builders for the ships by vote; and if they do not hand them over completed to the next Council, the old Council cannot receive the customary donation,—that being normally given to it during its successor's term of office. For the building of the triremes it appoints ten ship-builders, chosen out of the whole body of the people. The Council also inspects all public buildings, and if it is of opinion that the state is being defrauded, it reports the culprit to the Assembly, and after itself condemning him hands him over to the law-courts.

47. The Council also co-operates with the other magistrates in most of their duties. First there are the treasurers of Athena, ten in number, elected by lot, one from each tribe. According to the law of Solon—which is still in force—they must be Pentacosimedimni, but in point of fact the person on whom the lot falls holds the office even though he be quite a poor man. These officers take over charge of the statue of Athena, the figures of Victory and all the other ornaments of the temple, together with the money, in the presence of the Council. Then there are the Commissioners for Public Contracts [Poletae], ten in number, one elected by lot from each tribe. These

officers farm out the public contracts and lease the mines, and, in conjunction with the military treasurer and the commissioners of the Theoric fund, confirm the farming out of taxes, in the presence of the Council, to the persons whom the latter appoints. They also lease, in the presence of the Council, such workable mines as are let out by the state, which are let for three years, and the concessions which are let for [three] years, and also the property of those who have gone into exile from a sentence of the Areopagus, and of state-debtors; and the nine Archons ratify the contracts. They also hand over to the Council lists of the taxes which are farmed out for the year, entering on whitened tablets the name of the lessee and the amount paid. They make separate lists, first of those who have to pay their instalments in each prytany, on ten several tablets, next of those who pay at the end of the year, with a separate tablet for each instalment, and finally of those who pay in the ninth prytany. They also draw up a list of farms and dwellings which are leased or farmed out, and place it in the law-court; for these too come within their province. In the case of dwellings the value must be paid up in five years, and in that of farms, in ten. The instalments are paid in the ninth prytany. Further, the King-archon brings before the Council the leases of the sacred enclosures, written on whitened tablets. These too are leased for ten years, and the instalments are paid in the [ninth] prytany; consequently it is in this prytany that the greatest amount of money is collected. The tablets containing the lists of the instalments are carried into the Council, and the public clerk takes charge of them. Whenever a payment of instalments is to be made he delivers to the Receivers-General the precise columns containing the sums which are to be paid and struck off on that day. The rest are kept apart, in order that no sum may be struck off before it is paid.

48. There are ten Receivers-General [Apodectae], elected by lot, one from each tribe. These officers receive the tablets, and strike off the instalments as they are paid, in the presence of the Council in the Council-chamber, and give the tablets back to the public clerk. If anyone fails to pay his instalment, a note is made of it from this record, together with the cause; and he is bound to make good the deficiency, or, in default, to be imprisoned. The Council has full power by the laws to exact these payments and to inflict this imprisonment. They receive the money, therefore, on one day, and portion it out among the magistrates; and on the next day they bring up the report of the apportionment, written on a wooden notice-board, and read it

out in the Council-chamber, and after which they ask publicly in the Council whether anyone knows of any malpractice in reference to the apportionment, on the part of either a magistrate or a private individual, and if anyone is charged with malpractice they put the question to the vote.

The Council also elects ten Auditors [Logistae] by lot from its own members, to audit the accounts of the magistrates for each prytany. They also elect one Examiner of Accounts [Euthunus] by lot from each tribe, with two assessors [Paredri] for each examiner, whose duty it is to sit in the market-place, each opposite the statue of the eponymous hero of his tribe; and if anyone wishes, on the ground of some private difference, to question the accounts of any magistrate who has given in his accounts before the law-courts, within three days of his having given them in, the assessor enters on a whitened tablet the name of this person and that of the magistrate prosecuted, together with the malpractice that is alleged against him. Then he enters his claim for a penalty of such amount as seems to him fitting, and gives in the record to the Examiner. The latter takes it and hears the charge, and if he considers it proved he hands it over, if a private case, to the local justices who introduce cases for the tribe concerned, while if a public case he enters it on the register of the Thesmothetae. Then, if the Thesmothetae accept it, they bring the accounts of this magistrate once more before the law-court, and the decision of the jury stands as the final judgment.

49. The Council also examines the horses belonging to the state. If it finds one which, though sound will not go well, it mulcts it of some of its corn; while those which cannot go or which will not obey the rein, it brands with a wheel on the jaw, and the horse so marked is disqualified for service. It also examines those who appear to be fit for service as couriers, and anyone whom it rejects is deprived of his horse. It also examines the unmounted couriers, and anyone whom it rejects ceases to receive his pay. The roll of the cavalry is drawn up by the Commissioners of Enrolment [Catalogeis], ten in number, elected by the Assembly by open vote. They hand over to the Hipparchs and Phylarchs the list of those whom they have enrolled, and these officers take it and bring it up before the Council, and there open the tablet in which the names of the cavalry are sealed up. If any of those who have been on the roll previously make affidavit that they are physically incapable of cavalry service, they strike them out; then they call up the persons newly enrolled, and

if anyone makes affidavit that he is either physically or pecuniarily incapable of cavalry service they dismiss him, but if no such affidavit is made the Council votes whether the individual in question is suitable for the purpose or not. If they vote in the affirmative his name is entered on the tablet; if not, he is dismissed with the others.

Formerly the Council used to decide on the plans for public buildings and the contract for making the robe of Athena; but now this work is done by a jury in the law-courts appointed by lot, since the Council was considered to have shown favouritism in its decisions. The Council also has a share in the superintendence of the manufacture of the images of Victory and the prizes at the Panathenaic festival, in conjunction with the Military Treasurer.

The Council also examines infirm paupers; for there is a law which enacts that persons possessing less than three minas, who are so crippled as not to be able to do any work, are, after examination by the Council, to receive two obols a day from the state for their support. A treasurer is appointed by lot to attend to them.

The Council also, speaking broadly, co-operates in most of the duties of all the other magistrates; and this ends the list of the functions of that body.

50. There are ten Commissioners for Repairs of Temples, elected by lot, who receive a sum of thirty minas from the Receivers-General, and therewith carry out the most necessary repairs in the temples.

There are also ten City Commissioners [Astynomi], of whom five hold office in Piraeus and five in the city. Their duty is to see that female flute- and harp- and lute-players are not hired at more than two drachmas, and if more than one person is anxious to hire the same girl, they cast lots and hire her out to the person to whom the lot falls. They also provide that no collector of sewage shall shoot any of his sewage within ten stadia of the walls; they prevent people from blocking up the streets by building, or stretching barriers across them, or making drain-pipes in mid-air so as to pour their contents into the street, or having doors which open outwards; and they remove the corpses of those who die in the streets, for which purpose they have a body of state slaves assigned to them.

51. Market Commissioners [Agoranomi] are elected by lot, five for Piraeus, five for the city. The duty assigned to them by law is to see that all articles offered for sale in the market are pure and unadulterated.

Commissioners of Weights and Measures [Metronomi] are elect-

ed by lot, five for the city, and five for Piraeus. They see that sellers use fair weights and measures.

Formerly there were five Corn Commissioners [Sitophylaces], elected by lot, for Piraeus, and five for the city; but now there are twenty for the city and fifteen for Piraeus. Their duties are, first, to see that the unprepared corn in the market is offered for sale at reasonable prices, and secondly to see that the millers sell barley meal at a price proportionate to that of barley, and that the bakers sell their loaves at a price proportionate to that of wheat, and of such weight as the Commissioners may appoint; for the law requires them to fix the standard weight.

There are ten Superintendents of the Mart, elected by lot, whose duty is to superintend the Mart, and to compel merchants to bring up into the city two-thirds of the corn which is brought by sea to the Corn Mart.

52. The Eleven also are appointed by lot to take care of those who are in the state gaol. Thieves, kidnappers, and pickpockets are brought to them, and if they plead guilty they are executed, but if they deny their crime the Eleven bring the case before the law-courts; if the prisoners are acquitted, they release them, but if not, they execute them. They also bring up before the law-courts the list of farms and houses claimed as state-property; and if it is decided that they are so, they deliver them to the Commissioners for Public Contracts. The Eleven also bring up informations laid against magistrates alleged to be disqualified; this function comes within their province, but some such cases are brought up by the Thesmothetae.

There are also five Introducers of Cases [Eisagogeis], one for each pair of tribes, who bring up the "monthly" cases to the law-courts. "Monthly" cases are these; refusal to pay up a dowry where a party is bound to do so, refusal to pay interest on money borrowed at 12 per cent., or where a man desirous of setting up business in the market has borrowed from another man capital to start with; also cases of slander, cases arising out of clubs or partnerships, and cases concerned with slaves, cattle, the office of trierarch, or with banks. These are brought up as "monthly" cases and are heard by these officers; but the Receivers-General perform the same function in cases for or against the farmers of taxes. Those in which the sum concerned is not more than ten drachmas they can decide summarily, but all above that amount they report to the law-courts as "monthly" cases.

53. Forty persons are also elected by lot, four from each tribe,

before whom suitors bring all other cases. Formerly they were thirty in number, and they went on circuit through the demes to hear causes; but after the oligarchy of the Thirty they were increased to forty. They have full powers to deal with cases in which the damages claimed do not exceed ten drachmas, but anything beyond that amount they hand over to the Arbitrators. The Arbitrators take up the case, and, if they cannot bring the parties to an agreement, they give a decision. If their decision satisfies both parties, and they abide by it, the case is at an end; but if either of the parties appeals to the law-courts, the Arbitrators enclose the evidence, the pleadings, and the laws quoted in the one, and those of the defendant in the other. These they seal up and, having attached to them the decision of the arbitrator, written out on a tablet, hand them over to the justices whose function it is to introduce cases on behalf of the tribe of the defendant. These officers take them and bring up the case before the law-court, to a jury of two hundred and one members in cases up to the value of a thousand drachmas, or to one of four hundred and one in cases above that value. No laws or pleadings or evidence may be used except those which were adduced before the Arbitrator, and which have been enclosed in the urns.

The Arbitrators are persons of sixty years of age, as is clear from the Archons and the Eponymi. There are two classes of Eponymi, the ten who give their names to the tribes, and the forty-two of the years of service. The names of the youths, on being enrolled among the citizens, were formerly inscribed upon whitened tablets, and the names were appended of the Archon in whose year they were enrolled, and of the Eponymus who had been in course in the preceding year; at the present day they are written on a bronze pillar, which stands in front of the Council-chamber, near the Eponymi of the tribes. Then the Forty take the last of the Eponymi of the years of service, and assign the arbitrations to the persons belonging to that year, casting lots to determine which arbitrations each shall undertake; and everyone is compelled to carry through the arbitrations which the lot assigns to him. The law enacts that anyone who does not serve as Arbitrator when he has arrived at the necessary age shall lose his civil rights, unless he happens to be holding some other office during that year, or to be out of the country. These are the only persons who escape the duty. Anyone who suffers injustice at the hands of the Arbitrator may appeal to the whole board of Arbitrators, and if they find the magistrate guilty, the law enacts that he shall lose his civil

rights. The persons thus condemned have, however, in their turn an appeal. The Eponymi are also used in reference to military expeditions; when the men of military age are despatched on service, a notice is put up stating that the men from such-and-such an Archon and Eponymus to such-and-such another Archon and Eponymus are to go on the expedition.

54. The following magistrates also are elected by lot: Ten Commissioners of Roads [Hodopoei], who, with an assigned body of public slaves, are required to keep the roads in order: and ten Auditors, with ten assistants, to whom all persons who have held any office must give in their accounts. These are the only officers who audit the accounts of those who are subject to examination, and who bring them up for examination before the law-courts. If they detect any magistrate in embezzlement, the jury condemn him on a charge of embezzlement, and he is obliged to repay tenfold the sum he is declared to have misappropriated. If they charge a magistrate with accepting bribes and the jury convict him, they fine him for corruption, and this sum too is repaid tenfold. Or if they convict him of unfair dealing, he is fined on that charge, and the sum assessed is paid without increase, if payment is made before the ninth prytany, but otherwise it is doubled. A ten-fold fine is not doubled, however.

The Clerk of the Prytany, as he is called, is also elected by lot. He is the chief of all the clerks, and keeps the resolutions which are passed by the Assembly, and records all other business and attends at the sessions of the Council. Formerly he was elected by open vote, and the most distinguished and trustworthy persons were elected to the post, as is known from the fact that the name of this officer is appended on the pillars recording treaties of alliance and grants of consulship and citizenship. Now, however, he is elected by lot. There is, in addition, a Clerk of the Laws, elected by lot, who attends at the sessions of the Council; and he too records all the laws. The Assembly also elects by open vote a clerk to read documents to it and to the Council; but he has no other duty except that of reading aloud.

The Assembly also elects by lot ten Commissioners of Religion [Hieropoei], known as the Commissioners for Sacrifices, who offer the sacrifices appointed by oracle, and, in conjunction with the seers, take auspices whenever there is occasion. It also elects by lot ten others, known as Annual Commissioners, who offer certain sacrifices and administer all the quadriennial festivals except the Panathenaea. There are the following quadriennial festivals, first that of Delos

(where there is also a septennial festival), secondly the Brauronia, thirdly the Heracleia, fourthly that at Eleusis, and fifthly the Panathenaea. No two of these are celebrated in the same place; [and the regulations for them] are set forth [in the decrees passed] in the archonship of Cephisophon.

An Archon is also elected by lot for Salamis, and a Demarch for Piraeus. These officers celebrate the Dionysia in these two places, and appoint Choregi. In Salamis, moreover, the name of the Archon is publicly recorded.

55. All the foregoing magistrates are elected by lot, and their duties are those which have been stated. To pass on to the nine Archons, as they are called, the manner of their appointment from the earliest times has been described already. At the present day six Thesmothetae are elected by lot, together with their clerk and in addition to these an Archon, a King, and a Polemarch. One is elected from each tribe. They are examined first of all by the Council of Five Hundred, with the exception of the clerk. The latter is examined only in the law-court, like other magistrates (for all magistrates, whether elected by lot or by open vote, are examined before entering on their offices); but the nine Archons are examined both in the Council and again in the law-court. Formerly no one could hold the office if the Council rejected him, but now there is an appeal to the law-court, which is the final authority in the matter of examination. When they are examined, they are asked, first, "Who is your father, and of what deme? who is your father's father? who is your mother? who is your mother's father, and of what deme?" Then the candidate is asked whether he possesses an ancestral Apollo and a household Zeus, and where their sanctuaries are; next if he possesses a family tomb, and where; then if he treats his parents well, and pays his taxes, and has served on the required military expeditions. When the examiner has put these questions, he proceeds, "Call the witnesses to these facts"; and when the candidate has produced his witnesses, he next asks, "Does anyone wish to make any accusation against this man?" If an accuser appears, he gives the parties an opportunity of making their accusation and defence, and then puts it to the Council to pass the candidates or not, and to the law-court to give the final vote. Formerly a single individual gave the vote, but now all the members are obliged to vote on the candidates, so that if any unprincipled candidate has managed to get rid of his accusers, it may still be possible for him to be disqualified before the law-court. When the ex-

amination has been thus completed, they proceed to the stone on which are the pieces of the victims, and on which the Arbitrators take oath before declaring their decisions, and witnesses swear to their testimony. On this stone the Archons stand, and swear to execute their office uprightly and according to the laws, and not to receive presents in respect of the performance of their duties, or, if they do, to dedicate a golden statue. When they have taken this oath they proceed to the Acropolis, and there they repeat it; after this they enter upon their office.

56. The Archon, the King, and the Polemarch have each two assessors; they appoint whomsoever they please to the post, but the nominees are examined in the law-court before they begin to act, and give in accounts on each occasion of their acting.

As soon as the Archon enters office, he begins by issuing a proclamation that whatever anyone possessed before he entered into office, that he shall possess and hold until the end of his term. Next he assigns Choregi to the tragic poets, choosing three of the richest persons out of the whole body of Athenians. Formerly he used also to assign five Choregi to the comic poets, but now the tribes provide the Choregi for this purpose. Then he receives the Choregi who have been appointed by the tribes for the men's and boy's choruses and the comic poets at the Dionysia, and for the men's and boy's choruses at the Thargelia (at the Dionysia there is a chorus for each tribe, but at the Thargelia one between two tribes, each tribe bearing its share in providing it), and transacts the exchanges of properties, and reports any excuses that are tendered, if anyone says that he has already borne this burden, or that he is exempt because he has borne a similar burden and the period of his exemption has not yet expired, or that he is not forty years of age; since the Choregus of a boys' chorus must be over forty years of age. He also appoints Choregi for the festival at Delos, and chiefs of the mission for the thirty-oar boat which conveys the youths thither. He also superintends sacred processions, both that in honour of Asclepius, when the initiated keep house, and that of the great Dionysia,—the latter in conjunction with the Superintendents of that festival. These officers, ten in number, were formerly elected by open vote in the Assembly, and used to provide for the expenses of the procession out of their private means; but now one is elected by lot from each tribe, and the state contributes a hundred minas for the expenses. The Archon also superintends the procession at the Thargelia, and that

in honour of Zeus the Saviour. He also manages the contests at the Dionysia and the Thargelia.

These, then, are the festivals which he superintends. The suits and indictments which come before him, and which he, after a preliminary inquiry, brings up before the law-courts, are as follows. Injury to parents (for bringing these actions the prosecutor cannot suffer any penalty); injury to orphans (these actions lie against their guardians); injury to a ward of state (these lie against their guardians or their husbands); injury to an orphan's house (these too lie against the guardians); mental derangement, where a party charges another with destroying his own property through unsoundness of mind; for appointment of liquidators, where a party refuses to divide property in which others have a share; for constituting a wardship; for determining between rival claims to a wardship, where more persons than one wish to be enrolled as guardian of the same ward; and for determining disputes as to inheritances and wards of state. The Archon also has the care of orphans and wards of state, and of women who, on the death of their husband, declare themselves to be with child; and he has power to inflict a fine on those who offend against the persons under his charge, or to bring the case before the law-courts. He also leases out the houses of orphans and wards of state . . . and takes mortgages on them; and if the guardians fail to provide the necessary food for the children under their charge, he exacts it from them. Such are the duties of the Archon.

57. The King in the first place superintends the mysteries, in conjunction with the Superintendents of Mysteries. The latter are elected in the Assembly by open vote, two from the general body of Athenians, one from the Eumolpidae, and one from the Ceryces. Next, he superintends the Lenaeon Dionysia. . . . On this occasion the procession is ordered by the King and the Superintendents in conjunction; but the contest is managed by the King alone. He also manages all the contests of the torch-race; and to speak broadly, he administers all the ancestral sacrifices. Indictments for impiety come before him, or any disputes between parties concerning priestly rites; and he also determines all controversies concerning the privileges of the ancient clans and the priests. All actions for homicide come before him, and it is he that makes the proclamation requiring polluted persons to keep away from sacred ceremonies. Actions for homicide and wounding are of the following kinds. In cases of wilful homicide, the offender is indicted in the Areopagus; also in cases

of killing by poison, and of arson. These are the only cases heard by that Council. Cases of unintentional homicide, or of intent to kill, or of killing a slave or a resident alien or a foreigner, are heard in the court of Palladium. When the homicide is acknowledged, but legal justification is pleaded, as when a man takes an adulterer in the act, or kills another by mistake in battle, or in an athletic contest, the prisoner is tried in the court of Delphinium. If a man who is in banishment for a homicide which admits of reconciliation incurs a further charge of killing or wounding, he is tried in Phreatto, and he makes his defence sitting in a boat moored near the shore. All these cases, except those which are heard in the Areopagus, are tried by the Ephetae on whom the lot falls. The King introduces them, and the hearing is held by night and in the open air. Whenever the King hears a case, he takes off his crown. The person who is subject to a charge of homicide is at all other times excluded from the temples, nor is he allowed to enter the market-place; but on the occasion of his trial he enters the temple and makes his defence. If the actual offender is unknown, the writ runs against "the doer of the deed." The King and the tribe-kings also hear the cases in which the guilt rests on inanimate objects and the lower animals.

58. The Polemarch performs the sacrifices to Artemis the huntress and to Enyalios, and arranges the contest at the funeral of those who have fallen in war, and makes offerings to the memory of Harmodius and Aristogeiton. Of private actions, those come before him in which resident aliens, both ordinary and privileged, and agents of foreign states are concerned. It is his duty to receive these cases and divide them into ten parts, and assign to each tribe the part which comes to it by lot; after which the magistrates who introduce cases for the tribe hand them over to the Arbitrators. The Polemarch, however, brings up in person cases in which an alien is charged with deserting his patron or neglecting to provide himself with one, and also of inheritances and wards of state where aliens are concerned; and in fact, generally, whatever the Archon does for citizens, the Polemarch does for aliens.

59. The Thesmothetae in the first place have the power of prescribing on what days the law-courts are to sit, and next of assigning them to the several magistrates; for the latter must follow the arrangement which the Thesmothetae assign. Moreover they introduce impeachments before the Assembly, and bring up all votes for removal from office, challenges of a magistrate's conduct before the

Assembly, indictments for illegal proposals, or for proposing a law which is contrary to the interests of the state, complaints against Proedri or their president for their conduct in office, and the accounts presented by the generals. All indictments also come before them in which a deposit has to be made by the prosecutor, namely, indictments for concealment of foreign origin, for corrupt evasion of foreign origin (when a man escapes the disqualification by bribery), for blackmailing accusations, bribery, false entry of another as a state debtor, false testimony to the service of a summons, conspiracy to enter as a state debtor, corrupt omission from the list of debtors, and adultery. They also bring up the examinations of all magistrates, and the rejections by the demes and the condemnation by the Council. Moreover they bring up certain private suits in cases of merchandise and mines, or where a slave has slandered a free man. It is they also who cast lots to assign the courts to the various magistrates, whether for private or public cases. They ratify agreements with foreign states to regulate the decision of commercial disputes, and bring up the cases which arise out of such agreements; and they also bring up cases of perjury from the Areopagus. The casting of lots for the jurors is conducted by all the nine archons, with the clerk to the Thesmothetae as the tenth, each performing the duty for his own tribe. Such are the duties of the nine Archons.

60. There are also ten Commissioners of Games [Athlothetae], elected by lot, one from each tribe. These officers, after passing an examination, serve for four years; and they manage the Panathenaic procession, the contest in music and that in gymnastic, and the horse-race; they also, in conjunction with the Council, see to the making of the robe of Athena and the vases, and they present the oil to the athletes. This oil is collected from the sacred olives. The archon requisitions it from the owners of the farms on which the sacred olives grow, to the amount of three-quarters of a pint from each plant. Formerly the state used to sell the fruit itself, and if anyone dug up or broke down one of the sacred olives, he was tried by the Council of Areopagus, and if he was condemned, the penalty was death. Since, however, the oil has been paid by the owner of the farm, the procedure has lapsed, though the law remains. The state takes the oil from the shoots, not from the stem of the plants. When, then, the Archons has collected the oil for his year of office, he hands it over to the Treasurers to preserve in the Acropolis, and he may not take his seat in the Areopagus until he has paid over to the Treasurers

the full amount. The Treasurers keep it in the Acropolis until the Panathenaea, when they measure it out to the Commissioners of Games, and they again to the victorious competitors. The prizes for the victors in the musical contest consist of silver and gold, for the victors in manly vigour, of shields, and for the victors in the gymnastic contest and the horse-race, of oil.

61. All officers connected with military service are elected by open vote. The Generals [Strategi] were formerly elected one from each tribe, but now they are chosen from the whole mass of citizens. Their duties are assigned to them by open vote; one is appointed to command the heavy infantry, and leads the citizens if they go out to war; one to the defence of the country, who remains on the defensive, and fights if there is war within the borders of the country; two to Piraeus, one of whom is assigned to Munychia, and one to the south shore, and these have charge of the north front and of everything in Piraeus; and one to superintend the symmories, who nominates the trierarchs and arranges exchanges of properties for them, and brings up actions to decide on rival claims in connection with them. The rest are despatched to whatever business may be on hand at the moment. The appointment of these officers is submitted for confirmation in each prytany, when the question is put whether they are considered to be doing their duty. If any officer is rejected on this vote, he is tried in the law-court, and if he is found guilty the people decide what punishment or fine shall be inflicted on him; but if he is acquitted he holds office for the rest of his term. The Generals have full power, when on active service, to arrest anyone for insubordination, or to proclaim his name publicly, or to inflict a fine; the latter is, however, unusual.

There are also ten Taxiarchs, one from each tribe, elected by open vote; and each commands his own tribesmen and appoints captains of companies [Lochagi]. There are also two Hipparchs, elected by open vote from the whole mass of the citizens, who command the cavalry, each taking five tribes. They have the same powers as the Generals have in respect of the infantry, and their appointments are also subject to confirmation. There are also Phylarchs, elected by open vote, one from each tribe, to command the cavalry, as the Taxiarchs do the infantry. There is also a Hipparch for Lemnos, elected by open vote, who has charge of the cavalry in Lemnos. There is also a treasurer of the Paralus, and another of the Ammonias.

62. Of the magistrates elected by lot, in former times some,

including the nine Archons, were elected out of the tribe as a whole, while others, namely those who are now elected in the Theseum, were apportioned among the demes; but since the demes used to sell the elections, these magistrates too are now elected from the whole tribe, except the members of the Council and the guards of the dockyards, who are still left to the demes.

Pay is received for the following services. First the members of the Assembly receive a drachma for the ordinary meetings, and nine obols for the "sovereign" meeting. Then the jurors at the law-courts receive three obols; and the members of the Council five obols. The Prytanes receive an allowance for their maintenance. . . . The nine Archons receive four obols apiece for maintenance, and also keep a herald and a flute-player; and the Archon for Salamis receives a drachma a day. The Commissioners for Games dine in the Prytaneum during the month of Hecatombaeon in which the Panathenaic festival takes place, from the fourteenth day onwards. The Amphictyonic deputies to Delos receive a drachma a day from the exchequer of Delos. Also all magistrates sent to Samos, Scyros, Lemnos or Imbros receive an allowance for their maintenance. The military offices may be held any number of times, but none of the others more than once, except the membership of the Council, which may be held twice.

63. The juries for the law-courts are chosen by lot by the nine Archons, each for their own tribe, and by the clerk to the Thesmothetae for the tenth. There are ten entrances into the courts, one for each tribe; twenty vessels for holding votes, two for each tribe; a hundred chests, ten for each tribe; and ten other chests, in which are placed the tickets of the jurors on whom the lot falls. Also two vases and a number of staves, equal to that of the jurors required, are placed by the side of each entrance; and counters are put into one vase, equal in number to the staves. These are inscribed with letters of the alphabet beginning with the eleventh (λ), equal in number to the courts which require to be filled. All persons above thirty years of age are qualified to serve as jurors, provided they are not debtors to the state and have not lost their civil rights. If any unqualified person serves as juror, an information is laid against him, and he is brought before the court; and, if he is convicted, the jurors assess the punishment or fine which they consider him to deserve. If he is condemned to a money fine, he must be imprisoned until he has paid up both the original debt, on account of which the informa-



DORYPHORUS

Copy after Polycleitus, now in Naples.

POLYCLEITUS was born in Achaea about 430 B. C. and was reputed, like Phidias and Myron, to have studied with Ageladas. He was ranked next to Phidias by contemporary critics, but little is known of his life. He wrote a treatise on the symmetry of the human body and called it "Doryphorus" after the statue in which he embodied his theories. He was a great architect and designed the theater at Epidaurus, unequaled in beauty among classic theaters.

tion was laid against him, and also the fine which the court has imposed upon him. Each juror has a ticket of box-wood, on which is inscribed his name, with the name of his father and his deme, and one of the letters of the alphabet up to kappa; for the jurors are divided into ten sections according to their tribes, with approximately an equal number from each tribe in each letter. When the Thesmothetes has decided by lot which letters are required to attend at the courts, the servant puts up above each court the letter which has been assigned to it by the lot. . . .

TRANSLATION OF F. G. KENYON.

SPARTAN INSTITUTIONS

LYCURGUS

BY PLUTARCH

THERE is so much uncertainty in the accounts which historians have left us of Lycurgus, the lawgiver of Sparta, that scarcely any thing is asserted by one of them which is not called into question or contradicted by the rest. Their sentiments are quite different as to the family he came of, the voyages he undertook, the place and manner of his death, but most of all when they speak of the laws he made and the commonwealth which he founded. They cannot, by any means, be brought to an agreement as to the very age in which he lived; for some of them say that he flourished in the time of Iphitus, and that they two jointly contrived the ordinance for the cessation of arms during the solemnity of the Olympic games. Of this opinion was Aristotle; and for confirmation of it, he alleges an inscription upon one of the copper quoits used in those sports, upon which the name of Lycurgus continued uneffaced to his time. But Eratosthenes and Apollodorus and other chronologers, computing the time by the successions of the Spartan kings, pretend to demonstrate that he was much more ancient than the institution of the Olympic games. Timæus conjectures that there were two of this name, and in diverse times, but that the one of them being much more famous than the

other, men gave to him the glory of the exploits of both; the elder of the two, according to him, was not long after Homer; and some are so particular as to say that he had seen him. But that he was of great antiquity may be gathered from a passage in Xenophon, where he makes him contemporary with the Heraclidæ. By descent, indeed, the very last kings of Sparta were Heraclidæ too; but he seems in that place to speak of the first and more immediate successors of Hercules. But notwithstanding this confusion and obscurity, we shall endeavor to compose the history of his life, adhering to those statements which are least contradicted, and depending upon those authors who are most worthy of credit.

The poet Simonides will have it that Lycurgus was the son of Prytanis, and not of Eunomus; but in this opinion he is singular, for all the rest deduce the genealogy of them both as follows:—

Aristodemus.

|

Patrocles.

|

Sous.

|

Eurypon.

|

Eunomus.

|

Polydectes by his first wife.

Lycurgus by Dionassa his second.

Dieuchidas says he was the sixth from Patrocles and the eleventh from Hercules. Be this as it will, Sous certainly was the most renowned of all his ancestors, under whose conduct the Spartans made slaves of the Helots, and added to their dominions, by conquest, a good part of Arcadia. There goes a story of this king Sous, that, being besieged by the Clitorians in a dry and stony place so that he could come at no water, he was at last constrained to agree with them upon these terms, that he would restore to them all his conquests, provided that himself and all his men should drink of the nearest spring. After the usual oaths and ratifications, he called his soldiers together, and offered to him that would forbear drinking, his kingdom for a reward; and when not a man of them was able to forbear, in short, when they had all drunk their fill, at last comes king Sous himself to the spring, and, having sprinkled his face only, without

swallowing one drop, marches off in the face of his enemies, refusing to yield up his conquests, because himself and all his men had not, according to the articles, drunk of their water.

Although he was justly had in admiration on this account, yet his family was not surnamed from him, but from his son Eurypon (of whom they were called Eurypontids); the reason of which was that Eurypon relaxed the rigor of the monarchy, seeking favor and popularity with the many. They, after this first step, grew bolder; and the succeeding kings partly incurred hatred with their people by trying to use force, or, for popularity's sake and through weakness, gave way; and anarchy and confusion long prevailed in Sparta, causing, moreover, the death of the father of Lycurgus. For as he was endeavoring to quell a riot, he was stabbed with a butcher's knife, and left the title of king to his eldest son Polydectes.

He, too, dying soon after, the right of succession (as every one thought) rested in Lycurgus; and reign he did, until it was found that the queen, his sister-in-law, was with child; upon which he immediately declared that the kingdom belonged to her issue, provided it were male, and that he himself exercised the regal jurisdiction only as his guardian; the Spartan name for which office is *prodicus*. Soon after, an overture was made to him by the queen, that she would herself in some way destroy the infant, upon condition that he would marry her when he came to the crown. Abhorring the woman's wickedness, he nevertheless did not reject her proposal, but, making show of closing with her, despatched the messenger with thanks and expressions of joy, but dissuaded her earnestly from procuring herself to miscarry, which would impair her health, if not endanger her life; he himself, he said, would see to it, that the child, as soon as born, should be taken out of the way. By such artifices having drawn on the woman to the time of her lying-in, as soon as he heard that she was in labor, he sent persons to be by and observe all that passed, with orders that if it were a girl they should deliver it to the women, but if a boy, should bring it to him wheresoever he were, and whatsoever doing. It so fell out that when he was at supper with the principal magistrates, the queen was brought to bed of a boy, who was soon after presented to him as he was at the table; he, taking him into his arms, said to those about him, "Men of Sparta, here is a king born unto us;" this said, he laid him down in the king's place, and named him Charilaus, that is, the joy of the people; because that all were transported with joy and with wonder at his

noble and just spirit. His reign had lasted only eight months, but he was honored on other accounts by the citizens, and there were more who obeyed him because of his eminent virtues, than because he was regent to the king and had the royal power in his hands. Some, however, envied and sought to impede his growing influence while he was still young; chiefly the kindred and friends of the queen-mother, who pretendd to have been dealt with injuriously. Her brother Leonidas, in a warm debate which fell out betwixt him and Lycurgus, went so far as to tell him to his face that he was well assured that ere long he should see him king; suggesting suspicions and preparing the way for an accusation of him, as though he had made away with his nephew, if the child should chance to fail, though by a natural death. Words of the like import were designedly cast abroad by the queen-mother and her adherents.

Troubled at this, and not knowing what it might come to, he thought it his wisest course to avoid their envy by a voluntary exile, and to travel from place to place until his nephew came to marriageable years, and, by having a son, had secured the succession; setting sail, therefore, with this resolution, he first arrived at Crete, where, having considered their several forms of government, and got an acquaintance with the principal men amongst them, some of their laws he very much approved of, and resolved to make use of them in his own country; a good part he rejected as useless. Amongst the persons there the most renowned for their learning and their wisdom in state matters was one Thales, whom Lycurgus, by importunities and assurances of friendship, persuaded to go over to Lacedæmon; where, though by his outward appearance and his own profession he seemed to be no other than a lyric poet, in reality he performed the part of one of the ablest lawgivers in the world. The very songs which he composed were exhortations to obedience and concord, and the very measure and cadence of the verse, conveying impressions of order and tranquillity, had so great an influence on the minds of the listeners, that they were insensibly softened and civilized, insomuch that they renounced their private feuds and animosities, and were reunited in a common admiration of virtue. So that it may truly be said that Thales prepared the way for the discipline introduced by Lycurgus.

From Crete he sailed to Asia, with design, as is said, to examine the difference betwixt the manners and rules of life of the Cretans, which were very sober and temperate, and those of the Ionians, a people of sumptuous and delicate habits, and so to form a judgment;

just as physicians do by comparing healthy and diseased bodies. Here he had the first sight of Homer's works, in the hands, we may suppose, of the posterity of Creophylus; and, having observed that the few loose expressions and actions of ill example which are to be found in his poems were much outweighed by serious lessons of state and rules of morality, he set himself eagerly to transcribe and digest them into order, as thinking they would be of good use in his own country. They had, indeed, already obtained some slight repute amongst the Greeks, and scattered portions, as chance conveyed them, were in the hands of individuals; but Lycurgus first made them really known.

The Egyptians say that he took a voyage into Egypt, and that, being much taken with their way of separating the soldiery from the rest of the nation, he transferred it from them to Sparta, a removal from contact with those employed in low and mechanical occupations giving high refinement and beauty to the state. Some Greek writers also record this. But as for his voyages into Spain, Africa, and the Indies, and his conferences there with the Gymnosophists, the whole relation, as far as I can find, rests on the single credit of the Spartan Aristocrates, the son of Hipparchus.

Lycurgus was much missed at Sparta, and often sent for, "for kings indeed we have," they said, "who wear the marks and assume the titles of royalty, but as for the qualities of their minds, they have nothing by which they are to be distinguished from their subjects;" adding, that in him alone was the true foundation of sovereignty to be seen, a nature made to rule, and a genius to gain obedience. Nor were the kings themselves averse to see him back, for they looked upon his presence as a bulwark against the insolencies of the people.

Things being in this posture at his return, he applied himself, without loss of time, to a thorough reformation and resolved to change the whole face of the commonwealth; for what could a few particular laws and a partial alteration avail? He must act as wise physicians do, in the case of one who labors under a complication of diseases, by force of medicines reduce and exhaust him, change his whole temperament, and then set him upon a totally new regimen of diet. Having thus projected things, away he goes to Delphi to consult Apollo there; which having done, and offered his sacrifice, he returned with that renowned oracle, in which he is called beloved of God, and rather God than man; that his prayers were heard, that his laws should be the best, and the commonwealth which observed

them the most famous in the world. Encouraged by these things, he set himself to bring over to his side the leading men of Sparta, exhorting them to give him a helping hand in his great undertaking; he broke it first to his particular friends, and then by degrees gained others, and animated them all to put his design in execution. When things were ripe for action, he gave order to thirty of the principal men of Sparta to be ready armed at the market-place by break of day, to the end that he might strike a terror into the opposite party. Hermippus hath set down the names of twenty of the most eminent of them; but the name of him whom Lycurgus most confided in, and who was of most use to him, both in making his laws and putting them in execution, was Arthmiadas. Things growing to a tumult, king Charilaus, apprehending that it was a conspiracy against his person, took sanctuary in the temple of Minerva of the Brazen House; but, being soon after undeceived, and having taken an oath of them that they had no designs against him, he quitted his refuge, and himself also entered into the confederacy with them; of so gentle and flexible a disposition he was, to which Archlaus, his brother-king, alluded, when, hearing him extolled for his goodness, he said, "Who can say he is any thing but good? he is so even to the bad."

Amongst the many changes and alterations which Lycurgus made, the first and of greatest importance was the establishment of the senate, which, having a power equal to the king's in matters of great consequence, and, as Plato expresses it, allaying and qualifying the fiery genius of the royal office, gave steadiness and safety to the commonwealth. For the state, which before had no firm basis to stand upon, but leaned one while towards an absolute monarchy, when the kings had the upper hand, and another while towards a pure democracy, when the people had the better, found in this establishment of the senate a central weight, like ballast in a ship, which always kept things in a just equilibrium; the twenty-eight always adhering to the kings so far as to resist democracy, and, on the other hand, supporting the people against the establishment of absolute monarchy. As for the determinate number of twenty-eight, Aristotle states, that it so fell out because two of the original associates, for want of courage, fell off from the enterprise; but Sphærus assures us that there were but twenty-eight of the confederates at first; perhaps there is some mystery in the number, which consists of seven multiplied by four, and is the first of perfect numbers after six, being, as that is, equal to all its parts. For my part, I believe Lycurgus fixed upon

the number of twenty-eight, that, the two kings being reckoned amongst them, they might be thirty in all. So eagerly set was he upon this establishment, that he took the trouble to obtain an oracle about it from Delphi, the Rhetra, which runs thus: "After that you have built a temple to Jupiter Hellanius, and to Minerva Hellania, and after that you have *phyle'd* the people into phyles, and *obe'd* them to obes, you shall establish a council of thirty elders, the leaders included, and shall, from time to time, *apellazein* the people betwixt Babyca and Cnacion, there propound and put to the vote. The commons have the final voice and decision." By phyles and obes are meant the divisions of the people; by the leaders, the two kings; *ap-pillazein*, referring to the Pythian Apollo, signifies to assemble; Babyca and Cnacion they now call Oenus; Aristotle says Cnacion is a river, and Babyca a bridge. Betwixt this Babyca and Cnacion, their assemblies were held, for they had no council-house or building to meet in. Lycurgus was of opinion that ornaments were so far from advantaging them in their counsels, that they were rather an hindrance, by diverting their attention from the business before them to statutes and pictures, and roofs curiously fretted, the usual embellishments of such places amongst the other Greeks. The people then being thus assembled in the open air, it was not allowed to any one of their order to give his advice, but only either to ratify or reject what should be propounded to them by the king or senate. But because it fell out afterwards that the people, by adding or omitting words, distorted and perverted the sense of propositions, kings Polydorus and Theopompus inserted into the Rhetra, or grand covenant, the following clause: "That if the people decide crookedly, it should be lawful for the elders and leaders to dissolve;" that is to say, refuse ratification, and dismiss the people as depravers and perverters of their counsel. It passed among the people, by their management, as being equally authentic with the rest of the Rhetra, as appears by these verses of Tyrtaeus,—

These oracles they from Apollo heard,
And brought from Pytho home the perfect word:
The heaven-appointed kings, who love the land,
Shall foremost in the nation's council stand;
The elders next to them; the commons last;
Let a straight Rhetra among all be passed.

Although Lycurgus had, in this manner, used all the qualifications possible in the constitution of his commonwealth, yet those who succeeded him found the oligarchical element still too strong and dominant, and, to check its high temper and its violence, put, as Plato says, a bit in its mouth, which was the power of the ephori, established an hundred and thirty years after death of Lycurgus. Elatus and his colleagues were the first who had this dignity conferred upon them, in the reign of king Theopompus, who, when his queen upbraided him one day that he would leave the regal power to his children less than he had received it from his ancestors, said, in answer, "No, greater; for it will last longer." For, indeed, their prerogative being thus reduced within reasonable bounds, the Spartan kings at once freed from all further jealousies and consequent danger, and never experienced the calamities of their neighbors at Messene and Argos, who, by maintaining their prerogative too strictly, for want of yielding a little to the populace, lost it all.

Indeed, whosoever shall look at the sedition and misgovernment which befell these bordering nations to whom they were as near related in blood as situation, will find in them the best reason to admire the wisdom and foresight of Lycurgus. For these three states, in their first rise, were equal, or, if there were any odds, they lay on the side of the Messenians and Argives, who, in the first allotment, were thought to have been luckier than the Spartans; yet was their happiness but of small continuance, partly the tyrannical temper of their kings and partly the ungovernableness of the people quickly bringing upon them such disorders, and so complete an overthrow of all existing institutions, as clearly to show how truly divine a blessing the Spartans had had in that wise lawgiver who gave their government its happy balance and temper. But of this I shall say more in its due place.

After the creation of the thirty senators, his next task, and, indeed, the most hazardous he ever undertook, was the making a new division of their lands. For there was an extreme inequality amongst them, and their state was overloaded with a multitude of indigent and necessitous persons, while its whole wealth had centered upon a very few. To the end, therefore, that he might expel from the state arrogance and envy, luxury and crime, and those yet more inveterate diseases of want and superfluity, he obtained of them to renounce their properties, and to consent to a new division of the land, and that they should live all together on an equal footing; merit to be their only road to eminence, and the disgrace of evil, and credit of worthy acts, **their one**

measure of difference between man and man.

Upon their consent to these proposals, proceeding at once to put them into execution, he divided the country of Laconia in general into thirty thousand equal shares, and the part attached to the city of Sparta into nine thousand; these he distributed among Spartans, as he did the others to the country citizens. Some authors say that he made but six thousand lots for the citizens of Sparta, and that king Polydorus added three thousand more. Others say that Polydorus doubled the number Lycurgus had made, which, according to them, was but four thousand five hundred. A lot was so much as to yield, one year with another, about seventy bushels of grain for the master of the family, and twelve for his wife, with a suitable proportion of oil and wine. And this he thought sufficient to keep their bodies in good health and strength; superfluities they were better without. It is reported, that, as he returned from a journey shortly after the division of the lands, in harvest time, the ground being newly reaped, seeing the stacks all standing equal and alike, he smiled, and said to those about him, "Methinks all Laconia looks like one family estate just divided among a number of brothers."

Not contented with this, he resolved to make a division of their movables too, that there might be no odious distinction or inequality left amongst them; but finding that it would be very dangerous to go about it openly, he took another course, and defeated their avarice by the following stratagem: he commanded that all gold and silver coin should be called in, and that only a sort of money made of iron should be current, a great weight and quality of which was but very little worth; so that to lay up twenty or thirty pounds there was required a pretty large closet, and, to remove it, nothing less than a yoke of oxen. With the diffusion of this money, at once a number of vices were banished from Lacedæmon; for who would rob another of such a coin? Who would unjustly detain or take by force, or accept as a bribe, a thing which it was not easy to hide, nor a credit to have, nor indeed of any use to cut in pieces? For when it was just red hot, they quenched it in vinegar, and by that means spoilt it, and made it almost incapable of being worked.

In the next place, he declared an outlawry of all needless and superfluous arts; but here he might almost have spared his proclamation; for they of themselves would have gone after the gold and silver, the money which remained being not so proper payment for curious work; for, being of iron, it was scarcely portable, neither, if they should

take the pains to export it, would it pass amongst the other Greeks, who ridiculed it. So there was now no more means of purchasing foreign goods and small wares; merchants sent no shiploads into Laconian ports; no rhetoric-master, no itinerant fortune-teller, no harlot-monger, or gold or silversmith, engraver, or jeweler, set foot in a country which had no money; so that luxury, deprived little by little of that which fed and fomented it, wasted to nothing, and died away of itself. For the rich had no advantage here over the poor, as their wealth and abundance had no road to come abroad by, but were shut up at home doing nothing. And in this way they became excellent artists in common, necessary things; bedsteads, chairs, and tables, and such-like staple utensils in a family, were admirably well made there; their cup particularly, was very much in fashion, and eagerly bought up by soldiers, as Critias reports; for its color was such as to prevent water, drunk upon necessity and disagreeable to look at, from being noticed; and the shape of it was such that the mud stuck to the sides, so that only the purer part came to the drinker's mouth. For this, also, they had to thank their lawgiver, who, by relieving the artisans of the trouble of making useless things, set them to show their skill in giving beauty to those of daily and indispensable use.

The third and most masterly stroke of this great lawgiver, by which he struck a yet more effectual blow against luxury and the desire of riches, was the ordinance he made, that they should all eat in common, of the same bread and same meat, and of kinds that were specified, and should not spend their lives at home, laid on costly couches at splendid tables, delivering themselves up into the hands of their tradesmen and cooks, to fatten them in corners, like greedy brutes, and to ruin not their minds only but their very bodies, which, enfeebled by indulgence and excess, would stand in need of long sleep, warm bathing, freedom from work, and, in a word, of as much care and attention as if they were continually sick. It was certainly an extraordinary thing to have brought about such a result as this, but a greater yet to have taken away from wealth, as Theophrastus observes, not merely the property of being coveted, but its very nature of being wealth. For the rich, being obliged to go to the same table with the poor, could not make us of or enjoy their abundance, nor so much as please their vanity by looking at or displaying it. So that the common proverb, that Plutus, the god of riches, is blind, was nowhere in all the world literally verified but in Sparta. There, indeed, he was not only blind, but like a picture, without either life or motion. Nor were they allowed

to take food at home first, and then attend the public tables, for every one had an eye upon those who did not eat and drink like the rest, and reproached them with being dainty and effeminate.

This last ordinance in particular exasperated the wealthier men. They collected in a body against Lycurgus, and from ill words came to throwing stones, so that at length he was forced to run out of the market-place, and make to a sanctuary to save his life; by good-hap he outran all excepting one Alcander, a young man otherwise not ill accomplished, but hasty and violent, who came up so close to him, that, when he turned to see who was near him, he struck him upon the face with his stick, and put out one of his eyes. Lycurgus, so far from being daunted and discouraged by this accident, stopped short, and showed his disfigured face and eye beat out to his countrymen; they, dismayed and ashamed at the sight, delivered Alcander into his hands to be punished, and escorted him home, with expressions of great concern for his ill usage. Lycurgus, having thanked them for their care of his person, dismissed them all, excepting only Alcander; and, taking him with him into his house, neither did nor said any thing severely to him, but, dismissing those whose place it was, bade Alcander to wait upon him at table. The young man, who was of an ingenuous temper, without murmuring did as he was commanded; and, being thus admitted to live with Lycurgus, he had an opportunity to observe in him, besides his gentleness and calmness of temper, an extraordinary sobriety and an indefatigable industry, and so, from an enemy, became one of his most zealous admirers, and told his friends and relatives that Lycurgus was not that morose and ill-natured man they had formerly taken him for, but the one mild and gentle character of the world. And thus did Lycurgus, for chastisement of his fault, make of a wild and passionate young man one of the discreetest citizens of Sparta.

In memory of this accident, Lycurgus built a temple to Minerva, surnamed Optiletis; *optilus* being the Doric of these parts for *ophthalmus*, the eye. Some authors, however, of whom Dioscorides is one (who wrote a treatise on the commonwealth of Sparta), say that he was wounded, indeed, but did not lose his eye with the blow; and that he built the temple in gratitude for the cure. Be this as it will, certain it is, that, after this misadventure, the Lacedæmonians made it a rule never to carry so much as a staff into their public assemblies.

But to return to their public repasts;—these had several names in Greek; the Cretans called them *andria*, because the men only came to them. The Lacedæmonians called them *phiditia*, that is, by changing

l into *d*, the same as *philitia*, love feasts, because that, by eating and drinking together, they have opportunity of making friends. Or perhaps from *phido*, parsimony, because they were so many schools of sobriety; or perhaps the first letter is an addition, and the word at first was *editia*, from *edode*, eating. They met by companies of fifteen, more or less and each of them stood bound to bring in monthly a bushel of meal, eight gallons of wine, five pounds of cheese, two pounds and a half of figs, and some very small sum of money to buy flesh or fish with. Besides this, when any of them made sacrifice to the gods, they always sent a dole to the common hall; and, likewise, when any of them had been a hunting, he sent thither a part of the venison he had killed; for these two occasions were the only excuses allowed for supping at home. The custom of eating together was observed strictly for a great while afterwards; insomuch that king Agis himself, after having vanquished the Athenians, sending for his commons at his return home, because he desired to eat privately with his queen, was refused them by the polemarchs; which refusal when he resented so much as to omit next day the sacrifice due for a war happily ended, they made him pay a fine.

They used to send their children to these tables as to schools of temperance; here they were instructed in state affairs by listening to experienced statesmen; here they learnt to converse with pleasantry, to make jests without scurrility, and take them without ill humor. In this point of good breeding, the Lacedæmonians excelled particularly, but if any man were uneasy under it, upon the least hint given there was no more to be said to him. It was customary also for the eldest man in the company to say to each of them, as they came in, "Through this" (pointing to the door), "no words go out." When any one had a desire to be admitted into any of these little societies; he was to go through the following probation, each man in the company took a little ball of soft bread, which they were to throw into a deep basin, which a waiter carried round upon his head; those that liked the person to be chosen dropped their ball into the basin without altering its figure, and those who disliked him pressed it betwixt their fingers, and made it flat; and this signified as much as a negative voice. And if there were but one of these flattened pieces in the basin, the suitor was rejected, so desirous were they that all the members of the company should be agreeable to each other. The basin was called *caddichus*, and the rejected candidate had a name thence derived. Their most famous dish was the black broth, which was so much valued that the

elderly men fed only upon that, leaving what flesh there was to the younger.

They say that a certain king of Pontus, having heard much of this black broth of theirs, sent for a Lacedæmonian cook on purpose to make him some, but had no sooner tasted it than he found it extremely bad, which the cook observing, told him, "Sir, to make this broth relish, you should have bathed yourself first in the river Eurotas."

After drinking moderately, every man went to his home without lights, for the use of them was, on all occasions, forbidden, to the end that they might accustom themselves to march boldly in the dark. Such was the common fashion of their meals.

Lycurgus would never reduce his laws into writing; nay, there is a Rhetra expressly to forbid it. For he thought that the most material points, and such as most directly tended to the public welfare, being imprinted on the hearts of their youth by a good discipline, would be sure to remain, and would find a stronger security, than any compulsion would be, in the principles of action formed in them by their best law-giver, education. And as for things of lesser importance, as pecuniary contracts, and such like, the forms of which have to be changed as occasion requires, he thought it the best way to prescribe no positive rule or inviolable usage in such cases, willing that their manner and form should be altered according to the circumstances of time, and determinations of men of sound judgment. Every end and object of law and enactment it was his design education should effect.

One, then, of the Rhetras was, that their law should not be written; another is particularly levelled against luxury and expensiveness, for by it it was ordained that the ceilings of their houses should only be wrought by the axe, and their gates and doors smoothed only by the saw. Epaminondas's famous dictum about his own table, that "Treason and a dinner like this do not keep company together," may be said to have been anticipated by Lycurgus. Luxury and a house of this kind could not well be companions. For a man must have a less than ordinary share of sense that would furnish such plain and common rooms with silver-footed couches and purple coverlets and gold and silver plate. Doubtless he had good reason to think that they would proportion their beds to their houses, and their coverlets to their beds, and the rest of their goods and furniture to these. It is reported that king Leotychides, the first of that name, was so little used to the sight of any other kind of work, that, being entertained at Corinth in a stately room, he was much surprised to see the timber and ceiling so finely

carved and pannelled, and asked his host whether the trees grew so in his country.

A third ordinance or Rhetra was, that they should not make war often, or long, with the same enemy, lest that they should train and instruct them in war, by habituating them to defend themselves. And this is what Agesilaus was much blamed for, a long time after ; it being thought, that, by his continual incursions into Bœotia, he made the Thebans a match for the Lacedæmonians ; and therefore Antalcidas, seeing him wounded one day, said to him, that he was very well paid for taking such pains to make the Thebans good soldiers, whether they would or no. These laws were called the Rhetras, to intimate that they were divine sanctions and revelations.

In order to the good education of their youth (which, as I said before, he thought the most important and noblest work of a law-giver), he went so far back as to take into consideration their very conception and birth, by regulating their marriages. For Aristotle is wrong in saying, that, after he had tried all ways to reduce the women to more modesty and sobriety, he was at last forced to leave them as they were, because that, in the absence of their husbands, who spent the best part of their lives in the wars, their wives, whom they were obliged to leave absolute mistresses at home, took great liberties and assumed the superiority ; and were treated with overmuch respect and called by the title of lady or queen. The truth is, he took in their case, also, all the care that was possible ; he ordered the maidens to exercise themselves with wrestling, running, throwing the quoit, and casting the dart, to the end that the fruit they conceived might, in strong and healthy bodies, take firmer root and find better growth, and withal that they, with this greater vigor, might be the more able to undergo the pains of child-bearing. And to the end he might take away their overgreat tenderness and fear of exposure to the air, and all acquired womanishness, he ordered that the young women should go naked in the processions, as well as the young men, and dance, too, in that condition, at certain solemn feasts, singing certain songs, whilst the young men stood around, seeing and hearing them. On these occasions, they now and then made, by jests, a befitting reflection upon those who had misbehaved themselves in the wars ; and again sang encomiums upon those who had done any gallant action, and by these means inspired the younger sort with an emulation of their glory. Those that were thus commended went away proud, elated, and gratified with their honor among the maidens ; and those who were rallied were as sensibly

touched with it as if they had been formally reprimanded ; and so much the more, because the kings and the elders, as well as the rest of the city, saw and heard all that passed. Nor was there any thing shameful in this nakedness of the young women ; modesty attended them, and all wantonness was excluded. It taught them simplicity and a care for good health, and gave them some taste of higher feelings, admitted as they thus were to the field of noble action and glory. Hence it was natural for them to think and speak as Gorgo, for example, the wife of Leonidas, is said to have done, when some foreign lady, as it would seem, told her that the women of Lacedæmon were the only women of the world who could rule men ; "With good reason," she said, "for we are the only women who bring forth men."

These public processions of the maidens, and their appearing naked in their exercises and dancings, were incitements to marriage, operating upon the young with the rigor and certainty, as Plato says, of love, if not of mathematics. But besides all this, to promote it yet more effectually, those who continued bachelors were in a degree disfranchised by law ; for they were excluded from the sight of those public processions in which the young men and maidens danced naked, and, in winter-time, the officers compelled them to march naked themselves round the market-place, singing as they went a certain song to their own disgrace, that they justly suffered this punishment for disobeying the laws. Moreover, they were denied that respect and observance which the younger men paid their elders ; and no man, for example, found fault with what was said to Dercyllidas, though so eminent a commander ; upon whose approach one day, a young man, instead of rising, retained his seat, remarking, "No child of yours will make room for me."

In their marriages, the husband carried off his bride by a sort of force ; nor were their brides ever small and of tender years, but in their full bloom and ripeness. After this, she who superintended the wedding comes and clips the hair of the bride close around her head, dresses her up in man's clothes, and leaves her upon a mattress in the dark ; afterwards comes the bridegroom, in his every-day clothes, sober and composed, as having supped at the common table, and, entering privately into the room where the bride lies, unties her virgin zone, and takes her to himself ; and, after staying some time together, he returns composedly to his own apartment, to sleep as usual with the other young men. And so he continues to do, spending his days, and, indeed, his nights with them, visiting his bride in fear and shame, and with

circumspection, when he thought he should not be observed; she, also, on her part, using her wit to help and find favorable opportunities for their meeting, when company was out of the way. In this manner they lived a long time, insomuch that they sometimes had children by their wives before ever they saw their faces by daylight. Their interviews, being thus difficult and rare, served not only for continual exercise of their self-control, but brought them together with their bodies healthy and vigorous, and their affections fresh and lively, unsated and undulled by easy access and long continuance with each other; while their partings were always early enough to leave behind unextinguished in each of them some remaining fire of longing and mutual delight. After guarding marriage with this modesty and reserve, he was equally careful to banish empty and womanish jealousy. For this object, excluding all licentious disorders, he made it, nevertheless, honorable for men to give the use of their wives to those whom they should think fit, that so they might have children by them; ridiculing those in whose opinion such favors are so unfit for participation as to fight and shed blood and go to war about it. Lycurgus allowed a man who was advanced in years and had a young wife to recommend some virtuous and approved young man, that she might have a child by him, who might inherit the good qualities of the father, and be a son to himself. On the other side, an honest man who had love for a married woman on account of her modesty and the well-favoredness of her children, might, without formality, beg her company of her husband, that he might raise, as it were, from this plot of good ground, worthy and well-allied children for himself. And, indeed, Lycurgus was of a persuasion that children were not so much the property of their parents as of the whole commonwealth, and, therefore, would not have his citizens begot by the first comers, but by the best men that could be found; the laws of others nations seemed to him very absurd and inconsistent, where people would be so solicitous for their dogs and horses as to exert interest and pay money to procure fine breeding, and yet kept their wives shut up, to be made mothers only by themselves, who might be foolish, infirm, or diseased; as if it were not apparent that children of a bad breed would prove their bad qualities first upon those who kept and were rearing them, and well-born children, in like manner, their good qualities. These regulations, founded on natural and social grounds, were certainly so far from that scandalous liberty which was afterwards charged upon their women, that they knew not what adultery meant. It is told, for instance, of Geradas, a very ancient Spartan, that, being

asked by a stranger what punishment their law had appointed for adulterers, he answered, "There are no adulterers in our country." "But," replied the stranger, "suppose there were?" "Then," answered he, "the offender would have to give the plaintiff a bull with a neck so long that he might drink from the top of Taygetus of the Eurotas river below it." The man, surprised at this, said, "Why, 't is impossible to find such a bull." Geradas smilingly replied, "'T is as possible as to find an adulterer in Sparta." So much I had to say of their marriages.

Nor was it in the power of the father to dispose of the child as he thought fit; he was obliged to carry it before certain triers at a place called Lesche; these were some of the elders of the tribe to which the child belonged; their business it was carefully to view the infant, and, if they found it stout and well made, they gave order for its rearing, and allotted to it one of the nine thousand shares of land above mentioned for its maintenance, but, if they found it puny and ill-shaped, ordered it to be taken to what was called the Apothetæ, a sort of chasm under Taygetus; as thinking it neither for the good of the child itself, nor for the public interest, that it should be brought up, if it did not, from the very outset, appear made to be healthy and vigorous. Upon the same account, the women did not bathe the new-born children with water, as is the custom in all other countries, but with wine, to prove the temper and complexion of their bodies; from a notion they had that epileptic and weakly children faint and waste away upon their being thus bathed, while, on the contrary, those of a strong and vigorous habit acquire firmness and get a temper by it, like steel. There was much care and art, too, used by the nurses; they had no swaddling bands; the children grew up free and unconstrained in limb and form, and not dainty and fanciful about their food; not afraid in the dark, or of being left alone; without any peevishness or ill humor or crying. Upon this account, Spartan nurses were often bought up, or hired by people of other countries; and it is recorded that she who suckled Alcibiades was a Spartan; who, however, if fortunate in his nurse, was not so in his preceptor; his guardian, Pericles, as Plato tells us, chose a servant for that office called Zopyrus, no better than any common slave.

Lycurgus was of another mind; he would not have masters bought out of the market for his young Spartans, nor such as should sell their pains; nor was it lawful, indeed, for the father himself to breed up the children after his own fancy; but as soon as they were seven years old they were to be enrolled in certain companies and classes, where they

all lived under the same order and discipline, doing their exercises and taking their play together. Of these, he who showed the most conduct and courage was made captain; they had their eyes always upon him, obeyed his orders, and underwent patiently whatsoever punishment he inflicted; so that the whole course of their education was one continued exercise of a ready and perfect obedience. The old men, too, were spectators of their performances, and often raised quarrels and disputes among them, to have a good opportunity of finding out their different characters, and of seeing which would be valiant, which a coward, when they should come to more dangerous encounters. Reading and writing they gave them, just enough to serve their turn; their chief care was to make them good subjects, and to teach them to endure pain and conquer in battle. To this end, as they grew in years, their discipline was proportionately increased; their heads were close-clipped, they were accustomed to go bare-foot, and for the most part to play naked.

After they were twelve years old, they were no longer allowed to wear any under-garment; they had one coat to serve them a year; their bodies were hard and dry, with but little acquaintance of baths and unguents; these human indulgences they were allowed only on some few particular days in the year. They lodged together in little bands upon beds made of the rushes which grew by the banks of the river Eurotas, which they were to break off with their hands without a knife; if it were winter, they mingled some thistle-down with their rushes, which it was thought had the property of giving warmth. By the time they were come to this age, there was not any of the more hopeful boys who had not a lover to bear him company. The old men, too, had an eye upon them, coming often to the grounds to hear and see them contend either in wit or strength with one another, and this as seriously and with as much concern as if they were their fathers, their tutors, or their magistrates; so that there scarcely was any time or place without some one present to put them in mind of their duty, and punish them if they had neglected it.

Besides all this, there was always one of the best and honestest men in the city appointed to undertake the charge and governance of them; he again arranged them into several bands, and set over each of them for their captain the most temperate and boldest of those they called Irens, who were usually twenty years old, two years out of the boys; and the eldest of the boys, again, were Mell-Irens, as much as to say, who would shortly be men. This young man, therefore, was their captain when they fought, and their master at home, using them for

the offices of his house; sending the oldest of them to fetch wood, and the weaker and less able, to gather salads and herbs, and these they must either go without or steal; which they did by creeping into the gardens, or conveying themselves cunningly and closely into the eating-houses; if they were taken in the act, they were whipped without mercy, for thieving so ill and awkwardly. They stole, too, all other meat they could lay their hands on, looking out and watching all opportunities, when people were asleep or more careless than usual. If they were caught, they were not only punished with whipping, but hunger, too, being reduced to their ordinary allowance, which was but very slender, and so contrived on purpose, that they might set about to help themselves, and be forced to exercise their energy and address. This was the principal design of their hard fare; there was another not inconsiderable, that they might grow taller; for the vital spirits, not being overburdened and oppressed by too great a quantity of nourishment, which necessarily discharges itself into thickness and breadth, do, by their natural lightness, rise; and the body, giving and yielding because it is pliant, grows in height. The same thing seems, also, to conduce to beauty of shape; a dry and lean habit is a better subject for nature's configuration, which the gross and over-fed are too heavy to submit to properly. Just as we find that women who take physic whilst they are with child, bear leaner and smaller but better-shaped and prettier children; the material they come of having been more pliable and easily moulded. The reason, however, I leave others to determine.

To return from whence we have digressed. So seriously did the Lacedæmonian children go about their stealing, that a youth, having stolen a young fox and hid it under his coat, suffered it to tear out his very bowels with its teeth and claws, and died upon the place, rather than let it be seen. What is practised to this very day in Lacedæmon is enough to gain credit to this story, for I myself have seen several of the youths endure whipping to death at the foot of the altar of Diana surnamed Orthia.

The Iren, or under-master, used to stay a little with them after supper, and one of them he bade to sing a song, to another he put a Who was the best man in the city? What he thought of such an action of such a man? They used them thus early to pass a right judgment upon persons and things, and to inform themselves of the abilities or defects of their countrymen. If they had not an answer ready to the question Who was a good or who was an ill-reputed citizen, they were looked upon as of a dull and careless disposition, and to have little or

no sense of virtue and honor; besides this, they were to give a good reason for what they said, and in as few words and as comprehensive as might be; he that failed of this, or answered not to the purpose, had his thumb bit by his master. Sometimes the Iren did this in the presence of the old men and magistrates, that they might see whether he punished them justly and in due measure or not; and when he did amiss, they would not reprove him before the boys, but, when they were gone, he was called to an account and underwent correction, if he had run far into either of the extremes of indulgence or severity.

Their lovers and favorers, too, had a share in the young boy's honor or disgrace; and there goes a story that one of them was fined by the magistrates, because the lad whom he loved cried out effeminately as he was fighting. And though this sort of love was so approved among them, that the most virtuous matrons would make professions of it to young girls, yet rivalry did not exist, and if several men's fancies met in one person, it was rather the beginning of an intimate friendship, whilst they all jointly conspired to render the object of their affection as accomplished as possible.

They taught them, also, to speak with a natural and graceful railery, and to comprehend much matter of thought in few words. For Lycurgus, who ordered, as we saw, that a great piece of money should be but of an inconsiderable value, on the contrary would allow no discourse to be current which did not contain in few words a great deal of useful and curious sense; children in Sparta, by a habit of long silence, came to give just and sententious answers; for, indeed, as loose and incontinent livers are seldom fathers of many children, so loose and incontinent talkers seldom originate many sensible words. King Agis, when some Athenian laughed at their short swords, and said that the jugglers on the stage swallowed them with ease, answered him, "We find them long enough to reach our enemies with;" and as their swords were short and sharp, so, it seems to me, were their sayings. They reach the point and arrest the attention of the hearers better than any. Lycurgus himself seems to have been short and sententious, if we may trust the anecdotes of him; as appears by his answer to one who by all means would set up democracy in Lacedæmon. "Begin, friend," said he, "and set it up in your family." Another asked him why he allowed of such mean and trivial sacrifices to the gods. He replied, "That we may always have something to offer to them." Being asked what sort of martial exercises or combats he approved of, he answered, "All sorts, except that in which you stretch

out your hands." Similar answers, addressed to his countrymen by letter, are ascribed to him; as, being consulted how they might best oppose an invasion of their enemies, he returned this answer, "By continuing poor, and not coveting each man to be greater than his fellow." Being consulted again whether it were requisite to enclose the city with a wall, he sent them word, "The city is well fortified which hath a wall of men instead of brick." But whether these letters are counterfeit or not is not easy to determine.

Of their dislike to talkativeness, the following apophthegms are evidence. King Leonidas said to one who held him in discourse upon some useful matter, but not in due time and place, "Much to the purpose, Sir, elsewhere." King Charilaus, the nephew of Lycurgus, being asked why his uncle had made so few laws, answered, "Men of few words require but few laws." When one blamed Hecatæus the sophist because that, being invited to the public table, he had not spoken one word all supper-time, Archidamidas answered in his vindication, "He who knows how to speak, knows also when."

The sharp and yet not ungraceful retorts which I mentioned may be instanced as follows. Demaratus, being asked in a troublesome manner by an importunate fellow, Who was the best man in Lacedæmon? answered at last, "He, Sir, that is the least like you." Some, in company where Agis was, much extolled the Eleans for their just and honorable management of the Olympic games; "Indeed," said Agis, "they are highly to be commended if they can do justice one day in five years." Theopompus answered a stranger who talked much of his affection to the Lacedæmonians, and said that his countrymen called him Philolacon (a lover of the Lacedæmonians), that it had been more for his honor if they had called him Philopolites (a lover of his own countrymen). And Plistoanax, the son of Pausanias, when an orator of Athens, said the Lacedæmonians had no learning, told him, "You say true, Sir; we alone of all the Greeks have learned none of your bad qualities." One asked Archidamidas what number there might be of the Spartans; he answered, "Enough, Sir, to keep out wicked men."

We may see their character, too, in their very jests. For they did not throw them out at random, but the very wit of them was grounded upon something or other worth thinking about. For instance, one, being asked to go hear a man who exactly counterfeited the voice of a nightingale, answered, "Sir, I have heard the nightingale itself." Another, having read the following inscription upon a tomb,

Seeking to quench a cruel tyranny,
They, at Selinus, did in battle die,

said, it served them right; for instead of trying to quench the tyranny they should have let it burn out. A lad, being offered some game-cocks that would die upon the spot, said that he cared not for cocks that would die, but for such that would live and kill others. Another, seeing people easing themselves on seats, said, "God forbid I should sit where I could not get up to salute my elders." In short, their answers were so sententious and pertinent, that one said well that intellectual much more truly than athletic exercise was the Spartan characteristic.

Nor was their instruction in music and verse less carefully attended to than their habits of grace and good breeding in conversation. And their very songs had a life and spirit in them that inflamed and possessed men's minds with an enthusiasm and ardor for action; the style of them was plain and without affectation; the subject always serious and moral; most usually, it was in praise of such men as had died in defence of their country, or in derision of those that had been cowards; the former declared happy and glorified; the life of the latter they described as most miserable and abject. There were also vaunts of what they would do, and boasts of what they had done, varying with the various ages, as, for example, they had three choirs in their solemn festivals, the first of the old men, the second of the young men, and the last of the children; the old men began thus:

We once were young, and brave and strong;
the young men answered them, singing,

And we're so now, come on and try;
the children came last and said,

But we'll be strongest by and by.

Indeed, if we will take the pains to consider their compositions, some of which were still extant in our days, and the airs on the flute to which they marched when going to battle, we shall find that Terpendar and Pindar had reason to say that music and valor were allied. The first says of Lacedæmon—

The spear and song in her do meet,
And Justice walks about her street;

and Pindar—

Councils of wise elders here,
And the young men's conquering spear,
And dance, and song, and joy appear;

both describing the Spartans as no less musical than warlike; in the words of one of their own poets—

With the iron stern and sharp
Comes the playing on the harp.

For, indeed, before they engaged in battle, the king first did sacrifice to the Muses, in all likelihood to put them in mind of the manner of their education, and of the judgment that would pass upon their actions, and thereby to animate them to the performance of exploits that should deserve a record. At such times, too, the Lacedæmonians abated a little the severity of their manners in favor of their young men, suffering them to curl and adorn their hair, and to have costly arms, and fine clothes; and were well pleased to see them, like proud horses, neighing and pressing to the course. And therefore, as soon as they came to be well-grown, they took a great deal of care of their hair, to have it parted and trimmed, especially against a day of battle, pursuant to a saying recorded of their lawgiver, that a large head of hair added beauty to a good face, and terror to an ugly one.

When they were in the field, their exercises were generally more moderate, their fare not so hard, nor so strict a hand held over them by their officers, so that they were the only people in the world to whom war gave repose. When their army was drawn up in battle array and the enemy near, the king sacrificed a goat, commanded the soldiers to set their garlands upon their heads, and the pipers to play the tune of the hymn to Castor, and himself began the pæan of advance. It was at once a magnificent and a terrible sight to see them march on to the tune of their flutes, without any disorder in their ranks, any discomposure in their minds or change in their countenance, calmly and cheerfully moving with the music to the deadly fight. Men, in this temper, were not likely to be possessed with fear or any transport of fury, but with the deliberate valor of hope and assurance, as if some divinity were attending and conducting them. The king had always about his person some one who had been crowned in the Olympic games; and upon this account a Lacedæmonian is said to have refused a considerable present, which was offered to him upon condition that he would not come into

the lists ; and when he had with much to-do thrown his antagonist, some of the spectators saying to him, "And now, Sir Lacedæmonian, what are you the better for your victory?" he answered smiling, "I shall fight next the king." After they had routed an enemy, they pursued him till they were well assured of the victory, and then they sounded a retreat, thinking it base and unworthy of a Grecian people to cut men in pieces, who had given up and abandoned all resistance. This manner of dealing with their enemies did not only show magnanimity, but was politic too ; for, knowing that they killed only those who made resistance, and gave quarter to the rest, men generally thought it their best way to consult their safety by flight.

Hippias the sophist says that Lycurgus himself was a great soldier and an experienced commander. Philostephanus attributes to him the first division of the cavalry into troops of fifties in a square body ; but Demetrius the Phalerian says quite the contrary, and that he made all his laws in a continued peace. And, indeed, the Olympic holy truce, or cessation of arms, that was procured by his means and management, inclines me to think him a kind-natured man, and one that loved quietness and peace. Notwithstanding all this, Hermippus tells us that he had no hand in the ordinance ; that Iphitus made it, and Lycurgus came only as a spectator, and that by mere accident too. Being there, he heard as it were a man's voice behind him, blaming and wondering at him that he did not encourage his countrymen to resort to the assembly, and, turning about and seeing no man, concluded that it was a voice from heaven, and upon this immediately went to Iphitus, and assisted him in ordering the ceremonies of that feast, which, by his means, were better established, and with more repute than before.

To return to the Lacedæmonians. Their discipline continued still after they were full-grown men. No one was allowed to live after his own fancy ; but the city was a sort of camp, in which every man had his share of provisions and business set out, and looked upon himself not so much born to serve his own ends as the interest of his country. Therefore, if they were commanded nothing else, they went to see the boys perform their exercises, to teach thm something useful, or to learn it themselves of those who knew better. And, indeed, one of the greatest and highest blessings Lycurgus procured his people was the abundance of leisure, which proceeded from his forbidding to them the exercise of any mean and mechanical trade. Of the money-making that depends on troublesome going about and seeing people and doing business, they had no need at all in a state where wealth obtained no

honor or respect. The Helots tilled their ground for them, and paid them yearly in kind the appointed quantity, without any trouble of theirs. To this purpose there goes a story of a Lacedæmonian who, happening to be at Athens when the courts were sitting, was told of a citizen that had been fined for living an idle life, and was being escorted home in much distress of mind by his condoling friends; the Lacedæmonian was much surprised at it, and desired his friend to show him the man who was condemned for living like a freeman. So much beneath them did they esteem the frivolous devotion of time and attention to the mechanical arts and to money-making.

It need not be said, that, upon the prohibition of gold and silver, all law-suits immediately ceased, for there was now neither avarice nor poverty amongst them, but equality, where every one's wants were supplied, and independence, because those wants were so small. All their time, except when they were in the field, was taken up by the choral dances and the festivals, in hunting, and in attendance on the exercise-grounds and the places of public conversation. Those who were under thirty years of age were not allowed to go into the market-place, but had the necessaries of their family supplied by the care of their relations and lovers; nor was it for the credit of elderly men to be seen too often in the market-place; it was esteemed more suitable for them to frequent the exercise-grounds and places of conversation, where they spent their leisure rationally in conversation, not on money-making and market-prices, but for the most part in passing judgment on some action worth considering; extolling the good, and censuring those who were otherwise, and that in a light and sportive manner, conveying, without too much gravity, lessons of advice and improvement. Nor was Lycurgus himself unduly austere; it was he who dedicated, says Sosibius, the little statue of Laughter. Mirth, introduced seasonably at their suppers and places of common entertainments, was to serve as a sort of sweetmeat to accompany their strict and hard life. To conclude, he bred up his citizens in such a way that they neither would nor could live by themselves; they were to make themselves one with the public good, and, clustering like bees around their commander, be by their zeal and public spirit carried all but out of themselves, and devoted wholly to their country. What their sentiments were will better appear by a few of their sayings. Pædaretus, not being admitted into the list of the three hundred, returned home with a joyful face, well pleased to find that there were in Sparta three hundred better men than himself. And Polycratidas, being sent with some others ambassador to the lieu-

tenants of the king of Persia, being asked by them whether they came in a private or in a public character, answered, "In a public, if we succeed; if not, in a private character." Argileonis, asking some who came from Amphipolis if her son Brasidas died courageously and as became a Spartan, on their beginning to praise him to a high degree, and saying there was not such another left in Sparta, answered, "Do not say so; Brasidas was a good and brave man, but there are in Sparta many better than he."

The senate, as I said before, consisted of those who were Lycurgus' chief aiders and assistants in his plans. The vacancies he ordered to be supplied out of the best and most deserving men past sixty years old, and we need not wonder if there was much striving for it; for what more glorious competition could there be amongst men, than one in which it was not contested who was swiftest among the swift or strongest of the strong, but who of many wise and good was wisest and best, and fittest to be intrusted for ever after, as the reward of his merits, with the supreme authority of the commonwealth, and with power over the lives, franchises, and highest interests of all his countrymen? The manner of their election was as follows: the people being called together, some selected persons were locked up in a room near the place of election, so contrived that they could neither see nor be seen, but could only hear the noise of the assembly without; for they decided this, as most other affairs of moment, by the shouts of the people. This done, the competitors were not brought in and presented all together, but one after another by lot, and passed in order through the assembly without speaking a word. Those who were locked up had writing-tables with them, in which they recorded and marked each shout by its loudness, without knowing in favor of which candidate each of them was made, but merely that they came first, second, third, and so forth. He who was found to have the most and loudest acclamations was declared senator duly elected. Upon this he had a garland set upon his head, and went in procession to all the temples to give thanks to the gods; a great number of young men followed him with applauses, and women, also, singing verses in his honor, and extolling the virtue and happiness of his life. As he went round the city in this manner, each of his relations and friends set a table before him, saying, "The city honors you with this banquet;" but he, instead of accepting, passed round to the common table where he formerly used to eat, and was served as before, excepting that now he had a second allowance, which he took and put by. By the time supper was ended, the women who

were of kin to him had come about the door; and he, beckoning to her whom he most esteemed, presented to her the portion he had saved, saying, that it had been a mark of esteem to him, and was so now to her; upon which she was triumphantly waited upon home by the women.

Touching burials, Lycurgus made very wise regulations; for, first of all, to cut off all superstition, he allowed them to bury their dead within the city, and even round about their temples, to the end that their youth might be accustomed to such spectacles, and not be afraid to see a dead body, or imagine that to touch a corpse or to tread upon a grave would defile a man. In the next place, he commanded them to put nothing into the ground with them, except, if they please, a few olive leaves, and the scarlet cloth that they were wrapped in. He would not suffer the names to be inscribed, except only of men who fell in the wars, or women who died in a sacred office. The time, too, appointed for mourning, was very short, eleven days; on the twelfth, they were to do sacrifice to Ceres, and leave it off; so that we may see, that as he cut off all superfluity, so in things necessary there was nothing so small and trivial which did not express some homage of virtue or scorn of vice. He filled Lacedæmon all through with proofs and examples of good conduct; with the constant sight of which from their youth up, the people would hardly fail to be gradually formed and advanced in virtue.

And this was the reason why he forbade them to travel abroad, and go about acquainting themselves with foreign rules of morality, the habits of ill-educated people, and different views of government. Withal he banished from Lacedæmon all strangers who could not give a very good reason for their coming thither; not because he was afraid lest they should inform themselves of and imitate his manner of government (as Thucydides says), or learn anything to their good; but rather lest they should introduce something contrary to good manners. With strange people, strange words must be admitted; these novelties produce novelties in thought; and on these follow views and feelings whose discordant character destroys the harmony of the state. He was as careful to save his city from the infection of foreign bad habits, as men usually are to prevent the introduction of a pestilence.

Hitherto I, for my part, see no sign of injustice or want of equity in the laws of Lycurgus, though some who admit them to be well contrived to make good soldiers, pronounce them defective in point of justice. The Cryptia, perhaps (if it were one of Lycurgus' ordinances, as Aristotle says it was), gave both him and Plato, too, this opinion alike of the law-giver and his government. By this ordinance, the

acter of the government.

In the time of Agis, gold and silver first flowed into Sparta, and with them all those mischiefs which attend the immoderate desire of riches. Lysander promoted this disorder; for, by bringing in rich spoils from the wars, although himself incorrupt, he yet by this means filled his country with avarice and luxury, and subverted the laws and ordinances of Lycurgus; so long as which were in force, the aspect presented by Sparta was rather that of a rule of life followed by one wise and temperate man, than of the political government of a nation. And as the poets feign of Hercules, that, with his lion's skin and his club, he went over the world, punishing lawless and cruel tyrants, so may it be said of the Lacedæmonians, that, with a common staff and a coarse coat, they gained the willing and joyful obedience of Greece, through whose whole extent they suppressed unjust usurpations and despotisms, arbitrated in war, and composed civil dissensions; and this often without so much as taking down one buckler, but barely by sending some one single deputy, to whose direction all at once submitted, like bees swarming and taking their places around their prince. Such a fund of order and equity, enough and to spare for others, existed in their state.

And therefore I cannot but wonder at those who say that the Spartans were good subjects, but bad governors, and for proof of it allege a saying of king Theopompus, who, when one said that Sparta held up so long because their kings could command so well, replied, "Nay, rather because the people know so well how to obey." For people do not obey, unless rulers know how to command; obedience is a lesson taught by commanders. A true leader himself creates the obedience of his own followers; as it is the last attainment in the art of riding to make a horse gentle and tractable, so it is of the science of government, to inspire men with a willingness to obey. The Lacedæmonians inspired men not with a mere willingness, but with an absolute desire, to be their subjects. For they did not send petitions to them for ships or money, or a supply of armed men, but only for a Spartan commander; and, having obtained one, used him with honor and reverence; so the Sicilians behaved to Gylippus, the Chalcidians to Brasidas, and all the Greeks in Asia to Lysander, Callicratidas, and Agesilaus; they styled them the composers and chasteners of each people or prince they were sent to, and had their eyes always fixed upon the city of Sparta itself, as the perfect model of good manners and wise government. The rest seemed as scholars, they the masters of Greece; and to this Stratoniceus pleasantly alluded, when in jest he pretended to make a law that the

Athenians should conduct religious processions and the mysteries, the Eleans should preside at the Olympic games, and, if either did amiss, the Lacedæmonians be beaten. Antisthenes, too, one of the scholars of Socrates, said, in earnest, of the Thebans, when they were elated by their victory at Leuctra, that they looked like schoolboys who had beaten their master.

However, it was not the design of Lycurgus that his city should govern a great many others; he thought rather that the happiness of a state, as of a private man, consisted chiefly in the exercise of virtue, and in the concord of the inhabitants; his aim therefore, in all his arrangements, was to make and keep them free-minded, self-dependent, and temperate. And therefore all those who have written well on politics, as Plato, Diogenes, and Zeno, have taken Lycurgus for their model, leaving behind them, however, mere projects and words; whereas Lycurgus was the author, not in writing but in reality, of a government which none else could so much as copy; and while men in general have treated the individual philosophic character as unattainable, he, by the example of a complete philosophic state, raised himself high above all other lawgivers of Greece. And so Aristotle says they did him less honor at Lacedæmon after his death than he deserved, although he has a temple there, and they offer sacrifices yearly to him as to a god.

It is reported that when his bones were brought home to Sparta his tomb was struck with lightning; an accident which befell no eminent person but himself, and Euripides, who was buried at Arethusa in Macedonia; and it may serve that poet's admirers as a testimony in his favor, that he had in this the same fate with that holy man and favorite of the gods. Some say Lycurgus died in Cirrha; Apollonius says, after he had come to Elis; Timæus and Aristoxenus, that he ended his life in Crete; Aristoxenus adds that his tomb is shown by the Cretans in the district of Pergamus, near the strangers' road. He left an only son, Antiorus, on whose death without issue, his family became extinct. But his relations and friends kept up an annual commemoration of him down to a long time after; and the days of the meeting were called Lycurgides. Aristocrates, the son of Hipparchus, says that he died in Crete, and that his Cretan friends, in accordance with his own request, when they had burned his body, scattered the ashes into the sea; for fear lest, if his relics should be transported to Lacedæmon, the people might pretend to be released from their oaths, and make innovations in the government. Thus much may suffice for the life and actions of Lycurgus.

TRANSLATION OF A. H. CLOUGH.

EARLY GREEK THINKERS

THE EARLY GREEK thinkers are important not only because many details of their thought have force to-day, but because they form the beginning of a movement, that, continuing almost uninterruptedly since their own time, constitutes one of the mightiest factors of modern civilization.

As with the Brahmans in their Upanishads, so with the Greeks, the continual changes that they saw going on in Nature led them to seek for that something which, amid all these changing conditions, remains constant. It was easy to see that some of these alterations, such, for example, as that of snow or ice to water, water to steam, wood to fire, or vegetation to earth, were not permanent substitutions of new substances: hence the Greeks sought to find the underlying reality back of all such manifestations of nature.

Thales, the Milesian, thought the characteristic of this world-substance to be life, and the substance itself water; Anaximander, that the universe has no bounds in space and that all things are supplied from this infinite store; Anaximenes, also, that the world-substance is infinite, but that it is the air; Xenophanes made its peculiarity divinity and believed the universe as a whole to be an immovable god; Herakleitos considered that the reality must have the quality of change with permanence, that change is a succession of opposites such as heat and cold in an endless chain, and that the reality itself is fire; Parmenides insisted that empty space is unthinkable and that *what is* is uncreated, indistructable, everywhere present, and immovable.

Then followed a period during which men tried to harmonize or combine these various guesses. Empedocles thought there are four

AMAZON

After Polycleitus. Now in Berlin.



elements, water, air, fire, and earth, with love and hate as the causes of motion. Anaxagoras put his faith in numberless unanalyzable elements. Leukippos advanced the theory that there are countless atoms infinite in kind, and that change is only a result of the collision of atoms. The Pythagoreans, influenced by the certainty of mathematical conclusions, placed the reality that they sought in the unchanging relations they found to exist between numbers. Zeno re-enforced Parmenides' theory of the unity of the world by showing the difficulties that are involved in the idea of change itself and in the doctrine that there are many world-substances.

The fragments that are given below, all the most important extant, will fill out and make interesting the bare outline traced above. Besides the details of the philosophic thought of these early wise men, the fragments will show their efforts in the natural and social sciences, for it must be understood that in the beginning science was but a part of philosophy. It has been the history of thought that philosophy first attacks broad questions such as the constitution of the universe, or the nature and possibility of knowledge, that at the start it leaps to conclusions, that next questions are developed which the knowledge of the time cannot answer, that some worker pauses to explore the tributary stream which philosophy has thus disclosed, and lo! a new science is discovered.

So in Greece, after these attempts to divine at a bound the nature of true reality, men began to apply philosophy to life and to inquire whether there is any certain foundation for knowledge or religion or law. The Sophists argued against any such sure foundations. Protagoras contended that consciousness consists entirely of perceptions, and that our perceptions notoriously do not give us the things themselves (for example, sound is the effect of vibrations in the air); hence that all things are as it were merely a matter of taste, that each man is the "measure of all things" and that certain knowledge, or science, is impossible. Socrates, on the other hand, believed that individual things could be grouped into classes, perceptions into conceptions, and that we may make a general statement of the class that will always hold good. Hence he made science equivalent to thinking in concepts, its method a grouping into classes, and its first object a definition of the group. In religion, he believed that knowledge itself will bring morality; that sin is ignorance or error, and that a true perception of the relations of things will see that virtue gives happiness, wrong-doing punishment. Others after him took up the

idea of virtue and sought to discover in what it consists. Thus the Stoics believed it to consist in being above circumstances, in standing unmoved in the midst of trouble and misfortune; the cynic Diogenes thought it to be entire freedom from wants and desires, and went back to a state of nature and lived in a tub; and Epicurus taught that virtue is only the ability for enjoyment. But after Socrates comes the great work of Plato and Aristotle, and we must consider these under separate heads.

THALES

Thales, of Miletus in Asia Minor is supposed to have been the founder of Greek philosophy. He probably flourished about 585 B. C., as Herodotus says that he foretold the eclipse most likely of that date, which put an end to the war between the Medes and Lydians. This he is thought to have done by using the cycle of 223 lunar months made out by the Babylonians, during which period eclipses of the sun and moon recur at equal intervals, although they may or may not be visible at any given spot on the earth's surface. He visited Egypt and brought back some knowledge of mensuration. Whether he wrote anything is a question, but it seems indubitable that he believed water to be the basis of all things, as all agree in ascribing this doctrine to him.

I. Thales, then, as Herodotus and Duris and Democritus say, was the son of Euxamius and Cleobule; of the family of the Thelidæ, who are Phœnicians by descent, among the most noble of all the descendants of Cadmus and Agenor, as Plato testifies. And he was the first man to whom the name of Wise was given, when Damasius was Archon at Athens, in whose time also the seven wise men had that title given to them, as Demetrius Phalereus records in his Catalogue of the Archons. He was enrolled as a citizen at Miletus when he came thither with Neleus, who had been banished from Phœnicia; but a more common statement is that he was a native Milesian, of noble extraction.

II. After having been immersed in state affairs he applied himself to speculations in natural philosophy; though, as some people state, he left no writings behind him, for the book on Naval Astronomy, which is attributed to him is said in reality to be the work of Focus the Samian. But Callimachus was aware that he was the discoverer of

the Lesser Bear ; for in his Iambics he speaks of him thus :

And, he, 'tis said, did first compute the stars
Which beam in Charles's wain, and guide the bark
Of the Phœnician sailor o'er the sea.

According to others he wrote two books, and no more, about the solstice and the equinox ; thinking that everything else was easily to be comprehended. According to other statements, he is said to have been the first who studied astronomy, and who foretold the eclipses and motions of the sun, as Eudemus relates in his history of the discoveries made in astronomy ; on which account Xenophanes and Herodotus praise him greatly ; and Heraclitus and Democritus confirm this statement.

III. Some again (one of whom is Chærilus the poet) say that he was the first person who affirmed that the souls of men were immortal ; and he was the first person, too, who discovered the path of the sun from one end of the ecliptic to the other ; and who, as one account tells us, defined the magnitude of the sun as being seven hundred and twenty times as great as that of the moon. He was also the first person who called the last day of the month the thirtieth. And likewise the first to converse about natural philosophy, as some say. But Aristotle and Hippias say that he attributed souls also to lifeless things, forming his conjecture from the nature of the magnet, and of amber.

VI. He asserted water to be the principle of all things, and that the world had life, and was full of demons ; they say, too, that he was the original definer of the seasons of the year, and that it was he who divided the year into three hundred and sixty-five days. And he never had any teacher except during the time that he went to Egypt, and associated with the priests. Hieronymus also says that he measured the Pyramids : watching their shadow, and calculating when they were of the same size as that was. He lived with Thrasybulus the tyrant of Miletus, as we are informed by Minyas.

IX. These are quoted as some of his lines :—

It is not many words that real wisdom proves ;
Breathe rather one wise thought,
Select one worthy object,

So shall you best the endless prate of silly men reprove.—

And the following are quoted as saying of his :—"God is the most ancient of all things, for he had no birth : the world is the most beautiful of things, for it is the work of God ; place is the greatest of things,

for it contains all things: intellect is the swiftest of things, for it runs through everything: necessity is the strongest of things, for it rules everything: time is the wisest of things, for it finds out everything."

He said also that there was no difference between life and death. "Why, then," said some one to him, "do not you die?" "Because," said he, "it does make no difference." A man asked him which was made first, night or day, and he replied, "Night was made first by one day." Another man asked him whether a man who did wrong, could escape the notice of the gods. "No, not even if he thinks wrong," said he. An adulterer inquired of him whether he should swear that he had not committed adultery. "Perjury," said he, "is no worse than adultery." When he was asked what was very difficult, he said, "To know one's self." And what was easy, "To advise another." What was most pleasant? "To be successful." To the question, "What is the divinity?" he replied, "That which has neither beginning nor end." When asked what hard thing he had seen, he said, "An old man a tyrant." When the question was put to him how a man might most easily endure misfortune, he said, "If he saw his enemies more unfortunate still." When asked how men might live most virtuously and most justly, he said, "If we never do ourselves what we blame in others." To the question, "Who was happy?" he made answer, "He who is healthy in his body, easy in his circumstances, and well-instructed as to his mind." He said that men ought to remember those friends who were absent as well as those who were present, and not to care about adorning their faces, but to be beautified by their studies. "Do not," said he, "get rich by evil actions, and let not any one ever be able to reproach you with speaking against those who partake of your friendship. All the assistance that you give to your parents, the same you have a right to expect from your children." He said that the reason of the Nile overflowing was, that its streams were beaten back by the Etesian winds blowing in a contrary direction.—Diogenes Lærtius.

TRANSLATION OF C. D. YONGE.

ANAXIMANDER.

Anaximander was also a citizen of Miletus. He was born 610 B. C. He was one of the first to construct a map of the world. In philosophy he belonged to the school of Thales. Most of the extant frag-

ments of his writings come from Theophrastus. He was still alive at the fall of Sardis in 546 B. C. He mounted from the particular to the general and taught that the world is infinite in space and time.

FRAGMENTS

Anaximander of Miletos, son of Praxiades, a fellow-citizen and associate of Thales, said that the material cause and first element of things was the Infinite, he being the first to introduce this name for the material cause. He says it is neither water nor any other of what are now called the elements, but a substance different from them which is infinite, from which arise all the heavens and the worlds within them.—Phys. Op. fr. 2 (Diels *Doxographi Graeci* p. 476; Ritter's *Historia Philosophiae Graecae* 12).

He says that this is eternal and ageless, and that it encompasses all the worlds.—Hippolytos, *Refutation of all Heresies* i. 6 (R. P. 13a).

And into that from which things take their rise they pass away once more, "as is ordained; for they make reparation and satisfaction to one another for their injustice according to the appointed time," as he says in these somewhat poetical terms.—Phys. Op. fr. 2 (R. P. 12).

And besides this, there was an eternal motion, in the course of which was brought about the origin of the worlds.—Hipp. Ref. i. 6 (R. P. 13a).

He did not ascribe the origin of things to any alteration in matter, but said that the oppositions in the substratum, which was a boundless Body, were separated out.—Simplicius Phys. p. 150 D (R. P. 14a).

He says that something capable of begetting hot and cold was separated off from the eternal at the origin of this world. From this arose a sphere of flame which grew round the air encircling the earth, as the bark grows round a tree. When this was broken up and enclosed in certain rings, the sun, moon, and stars came into existence.—Pseudo Plutarch *Stromateis* fr. 2 (R. P. 14 B).

The heavenly bodies are wheels of fire separated off from the fire which encircles the world, and surrounded by air. And they have breathing-holes, certain pipe-like openings through which the heavenly bodies are seen. For this reason, too, when the breathing-holes are stopped, eclipses occur. And the moon appears now to wax and now to wane because of the stopping and opening of the outlets. The circle of the sun is twenty-seven times the size (of the earth, while that) of the moon (is eighteen times as large). The sun is highest of

all, and lowest are the wheels of the fixed stars.—Hipp. Ref. i. 6 (R. P. 14 C).

Anaximander said the stars were hoop-like compressions of air, full of fire, breathing out flames at a certain point from orifices. The sun was highest of all, after it came the moon, and below these the fixed stars and the planets.—Aetios=Stobaios Ekl. i. 510 (R. P. 14b).

Anaximander said the sun was a ring twenty-eight times the size of the earth, like a cart-wheel with the fellow hollow and full of fire, showing the fire at a certain point, as if through the nozzle of a pair of bellows.—Aetios=Placita 11. 20. 1 (R. P. 14b).

Anaximander held that thunder and lightning were caused by the blast. When it is shut up in a thick cloud and bursts forth with violence, then the breakage of the cloud makes the noise, and the rift gives the appearance of a flash by contrast with the darkness of the cloud.—Aet. iii. 3. 1 (Dox. p. 367).

Anaximander held that wind was a current of air (i.e. mist) which arose when its finest and moistest particles were set in motion or dissolved by the sun.—Aet. iii. 6. 1 (Dox. p. 374).

Rain was produced by the moisture drawn up from the earth by the sun.—Hipp. Ref. i. 6, 7 (Dox. p. 560).

The sea is what is left of the original moisture. The fire has dried up most of it and turned the rest salt by scorching it.—Aet.=Plac. iii. 16. 1 (R. P. 14c).

He says that the earth is cylindrical in form, and that its height is as a third part of its width.—Ps.-Plut. Strom. fr. 2 (R. P. ib.).

The earth swings free, held in its place by nothing. It stays where it is because of its equal distance from anything. Its shape is convex and round, and like a stone pillar (?). We are on one of the surfaces, and the other is on the opposite side.—Hipp. Ref. i. 6 (R. P. 14 C).

Living creatures arose from the moist element as it was evaporated by the sun. Man was like another animal, namely, a fish, in the beginning.—Hipp. Ref. i. 6 (R. P. 16a).

Further, he says that in the beginning man was born from animals of a different species. His reason is, that, while other animals quickly find food for themselves, man alone requires a prolonged period of sucking. Hence, had he been originally such as he is now, he could never have survived.—Ps.-Plut. Strom. fr. 2 (R. P. 16).

The first living creatures were produced in the moist element, and were covered with prickly integuments. As time went on they came out upon the drier part, and, the integument soon breaking off,

they changed their manner of life.—Aet.=Plac. v. 19. 1 (R. P. ib.).

TRANSLATIONS OF JOHN BURNET.

ANAXIMENES

Anaximenes, like Thales and Anaximander, was a Milesian. He lived in the latter half of the sixth century B. C., and is the last of the Milesian philosophers, as the school was broken up with the fall of the city, in 494 B. C. He thought air would satisfy the quality of infinity demanded by Anaximander, and tried to show how it gave rise to the phenomena of the world.

FRAGMENTS

Anaximenes of Miletos, son of Eurystratos, who had been an associate of Anaximander, said, like him, that the underlying substance was one and infinite. He did not, however, say it was indeterminate, like Anaximander, but determinate; for he said it was Air.—Phys. Op. fr. 3 (Dox. p. 476, R. P. 19 B).

From it, he said, the things that are, and have been, and shall be, the gods and things divine, took their rise, while other things come from its offspring.—Hipp. Ref. i. 7 (R. P. 21).

"Just as," he said, "our soul, being air, holds us together, so do breath and air encompass the whole world."—Aet. i. 3. 4 (R. P. 18).

And the form of the air is as follows. Where it is most even, it is invisible to our sight; but cold and heat, moisture and motion, make it visible. It is always in motion; for, if it were not, it would not change so much as it does.—Hipp. Ref. 1.c. (R. P. 21).

It differs in different substances in virtue of its rarefaction and condensation.—Simpl. Phys. p. 24 D (R. P. 19 B).

When it is dilated so as to be rarer, it becomes fire; while winds, on the other hand, are condensed Air. Cloud is formed from Air by "felting;" and this, still further condensed, becomes water. Water, condensed still more, turns to earth; and when condensed as much as it can be, to stones.—Hipp. Ref. 1.c. (R. P. 21).

He says that, as the air was "felted," the earth first came into being. It is very broad, and is accordingly supported by the air.—Ps.-Plut. Strom. fr. 3 (R. P. 19 A).

In the same way, the sun and the moon and the other heavenly bodies, which are of a fiery nature, are supported by the air because of their breadth. The heavenly bodies were produced from the earth by moisture rising from it. When this is rarefied, fire comes into being, and the stars are composed of the fire thus raised aloft. There were also bodies of earthy substance in the region of the stars, revolving along with them. And he says that the heavenly bodies do not move under the earth, as others suppose, but round it, as a cap turns round our head. The sun is hidden from sight, not because it goes under the earth, but because it is concealed by the higher parts of the earth, and because its distance from us becomes greater. The stars give no heat because of the greatness of their distance.

Winds are produced when condensed air rushes into rarefied; but when it is concentrated and thickened still more, clouds are generated; and, lastly, it turns to water.—Hipp. Ref. i. 7 (R. P. 21).

The stars are fixed like nails in the crystalline vault of the heavens.—Aet. ii. 14. 3 (Dox. p. 344).

They do not go under the earth, but turn round it.—Ibid, i. 16. 6 (Dox. p. 346).

The sun is fiery.—Ib. 20. 2 (Dox. p. 348).

It is broad like a leaf.—Ib. 22. 1 (Dox. p. 352).

The heavenly bodies are diverted from their courses by the resistance of compressed air.—Ib. 23. 1 (Dox. p. 352).

The moon is of fire.—Ib. 25. 2 (Dox. p. 356).

Anaximenes explained lightning like Anaximander (p. 142), adding as an illustration what happens in the case of the sea, which flashes when divided by the oars.—Aet. iii. 3. 2 (Dox. p. 368).

Hail is produced when water freezes in falling; snow, when there is some air imprisoned in the water.—Ib. 4. 1 (Dox. p. 370).

The rainbow is produced when the beams of the sun fall on thick condensed air. Hence the anterior part of it seems red, being burnt by the sun's rays, while the other part is dark, owing to the predominance of moisture. And he says that a rainbow is produced at night by the moon; but not often, because there is not constantly a full moon, and because the moon's light is weaker than that of the sun.—Schol. Arat. (Dox. p. 231).

The earth was like the slab of a table in shape.—Aet. iii. 10. 3 (Dox. p. 377).

The cause of earthquakes was the dryness and moisture of the

earth, occasioned by droughts and heavy rains respectively.—Ib. 15. 3 (Dox. p. 379).

TRANSLATIONS OF JOHN BURNET.

PYTHAGORAS

Pythagoras must be distinguished from the Pythagoreans. He seems himself to have been a good deal of a "medicine man", although he founded a religious order, which, for a time, held the political power in Croton, and afterwards became famous for its theories in mathematics. Pythagoras was born in Samnos around 570 B. C., but left there on account of the tyranny of Polycrates, and established his order in Croton in southern Italy. Most of the stories that have gathered about his life are later inventions. It is even uncertain whether he visited Egypt. It will be seen from the fragments that many of his rules bear a close resemblance to the taboos of an Indian medicine-man.

FRAGMENTS

XVII. Now, what he called his symbols were such as these. "Do not stir the fire with a sword." "Do not sit down on a bushel." "Do not devour your heart." "Do not aid men in discarding a burden, but in increasing one." "Always have your bed packed up." "Do not bear the image of a god on a ring." "Efface the traces of a pot in the ashes." "Do not wipe a seat with a lamp." "Do not walk in the main street." "Do not offer your right hand lightly." "Do not cherish swallows under your roof." "Do not cherish birds with crooked talons." "Do not defile; and do not stand upon the parings of your nails, or the cuttings of your hair." "Avoid a sharp sword." "When you are travelling abroad, look not back at your own borders." Now the precept not to stir fire with the sword meant, not to provoke the anger or swelling pride of powerful men; not to violate the beam of the balance meant, not to transgress fairness and justice; not to sit on a bushel is to have an equal care for the present and for the future, for by the bushel is meant one's daily food. By not devouring one's heart, he intended to show that we ought not to waste away our souls with grief and sorrow. In the precept that a man when travelling abroad should not turn his eyes back, he recommended those who were departing from life not to be desirous to live, and not to be too much attracted by the pleasures here on earth. And the other symbols may

be explained in a similar manner, that we may not be too prolix here.

XVIII. And above all things, he used to prohibit the eating of the erythinus, and the melanurus; and also, he enjoined his disciples to abstain from the hearts of animals, and from beans. And Aristotle informs us, that he sometimes used also to add to these prohibitions paunches and mullet. And some authors assert that he himself used to be contented with honey and honeycomb, and bread, and that he never drank wine in the day time. And his desert was usually vegetables, either boiled or raw; and he very rarely ate fish. His dress was white, very clean, and his bed-clothes were also white, and woolen, for linen had not yet been introduced into that country. He was never known to have eaten too much, or to have drunk too much, or to indulge in the pleasures of love. He abstained wholly from laughter, and from all such indulgences as jests and idle stories. And when he was angry, he never chastised any one, whether slave or freeman. He used to call admonishing, feeding storks.

He used to practise divination, as far as auguries and auspices go, but not by means of burnt offerings, except only the burning of frankincense. And all the sacrifices which he offered consisted of inanimate things. But some, however, assert that he did sacrifice animals, limiting himself to cooks, and sucking kids, which are called *apalioi*, but that he very rarely offered lamb. Aristoxenus, however, affirms that he permitted the eating of all other animals and only abstained from ~~oxen~~ used in agriculture, and from rams.

XENOPHANES

Xenophanes of Colophon was a philosophical satirist of the Greek idea of many human-like gods. He thought the world to be one unchangeable God. He was born probably about 571 B. C. Very little is known of his life, though he was driven from his home by the invasion of the Medes in 540 B. C., and seems to have been still a wanderer over Hellas in 479 B. C.

FRAGMENTS

1. There is one god, the greatest among gods and men, neither in form nor thought like unto mortals. R. P. 83.
2. He sees all over, thinks all over, and hears all over. R. P. 85.

3. But without toil he sways all things by the thought of his mind. R. P. 89b.

4. And he abideth ever in the same place, moving not at all; nor doth it befit him to go about, now hither, now thither. R. P. 90 D.

5. But mortals think that the gods are born as they are, and have perception like theirs, and voice and form. R. P. 83.

6. Yes, and if oxen or lions had hands, and could paint with their hands and produce works of art as men do, horses would paint the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen. Each would represent them with bodies according to the form of each. R. P. 83.

6a. So the Ethiopians make their gods black and snubnosed; the Thracians give theirs red hair and blue eyes. R. P. 83a.

7. Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to the gods all things that are a shame and a disgrace among men, thefts and adulteries and deception of one another. R. P. 82.

9. For we all arise from earth and water. R. P. 86.

10. All things are earth and water that come into being and grow. R. P. 86.

11. The sea is the source of water and the source of wind; for neither would the blasts of winds arise in the clouds and blow forth from within them without the mighty sea, nor the rivers' streams nor the rain-water in the sky. But the mighty sea is the father of clouds and winds and rivers.

12. This limit of the earth above is seen at our feet; but below its roots stretch to infinity. R. P. 86.

13. She that they call Iris is a cloud likewise, purple, scarlet, and green to behold. R. P. 86.

14. There never was nor will be a man who has clear certainty as to what I say about the gods and about all things; for, even if he does chance to say what is right, yet he himself does not know that it is so. But all are free to guess. R. P. 87.

15. These are guesses something like the truth. R. P. 87a.

16. The gods have not shown forth all things to men from the beginning, but by seeking they gradually find out what is better. R. P. 87b.

HERAKLEITOS

We know practically nothing of the life of Herakleitos. He lived at Ephesos during the last of the sixth and first of the fifth century, B. C. His ideas, which are very important for the history of thought, are embodied in the fragments that follow. They teach that the universe is an eternal series of changes.

FRAGMENTS

1. It is wise to hearken not to me but my argument, and to confess that all things are one. R. P. 32.

2. Though this discourse is true evermore, yet men are as unable to understand it when they hear it for the first time as before they have heard it at all. For, although all things happen in accordance with the account I give, men seem as if they had no experience of them, when they make trial of words and works such as I set forth, dividing each thing according to its nature and explaining how it truly is. But other men know not what they are doing when you wake them up, just as they forget what they do when asleep. R. P. 25.

3. Fools when they do hear are like the deaf; of them does the proverb bear witness that they are absent when present. R. P. 24a.

4. Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men, if they have souls that understand not their language. R. P. 34.

5. The many have not as many thoughts as the things they meet with; nor, if they do remark them, do they understand them, though they believe they do.

6. Knowing not how to listen nor how to speak.

7. If you do not expect the unexpected, you will not find it; for it is hard to be sought out and difficult.

8. Those who seek for gold dig up much earth and find a little. R. P. 36b.

10. Nature loves to hide. R. P. 27f.

11. The lord whose is the oracle at Delphoi neither utters nor hides his meaning, but shows it by a sign. R. P. 23a.

12. And the Sibyl, with raving lips uttering things solemn, unadorned, and unembellished, reaches over a thousand years with her voice because of the god in her. R. P. 23a.

13. Am I to prize these things above what can be seen, heard, and learned? R. P. 34.

14. . . . bringing untrustworthy witnesses in support of disputed points.

15. The eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears. R. P. 34b.

16. The learning of many things teacheth not understanding, else would it have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hekataios. R. P. 24.

17. Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchos, practised inquiry beyond all other men, and made himself a wisdom of his own, which was but a knowledge of many things and an art of mischief. R. P. 24a.

18. Of all whose discourses I have heard, there is not one who attains to understanding that wisdom is apart from other things.

19. Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things. R. P. 32.

20. This order, which is the same in all things, no one of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be an ever-living Fire, fixed measures of it kindling and fixed measures going out. R. P. 28.

21. The transformations of Fire are, first of all, sea (and half of the sea is earth, half fiery storm-cloud). . . . R. P. 28b.

22. All things are exchanged for Fire, and Fire for all things, as wares are exchanged for gold and gold for wares. R. P. 28.

23. (The earth) is liquefied, and the sea is measured by the same tale as before it became earth. R. P. 31.

24. Fire is want and satiety. R. P. 29a.

25. Fire lives the death of earth, and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of air, earth that of water. R. P. 30 A.

26. Fire will come upon and lay hold of all things. R. P. 29a.

27. How can one hide from that which never sinks to rest?

28. It is the thunderbolt that steers the course of all things. R. P. 28b.

29. The sun will not exceed his measures; if he does, the Erin-yes, the avenging handmaids of Justice, will find him out. R. P. 31.

30. The limit of East and West is the Bear; and opposite the Bear is the boundary of bright Zeus.

31. If there were no sun, it would be night.

32. The sun is new every day.

34. The seasons that bring all things.

35. Hesiod is most men's teacher. Men think he knew very many things, a man who did not know day or night! They are one. R. P. 31b.

36. God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and hunger; but he takes various shapes, just as fire, when it is mingled with different incenses, is named according to the savour of each. R. P. 31b.

37. If all things were turned to smoke, the nostrils would distinguish them.

38. Souls smell in Hades. R. P. 38d.

39. It is cold things that become warm, and what is warm that cools; what is wet dries, and the parched is moistened.

40. It scatters things and brings them together; it approaches and departs.

41, 42. You cannot step twice into the same rivers; for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you. R. P. 26a.

43. Homer was wrong in saying: "Would that strife might perish from among gods and men!" He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the universe; for, if his prayer were heard, all things would pass away. R. P. 27d.

44. War is the father of all and the king of all; and some he has made gods and some men, some bond and some free. R. P. 27.

45. Men do not know how that which is drawn in different directions harmonises with itself. The harmonious structure of the world depends upon opposite tension, like that of the bow and the lyre. R. P. 27.

46. It is opposition that brings things together.

47. The hidden harmony is better than the open. R. P. 27.

48. Let us not conjecture at random about the greatest things.

49. Men who love wisdom must be acquainted with very many things indeed.

50. The straight and the crooked path of the fuller's comb is one and the same.

51. Asses would rather have straw than gold. R. P. 24a.

51a. Oxen are happy when they find bitter vetches to eat. R. P. 40b.

52. The sea is the purest and the impurest water. Fish can drink it, and it is good for them; to men it is undrinkable and destructive. R. P. 39c.

53, 54. Swine like to wash in the mire rather than in clean water, and barnyard fowls in dust.

55. Every beast is tended with blows.

56. Same as 45.

57. Good and ill are the same. R. P. 39c.

58. Physicians who cut, burn, stab, and rack the sick, then complain that they do not get any adequate recompense for it. R. P. 39c.

59. You must couple together things whole and things not whole, what is drawn together and what is drawn asunder, the harmonious and the discordant. The one is made up of all things, and all things issue from the one.

60. Men would not have known the name of justice if there were no injustice.

61. Men themselves have made a law for themselves, not knowing what they made it about; but the gods have ordered the nature of all things. Now the arrangements which men have made are never constant, neither when they are right nor when they are wrong; but all the arrangements which the gods have made are always right, both when they are right and when they are wrong; so great is the difference. R. P. 37s.

62. We must know that war is the common and justice is strife, and that all things come into being and pass away (?) through strife.

63. . . . for they are undoubtedly allotted by destiny.

64. All the things we see when awake are death, even as the things we see in slumber are sleep. R. P. 34b.

65. Wisdom is one only. It is willing and unwilling to be called by the name of Zeus. R. P. 32.

66. The bow (bios') is called life (bi'os), but its work is death, R. P. 40c, note 2.

67. Mortals are immortals and immortals are mortals, the one living the other's death and dying the other's life. R. P. 38.

68. For it is death to souls to become water, and death to water to become earth. But water comes from earth; and, from water, soul. R. P. 30 B.

69. The way up and the way down is one and the same. R. P. 29 d.

70. The beginning and the end are common (to both paths).

71. You will not find the boundaries of soul by travelling in any direction. R. P. 33d.

72. It is pleasure to souls to become moist. R. P. 38b.

73. A man, when he gets drunk, is led by a beardless lad, knowing not where he steps, having his soul moist. R. P. 34.

74-76. The dry soul is the wisest and best. R. P. 34.

77. Man is kindled and put out like a light in the night-time.

78. The quick and the dead, the waking and the sleeping, the

young and the old are the same; the former are changed and become the latter, and the latter in turn are changed into the former. R. P. 39.

79. Time is a child playing draughts, the kingly power is a child's. R. P. 32a.

80. I have sought to know myself. R. P. 40.

81. We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not. R. P. 26a.

82. It is a weariness to labour at the same things and to be always beginning afresh.

83. It finds rest in change.

84. Even the ingredients of a posset separate if it is not stirred.

85. Corpses are more fit to be cast out than dung.

86. When they are born, they wish to live and to meet with their dooms—or rather to rest, and they leave children behind them to meet with dooms in turn.

87-89. A man may be a grandfather in thirty years.

90. Those who are asleep are fellow-workers. . . .

91. Wisdom is common to all things. Those who speak with intelligence must hold fast to the common as a city holds fast to its law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are fed by one thing, the divine. It prevails as much as it will, and suffices for all things with something to spare. R. P. 35.

92. Though wisdom is common, yet the many live as if they had a wisdom of their own. R. P. 36.

93. They are estranged from that with which they have most constant intercourse.

94. It is not meet to eat and speak like men asleep.

95. The waking have one and the same world, but the sleeping turn aside each into a world of his own.

96. The way of man has no wisdom, but that of the gods has. R. P. 37.

97. Man is called a baby by god, even as a child by a man. R. P. 37.

98, 99. The wisest man is an ape compared to god, just as the most beautiful ape is ugly compared to man.

100. The people must fight for its law as for its walls. R. P. 40.

101. Greater deaths win greater portions. R. P. 40d.

102. Gods and men honour those who are slain in battle. R. P. 40d.

103. Wantonness needs to be extinguished even more than a conflagration. R. P. 40d.

104. It is not good for men to get all they wish to get. It is disease that makes health pleasant and good; hunger, plenty; and weariness rest. R. P. 40b.

105-107. It is hard to fight with desire. Whatever it wishes to get, it purchases at the cost of soul. R. P. 40d.

108, 109. It is best to hide folly; but it is a hard task in times of relaxation, over our cups.

110. And it is the law, too, that we obey the counsel of one. R. P. 40d.

111. For what thought or wisdom have they? They follow the poets and take the crowd as their teacher, knowing not that there are many bad and few good. For even the best of them choose one thing above all others, immortal glory among mortals, while most of them fill their bellies like beasts. R. P. 24a.

112. In Priene lived Bias, son of Teutamias, who is of more account than the rest. (He said, "Most men are bad.")

113. One is as ten thousand to me, if he be the best. R. P. 24a.

114. The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every grown man of them, and leave the city to beardless youths; for they have cast out Hermodoros, the best man among them, saying: "We will have none who is best among us; if there be any such, let him be so elsewhere and among others." R. P. 22b.

115. Dogs bark at every one they do not know. R. P. 24a.

116. . . . (The wise man) is not known because of men's want of belief.

117. The fool is fluttered at every word. R. P. 36b.

118. The most esteemed of those in estimation knows how to feign; yet of a truth justice shall overtake the artificers of lies and the false witnesses.

119. Homer should be turned out of the lists and whipped, and Archilochos likewise. R. P. 24.

120. One day is equal to another.

121. Man's character is his fate.

122. There await men when they die such things as they look not for nor dream of. R. P. 38d.

123. . . . that they rise up and become the guardians of the hosts of the quick and dead. R. P. 38d.

124. Night-walkers, Magians, priests of Bakchos and priestes-

ses of the wine-vat, mystery-mongers. . . .

125. The mysteries into which men are initiated are unholy. R. P. 40.

126. And they pray to these images, as if one were to talk with a man's house, knowing not what gods or heroes are. R. P. 40c.

127. For if it were not to Dionysos that they made a procession and sang the shameful phallic hymn, they would be acting most shamelessly. But Hades is the same as Dionysos in whose honour they go mad and keep the feast of the wine-vat. R. P. 40e.

129, 130. They purify themselves by defiling themselves with blood, just as if one who had stepped into the mud were to go and wash his feet in mud.

His opinions on particular points are these:—

He held that Fire was the element, and that all things were produced in exchange for fire, and that they arise from condensation and rarefaction. But he explains nothing clearly. All things were due to opposition, and all things were in flux like a river. (Given in Diogenes Laertios.)

The all is infinite and the world is one. It arises from fire, and is consumed again by fire alternately through all eternity in certain cycles. This happens according to fate. That which leads to the becoming of the opposites is called War and Strife; that which leads to the final conflagration is Concord and Peace. (This is the Stoic interpretation.)

He called change the upward and the downward path, and held that the world goes on according to this. When fire is condensed it becomes moist, and when collected together it turns to water; water being congealed turns to earth (the conjecture of Theophrastos); and this he calls the downward path. And, again, the earth is in turn liquefied, and from it water arises, and from that everything else; for he refers almost everything to the evaporation from the sea. This is the path upwards. R. P. 29.

He held, too, that exhalations arose both from the sea and the land; some bright and pure, others dark. Fire was nourished by the bright ones, and moisture by the others.

He does not make it clear what is the nature of that which surrounds the world. He held, however, that there were bowls in it with the concave sides turned towards us, in which the bright exhalations

tions were collected and produced flames. These were the heavenly bodies.

The flame of the sun was the brightest and warmest; for the other heavenly bodies were more distant from the earth; and for that reason gave less light and heat. The moon, on the other hand, was nearer the earth; but it moved through an impure region. The sun moved in a bright and unmixed region, and at the same time was at just the distance from us. That is why it gives more heat and light. The eclipses of the sun and moon were due to the turning of the bowls upwards, while the monthly phases of the moon were produced by a slight turning of its bowl.

Day and night, months and seasons and years, rains and winds, and things like these, were due to the different exhalations. The bright exhalation, when ignited in the circle of the sun, produced day, and the preponderance of the opposite exhalations produced night; increase of warmth proceeding from the bright exhalation produced summer, and the multiplication of moisture from the dark exhalation produced winter. He assigns the causes of other things in conformity with this.

As to the earth, he makes no clear statement about its nature, any more than he does about that of the bowls.

These, then, were his opinions. R. P. 31b.

And in turn each (i.e. fire and water) prevails, and is prevailed over to the greatest and the least degree that is possible. For neither can prevail altogether for the following reasons. If fire advances to the utmost limit of the water, its nourishment fails it. It retires, then, to a place where it can get nourishment. And if water advances to the utmost limit of the fire, movement fails it. At that point, then, it stands still; and, when it stands still, it has no longer power to resist, but is at once consumed as nourishment for the fire that falls upon it. For these reasons neither can prevail altogether. But, if at any time either should in any way be overcome, then none of the things that exist would be as they are now. So long as things are as they are, fire and water will always be too, and neither will ever fail.

—Ps. -Hipp. De Diæta, i. 3.

PARMENIDES

Parmenides was born at Elea about 515 B. C. Plato says that, along with Zeno, Parmenides visited Athens in his sixty-fifth year and met Socrates, and although the statement is made in a dialogue it probably records a fact. Parmenides wrote in hexameter verse, and followed out the assumption that the universe is a unity to its logical limit.

FRAGMENTS

The steeds that bear me carried me as far as ever my heart desired, since they brought me and set me on the renowned way of the goddess, who with her own hands conducts the man who knows through all things. On that way was I borne along; for on it did the wise steeds carry me, drawing my car, and maidens showed the way. And the axle, glowing in the socket—for it was urged round by the whirling wheels at each end—gave forth a sound as of a pipe, when the daughters of the Sun, hasting to convey me into the light, threw back their veils from off their faces and left the abode of Night.

There are the gates of the ways of Night and Day, fitted above with a lintel and below with a threshold of stone. They themselves, high in the air, are closed by mighty doors, and Avenging Justice keeps the keys that open them. Her 'did the maidens entreat with gentle words and skilfully persuade to unfasten without demur the bolted bars from the gates. Then, when the doors were thrown back, they disclosed a wide opening, when their brazen hinges swung backwards in the sockets fastened with rivets and nails. Straight through them, on the broad way, did the maidens guide the horses and the car, and the goddess greeted me kindly, and took my right hand in hers, and spake to me these words:—

“Welcome, noble youth, that comest to my abode on the car that bears thee tended by immortal charioteers! It is no ill chance, but justice and right that has sent thee forth to travel on this way. Far, indeed, does it lie from the beaten track of men! Meet it is that thou shouldst learn all things, as well the unshaken heart of persuasive truth, as the opinions of mortals in which is no true belief at all. Yet none the less shalt thou learn of these things also, since thou must judge approvedly of the things that seem to men as thou goest through all things in thy journey.” R. P. 93.

THE WAY OF TRUTH

Come now, I will tell thee—and do thou hearken to my saying and carry it away—the only two ways of search that can be thought of. The first, namely, that It is, and that it is impossible for anything not to be, is the way of conviction, for truth is its companion. The other, namely, that It is not, and that something must needs not be, that, I tell thee, is a wholly untrustworthy path. For you cannot know what is not—that is impossible—nor utter it; for it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be. R. P. 94a.

It needs must be that what can be thought and spoken of is; for it is possible for it to be, and it is not possible for what is nothing to be. This is what I bid thee ponder. I hold thee back from this first way of inquiry, and from this other also, upon which mortals knowing naught wander in two minds; for hesitation guides the wandering thought in their breasts, so that they are borne along stupefied like men deaf and blind. Undiscerning crowds, in whose eyes the same thing and not the same is and is not, and all things travel in opposite directions! R. P. 94b.

For this shall never be proved, that the things that are not are; and do thou restrain thy thought from this way of inquiry. Nor let habit force thee to cast a wandering eye upon this devious track, or to turn thither thy resounding ear or thy tongue; but do thou judge the subtle refutation of their discourse uttered by me. One path only is left for us to speak of, namely, that It is. In it are very many tokens that what is, is uncreated and indestructible, alone, complete, immovable and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now it is, all at once, a continuous one. For what kind of origin for it will you look for? In what way and from what source could it have drawn its increase? I shall not let thee say nor think that it came from what is not; for it can neither be thought nor uttered that what is not is. And, if it came from nothing, what need could have made it arise later rather than sooner? Therefore must it either be altogether or be not at all. Nor will the force of truth suffer aught to arise besides itself from that which in any way is. Wherefore, Justice does not loose her fetters and let anything come into being or pass away, but holds it fast. R. P. 94C-95.

"Is it or is it not?" Surely it is adjudged, as it needs must be, that we are to set aside the one way as unthinkable and nameless (for it is no true way), and that the other path is real and true. How.

then, can what is be going to be in the future? Or how could it come into being? If it came into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future. Thus is becoming extinguished and passing away not to be heard of. R. P. 95c.

Nor is it divisible, since it is all alike, and there is no more of it in one place than in another, to hinder it from holding together, nor less of it, but everything is full of what is. Wherefore all holds together; for what is, is in contact with what is.

Moreover, it is immovable in the bonds of mighty chains, without beginning and without end; since coming into being and passing away have been driven afar, and true belief has cast them away. It is the same, and it rests in the self-same place, abiding in itself. And thus it remaineth constant in its place; for hard necessity keeps it in the bonds of the limit that holds it fast on every side. Wherefore it is not permitted to what is to be infinite; for it is in need of nothing; while, if it were infinite, it would stand in need of everything. R. P. 96.

Look steadfastly with thy mind at things afar as if they were at hand. You cannot cut off what anywhere is from holding fast to what is anywhere; neither is it scattered abroad throughout the universe, nor does it come together. R. P. 96a.

It is the same thing that can be thought and for the sake of which the thought exists; for you cannot find thought without something that is, to which it is betrothed. And there is not, and never shall be, any time other than that which is present, since fate has chained it so as to be whole and immovable. Wherefore all these things are but the names which mortals have given, believing them to be true—coming into being and passing away, being and not being, change of place and alteration of bright colour. R. P. 97.

Where, then, it has its farthest boundary, it is complete on every side, equally poised from the centre in every direction, like the mass of a rounded sphere; for it cannot be greater or smaller in one place than in another. For there is nothing which is not that could keep it from reaching out equally, nor is it possible that there should be more of what is in this place and less in that, since it is all inviolable. For, since it is equal in all directions, it is equally confined within limits. R. P. 98.

THE WAY OF OPINION

Here shall I close my trustworthy speech and thought about the truth. Henceforward learn the opinions of mortals, giving ear to deceptive ordering of my words.

Mortals have settled in their minds to speak of two forms, one of which they should have left out, and that is where they go astray from the truth. They have assigned an opposite substance to each, and marks distinct from one another. To the one they allot the fire of heaven, light, thin, in every direction the same as itself, but not the same as the other. The other is opposite to it, dark night, a compact and heavy body. Of these I tell thee the whole arrangement as it seems to men, in order that no mortal may surpass thee in knowledge. R. P. 99.

Now that all things have been named light and night, and the things which belong to the power of each have been assigned to these things and to those, everything is full at once of light and dark night, both equal, since neither has aught to do with the other. R. P. 100.

The narrower circles are filled with unmixed fire, and those surrounding them with night, and in the midst of these rushes their portion of fire. In the midst of these circles is the divinity that directs the course of all things; for she rules over all painful birth and all begetting, driving the female to the embrace of the male, and the male to that of the female. R. P. 101 A.

First of all the gods she contrived Eros. R. P. ib.

And thou shalt know the origin of all the things on high, and all the signs in the sky, and the resplendent works of the glowing sun's clear torch, and whence they arose. And thou shalt learn likewise of the wandering deeds of the round-faced moon, and of her origin. Thou shalt know, too, the heavens that surround us, whence they arose, and how Necessity took them and bound them to keep the limits of the stars . . . how the earth, and the sun, and the moon, and the sky that is common to all, and the Milky Way, and the outermost Olympus, and the burning might of the stars arose. R. P. 101 B, C.

Shining by night with borrowed light, wandering round the earth.
Always straining her eyes to the beams of the sun.

For as at any time is the condition of the flexible limbs, so is the state of men's minds; for that which thinks is the same, namely, the substance of the limbs, in each and every man; for their thought is that of which there is most in them. R. P. 102 B.

On the right boys; on the left girls.

Thus, according to men's opinions, did things come into being, and thus they are now. In time (they think) they will grow up and pass away. To each of these things men have assigned a fixed name. R. P. 102d.

Parmenides held that there were crowns close together and encircling one another, formed of the rare and dense element respectively, and that between these there were other mixed crowns made up of light and darkness. That which surrounds them all was solid like a wall, and under it is a fiery crown. That which is the midmost of all crowns is also solid, and surrounded in turn by a fiery circle. The central circle of the mixed crowns is the cause of movement and becoming to all the rest. He calls it "the goddess who directs their course," "the Key-bearer," and "Necessity." (Aet. ii. 7. 1; R. P. 101 D.)

TRANSLATIONS OF JOHN BURNET.

EMPEDOKLES

Empedocles lived during the first half of the fifth century B. C. He was born at Akragas in Sicily of an illustrious family, and seems to have been a ruling demagogue of the city for some years. He wrote in verse and the fragments, besides being important philosophically, show considerable poetic thought. He sought to find in water, air, fire, and earth, four elements, which together could explain the world.

FRAGMENTS

BOOK I.

And do thou give ear, Pausanias, son of Anchitos the wise!

For straitened are the powers with which their bodily parts are endowed, and many are the woes that burst in on them and blunt the

edge of their careful thoughts! They behold but a brief span of a life that is no life, and, doomed to swift death, are borne away and fly off like smoke. Each is convinced of that alone which he has chanced upon as he is hurried to and fro, and idly fancies he has found the whole. So hardly can these things be seen by the eyes or heard by the ears of men, so hardly grasped by their mind! Thou, then, since thou hast found thy way hither, shalt learn no more than mortal mind has seen. R. P. 130.

But, O ye gods, turn aside from my tongue the madness of those men. Hallow my lips and make a pure stream flow from them! And thee, much-wooded, white-armed Virgin Muse, do I beseech, that I may hear what is lawful for the children of a day! Speed me on my way from the abode of Holiness and drive my willing car! Constrain me not to win garlands of honour and glory at the hands of mortals on condition of speaking in my pride beyond that which is lawful and right, and only so to gain a seat upon the heights of wisdom. R. P. ib.

Go to now, consider with all thy powers in what way each thing is clear. Hold nothing that thou seest in greater credit than what thou hearest, nor value thy resounding ear above the clear instructions of thy tongue; and do not withhold thy confidence in any of thy other bodily parts by which there is an opening for understanding, but consider everything in the way it is clear. R. P. ib.

And thou shalt learn all the drugs that are a defence against ills and old age, since for thee alone shall I accomplish all this. Thou shalt arrest the violence of the weariless winds that arise and sweep the earth, laying waste the corn-fields with their breath; and again, when thou so desirest, thou shalt bring their blasts back again with a rush. Thou shalt cause for men a seasonable drought after the dark rains, and again after the summer drought thou shalt produce the streams that feed the trees as they pour down from the sky. Thou shalt bring back from Hades the life of a dead man.

Hear first the four roots of all things: shining Zeus, life-bringing Hera, Aidoneus, and Nestis dripping with tears, the well-spring of mortals. R. P. 131 A.

And I shall tell thee another thing. There is no coming into being of aught that perishes, nor any end for it in baneful death; but

only mingling and separation of what has been mingled. Coming into being is but a name given to these by men. R. P. 131 B.

But, when the elements have been mingled in the fashion of a man and come to the light of day, or in the fashion of the race of wild beasts or plants or birds, then men say that these come into being; and when they are separated, they call that, as is the custom, woeful death. I too follow the custom, and call it so myself.

Fools!—for they have no far-reaching thoughts—who deem that what before was not comes into being, or that aught can perish and be utterly destroyed. For it cannot be that aught can arise from what in no way is, and it is impossible and unheard of that what is should perish; for it will always be, wherever one may keep putting it. R. P. 131d.

A man who is wise in such matters would never surmise in his heart that, so long as mortals live what men choose to call their life, they are, and suffer good and ill; while, before they were formed and after they have been dissolved they are, it seems, nothing at all. R. P. ib.

But it is ever the way of low minds to disbelieve the better sayings. Do thou learn as the sure testimonies of my Muse bid thee, and divide the argument in thy heart.

. . . Joining one choice argument to another, not to finish one path . . . for what is right may well be said even twice.

I shall tell thee a twofold tale. At one time things grew to be one only out of many; at another, that divided up to be many instead of one. There is a double becoming of perishable things and a double passing away. The coming together of all things brings one generation into being and destroys it; the other grows up and is scattered as things become divided. And these things never cease, continually changing places, at one time all uniting in one through Love, at another each borne in different directions by the repulsion of Strife. Thus, as far as it is their nature to grow into one out of many, and to become many once more when the one is parted asunder, so far they come into being and their life abides not. But, inasmuch as they never cease changing their places continually, so far they are immovable as they go round the circle of existence. R. P. 132.

But come, hearken to my words, for it is learning that increaseth

wisdom. As I said before, when I declared the heads of my discourse, I shall tell thee a twofold tale. At one time things grew together to be one only out of many, at another they parted asunder so as to be many instead of one;—Fire and Water and Earth and the mighty height of Air, dead Strife, too, apart from these and balancing every one of them, and have among them, their equal in length and breadth. Her do thou contemplate with thy mind, nor sit with dazed eyes. It is she that is deemed to be implanted in the frame of mortals. It is she that makes them have kindly thoughts and work the works of peace. They call her by the names of Joy and Aphrodite. Her has no mortal yet marked moving among the gods, but do thou attend to the undeceitful ordering of my discourse. R. P. 132.

For all these are equal and alike in age, yet each has a different prerogative and its own peculiar nature. And nothing comes into being besides these, nor do they pass away; for, if they had been passing away continually, they would not be now. R. P. 132.

Nor is any part of the whole empty. Whence, then, could aught come to increase it? Where, too, could these things perish, since no place is empty of them? They are what they are; but, running through one another, different things continually come into being from different sources, yet ever alike. R. P. 132.

Come now, look at the things that bear virtues to my earlier discourse, if so be that there was any form left out in the earlier list. Behold the sun, everywhere bright and warm, and all the immortal things that are bathed in its heat and bright radiance. Behold the rain, everywhere dark and cold; and from the earth issue forth things close-pressed and solid. When they are in strife all these are different in form and separated; but they come together in love, and are desired by one another. R. P. 132.

For out of these have sprung all things that were and are and shall be,—trees and men and women, beasts and birds and the fishes that dwell in the waters, yea, and the gods that live long lives and are exalted in honour. R. P. 132i.

For these things are what they are; but, running through one another, they take different shapes—so much does mixture change them. R. P. 132g.

For, of a truth, they (i.e. Love and Strife) were aforetime and shall be; nor ever, methinks, will boundless time be emptied of that pair. And they prevail in turn as the circle comes round, and pass away before one another, and increase in their appointed turn. R. P. 132c.

For these things are what they are; but, running through one another, they become men and the other races of mortal creatures. At one time they are brought together into one order by Love; at another, again, they are carried each in different directions by the repulsion of Strife, till once more they grow into one and are wholly subdued.

Just as when painters are elaborating temple-offerings, men whom Metis has well taught their art,—they, when they have taken pigments of many colours with their hands, mix them in a harmony, more of some and less of others, and from them produce shapes like unto all things, making trees and men and women, beasts and birds and fishes that dwell in the waters, yea, and gods, that live long lives, and are exalted in honour,—so let not the error prevail over thy mind, that there is any other source of all the perishable creatures that appear in countless numbers. Know this for sure, for thou hast heard the tale from a goddess.

Come, I shall now tell thee first of all the beginning of the sun, and the sources from which have sprung all the things we now behold, the earth and the billowy sea, the damp mist and the Titan air that binds his circle fast round all things. R. P. 135a.

It was spherical . . . naught of the whole was empty and naught superfluous.

In it is distinguished neither the bright form of the sun, no, nor the shaggy earth in its might, nor the sea,—so fast was the god bound in the close covering of Harmony, spherical and round, rejoicing in his circular rest. R.P. 133 A.

But when Strife was grown great in the limbs of the god and sprang forth to claim his prerogatives, in the fulness of the alternate time set for them by the mighty oath, . . . for all the limbs of the god in turn quaked. R. P. 133 A and B.

[Everything heavy and everything light it (Strife) separated apart. R. P. 133e.]

. . . Without affection and incapable of mixing.

. . . The heaped up mass. . . .

If the depths of the earth and the vast air were infinite, a foolish

saying which has been vainly dropped from the lips of many mortals, though they have seen but a little of the All. . . . R. P. 86b.

The sharp-darting sun and the gentle moon. But (the sunlight) is gathered together and circles round the mighty heavens.

It flashes back to Olympus with untroubled countenance. R. P. 135c.

But the gentle flame (of the eye) has but a scanty portion of earth.

Even so the sunbeam, having struck the broad and mighty circle of the moon, returns at once, running so as to reach the sky.

It circles round the earth, a borrowed light, as on the track of a car.

For she gazes at the sacred circle of the lordly sun opposite.

And she scatters his rays away into the sky above, and casts a shadow on as much of the earth as is the breadth of the pale-faced moon.

It is the earth that makes night by coming before the lights.

. . . of deserted, blind-eyed night.

And many fires burn beneath the earth.

The sea with its silly tribe of fertile fish.

Salt was solidified by the impact of the sun's beams.

Sea, the sweat of the earth. . . . R. P. 135b.

But the air sunk down upon the earth with its long roots; for thus it chanced to be running at that time, though often it runs otherwise. R. P. 135d.

(Fire) swiftly rushing upwards. . . .

But now I shall retrace my steps over the paths of song that I have travelled before, drawing from my saying a new saying. When Strife was fallen to the lowest depth of the vortex, and Love had reached to the centre of the whirl, in it do all things come together so as to be one only; not all at once, but coming together gradually each from different quarters; and, as they came together, Strife retired to the extreme boundary. Yet many things remained unmixed, alternating with the things that were being mixed, namely, all that Strife not fallen yet retained; for it had not yet altogether retired perfectly to the outermost boundaries of the circle. Some of its members still remained within, and some had passed out. But in proportion as it kept rushing out, a soft, immortal stream of blameless Love kept running in, and straightway those things became mortal which had been immortal before, those things were mixed that had been unmixed, each changing its path. And, as they were mingled, countless tribes of

mortal creatures were scattered abroad endowed with all manner of forms, a wonder to behold. R. P. 134.

For all of them—sun, earth, sky, and sea,—fit in with all the parts of themselves, the friendly parts which are separated off in perishable things. In the same way, all those things that are more adapted for mixture, are united to one another in Love, made like by the power of Aphrodite. But they themselves (i.e. the elements) differ as far as possible in their origin and mixture and the forms imprinted on each, being altogether unaccustomed to come together, and very hostile, under the influence of Strife, since it has wrought their birth.

Thus all things have thought by the will of fortune. . . . And, inasmuch as the rarest things came together in their fall. . . .

Fire is increased by Fire, Earth increases its own mass, and Air swells the bulk of Air.

And the kindly earth in its well-wrought ovens received two parts of shining Nestis out of the eight, and four of Hephaistos; and they became white bones, divinely fitted together by the cements of Harmony. R. P. 138c.

And the earth meets with these in nearly equal proportions, with Hephaistos and Water and shining Air, anchoring in the perfect haven of Kypris, — either a little more of it, or less of it and more of them. From these did blood arise and the various forms of flesh. R. P. 138c.

(As a baker) cementing barley-meal with water. . . .

. . . tenacious Love. . . .

BOOK II.

But if your assurance of these things was in any way deficient as to how, out of Water and Earth and Air and Fire mingled together, arose the colours and forms of all those mortal things that have been fitted together by Aphrodite, and so are now come into being, how both tall trees and the fishes of the sea (arose). . . .

And even as at that time Kypris, plying her pleasant task, after she had moistened the Earth in water, gave it to swift fire to harden it. R. P. 135d.

All of those which are dense within and rare without, having received a moisture of this kind at the hands of Kypris. . . .

And so tall trees bear eggs, first of all olives. . . .

Wherefore late-born pomegranates and blooming apples. . . .

Wine is the water putrefied in the wood, under the bark.

For, if thou takest them (trees and plants) to the close recesses of thy heart and watchest over them kindly with faultless care, then thou shalt have all these things in abundance throughout thy life, and thou shalt gain many others from them; for each grows ever true to its own character, according as its nature is. But if thou strivest after things of a different kind, as is the way with men, ten thousand woes await thee to blunt thy careful thoughts. All at once they will cease to live when the time comes round, desiring each to reach its own kind; for know that all things have wisdom and a share of thought.

Love hates necessity.

This thou mayest see in the heavy-backed shell-fish that dwell in the sea, in mænæ and buccinia and the stony-skinned turtles. In them thou mayest see that the earthy part dwells on the uppermost surface.

Hair and leaves, and the thick feathers of birds, and the scales that grow on mighty limbs, are the same thing.

But the hair of hedgehogs is sharp-pointed and bristles on their backs.

. . . Out of which (Fire and Water) divine Aphrodite fashioned unwearying eyes . . . Aphrodite working them together with the rivets of love . . . since they first grew together in the hands of Kypris.

. . . the liver full of blood.

It (Love) made many heads spring up without necks, and arms wandered bare and bereft of shoulders. Eyes strayed up and down in want of foreheads. R. P. 137a.

. . . this marvellous mass of mortal limbs. At one time all the limbs that are the body's portion are brought together into one by Love, and flourish in the high season of life; and again, at another time they are severed by cruel Strife, and wander each in different directions by the breakers of the sea of life. It is the same with shrubs and the fish that make their homes in the waters, the beasts that make their lairs in the hills, and the birds that sail on wings. R. P. 137a.

But, as divinity was mingled still further with divinity, these things joined together as each might chance, and many other things beside them continually arose. Many creatures with faces and breasts looking in different directions were born; some, offspring of oxen with faces of men, while others, again, arose as offspring of men with the heads of oxen, and creatures in whom the nature of women and men was mingled, furnished with sterile parts. R. P. 137b.

. . . Shambling oxen with undivided hoofs. . . .

Come now, hear how the Fire as it was separated caused the night-born shoots of men and tearful women to arise; for my tale is not off the point nor uninformed. Whole-natured forms first arose from the earth, having a portion both of water and fire. These did the fire, desirous of reaching its like, cause to grow, showing as yet neither the charming form of women's limbs, nor yet the voice and parts that are proper to men. R. P. 137c.

. . . But the substance of (the child's limbs is divided between them, part of it in men's and part in women's (body).

And upon him came desire as he mingled with her through sight.

. . . And it was poured out in the pure parts; and when it met with cold women arose from it.

. . . The two diverging harbours of Aphrodite.

For in its warmer part the womb brings forth males, and that is why men are darker, more sinewy, and more hairy.

Just as when rennet rivets and binds white milk. . . .

On the tenth day of the eighth month the white putrefaction arose.

Know that effluences flow from all things that have come into being. R. P. 132h.

So sweet lays hold of sweet, and bitter rushes to bitter; acid comes to acid, and warm couples with warm.

Water fits better into wine, but it will not (mingle) with oil. R. P. 132h.

The bloom of scarlet dye mingles with the gleaming linen.

Thus do all things draw breath and breathe it out again. All have bloodless tubes of flesh extended over the surface of their bodies; and at the mouths of these the uttermost surface of the skin is perforated all over with pores closely packed together, so as to keep in the blood while a free passage is cut for the air to pass through. Then, when the yielding blood recedes from these, the bubbling air rushes in with an impetuous surge; and when the blood runs back it is breathed out again. Just as when a girl, playing with a water-clock of shining brass, puts the orifice of the pipe upon her comely hand, and dips the water-clock into the yielding mass of silvery water,—the stream does not then flow into the vessel, but the bulk of the air inside, pressing upon the close packed perforations, keeps it out till she uncovers the compressed stream; but then air escapes and an equal volume of water runs in. Just in the same way, when water occupies the interior of the brazen vessel and the opening and passage is stopped up by the human hand, the air outside, striving to get in,

keeps back the water at the gates of the sounding strainer, pressing upon its surface till she lets go with her hand. Then, on the contrary, just in the opposite way to what happened before, the wind rushes in and an equal volume of water runs out to make room. Even so, when the thin blood that surges through the limbs rushes backwards to the interior, straightway the stream of air comes in with a rushing swell; but when the blood returns the air breathes out again in equal quantity.

(The dog) with its nostrils tracking out the fragments of the beast's limbs, which the tender breathing of its feet has left in the copse.

Thus all things have their share of breath and smell.

The fleshy sprout (of the ear).

And even as when a man, thinking to sally forth through a stormy night, gets him ready a lantern, a flame of flashing fire, fastening to it horn plates to keep out all manner of winds; and they scatter the blast of the winds that blow, but the light leaping out through them shines across the threshold with its unyielding rays inasmuch as it is finer; even so did love surround the elemental fire in the round pupil and confine it with membranes and fine tissues, which are pierced through and through with innumerable passages. They keep out the deep water that surrounds the pupil, but they let through the fire, inasmuch as it is finer. R. P. 139d.

One vision is produced by both the eyes.

(The heart), dwelling in the sea of blood that runs in opposite directions, where men's thoughts chiefly revolve; for the blood round the heart is the thought of man. R. P. 139e.

For the wisdom of men grows according to what is before them. R. P. 139 B.

And just so far as they grow to be different, so far do different thoughts ever present themselves to their minds (in dreams). R. P. 139c.

For it is with earth that we see Earth, and Water with water; by air we see bright Air, by fire destroying Fire. By love do we see Love, and Hate by grievous hate. For out of these are all things

formed and fitted together, and by these do men think and feel pleasure and pain. R. P. 139 A and C.

BOOK III.

If ever, as regards the things of a day, immortal Muse, thou didst deign to take thought for my endeavour, then stand by me once more as I pray to thee, O Kalliopeia, as I utter a pure discourse concerning the blessed gods. R. P. 140 A.

Blessed is the man who has gained the riches of divine wisdom; wretched he who has a dim opinion of the gods in his heart. R. P. 140 B.

It is not possible for us to set God before our eyes, or to lay hold of him with our hands, which is the broadest way of persuasion that leads into the heart of man. For he is not furnished with a human head on his body, two branches do not sprout from his shoulders, he has no feet, no swift knees, nor hairy parts; but he is only a sacred and unutterable mind flashing through the whole world with rapid thoughts. R. P. 140 C, D.

PURIFICATIONS

Friends, who inhabit the great town below the yellow rock of Akragas and up on the heights of the city, busy in goodly works, safe harbours for the stranger that claims respect, men unskilled in meanness, all hail. I go about among you an immortal god, no mortal now, honoured by all as is meet, crowned with fillets and flowery garlands. Straightway, whenever I enter with these into the flourishing towns, reverence is done me by men and women; they go after me in countless throngs, asking of me the way to gain; some desiring oracles, while some, who for many a weary day have been pierced by the grievous pangs of all manner of sickness, beg to hear from me the word of healing. R. P. 129 F.

But why do I harp on these things, as if it were any great matter that I should surpass mortal, perishable men?

Friends, I know indeed that truth is in the words I shall utter, but for men the assault of belief upon their hearts is grievous and hateful.

There is a decree of necessity, an ancient ordinance of the gods, eternal and sealed fast by broad oaths, that whenever one of the dæmons, whose portion is length of days, sinfully pollutes his hands with

blood, he must wander thrice ten thousand seasons from the abodes of the blessed, being born throughout the time in all manners of mortal forms, changing one toilsome path of life for another. For the mighty Air drives him into the Sea, and the Sea spews him forth on the dry Earth; Earth tosses him into the beams of the blazing Sun, and he flings him back to the eddies of Air. One takes him from the other, and all reject him. One of these I now am, an exile and a wanderer from the gods, the bondsman of insensate strife. R. P. 141 A.

For I have been ere now a boy and a girl, a bush and a bird and a glittering fish in the sea. R. P. 141 B.

I wept and I wailed when I saw the unfamiliar land where were Birth and Sudden Death and troops of Dooms besides, and loathsome sicknesses and putrefactions and fluxes. R. P. 141 C.

They wander in darkness up and down the meadow of Ate.

Robbed of the blessed life.

From what honour, from what a height of bliss have I fallen to go about among mortals here on earth.

We have come down under this roofed-in cave.

There was Chthonie and far-sighted Heliopé, bloody Discord and gentle-visaged Harmony, Kallisto and Aischre, Speed and Tarrying, lovely Truth and dark-faced Uncertainty, Birth and Decay, Sleep and Waking, Movement and Immobility, crowned Majesty and Meanness, Silence and Voice. R. P. 131e.

Alas, O wretched race of mortals, twice unblessed: such are the strifes and groanings from which ye have been born!

(The goddess) clothing them with a strange garment of flesh.

. . . Earth that envelops the man.

From living creatures he made them dead, changing their forms.

Nor had they any Ares for a god nor Kydoimos, no nor King Zeus nor Kronos nor Poseidon, but Kypris the Queen. . . . Her did they propitiate with holy gifts, with animals kneaded out of meal

and perfumes of cunning fragrancv, with offerings of pure myrrh and sweet-smelling frankincense, casting on the ground libations of brown honey. And the altar did not reek with pure bull's blood, but this was held in the greatest abomination among men, to eat the goodly limbs after tearing out the life. R. P. 142 B.

And there was among them a man of rare knowledge, most skilled in all manner of wise works, a man who had won the utmost wealth of wisdom; for whensoever he strained with all his mind, he easily saw everything of all the things that are now (though he lived) ten, yea twenty generations of men ago.

For all things were tame and gentle to man, both beasts and birds, and friendly feelings were kindled everywhere. Trees flourished with perpetual leaves and with perpetual fruit, hanging down with abundance of fruit all the year round. R. P. 142a.

This is not lawful for some and unlawful for others; but the law for all extends everywhere, through the wide-ruling air and the infinite light of heaven. R. P. 142 A.

Will ye not cease from this accursed slaughter? See ye not that ye are feasting on one another in the thoughtlessness of your hearts. R. P. 142 B.

And the father lifts up his own son in a changed form and slays him with a prayer. Infatuated fool! And they are dragged along begging mercy from the madman, while he, deaf to their cries, slaughters them in his halls and gets ready the evil feast. In like manner does the son seize the father, and children their mother, tear out their life and eat their flesh. R. P. ib.

Ah, woe is me that the pitiless day of death did not destroy me ere ever I wrought evil deeds of devouring with my lips! R. P. ib.

Among beasts they become lions that make their lair on the hills and their couch on the ground; and laurels among trees with goodly foliage. R. P. 141b.

Abstain wholly from laurel leaves.

Wretches, utter wretches, keep your hands from beans!

Wash your hands, cutting the water from five springs in the unyielding brass. R. P. 143, n. 1.

Fast from wickedness! R. P. *ib.*

Therefore are ye distraught by grievous wickednesses, and will not unburden your souls of wretched sorrows.

But, at the last, they appear among mortal men as prophets, song-writers, physicians, and princes; and thence they rise up as gods exalted in honour, sharing the hearth of the other gods and the same table, free from human woes, safe from destiny, and incapable of hurt. R. P. 141c.

Empedokles held that the Air was first separated out and secondly Fire. Next came Earth, from which, highly compressed as it was by the impetus of its revolution, Water gushed forth. From the water Mist was produced by evaporation. The heavens were formed out of the Air and the sun out of the Fire, while terrestrial things were condensed from the other elements.—Aet. ii. 6. 3 (Dox. p. 334; R. P. 135 A).

Empedokles held that the Air when separated off from the original mixture of the elements was spread round in a circle. After the Air, Fire running outwards, and not finding any other place, ran up under the solid ice that now surrounds the Air. There were two hemispheres revolving round the earth, the one altogether composed of fire, the other of a mixture of air and a little fire. The latter he supposed to be the Night. The origin of their motion he derived from the fact of fire preponderating in one hemisphere owing to its accumulation there.—Ps.-Plut. Strom. fr. 10 (Dox. p. 582; R. P. 135a).

Empedokles says that trees were the first living creatures to grow up out of the earth, before it was solidified by fire, and before day and night were distinguished; that, from the symmetry of their mixture, they contain the proportion of male and female; that they grow owing to the heat which is in the earth rising upwards, so that they are parts of the earth just as embryos are parts of the womb; that fruits are excretions of the water and fire in plants, and that those which have a deficiency of moisture shed their leaves when that is evaporated by the

summer heat, while those which have more moisture remain evergreen, as in the case of the laurel, the olive, and the palm; that the differences in taste are due to variations in the particles contained in the earth and to the plants drawing different particles from it, as in the case of vines; for it is not the difference of the vines that make wine good, but that of the soil which nourishes them.—Aet. v. 26. 4 (R. P. 136).

7. Empedokles speaks in the same way of all the senses, and says that perception is due to the "effluences" fitting into the passages of each sense. And that is why one cannot judge the objects of another; for the passages of some of them are too wide and those of others too narrow for the sensible object, so that the latter either goes through without touching or cannot enter at all. R. P. 139d.

He tries, too, to explain the nature of sight. He says that the interior of the eye consists of fire and water, while round about it is earth and "air," through which its rarity enables the fire to pass like the light in lanterns (v. 316 sqq.). The passages of the fire and water are arranged alternately; through those of the fire we perceive light objects, through those of the water, dark; each class of objects fits into each class of passages, and the colours are carried to the sight by effluence. R. P. ib.

8. But eyes are not all composed in the same way; some are composed of like elements and some of opposite; some have the fire in the centre and some on the outside. That is why some animals are keen-sighted in the daytime, for the fire within is brought up to an equality by that without; those which have less of the opposite (i.e. water), by night, for then their deficiency is supplemented. But, in the opposite case, each will behave in the opposite manner. Those eyes in which fire predominates will be dazzled in the daytime, since the fire being still further increased will stop up and occupy the pores of the water. And this goes on till the water is separated off by the air, for in each case it is the opposite which is a remedy. The best tempered and the most excellent vision is one composed of both in equal proportions. This is practically what he says about sight.

9. Hearing, he holds, is produced by sound outside, when the air moved by the voice sounds inside the ear; for the sense of hearing is a sort of bell sounding inside the ear, which he calls a "fleshy sprout." When the air is set in motion it strikes upon the solid parts and produces a sound. Smell, he holds, arises from respiration, and and that is why those smell most keenly whose breath has the most violent motion, and why most smell comes from subtle and light

bodies. As to touch and taste, he does not lay down how nor by means of what they arise, except that he gives us an explanation applicable to all, that sensation is produced by adaptation to the pores. Pleasure is produced by what is like in its element and their mixture; pain, by what is opposite. R. P. *ib.*

10. And he gives a precisely similar account of thought and ignorance. Thought arises from what is like and ignorance from what is unlike, thus implying that thought is the same, or nearly the same, as perception. For after enumerating how we know each thing by means of itself, he adds, "for all things are fashioned and fitted together out of these, and it is by these men think and feel pleasure and pain" (v. 336 sq.). And for this reason we think chiefly with our blood, for in it of all parts of the body all the elements are most completely mingled. R. P. 139 C.

11. All, then, in whom the mixture is equal or nearly so, and in whom the elements are neither at too great intervals nor too small or too large, are the wisest and have the most exact perceptions; and those who come next to them are wise in proportion. Those who are in the opposite condition are the most foolish. Those whose elements are separated by intervals and rare are dull and laborious; those in whom they are closely packed and broken into minute particles are impulsive, they attempt many things and finish few because of the rapidity with which their blood moves. Those who have a well-proportioned mixture in some one part of their bodies will be clever in that respect. That is why some are good orators and some good artificers. The latter have a good mixture in their hands, and the former in their tongues, and so with all other special capacities. R. P. *ib.*

TRANSLATIONS OF JOHN BURNET.

ANAXAGORAS

Anaxagoras was born probably a year or so after 500 B. C., at Klazomenai. At the age of twenty he began to study philosophy at Athens, and was the first of the philosophers to take up his residence there. He is said to have neglected his property for science. He was a friend of Pericles, and shortly before the Peloponnesian war, the enemies of Plato brought trial against Anaxagoras for holding that the sun was a red hot stone and the moon earth. Escaping from Athens,

Anaxagoras returned to Ionia to Lampsakos, and seems to have died there not long afterwards. He believed that there are as many elements as there are qualities in things.

FRAGMENTS

1. All things were together infinite both in number and in smallness,—for the small, too, was infinite. And when all things were together, none of them could be distinguished because of their smallness. For air and æther prevailed over all things, being both of them infinite; for amongst all things these are the greatest both in quantity and size. R. P. 120.

2. For air and æther are separated off from the mass that surrounds the world, and the surrounding mass is infinite in quantity. R. P. *ib.*

3-10. And since these things are so, we must suppose that there are contained many things and of all sorts in all (the worlds) that are brought together, germs of all things, with all sorts of shapes, and colours, and savours (R. P. *ib.*), and that men have been formed in them, and the other animals that have life, and that these men have inhabited cities and cultivated fields, as with us; and that they have a sun and moon and the rest, as with us; and that their earth brings forth for them many things of all kinds, of which they gather together the best and use them for their dwellings (R. P. 127b). Thus much have I said with regard to separating off, that it will not be only with us that things are separated off, but elsewhere too.

11. . . . as these thus revolve and are separated off by the force and speed. And the speed makes the force. And their speed is like nothing in speed of the things that are now among men, but in every way many times as quick.

4. But before they were separated off, when all things were together, not even was any colour distinguishable; for the mixture of all things prevented it,—of the moist and of the dry, and the warm and the cold, and the light and dark [and much earth being in it], and of a multitude of innumerable germs in no way like each other. For none of the other things either is like any other. R. P. 120.

5. In everything there is a portion of everything except Nous, and there are some things in which there is Nous (mind) also. R. P. 127b.

6. All other things partake in a portion of everything, while

Nous is infinite and self-ruled, and is mixed with nothing, but is alone, itself by itself. For if it were not by itself, but were mixed with anything else, it would partake in all things if it were mixed with any; for in everything there is a portion of everything, as has been said by me in what goes before, and the things mixed with it would hinder it, so that it would have power over nothing in the same way that it has now being alone by itself. For it is the thinnest of all things and the purest, and it has all knowledge about everything and the greatest strength; and Nous has power over all things, both greater and smaller, that have life. And Nous had power over the whole revolution, so that it began to revolve in the beginning. And it began to revolve first from a small beginning; but the revolution now extends over a large space, and will extend over a larger still. And all the things that are mingled together and separated off and distinguished are all known by Nous. And Nous set in order all things that were to be and that were, and all things that are not now and that are, and this revolution in which now revolve the stars and the sun and the moon, and the air and the æther that are separated off. And this revolution caused the separating off, and the rare is separated from the dense, the warm from the cold, the light from the dark, and the dry from the moist. And there are many portions in many things. But no thing is altogether separated off nor distinguished from anything else except Nous. And all Nous is alike, both the greater and the smaller; while nothing else is like anything else, but each single thing is and was most manifestly those things of which it has most in it. R. P. 123.

7. And when Nous began to move things, separating off took place from all that was moved, and so far as Nous set in motion all was separated. And as things were set in motion and separated, the revolution caused them to be separated much more.

8. The dense and the moist and the cold and the dark came together where the earth is now, while the rare and the warm and the dry (and the bright) went out towards the further part of the æther. R. P. 124 A.

9. From these as they are separated off earth is solidified; for from mists water is separated off, and from water earth. From the earth stones are solidified by the cold, and these rush outwards more than water. R. P. 124 A.

12. But Nous has power over all things that are, and it is now

where all the other things are, in the mass that surrounds the world, and in the things that have been separated off and that are being separated off.

13. Nor are the things that are in one world divided nor cut off from one another with a hatchet, neither the warm from the cold nor the cold from the warm. R. P. 123e.

14. And when those things are being thus distinguished, we must know that all of them are neither more nor less; for it is not possible for them to be more than all, and all are always equal. R. P. 120.

15. Nor is there a least of what is small, but there is always a smaller; for it is impossible that what is should cease to be by being divided. But there is always something greater than what is great, and it is equal to the small in amount, and, compared with itself, each thing is both great and small. R. P. 126a.

16. And since the portions of the great and of the small are equal in amount, for this reason, too, all things will be in everything; nor is it possible for them to be apart, but all things have a portion of everything. Since it is impossible for there to be a least thing, they cannot be separated, nor come to be by themselves; but they must be now, just as they were in the beginning, all together. And in all things many things are contained, and an equal number both in the greater and in the smaller of the things that are separated off.

17. The Hellenes are wrong in using the expressions coming into being and passing away; for nothing comes into being or passes away, but mingling and separation takes place of things that are. So they would be right to call coming into being mixture, and passing away separation. R. P. 119.

3. The earth is flat in shape, and remains suspended because of its size and because there is no vacuum. For this reason the air is very strong, and supports the earth which is borne up by it.

4. Of the moisture on the surface of the earth, the sea arose from the waters in the earth, . . . and from the rivers which flow into it.

5. Rivers take their being both from the rains and from the waters in the earth; for the earth is hollow, and has waters in its cavities. And the Nile rises in summer owing to the water that comes down from the snows in Ethiopia.

6. The sun and the moon and all the stars are fiery stones ig-

nited by the rotation of the æther. Under the stars are the sun and moon, and also certain bodies which revolve with them, but are invisible to us.

7. We do not feel the heat of the stars because of the greatness of their distance from the earth; and, further, they are not so warm as the sun, because they occupy a colder region. The moon is below the sun, and nearer us.

8. The sun surpasses the Peloponnesos in size. The moon has not a light of her own, but gets it from the sun. The course of the stars goes under the earth.

9. The moon is eclipsed by the earth screening the sun's light from it. The sun is eclipsed at the new moon, when the moon screens it from us. Both the sun and the moon turn in their courses owing to the repulsion of the air. The moon turns frequently, because it cannot prevail over the cold.

10. Anaxagoras was the first to determine what concerns the eclipses and the illumination of the sun and moon. And he said the moon was of earth, and had plains and ravines in it. The Milky Way was the reflexion of the light of the stars that were not illuminated by the sun. Shooting stars were sparks, as it were, which leapt out owing to the motion of the heavenly vault.

11. Winds arose when the air was rarefied by the sun, and when things were burned and made their way to the vault of heaven and were carried off. Thunder and lightning were produced by heat striking upon clouds.

12. Earthquakes were caused by the air above striking on that beneath the earth; for the movement of the latter caused the earth which floats on it to rock. Dox. p. 562.

27. But Anaxagoras says that perception is produced by opposites; for like things cannot be affected by like. He attempts to give a detailed enumeration of the particular senses. We see by means of the image in the pupil; but no image is cast upon what is of the same colour, but only on what is different. With most living creatures things are of a different colour to the pupil by day, though with some this is so by night, and these are accordingly keen-sighted at that time. Speaking generally, however, night is more of the same colour with the eyes than day. And an image is cast on the pupil by day, because light is a concomitant cause of the image, and because the prevailing colour casts an image more readily upon its op-

posite. Theophrastos *De Sens.* (Dox. p. 507).

28. It is in the same way that touch and taste discern their objects. That which is just as warm or just as cold as we are neither warms us nor cools us by its contact; and, in the same way, we do not apprehend the sweet and the sour by means of themselves. We know cold by warm, fresh by salt, and sweet by sour, in virtue of our deficiency in each; for all these are in us to begin with. And we smell and hear in the same manner; the former by means of the accompanying respiration, the latter by the sound penetrating to the brain, for the bone which surrounds this is hollow, and it is upon it that the sound falls.

29. And all sensation implies pain, a view which would seem to be the consequence of the first assumption, for all unlike things produce pain by their contact. And this pain is made perceptible by the long continuance or by the excess of a sensation. Brilliant colours and excessive noises produce pain, and we cannot dwell long on the same things. The larger animals are the more sensitive, and, generally, sensation is proportionate to the size of the organs of sense. Those animals which have large, pure and bright eyes see large objects and from a great distance, and contrariwise.

30. And it is the same with hearing. Large animals can hear great and distant sounds, while less sounds pass unperceived; small animals perceive small sounds and those near at hand. It is the same too with smell. Rarefied air has more smell; for, when air is heated and rarefied, it smells. A large animal when it breathes draws in the condensed air along with the rarefied, while a small one draws in the rarefied by itself; so the large one perceives more. For smell is better perceived when it is near than when it is far by reason of its being more condensed, while when dispersed it is weak. But, roughly speaking, large animals do not perceive a rarefied smell, nor small animals a condensed one.

TRANSLATIONS OF JOHN BURNET.

ZENO

Zeno, the Elean, born about 489 B. C., believed in the unity of Parmenides. Because Parmenides had in a thorough going way showed the consequences which follow from the assumption that the world is a unity, Empedocles and Anaxagoras had maintained the

plurality of the universe. Zeno came to the aid of Parmenides by showing the difficulties that are also involved in this assumption.

FRAGMENTS

If things are a many, they must be just as many as they are, and neither more nor less. Now, if they are as many as they are, they will be finite in number.

But again, if things are a many, they will be infinite in number; for there will always be other things between them, and others again between them. R. P. 105 B.

If things are a many, they are both great and small; so great as to be of an infinite magnitude, and so small as to have no magnitude at all.

That which has neither magnitude nor thickness nor bulk, will not even be. "For," he says, "if it be added to any other thing it will not make it any larger; for nothing can gain in magnitude by the addition of what has no magnitude, and thus it follows at once that what was added was nothing. . . . But if, when this is taken away from another thing, that thing is no less; and again, if, when it is added to another thing, that does not increase, it is plain that what was added was nothing, and what was taken away was nothing." R. P. 105 A.

But, if we assume that the unit is something, each one must have a certain magnitude and a certain thickness. One part of it must be at a certain distance from another, and the same may be said of what surpasses it in smallness; for it, too, will have magnitude, and something will surpass it in smallness. It is all the same to say this once and to say it always; for no such part of it will be the last, nor will one thing be non-existent compared with another. So, if things are a many, they must be both small and great, so small as not to have any magnitude at all, and so great as to be infinite. R. P. 105 C.

If there is space, it will be in something; for all that is is in something, and to be in something is to be in space. This goes on ad infinitum, therefore there is no space. R. P. 106.

1. You cannot traverse an infinite number of points in a finite time. You must traverse the half of any given distance before you

traverse the whole, and the half of that again before you can traverse it. This goes on *ad infinitum*, so that (if space is made up of points) there are an infinite number in any given space, and it cannot be traversed in a finite time.

2. The second is the famous puzzle of Achilles and the tortoise. Achilles must first reach the place from which the tortoise started. By that time the tortoise will have got on a little way. Achilles must then traverse that, and still the tortoise will be ahead. He is always coming nearer, but he never makes up to it.

3. The third argument against the possibility of motion through a space made up of points is that, on this hypothesis, an arrow in any given moment of its flight must be at rest in some particular point. Aristotle observes quite rightly that this argument depends upon the assumption that time is made up of "nows," that is, of indivisible instants. This, no doubt, was the Pythagorean view.

MELISSOS

We know practically nothing of the life of Melissos save the one great fact that he was the general of Samnos that defeated the Athenian fleet in 440 B. C.

FRAGMENTS

1. If nothing is, what can be said of it as of something real? R. P. 110.

2. What was was ever, and ever shall be. For, if it had come into being, there needs must have been nothing before it came into being. Now, if nothing were to exist, in no wise could anything have arisen out of nothing. R. P. 110a.

7. Since, then, it has not come into being, and since it is, it was ever and ever shall be, and has no beginning or end, but is infinite. For, if it had come into being, it would have had a beginning (or it would have begun to come into being at some time or other) and an end (for it would have ceased to come into being at some time or other); but, if it neither began nor ended, it ever was and ever shall be, and has no beginning or end; for it is not possible for anything to be ever without being all. R. P. 111a, fin.

8. Further, just as it ever is, so it must ever be infinite in mag-

nitude (for if it had bounds, it would be bounded by empty space). R. P. 111a, init.

9. But nothing which has a beginning or end is either eternal or infinite.

10. For if it is (infinite), it must be one; for if it were two, it could not be infinite; for then it would be bounded by another. R. P. 112a.

10a. (And, since it is one, it is alike throughout; for if it were unlike, it would be many and not one.)

11. So then it is eternal and infinite and one and all alike. And it cannot perish nor become greater, nor does it suffer pain or grief. For, if any of these things happened to it, it would no longer be one. For if it is altered, then the real must needs not be all alike, but what was before must pass away, and what was not must come into being. Now, if the all had changed by so much as a single hair, in thirty thousand years, it would all perish in the whole of time. R. P. 113a.

12. Further, it is not possible either that its order should be changed; for the order which it had before does not perish, nor does that which was not come into being. But, since nothing is either added to it or passes away or is altered, how can any real thing have had its order changed? For if anything became different, that would amount to a change in its order. R. P. ib.

13. Nor does it suffer pain; for the All cannot be in pain. For a thing in pain could not be ever, nor could it have the same power as what is whole. It is only from the addition or subtraction of something that it could feel pain, and then it would no longer be like itself. Nor could what is whole possibly begin to feel pain; for then what was whole and what was real would pass away, and what was not would come into being. And the same argument applies to grief as to pain. R. P. ib.

14. Nor is anything empty. For what is empty is nothing.

. . . What is nothing, then, cannot be.

Nor does it move; for it has nowhere to betake itself to, but is full. For if there were empty space, it would betake itself to empty space. But, since there is no empty space, it has no place to betake itself to.

And it cannot be dense and rare; for it is not possible for what is rarefied to be as full as what is dense, but what is rare is ipso facto emptier than what is dense.

This is the way in which we must distinguish between what is

full and what is not full. If a thing has room for anything else, and takes it in, it is not full; but if it has no room for anything and does not take it in, it is full.

Now, it must needs be full if there is no empty space, and if it is full, it does not move (n. 45).

15. If what is real is divided, it moves; but if it moves, it cannot have body; for, if it had body it would have parts, and would no longer be one. R. P. 114.

17. This argument, then, is the greatest proof that it is one alone; but the following are proofs of it also. If it were a many, these would have to be of the same kind as I say that the one is. For if there is earth and water, and air and iron, and gold and fire, and if one thing is living and another dead, and if things are black and white and all that men say they really are,—if that is so, and if we see and hear aright, each one of these must be such as we at first concluded that reality was, and they cannot be changed or altered. Whereas we say that we see and hear and understand aright, and yet we believe that what is warm becomes cold, and what is cold warm; that what is hard turns soft, and what is soft hard; that what is living dies, and that things are born from what lives not; and that all those things are changed. We think that iron, which is hard, is rubbed away with the finger, passing away in rust; and so with gold and stone and everything which we fancy to be strong, so that it turns out that we neither see nor know realities. Earth, too, and stone are formed out of water. Now these things do not agree with one another. We said that there were many things that were eternal and had forms and strength of their own, and yet we fancy that they all suffer alteration, and that they change with each perception. It is clear, then, that we did not see aright after all, nor are we right in believing that all these things are many. They would not change if they were real, but each thing would be just what we believed it to be; for nothing is stronger than true reality. But if it has changed, what was has passed away, and what was not is come into being. So then, if there were many things, they would have to be just of the same nature as the one. R. P. 115.

TRANSLATIONS OF JOHN BURNET.

THE PYTHAGOREANS

We stated under Pythagoras that he must be distinguished from his followers. We give below Aristotle's account of the celebrated theory of the order that number relations are the true reality of the world. The greatest work of the Pythagoreans was done in mathematics, and they certainly believed that the earth is round and goes round the sun.

But amongst these, and prior to them, those called Pythagoreans, applying themselves to the study of the mathematical sciences, first advanced these views; and having been nurtured therein, they considered the first principles of these to be the first principles of all entities. But since, among these, numbers by nature are the first, and in numbers they fancied they beheld many resemblances for entities and things that are being produced, rather than in fire, and earth, and water; because, to give an instance, such a particular property of numbers is justice, and such soul and mind; and another different one is opportunity; and it is the case, so to speak, in like manner with each of the other things;

Moreover, also, in numbers discerning the passive conditions and reasons of harmonies, since it was apparent that, indeed, other things in their nature were in all points assimilated unto numbers, and that the numbers were the first of the entire of Nature, hence they supposed the elements of numbers to be the elements of all entities, and the whole heaven to be an harmony and number. And as many phenomena as they could demonstrate to be conformable, both in their numbers and harmonies, with the passive conditions and parts of the heaven, and with its entire arrangement, these they collected and adapted to their philosophy: and if there was any interval left anywhere, they supplied the deficiency, in order that there might be a chain of connexion running through their entire system. Now, I say, as an illustration, since the decade seems to be a thing that is perfect, and to have comprised the entire nature of numbers, hence they also assert that the bodies that are borne through the heaven are truly ten in number; and whereas nine only are apparent, on this account they constitute the confronting earth tenth. But respecting these theorists, we have arrived at more accurate decisions in other parts of our works.

But the reason why we have gone in review through these philosophers is this, in order that we may receive also from them what they have already laid down as being first principles, and in what manner they fall in with the causes just enumerated. Undoubtedly do these appear to consider number to be a first principle, and, as it were, a material cause of entities, and as both their passive conditions and habits, and that the even and the odd are elements of number; and of these, that the one is finite and the other infinite, and that unity, doubtless, is composed of both of these, for that it is both even and odd, and that number is composed of unity, and that, as has been stated, the entire heaven is composed of numbers.

But others of these very philosophers affirm that first principles are ten in number, denominated in accordance with the following co-ordinate series, namely :—

Bound.	Infinity.		Rest.	Motion.
Odd.	Even.		Straight.	Crooked.
Unity.	Plurality.		Light.	Darkness.
Right.	Left.		Good.	Bad.
Male.	Female.		Square.	Oblong.

PROTAGORAS

Protagoras was born at Abdera about 480 B. C. He was the first of the so-called sophists. For forty years he travelled from place to place in Greece, educating his hearers in the culture of the time. When about seventy, he was exiled because he had begun one of his books with the sentence, "Concerning the gods, I cannot say, whether they exist or not." He believed all knowledge to be merely a question of opinion, and each "man to be the measure of all things." His great significance, from this point of view, is because he showed that our sensations are personal and do not necessarily give an exact knowledge of the things they represent, thus forcing thinkers to look behind the sensation to find the truth in which all men can agree. Practically nothing is extant of his works, but his doctrine is discussed in Plato's *Theætetus*.

SOCRATES

Socrates was born about 470 B. C., at Athens, the son of the statuary Sophroniscus. He was pug-nosed, thick lipped, big bellied, and bulging eyed—the very opposite of the Greek ideal of beauty. He served two campaigns in the army with credit, but did not seek distinction in this field. The rest of his life was spent at Athens, enlivened by his conversations with his friends and townspeople. Xantippe, his wife, berated him for his slothfulness and his three sons seem never to have amounted to much, so his domestic life was far from happy. He was accused by the Athenians of introducing strange gods and corrupting the youth, and was sentenced to death and died from drinking the hemlock in 399 B. C.

His influence, philosophically, has been enormous, partly on account of his own beliefs; but even more through his influence on Plato. He believed in the possibility of virtue, and that knowledge itself would bring virtue, and sought to find the ground for knowledge by defining things and grouping them into classes of which could be made a general statement which would hold good. He wrote nothing, but his teachings are described from a practical standpoint by Xenophon in the *Memorabilia*, and, much mixed with Plato's own doctrines, in the *Platonic dialogues*.

LEUKIPPOS AND DEMOKRITOS.

We have classed Leukippos and Demokritos together because the most satisfactory early statement of their atomic theory considers them in this way. The very existence of Leukippos has been doubted, as the theory seems to have been studied in the more developed form in which it was set by Demokritos.

Demokritos was born at Abdera, about 460 B. C. He travelled widely in Africa and Asia, and died about the age of a hundred. He started from the idea of the Atom of Leukippos, and developed it. His works were very highly considered, not only for thought, but for form, and their loss is one of the greatest in the history of thought. He placed the permanent reality of the world in numberless atoms, and believed that the universe as a whole is the result of the mechanical

motions and combination of these purposeless atoms. Color, sound, taste, and temperature, he believed to be personal and subjective, but thought form, weight, and hardness to belong to things in themselves.

FRAGMENTS

Leukippos and Demokritos have decided about all things practically by the same method and on the same theory, taking as their starting-point what naturally comes first. Some of the ancients had held that the real must necessarily be one and immovable; for, said they, empty space is not real, and motion would be impossible without empty space separated from matter; nor, further, could reality be a many, if there were nothing to separate things. And it makes no difference if any one holds that the All is not continuous, but discrete, with its parts in contact (Pythagorean view), instead of holding that reality is many, not one, and that there is empty space. For, if it is divisible at every point there is no one, and therefore no many, and the Whole is empty (Zeno); while, if we say it is divisible in one place and not in another, this looks like an arbitrary fiction; for up to what point and for what reason will part of the Whole be in this state and be full, while the rest is discrete? And, on the same grounds, they further say that there can be no motion. In consequence of these reasonings, then, going beyond perception and overlooking it in the belief that we ought to follow the argument, they say that the All is one and immovable, and some of them that it is infinite (Melissos), for any limit would be bounded by empty space. This, then, is the opinion they expressed about the truth, and these are the reasons which led them to do so. Now, so far as arguments go, this conclusion does seem to follow; but, if we appeal to facts, to hold such a view looks like madness. No one who is mad is so far out of his senses that fire and ice appear to him to be one; it is only things that are right, and things that appear right from habit, in which madness makes some people see no difference.

Leukippos, however, thought he had a theory which was in harmony with sense-perception, and did not do away with coming into being and passing away, nor motion, nor the multiplicity of things. He made this concession to experience, while he conceded, on the other hand, to those who invented the One that motion was impossible without the void, that the void was not real, and that nothing of what was real was not real. "For," said he, "that which is, strictly speaking, real is an absolute plenum; but the plenum is not one.

On the contrary, there are an infinite number of them, and they are invisible owing to the smallness of their bulk. They move in the void (for there is a void); and by their coming together they effect coming into being; by their separation, passing away."

He says that the worlds arise when many bodies are collected together into the mighty void from the surrounding space and rush together. They come into collision, and those which are of similar shape and like form become entangled, and from their entanglement the heavenly bodies arise.

TRANSLATIONS OF JOHN BURNET.

PLATO

ALTHOUGH so much remains of Plato's writings, but little is known of his life. His true name was Aristocles, Plato being a nickname given him on account of his broad (platus) shoulders. He was born in 429 B. C., and died in 348 B. C. He is said to have visited Cyrene and Egypt.

Out of the insistence of Protagoras that sensations are merely personal, there had come to be distinguished two realities, the transitory reality of the sensation, and a permanent reality, which philosophy had sought and had not found. Plato believed that it was possible to make a permanently true general statement about a class of things, and argued that there must be a permanently existing reality analogous to the class concept, in accordance with which the individual thing must take its form. In other words, he believed that such a general conception as man must have a real, though supersensible, existence, and that each individual human being must correspond to this concept. This is his famous doctrine of Ideas. The highest of all Ideas was the good, and he thought the universe in its parts to be reaching toward this unity.

The Theaetetus shows his theory of knowledge, the Parmenides explains and criticises his doctrine of Ideas, and the Phædo extends this doctrine and applies it to immortality. We give, also, from the Republic, his conception of the ideal state, the first great contribution to the social sciences.

LEMNIAN ATHENA

After Phidias. Now in Dresden.

PHIDIAS was born about 500 B. C. at Athens. He studied under Ageladas of Argos; began his great work as a sculptor in the time of Cimon and brought it to its zenith in the Age of Pericles. His great statue of Athena in the Parthenon, composed of gold, ivory, and precious stones was completed in 437 B. C.; his colossal statue of Zeus, wrought of like materials, was set up at Olympia about 433 B. C. Nothing but small wretched copies of these works, and their fame, remains. He superintended all the public architecture and sculpture of Athens, and himself executed some of the friezes of the temple of Athena. He was the greatest sculptor of Greece.



THE POSSIBILITY OF KNOWLEDGE

THEAETETUS

THE PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE

EUCLID TERPSION SOCRATES THEAETETUS THEODORUS

EUCLID. Are you only just arrived from the country, Terpsion?

Terpsion. No, I came some time ago: and I have been in the Agora looking for you, and wondering that I could not find you.

Euc. Why, I was not in the city at all.

Terp. Where then?

Euc. As I was going down to the harbour, I met Theaetetus; he was being carried up to Athens from the army at Corinth.

Terp. Do you mean that he was alive or dead?

Euc. He was scarcely alive; for he has been badly wounded, and what is worse, the sickness which prevails in the army has fastened upon him.

Terp. Is that the dysentery?

Euc. Yes.

Terp. Alas! what a loss he will be!

Euc. Yes. Terpsion, he is a noble fellow; I heard some one highly praising his behaviour in this very battle.

Terp. I do not wonder at that; I should wonder at hearing anything else of him. But why did he go on, instead of stopping at Megara?

Euc. He wanted to get home, for the fact was that I begged and advised him to remain, but he would not; so I set him on his way, and turned back, and then I remembered what Socrates had said of him, and thought how remarkably this, like all his predictions, had been fulfilled. I believe that he had seen him a little before his own death, when Theaetetus was a youth, and he had a conversation with him, which he repeated to me when I came to Athens; he was full of admiration of his genius, and said that he would most certainly be a great man, if he lived.

Terp. That has certainly proved true; but what was the conversation? can you tell me?

Euc. No, indeed, not without preparation; but I took notes as soon as I got home, which I filled up from memory and wrote out at leisure; and whenever I went to Athens, I asked Socrates about any point which I had forgotten, and on my return I made corrections; in this way I have nearly the whole conversation written down.

Terp. True; I have heard you say that before, and have always been intending to ask you to show me the writing, but have let the opportunity slip; and now, why not out with the book?—having just come from the country, I should greatly like to rest.

Euc. I, too, shall be very glad of a rest, for I went with Theaetetus as far as Erineum. Let us go in, then, and, while we are reposing, the servant shall read to us.

Terp. Very good.

Euc. Here is the roll, Terpion; I need only observe that I have introduced Socrates, not as narrating to me, but as actually conversing with the persons whom he mentioned—these were, Theodorus the geometrician (of Cyrene), and Theaetetus. I have omitted, for the sake of convenience, the interlocutory words ‘I said,’ ‘I remarked,’ which he used when he spoke of himself, and again, ‘he agreed,’ or ‘disagreed,’ in the answer, as the repetition of them would have been troublesome.

Terp. That is quite right, Euclid.

Euc. And now, boy, you may take the roll and read.

Euclid's servant reads.

Socrates. If I cared enough about the Cyrenians, Theodorus, I would ask you whether there are any rising geometricians or philosophers in that part of the world. But I am more interested in our Athenian youth, and I would rather know who among them are likely to do well. I observe them as far as I can myself, and I enquire of any one whom they follow, and I see that a great many of them follow you, in which they are quite right, considering your eminence in geometry and in other ways. I should like to know, if you have met with any one who is good for anything.

Theodorus. Yes, Socrates, there is one very remarkable Athenian youth with whom I have become acquainted, whom I commend to you as well worthy of your attention. If he had been a beauty I should have been afraid to praise him, lest you should suppose that I was in love with him; but he is no beauty, and you must not be offended if I say that he is very like you; for, he has a snub nose

and projecting eyes, although these features are less marked in him than in you. Seeing, then, that he has no personal attractions, I may freely say, that in all my acquaintance, which is very large, I never knew any one who was his equal in natural gifts; for he has a quickness of apprehension which is almost unrivalled, and he is remarkably gentle, and also the most courageous of men; there is a union of qualities in him such as I have never seen in any other, and should scarcely have thought that the combination was possible; for those who, like him, have quick and ready and retentive wits, have generally also quick tempers; they are ships without ballast, which go darting about, and are mad rather than courageous; and the steadier sort, when they have to face study, are stupid and cannot remember. Whereas he moves surely and smoothly and successfully in the path of knowledge and enquiry; and he is full of gentleness, and always making progress, like the noiseless flow of a river of oil; at his age, it is wonderful.

Soc. That is good news; and whose son is he?

Theod. The name of his father I have forgotten, but the youth himself is the middle one of those who are approaching us; he and his companions have been anointing in the outer court, and now they seem to have finished, and are coming towards us. Look and see whether you know him.

Soc. I know the youth, but I do not know his name; he is the son of Euphronius the Sunian, who was himself an eminent man, and such another as his son is, according to your account of him; I believe that he left a considerable fortune.

Theod. Theaetetus, Socrates, is his name; but I rather think that the property disappeared in the hands of trustees; notwithstanding which he is wonderfully liberal.

Soc. He must be a fine fellow; tell him to come and sit by me.

Theod. I will. Come hither, Theaetetus, and sit by Socrates.

Soc. By all means, Theaetetus, in order that I may see the reflection of myself in your face, for Theodorus says that we are alike; and yet if each of us held in his hands a lyre, and he said that they were alike, should we at once take his word, or should we ask whether he who said this was a musician?

Theaetetus. We should ask.

Soc. And if we found that he was a musician, we should take his word; and if not, not?

Theaet. True.

Soc. And if this supposed likeness of our faces is a matter of any interest to us, we should enquire whether he who says that we are alike is a painter or not?

Theaet. Certainly we should.

Soc. And is Theodorus a painter?

Theaet. I never heard that he was.

Soc. Is he a geometrician?

Theaet. There can be no doubt about that, Socrates.

Soc. And is he an astronomer and calculator and musician, and in general an educated man?

Theaet. I think that he is.

Soc. If, then, he remarks on the similarity of our persons, either in the way of praise or blame, there is no particular reason why we should attend to him.

Theaet. I should say not.

Soc. But if he praises the virtue or wisdom which are the mental endowments of either of us, then he who heard the praises will naturally desire to have an examination, and he who is praised ought to be willing to exhibit himself.

Theaet. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Then now is the time, my dear Theaetetus, for you to exhibit and for me to have the examination; for although Theodorus has praised many a citizen and stranger in my hearing, never did I hear him praise any one as he has been praising you.

Theaet. I am glad of that, Socrates; but what if he was only in jest?

Soc. Nay, that is not his way; and I cannot allow you to retract your assent on that ground. For if you do, he will have to clear himself on oath, and I am sure that no one will accuse him of false witness; do not then be afraid of standing to your word.

Theaet. I will do as you wish.

Soc. Well, then, I should like to ask what you learn of Theodorus; something of geometry, I suppose?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And astronomy and harmony and calculation?

Theaet. I do my best.

Soc. Yes, my boy, and so do I; and my desire is to learn of him, and of anybody who seems to understand these things. And I get on pretty well in general; but there is a little matter which I want you and the company to aid me in investigating. Will you

answer me a question: 'Is not learning growing wiser about that which you learn?'

Theaet. Of course.

Soc. And by wisdom the wise are wise?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And is that different from knowledge?

Theaet. What is different?

Soc. Wisdom; are not men wise in that which they know?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Then wisdom and knowledge are the same?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And this is the very difficulty which I can never explain to myself—What is the nature of knowledge? can we tell that? What do you say? which of us will answer first? whoever misses shall sit down, as at a game of ball, and be donkey, as the boys say, to the rest of the company; he who lasts out his competitors in the game without missing, shall be our king, and shall have the right of asking any questions which he likes. Why is there no reply? I hope, Theodorus, that I am not betrayed by my love of conversation? I only want to make us talk and be friendly and sociable.

Theod. The reverse of rudeness, Socrates; but I would rather that you would ask one of the young fellows; the truth is, that I am not in the habit of playing at your game of question and answer, and I am too old to acquire the habit; this will suit the young much better, and they will improve much more than I shall, for youth is always able to improve. Having already made a beginning with him, I would advise you to detain Theaetetus, and interrogate him.

Soc. Do you hear, Theaetetus, what Theodorus says; the philosopher, whom you would not like to disobey, and whose word ought to be a command to a young man, bids me interrogate you. Take courage, then, and nobly say what you think that knowledge is.

Theaet. Well, Socrates, I will answer as you and he bid me; and, if I make a mistake, you will be sure to correct me.

Soc. That we will, if we can.

Theaet. Then, I think that the sciences which I learn from Theodorus, geometry, and those which you just now mentioned, are knowledge; and I would include the art of the cobbler and other craftsmen; these, all and each of them, are knowledge.

Soc. Too much, Theaetetus, too much; the nobility and liberality of your own nature make you give many and diverse things, when

I am asking for one simple thing.

Theaet. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. Perhaps nothing. I will endeavour, however, to explain what I believe to be my meaning: When you speak of cobbling, you mean the art of making shoes?

Theaet. That is my meaning.

Soc. And when you speak of carpentering, you mean the art of making wooden implements?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. In both which cases you define the subjects of the two arts?

Theaet. True.

Soc. But that, Theaetetus, was not the question; we wanted to know not the subjects, nor yet the number of the arts or sciences, for we were not going to count them, but we wanted to know the nature of knowledge in the abstract. Am I not right?

Theaet. Perfectly right.

Soc. Take the following example: Suppose that a person were to ask about some very common and obvious thing. Shall I say—What is clay? and we were to answer him, that there is a clay of potters, there is a clay of oven-makers, there is a clay of brick-makers; would not that be ridiculous?

Theaet. Truly.

Soc. In the first place, there would be an absurdity in assuming that he who asked the question would understand from our answer the meaning of the word 'clay,' merely because we added 'of the image-makers,' or of any other workers. For how can a man understand the name of that of which he does not know the nature?

Theaet. To be sure he cannot.

Soc. Then he who does not know what science or knowledge is, has no knowledge of the art or science of making shoes?

Theaet. None.

Soc. Nor of any other science?

Theaet. No.

Soc. And when a man is asked 'what science or knowledge is,' to give as an answer the name of some art or science, is ridiculous; for the question is, 'What is knowledge?' and he replies, 'a knowledge of this and that.'

Theaet. True.

Soc. Moreover, he might answer shortly and simply, but he makes an enormous circuit. For example, when asked about the clay,

he might have said simply, that 'clay is moistened earth'—whose clay is not to the point.

Theaet. Yes, Socrates, that appears to be easy, as you state the matter. And, if I am not mistaken, you mean something like what occurred to me and to my friend here, your namesake, Socrates, in a recent discussion.

Soc. What was that, Theaetetus?

Theaet. Theodorus was writing out for us something about roots, such as the roots of three or five feet, showing that in linear measurement (i. e. comparing the sides of the squares), they are incommensurable by the unit; he selected the numbers which are roots, up to seventeen, but he went no farther; and as there are innumerable roots, the notion occurred to us of attempting to include them all under one name or class.

Soc. And did you find such a class?

Theaet. I think that we did; but I should like to have your opinion.

Soc. Let me hear.

Theaet. We divided all numbers into two classes; those which are made up of equal factors multiplying into one another, which we represented as squares and called squares, or equilateral numbers;—that was one class.

Soc. Very good.

Theaet. The intermediate numbers, such as three and five, and every other number which is made up of unequal factors, either of a greater multiplied by a less, or of a less multiplied by a greater, and when regarded as a figure, is contained in unequal sides;—all these we represented as oblong figures, and called them oblong numbers.

Soc. Capital; and what followed?

Theaet. The lines, or sides, which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the equilateral plane numbers, were called by us lengths or magnitudes; and the lines which are the roots of (or whose squares are equal to) the oblong numbers, were called powers or roots; the reason of this latter name being, that they are commensurable with the lines or sides not in linear measurement, but in the value of their squares; and the same about solids.

Soc. Excellent, my boy; I think that you fully justify the praises of Theodorus, and that he will not be found guilty of false witness.

Theaet. But I am unable, Socrates, to give you a similar answer about knowledge, which is what you appear to want; and therefore

Theodorus is a deceiver after all.

Soc. Well, but suppose that you were running a course, and some one said in praise of you, that he had never known any youth who was as good a runner, and afterwards you were beaten in a race by a grown-up man, who was a great runner—would his praise be any the less true?

Theaet. I do not say that.

Soc. And is the discovery of the nature of knowledge really a little matter, as I just now said, or one requiring great skill?

Theaet. Requiring the greatest, as I should say.

Soc. Well, then, be of good cheer; do not say that Theodorus was mistaken about you, but do your best to ascertain the true nature of knowledge, as well as of other things.

Theaet. I am eager enough, Socrates, if that would bring to light the truth.

Soc. Come, you made a good beginning just now; let your own answer about roots be your model, and as you comprehended them all in one class, try and bring the many sorts of knowledge under one name.

Theaet. I can assure you, Socrates, that I have tried very often, when I heard the questions which came from you; but I can neither persuade myself that I have any answer to give, nor hear of any one who answers as you would have me answer; and I cannot get rid of the desire to answer.

Soc. These are the pangs of labour, my dear Theaetetus; you have something within you which you are bringing to the birth.

Theaet. I do not know, Socrates; I only say what I feel.

Soc. And did you never hear, simpleton, that I am the son of a midwife, brave and burly, whose name was Phaenarete?

Theaet. Yes, I have heard that.

Soc. And that I myself practise midwifery?

Theaet. No, I never heard that.

Soc. Let me tell you that I do, though, my friend; but you must not reveal the secret, as the world in general have not found me out; and therefore they only say of me, that I am an exceedingly strange being, who drive men to their wits' end; did you ever hear that?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. Shall I tell you the reason?

Theaet. By all means.

Soc. I must make you understand the situation of the midwives,

and then you will see my meaning better:—No woman, as you are probably aware, who is still able to conceive and bear, attends other women, but only those who are past bearing.

Theaet. Yes, I know.

Soc. The reason of this is said to be that Artemis—the goddess of childbirth—is a virgin, and she honours those who are like herself; but she could not allow the barren to be midwives, because human nature cannot know the mystery of an art without experience; and therefore she assigned this office to those who by reason of age are past bearing, honouring them from their likeness to herself.

Theaet. That is natural.

Soc. And a natural, or rather necessary inference is, that the midwives know better than others who is pregnant and who is not?

Theaet. Very true.

Soc. And by the use of potions and incantations they are able to arouse the pangs and to soothe them at will; they can make those bear who have a difficulty in bearing, and if they choose they can smother the babe in the womb.

Theaet. They can.

Soc. Did you ever remark that they are also cunning match-makers, and have an entire knowledge of what unions are likely to produce a brave brood?

Theaet. I never heard of this.

Soc. Then let me tell you that this is their greatest pride, more than cutting the umbilical cord. And if you reflect, you will see that the same art which cultivates and gathers in the fruits of the earth, will be most likely to know in what soils the several plants or seeds should be deposited.

Theaet. Yes, the same art.

Soc. And do you suppose that this is otherwise in the case of women?

Theaet. No, that is not likely.

Soc. No, indeed; but the midwives, who are respectable women and have a character to lose, avoid this department of practice, because they are afraid of being called procuresses, which is a name given to those who join together man and woman in an unlawful and unscientific way; and yet the true midwife is also the true and only match-maker.

Theaet. That I understand.

Soc. Such are the midwives, whose work is a very important

one, but not so important as mine: for women do not bring into the world at one time real children, and at another time idols which are with difficulty distinguished from them; if they did, then the discernment of the true and false birth would be the crowning achievement of the art of midwifery—you would think that?

Theaet. Yes, I certainly should.

Soc. Well, my art of midwifery is in most respects like theirs; but the difference lies in this—that I attend men and not women, and I practise on their souls when they are in labour, and not on their bodies; and the triumph of my art is in examining whether the thought which the mind of the young man is bringing to the birth is a false idol or a noble and true creation. And like the midwives, I am barren, and the reproach which is often made against me, that I ask questions of others and have not the wit to answer them myself, is very just; the reason is, that the god compels me to be a midwife, but forbids me to bring forth. And therefore I am not myself wise, nor have I anything which is the invention or offspring of my own soul, but the way is this:—Some of those who converse with me, at first appear to be absolutely dull, yet afterwards, as our acquaintance ripens, if the god is gracious to them, they all of them make astonishing progress; and this not only in their own opinion but in that of others. There is clear proof that they have never learned anything of me, but they have acquired and discovered many noble things of themselves, although the god and I help to deliver them. And the proof is, that many of them in their ignorance, attributing all to themselves and despising me, either of their own accord or at the instigation of others, have gone away sooner than they ought; and the result has been that they have produced abortions by reason of their evil communications, or have lost the children of which I delivered them by an ill bringing up, deeming lies and shadows of more value than the truth; and they have at last ended by seeing themselves, as others see them, to be great fools. Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, is one of this sort, and there are many others. The truants often return to me, and beg that I would converse with them again—they are ready to go down on their knees—and then, if my familiar allows, which is not always the case, I receive them, and they begin to grow again. Dire are the pangs which my art is able to arouse and to allay in those who have intercourse with me, just like the pangs of women in childbirth; night and day they are full of perplexity and travail which is even worse than that of the women. So much for

them. And there are others, Theaetetus, who come to me apparently having nothing in them; and as I know that they have no need of my art, I coax them into another union, and by the grace of God I can generally tell who is likely to do them good. Many of them I have given away to Prodicus, and some to other inspired sages. I tell you this long story, friend Theaetetus, because I suspect, as indeed you seem to think yourself, that you are in labour—great with some conception. Come then to me, who am a midwife and the son of a midwife, and try to answer the question which I will ask you. And if I abstract and expose your first-born, because I discover upon inspection that the conception which you have formed is a vain shadow, do not quarrel with me on that account, as the manner of women is when their first children are taken from them. For I have actually known some who were ready to bite me when I deprived them of a darling folly; they did not perceive that I acted from goodwill, not knowing that no god is the enemy of man (that was not within the range of their ideas); neither am I their enemy in all this, but religion will never allow me to admit falsehood, or to stifle the truth. Once more, then Theaetetus, I repeat my old question, 'What is knowledge?' and do not say that you cannot tell; but quit yourself like a man, and by the help of God you will be able to tell.

Theaet. At any rate, Socrates, after such an exhortation I should be ashamed of not trying to do my best. And, according to my present notion, he who knows perceives what he knows, and therefore I should say that knowledge is perception.

Soc. Bravely said, boy; that is the way in which you should express your opinion. And now, suppose that you and I have an examination, and see whether this conception of yours is a true child or a mere wind-egg. And so you say that perception is knowledge?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. I think that you have delivered yourself of a very important doctrine about knowledge, which is indeed that of Protagoras, who has another way of expressing the same thing when he says, that man is the measure of all things, of the existence of things that are, and of the non-existence of things that are not:—You have read that?

Theaet. Yes, I have read that, again and again.

Soc. Does he not mean to say that things are to you such as they appear to you, and are to me such as they appear to me, for you and I are men?

Theaet. Yes, that is what he says.

Soc. Such a wise man has doubtless a meaning: let us try to understand him; the same wind is blowing, and yet one of us may be cold and the other not, or one may be slightly and the other very cold?

Theaet. Very true.

Soc. Now is the wind, regarded not in relation to us but absolutely, cold or not; or are we to say, with Protagoras, that the wind is cold to him who is cold, and not to him who is not?

Theaet. I suppose the last.

Soc. This is what appears to each of them?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And 'appears to him' means the same as 'he perceives'?

Theaet. True.

Soc. Then appearance and perception coincide in this instance of hot and cold, and in similar instances; for things appear, or may be supposed to be, to each one such as he perceives them?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. Then perception is always of existence, and being the same as knowledge is unerring?

Theaet. That is clear.

Soc. Now, I verily and indeed suspect that Protagoras, who was an almighty wise man, spoke these things in a parable to the common herd, like you and me, but he told the truth, 'his truth,' in secret to his own disciples.

Theaet. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I am about to speak of an illustrious philosophy, in which all things are said to be relative; you cannot rightly call anything by any name, such as great or small, or heavy or light, for the great will be small and the heavy light—there is no one or some or any sort of nature, but out of motion and change and admixture all things are becoming, which 'becoming' is by us incorrectly called being, but is really becoming, for nothing really is, but all things are becoming. Summon all philosophers—Protagoras, Heracleitus, Empedocles, and the rest of them, one after another, with the exception of Parmenides, and they will agree with you in this. Summon the great masters of either kind of poetry—Epicharmus, the prince of Comedy, and Homer of Tragedy; when the latter sings of

'Ocean the birth of gods, and mother Tethys,'

does he not mean that all things are the offspring of flux and motion?

Theaet. Yes, that is his meaning.

Soc. And who could take up arms against such a great army, and

Homer who is their general, and not be ridiculous?

Theaet. Who indeed, Socrates?

Soc. Yes, Theaetetus; and besides this there are plenty of proofs which will show that motion is the source of that which appears to be and becomes, and rest of not-being and destruction; for fire and warmth, which are supposed to be the parent and nurse of all other things, are born of friction, which is a kind of motion;— is not that the origin of fire?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And the race of animals is generated in the same way?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And is not the bodily habit spoiled by rest and idleness, but preserved for a long time by motion and exercise?

Theaet. True.

Soc. And is not this true of the mental habit also? Is not the soul informed, and improved, and preserved by thought and attention, which are motions; but when at rest, which in the soul means only want of thought and attention, is uninformed, and speedily forgets whatever she has learned?

Theaet. True.

Soc. Then motion is a good, and rest an evil, both of the soul and of the body?

Theaet. True.

Soc. I may affirm, also, that the breathless calm and stillness and the like are wasting and impairing, and wind and storm preserving; and the palmary argument of all, which I strongly urge is the golden chain in Homer, by which he means the sun, thus indicating that while the sun and the heavens go round, and all things human and divine are and are preserved, but if the sun were to be arrested in his course, then all things would be destroyed, and, as the saying is, Chaos would come again.

Theaet. I believe, Socrates, that you have truly explained his meaning.

Soc. Then apply this to perception, my good friend, and first of all to vision; that which you call white colour is not in your eyes, and is not a distinct thing which exists out of them, having no assignable place; for that would imply order and rest, and there would be no process of generation.

Theaet. Then what is colour?

Soc. Let us carry out the principle which has just been affirmed,

that nothing is self-existent, and then we shall see that every colour, white, black, and every other colour, arises out of the eye meeting the appropriate motion, and that what we term the substance of each colour is neither the active nor the passive element, but something which passes between them, and is peculiar to each percipient; are you certain that the several colours appear to every animal—say to a dog—as they appear to you?

Theaet. Indeed I am not.

Soc. Or that anything appears the same to you as to another man? Would you not rather question whether you yourself see the same thing at different times, because you are never exactly the same?

Theaet. I should.

Soc. And if that with which I compare myself in size, or which I apprehended, were great or white or hot, it could not without actually changing become different by mere contact with another; nor again, if the apprehending or comparing subject were great or white or hot, could this, when unchanged from within, become changed by any approximation or affection of any other thing. For already, my friend, we see that there are most ridiculous and wonderful contradictions into which we are only too readily falling, as Protagoras and all who take his line of argument would remark.

Theaet. How is that, and what sort of contradictions do you mean?

Soc. A little instance will sufficiently explain my meaning: Here are six dice, which are a third more when compared with four, and fewer by a half than twelve—they are more and also fewer—that cannot be denied either by you or by any one.

Theaet. True.

Soc. Well, then suppose that Protagoras or some one asks whether anything can become greater or more if not by increasing, how would you answer him, Theaetetus?

Theaet. I should say no, Socrates, if I were to speak my mind in reference to this last question, and if I were not afraid of contradicting my former answer.

Soc. By Hera, well and divinely said, my friend. And if you reply 'yes,' there will be a case for Euripides; 'for our tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind.'

Theaet. Very true.

Soc. The thoroughbred Sophists, who know all that can be known about the mind, and argue only out of the superfluity of their

wits, would have had a regular sparring-match over this. But you and I, who have no professional aims, only desire to see what is the real nature of our ideas, and whether they are consistent with each other or not.

Theaet. Yes, that is what I should wish.

Soc. And I as much as you. And as this is our feeling, and there is no hurry, why should we not gently and patiently review our own thoughts, and examine and see what these appearances in us really are? Concerning which, if I am not mistaken, we shall say:—first, that nothing can be greater or less, either in number or magnitude, while remaining equal to itself—you will allow that?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. Secondly, that without addition or subtraction there is no increase or diminution of anything, but only equality.

Theaet. Quite true.

Soc. Thirdly, that what once was not and afterwards was, could not be without becoming or having become.

Theaet. Yes, truly.

Soc. These three axioms, if I am not mistaken, were fighting with one another in our minds in the case of the dice, or, again, in such a case as this—when I say that I, at my age, who neither gain nor lose in height, may this year be taller than you, who are still a youth, and next year not so tall—not that I have lost, but that you have increased: in such a case, I am afterwards what I once was not; and yet I have not become, for I could not have become taller without becoming—that is certain—any more than I could have become less without losing somewhat of my height; and I could give you ten thousand examples of similar contradictions, if we admit them at all. I believe that you understand me, Theaetetus; for I suspect that you have thought of these questions before.

Theaet. Yes, Socrates, and I am amazed when I think of them; indeed I am; and I want to know what is the meaning of them, and there are times when my head quite swims with the contemplation of them.

Soc. I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder; he was not a bad genealogist who said that Iris the messenger of heaven is the child of Thaumas (wonder). But do you know what is the explanation of this perplexity on the hypothesis

which we attribute to Protagoras?

Theaet. Not as yet.

Soc. Then you will be obliged to me if I help you to unearth the hidden truth or wisdom of a famous man or men.

Theaet. Certainly, I shall be very greatly obliged.

Soc. Take a look around, then, and see that none of the uninitiated are listening. Now by the uninitiated I mean the people who believe in nothing but what they can hold fast in their hands, and who will not allow that action and generation and all that is invisible can have any real existence.

Theaet. Yes, indeed, Socrates, they are very stubborn and repulsive mortals.

Soc. Yes, my boy, outer barbarians. Far more ingenious are the brethren whose mysteries I am about to reveal to you. Their principle is, that all is motion, and upon this all the affections of which we were just now speaking are supposed to depend; there is nothing but motion, which has two forms, one active and the other passive, both in endless number, and out of the union and friction of them there is generated a progeny in endless number, having two forms, sense and the object of sense, which are ever breaking forth at the same moment and coming to the birth. The senses are variously named hearing, seeing, smelling; there is the sense of heat, cold, pleasure, pain, desire, fear, and many more which are named, and there are innumerable others which have no name; and there are all sorts of colours of a nature akin to the sight, and of sounds akin to the hearing, and other objects of sense which are akin to the several senses. Do you see, Theaetetus, the bearing of this tale on the preceding arguments?

Theaet. Indeed I do not.

Soc. Then attend, in the hope that there may be an end. The meaning is that all these things are in motion, as I was saying, and that this motion has degrees of swiftness or slowness; and the slower elements have their motions in the same place and about things near them, and thus beget, but the things begotten are quicker, for their motions are from place to place. Apply this to sense:—When the eye and the appropriate object meet together and give birth to whiteness and sensation of white, which could not have been given by either of them going to any other object, then, while the sight is flowing from the eye and whiteness from the colour-producing element, the eye becomes fulfilled with sight, and sees, and becomes,

not sight, but a seeing eye: the object which combines in forming the colour is fulfilled with whiteness, and becomes not whiteness but white, whether wood or stone, or whatever the object may be which happens to be coloured white. And this is true of all sensations, hard, warm, and the like, which are similarly to be regarded, as I was saying before, not as having any absolute existence, but as being all of them generated by motion in their intercourse with one another, according to their kinds; for of the agent and patient, taken singly, as they say, no fixed idea can be framed, for the agent has no existence until united with the patient, and the patient has no existence until united with the agent; and that which unites with anything and is an agent, when meeting with another thing, is converted into a patient. And out of all this, as I said at first, there arises a general reflection, which is, that there is no one or self-existent thing, but everything is becoming and in relation; and being has to be altogether abolished, although custom and ignorance may compel us to retain the use of the word. But philosophers tell us that we are not to allow either the word 'something,' or 'belonging to something,' or 'to me,' or 'this' or 'that,' or any other detaining name to be used; in the language of nature all things are being created and destroyed, coming into being and passing into new forms; nor can any name fix or detain them; he who attempts to fix them is easily refuted. And this should be the way of speaking, not only of particulars but of aggregates; such aggregates as are expressed in the word 'man,' or 'stone,' or any name of an animal or of a class. O Theaetetus, are not these speculations charming? And do you not like the taste of them?

Theaet. I do not know what to say, Socrates; for, indeed, I cannot make out whether you are giving your own opinion or only wanting to draw me out.

Soc. Do you not remember, my friend, that I neither know, nor pretend to know, anything of myself; I am barren, and attend on you as a midwife, and this is why I soothe you, and offer you samples of one philosopher after another, that you may taste them. And I hope that I may at last help to bring your own opinion into the light of day; when this has been accomplished, then we will determine whether what you have brought forth is only a wind-egg or a real and genuine creation. Therefore, keep up your spirits, and answer like a man what you think.

Theaet. Ask me.

Soc. Is your opinion that nothing is but what becomes? the good and the noble, as well as all the other things which we were mentioning?

Theaet. When I hear you discoursing in this style, I think that there is a great deal in what you say, and I am very ready to assent.

Soc. Let us not leave the argument unfinished, then; as there still remains to be considered an objection which may be raised about dreams and diseases, in particular about madness, and the various illusions of hearing and sight, or any other misapprehension. For you know that in all these cases the theory of the truth of perception appears to be unmistakably refuted, as in dreams and illusions we certainly have false perceptions; and far from saying that everything is which appears, we should rather say that nothing is which appears.

Theaet. That is very true, Socrates.

Soc. But then, my boy, how can any one assert that knowledge is perception, or that things are to each one as they appear?

Theaet. I am afraid to say, Socrates, that I have nothing to answer, because you rebuked me just now for saying that; but I certainly cannot undertake to argue that madmen or dreamers think truly, when they imagine some of them that they are gods, and others that they can fly, and are flying in their sleep.

Soc. Do you know that there is a question which is raised about all these errors, and especially about waking and sleeping?

Theaet. What question?

Soc. A question which I think that you must often have heard persons ask:—How can you prove whether at this moment we are sleeping, and all our thoughts are a dream; or whether we are awake, and talking to one another in the waking state?

Theaet. Indeed, Socrates, I do not know how you can prove that the one is any more true than the other, for all the phenomena correspond; and there is no difficulty in supposing that we have now been talking to one another in our sleep; and when in a dream we seem to be telling thoughts which are only dreams, the resemblance of the two state is quite astonishing.

Soc. You see, then, that there is no difficulty in raising a doubt, since there may even be a doubt whether we are awake or in a dream. And as the time is equally divided in which we are asleep or awake, in either sphere of existence the soul contends that the thoughts which are present to our minds at the time are true; and, during one

half of our lives we affirm the truth of the one, and, during the other half, of the other; and are equally confident of both.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And may not the same be said of madness and other disorders? the difference is only that the times are not equal.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And are truth or falsehood to be determined by duration of time?

Theaet. That would be in many ways ridiculous.

Soc. But can you certainly determine in any other way which of these opinions is true?

Theaet. I do not think that I can.

Soc. Listen, then, to a statement of the other side of the argument, which is made by the champions of appearance. They would say, as I should imagine:—Can that which is wholly other, have any similar quality or power? and observe, Theaetetus, that the word ‘other’ means not ‘partially,’ but ‘wholly other.’

Theaet. Certainly, that which is wholly other cannot have anything either potentially or in any way which is the same.

Soc. And must therefore be admitted to be unlike?

Theaet. True.

Soc. If, then, anything happens to become like or unlike itself or another, that which becomes like we call the same—that which becomes unlike, other?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Were we not saying that there are agents many and infinite, and patients many and infinite?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And also that different combinations will produce results which are not the same, but different?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Let us take you and me, or anything as an example:—there is Socrates in health, and Socrates sick—Are they like or unlike?

Theaet. You mean to compare Socrates in health as a whole, and Socrates in sickness as a whole?

Soc. Exactly; that is my meaning.

Theaet. I answer, that are unlike.

Soc. And if unlike, they are other?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And would you not say the same of Socrates sleeping and

waking, or in any of the states which we were mentioning?

Theaet. I should.

Soc. All agents whose nature is to act upon others, have a different patient in Socrates, accordingly as he is well or ill?

Theaet. Of course.

Soc. And I, who am the patient, and that which is the agent, will produce something different in each of the two cases?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. The wine which I drink when I am in health, appears sweet and pleasant to me?

Theaet. True.

Soc. For, as has been already acknowledged, the patient and agent meet together and produce sweetness and a perception of sweetness, which are in simultaneous motion, and the perception which comes from the patient makes the tongue percipient, and the quality of sweetness which arises out of and is moving about the wine, makes the wine both to be and to appear sweet to the healthy tongue.

Theaet. Certainly; that has been already acknowledged.

Soc. But when I am sick, the wine really acts upon me as if I were another and a different person?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. The combination of the draught of wine, and the Socrates who is sick, produces quite another result; which is the sensation of bitterness in the tongue, and the motion and creation of bitterness in the wine, which becomes not bitterness but bitter; as I myself become not perception but percipient?

Theaet. True.

Soc. There is no other object of which I shall ever have the same perception, for another object would imply another perception, and would make the percipient other and different; nor can that object which affects me meeting another subject, produce the same or become similar, for that too will produce another result from another subject, and become different.

Theaet. True.

Soc. Neither can I for myself, have this sensation, nor the object by or for itself, this quality.

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. When I perceive I must become percipient of something—there can be no such thing as perceiving and perceiving nothing; the quality of the object, whether sweet, bitter, or any other quality,

must have relation to a perception; there cannot be anything sweet which is sweet to no one.

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. Then the inference is, that we [the agent and patient] are or become in relation to one another; there is a law which binds us one to the other, but not to any other existence, nor yet to ourselves; and therefore we can only be bound to one another; so that whether a person says that a thing is or becomes, he must say that it is or becomes to or of or in relation to something else; but he must not say that anything is or becomes absolutely, or allow any one else to say this: that is the conclusion.

Theaet. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Then, if that which acts upon me has relation to me and to no other, I and no other am the percipient of it?

Theaet. Of course.

Soc. Then my perception is true to me, and is always a part of my being; and as Protagoras says, to myself I am judge of what is and what is not to me.

Theaet. That seems to be true.

Soc. How then, if I never err, and if my mind never trips in the conception of being or becoming, can I fail of knowing that which I perceive?

Theaet. You cannot.

Soc. Then you were quite right in affirming that knowledge is only perception; and the meaning turns out to be the same, whether with Homer and Heracleitus, and all that company, you say that all is motion and flux, or with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things; or with Theaetetus, that, supposing all this, perception is knowledge. Am I not right, Theaetetus, and may I not say that this is your new-born child, of which I have delivered you—What say you.

Theaet. I cannot but agree, Socrates.

Soc. Then this is the child, however he may turn out, which you and I have with difficulty brought into the world. And now that he is born, we must carry him round the hearth and see whether he is worth rearing, or is only a wind-egg and a sham. Is he to be reared in any case, and not exposed? or will you bear to see an assault made upon him, and not get into a passion if I take away your first-born?

Theod. Theaetetus will not be angry, for he is very good-na-

tured. But I should like to know, Socrates, by heaven I should, whether you mean to say that all this is untrue?

Sos. You are fond of an argument, Theodorus, and now you innocently fancy that I am a bag full of arguments, and can easily pull one out which will prove the reverse of all this. But you do not see that in reality none of these arguments come from me; they all come from him who talks with me. I only know just enough to extract them from the wisdom of another, and to receive them in a spirit of fairness. And now I shall say nothing of myself, but shall endeavor to elicit something from our friend.

Theod. Do as you say, Socrates; that will be the best way.

Soc. Shall I tell you, Theodorus, what amazes me in your acquaintance Protagoras?

Theod. What is that?

Soc. I say nothing against his doctrine, that what appears is to each one, but I wonder that he did not begin his great work on Truth with declaration that a pig or a dog-faced baboon, or some other stranger monster which has sensation, is the measure of all things; then, when we were reverencing him as a god, he might have condescended to inform us that he was no wiser than a tadpole, and did not even aspire to be a man—would not this have produced an overpowering effect? For if truth is only sensation, and one man's discernment is as good as another's, and no man has any superior right to determine whether the opinion of any other is true or false, but each man, as we have several times repeated, is to himself the sole judge, and everything that he judges is true and right, why should Protagoras be preferred to the place of wisdom and instruction, and deserve to be well paid, and we poor ignoramuses have to go to him, if each one is the measure of his own wisdom? Must he not be talking 'ad captandum' in all this? I say nothing of the ridiculous predicament in which my own midwifery and the whole art of dialectic is placed; for the attempt to supervise or refute the notions or opinions of others would be a tedious and enormous piece of folly, if to each man they are equally right; and this must be the case if Protagoras' Truth is the real truth, and the philosopher is not merely amusing himself by giving oracles out of the shrine of his book.

Theod. He was a friend of mine, Socrates, as you were saying, and therefore I cannot have him refuted by my lips, nor can I oppose you when I agree with you; please, then, to take Theaetetus again; he seemed to answer you very nicely.

Soc. If you were to go into a Lacedaemonian palestra, Theodorus, would you have a right to look on at the naked wrestlers, some of them making a poor figure, if you did not strip and give them an opportunity of judging of your own form?

Theod. Why not, Socrates, if they would allow me, as I think you will, in consideration of my age and stiffness; let more supple youth try a fall with you, and do not drag me into the gymnasium.

Soc. Your will is my will, Theodorus, as the proverbial philosophers say, and therefore I will return to the sage Theaetetus. Tell me, Theaetetus, in reference to what I was saying, are you not amazed at finding yourself all of a sudden raised to the level of the wisest of men, or indeed of the gods?—for you would assume the measure of Protagoras to apply to the gods as well as men?

Theaet. Certainly I should, and I am amazed, as you say. At first hearing, I was quite satisfied with the doctrine, that whatever appears is to each one, but now the face of things has changed.

Soc. Why, my dear boy, you are young, and your ear is quickly caught and your mind influenced by popular arguments. Protagoras, or some one speaking on his behalf, will doubtless say in reply,—Good people, young and old, you meet and harangue, and bring in the gods, the question of whose existence or non-existence I banish from writing or speech, or you talk about the reason of man being degraded to the level of the brutes, which is a telling argument with the multitude, but not one word of proof or demonstration do you offer. All is probability with you, and yet surely you and Theodorus had better reflect whether you are disposed to admit of probability and figures of speech in matters of such importance. He or any other geometrician who argued from probabilities and likelihoods in geometry, would not be worth an ace.

Theaet. Neither you nor we, Socrates, would reckon that fair.

Soc. Then you and Theodorus mean to say that we must view the matter in some other way?

Theaet. Yes, in quite another way.

Soc. And the way will be to ask whether sensation is or is not the same as knowledge; for this was the real point of our argument, and with a view to this we raised (did we not?) those many strange questions.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Shall we say that we know all that which we see and hear? for example shall we say that not having learned, we do not know

the language of foreigners when they speak to us? or shall we say that hearing them, we also know what they are saying? or suppose that we see letters which we do not understand, shall we say that we do not see them? or shall we maintain that, seeing them, we must know them?

Theaet. We shall say, Socrates, that we know that which we actually see and hear of them—that is to say, we see and know the figure and colour of the letters, and we hear and know the elevation or depression of the sound of them; but we do not perceive by sight and hearing, or know, that which grammarians and interpreters teach about them.

Soc. Capital, Theaetetus, I shall not dispute that, as I want you to grow; but there is another difficulty coming, which you will also have to repulse.

Theaet. What is that?

Soc. Some one will say,—Can a man who has ever known anything, and still has and preserves a memory of that which he knows, not know that which he remembers at the time when he remembers? I have, I fear, a tedious way of putting a simple question, which is only, whether a man who has learned, and remembers, can fail to know?

Theaet. That, Socrates, would be impossible and absurd.

Soc. Am I dreaming, then? Think: is not seeing perceiving, and is not sight perception?

Theaet. True.

Soc. And if our recent definition holds, every man knows that which he has seen?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And you would admit that there is such a thing as memory?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And is memory of something or of nothing?

Theaet. Of something, surely.

Soc. Of things learned and perceived, that is?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Often a man remembers that which he has seen?

Theaet. True.

Soc. And if he closed his eyes, would he forget?

Theaet. That, Socrates, would indeed be an absurd thing to affirm.

Soc. And yet that must be affirmed, if the previous argument

is to be maintained.

Theaet. How is that? I am not quite sure that I see your meaning, though I have a strong suspicion that you are right. Will you explain how this is?

Soc. As thus: he who sees knows, as we say, that which he sees; for perception and sight and knowledge are supposed to be all the same.

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. But he who saw, and has knowledge of that which he saw, remembers, when he closes his eyes, that which he no longer sees.

Theaet. True.

Soc. And seeing is knowing, and therefore not seeing is not knowing?

Theaet. That is true.

because he does not see; and this has been affirmed by us to be an

Soc. Then the inference is, that a man may have attained the knowledge of something, which he may remember and yet not know, absurdity.

Theaet. That is very true.

Soc. Thus, then, the assertion that knowledge and perception are one, involves a manifest impossibility?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. Then they must be distinguished?

Theaet. I suppose that they must.

Soc. Once more we shall have to begin, and ask 'What is knowledge?' and yet, Theaetetus, what are we going to do?

Theaet. About what?

Soc. After the manner of disputers, we drew inferences from words, and were well pleased if in this way we could gain an advantage. And, although professing not to be mere Eristics, but philosophers, I suspect that we have unconsciously fallen into the error of that ingenious class of persons.

Theaet. I do not as yet understand you.

Soc. Then I will try to explain myself: just now we asked the question, whether a man who had learned and remembered could fail to know, and we showed that a person who had seen might remember when he had his eyes shut and could not see, and then he would at the same time remember and not know. But this was an impossibility, and so the Protagorean fable came to nought, and yours also, who maintain that knowledge is the same as perception.

Theaet. True.

Soc. And yet, my friend, I do not suppose that this would have been the result if Protagoras, who was the father of the first of the two brats, had been alive; he would have had a great deal to say for himself. But he is dead, and we insult over his orphan child; and even the guardians whom he left, and of whom Theodorus is one, are unwilling to give any help, and therefore I suppose that I must take up his cause myself, and see justice done.

Theod. Not I, Socrates, but rather Callias, the son of Hipponicus, is guardian of his orphans. I was too soon diverted from the abstractions of dialectic to geometry. Nevertheless I shall be grateful to you if you assist him.

Soc. Very good, Theodorus; you shall see how I will come to the rescue. If a person does not attend to the meaning of the terms which are commonly used in argument, he may be involved even in greater paradoxes than these. Shall I explain this to you or to Theaetetus?

Theod. To both of us, and let the younger answer; he will incur less disgrace if he is discomforted.

Soc. Then now let me ask the awful question, which is this:—Can a man know and also not know that which he knows?

Theod. How shall we answer that, Theaetetus?

Theaet. That appears to me to be impossible.

Soc. Quite possible, if you maintain that seeing is knowing. When you are caught in a well, as they say, and the self-assured adversary closes one of your eyes with his hand, and asks whether you can see his cloak with the eye which he has closed, how will you answer the inevitable man?

Theaet. I should answer, not with that eye but with the other.

Soc. Then you see and do not see the same thing at the same time?

Theaet. Yes, in a certain sense.

Soc. I do not say anything about that, he will reply; I do not ask 'in what sense you know,' but only whether you know that which you do not know. You have been proved to see that which you do not see; and you have already admitted that seeing is knowing, and that not seeing is not knowing: I leave you to draw the inference.

Theaet. Yes; the inference is the contradictory of my assertion.

Soc. Yes, my marvel, and there may be yet worse things in store for you: an opponent will ask whether you can have a sharp and also

a dull knowledge, and whether you can know near, but not at a distance, or know the same thing with more or less intensity, and so on without end. When you took up the position, that sense is knowledge, there was lying in wait a light-armed mercenary, who argues for pay; he will dart from his ambush, and make his assault upon hearing, smelling, and the other senses;—he will show you no mercy; and while you are wondering at his enviable wisdom, he will have got you into his net, out of which you will not escape, until you have come to an understanding about the sum which is to be paid for your release. Well, you say, and how will Protagoras reinforce his position? Shall I answer for him?

Theaet. By all means.

Soc. After touching on the points which I have mentioned in defending him, he will close with us in disdain, and say:—The worthy Socrates asked a little boy, whether the same man could remember and not know the same thing, and the boy said no, because he was frightened, and could not see what was coming, and then Socrates made a fool of me. The truth is, O most incapable Socrates, that when you ask questions about any assertion of mine, and the person asked is found tripping, if he has answered as I should have answered, then I am refuted, but if he answers what I should not have answered, he is refuted and not I. For do you suppose that any one would admit the memory of a feeling afterwards to be the same as the feeling was at the time? Certainly not. Or that he would hesitate to acknowledge that the same man may know and not know the same thing at the same time? Or, if he is afraid of granting this, would he grant that one who has become unlike was the same as before he became unlike? Or would he admit that a man is one at all, and not rather many and infinite, as the changes which take place in him? I speak by the card in order to avoid entanglements of words. But O, my good sir, he will say, come to the point in a more generous spirit; and either show, if you can, that our sensations are not relative and individual, or, if you admit that they are individual, prove that this does not involve the consequence that the appearance becomes, or, if you like to say, is, to the individual only. As to your talk about pigs and baboons, you are yourself a pig, and you make my writings the sport of other swine, which is not right. For I declare that the truth is as I have written, and that each of us is a measure of existence and of non-existence. Yet one man may be a thousand times better than another in proportion as things are and

appear different to him. And I am far from saying that wisdom and the wise man have no existence; but I say that the wise man is he who makes the evils which appear and are to a man, into goods which are and appear to him. And I would beg you not to press my words in the letter, but to take the meaning of them as I will explain them. Remember how I said before, that to the sick man his food appears to be and is bitter, and to the man in health the opposite of bitter. Now I cannot conceive that one of these men can be or ought to be made wiser than the other; nor can you assert that the sick man because he has one impression is foolish, and the healthy man because he has another is wise; but the one state requires to be changed into the other, the worse into the better. As in education, a change of state has to be effected, and the sophist accomplishes by words the change which the physician works by the aid of drugs. Not that any one ever made another think truly, who previously thought falsely. For no one can think what is not, or think anything different from that which he feels, and which is always true. But as the inferior habit of mind has thoughts of a kindred nature, so I conceive that a good mind causes men to have good thoughts; and these which the inexperienced call true, I maintain to be only better, and not truer than others. And, O my dear Socrates, I do not call wise men tadpoles; far otherwise; I say that they are the physicians of the human body, and the husbandmen of plants—for the husbandmen also take away the evil and disordered sensations of plants, and infuse into them good and healthy sensations as well as true ones; and the wise and good rhetoricians make the good instead of the evil, both in appearance and in reality. And the sophist who is able to train his pupils in this spirit is a wise man, and deserves to be well paid by them. And in this way one man is wiser than another; and yet no one thinks falsely, and you, whether you will or not, must endure to be a measure. This is my argument, which you, Socrates, may, if you please, overthrow by an opposite argument, or if you like you may put questions to me, (no intelligent person will object to the method of questions,—quite the reverse.) But I must beg you to put fair questions: for there is great inconsistency in saying that you have a zeal for virtue, and then always behaving unfairly in argument. The unfairness of which I complain is that you never distinguish between mere disputation and dialectic: the disputer may trip up his opponent as often as he likes, and make fun; but the dialectician will be in earnest, and only correct his adversary when

necessary, telling him the errors into which he has fallen through his own fault, or that of the company which he has previously kept. If you do this, he will lay the blame of his own confusion and perplexity on himself, and not on you. He will follow and love you, and will hate himself, and escape from himself into philosophy, in order that he may become different and get rid of his former self. But the other mode of arguing, which is practised by the many, will have just the opposite effect upon him; and as he grows older, instead of turning philosopher, he will learn to hate philosophy. I would recommend you, therefore, as I said before, not to encourage yourself in this polemical and controversial temper, but to find out, in a friendly and congenial spirit, what we really mean when we say that all things are in motion, and that what appears is to individuals and states. In this way you will see whether knowledge and sensation are the same or different, but not by arguing, as you are doing, from the customary use of names and words, which the vulgar pervert in all manner of ways, causing infinite perplexity to one another. Such, Theodorus, is the very slight help which I am able to offer to your old friend; had he been living, he would have helped himself in a far grander style.

Theod. You are jesting, Socrates; indeed, your defense of him has been most valorous.

Soc. Thank you, friend; and I hope that you observed Protagoras bidding us be serious, as the text, 'man is the measure of all things,' was a solemn one; and he reproached us with making a boy the medium of discourse, and said that the boy's timidity was made to tell against his argument, he also complained that we made a joke of him.

Theod. Of course I observed that, Socrates.

Soc. Well, and shall we do as he says?

Theod. By all means.

Soc. But if his wishes are to be regarded, you and I must take up his argument in good earnest, and ask and answer one another, for you see that the rest of us are all boys. That is the only way in which we can escape his imputation, that we are making fun of him, and examining his thesis with boys.

Theod. Well, and is not Theaetetus better able to follow a philosophical enquiry than a great many men who have long beards?

Soc. Yes, Theodorus, but not better than you; and therefore please not to imagine that you are to leave in my exclusive charge

the care of your departed friend. At any rate, my good friend, do not sheer off until we know whether you are the true measure of diagrams, or whether all men are equally measures and sufficient for themselves in astronomy and geometry, and other branches of knowledge in which you are supposed to excel them.

Theod. He who is your companion, Socrates, will not easily avoid being drawn into an argument; and I am afraid that when I said that you would excuse me, and not like the Lacedaemonians, compel me to strip and fight, I said a stupid thing—I should rather compare you to Scirrhon, who threw travellers from the rocks; for the Lacedaemonian rule is, strip or depart,' but your method of proceeding is more after the fashion of Antaeus: you will not allow any one who approaches you to depart until you have stripped him, and he has tried a fall with you in argument.

Soc. I see, Theodorus, that you perfectly apprehend the nature of my complaint; but I am even more pugnacious than the giants of old, for I have met with no end of heroes; many a Heracles, many a Theseus, mighty in words, have broken my head; nevertheless I am always at this rough game, which inspires me like a passion. Please, then, to indulge me with a trial, for your own edification as well as mine.

Theod. I consent; lead me whither you will, for I know that you are like destiny; nor can any man escape from any argument which you may weave for him; but I am not disposed to go further than you suggest.

Soc. That will satisfy me; and now take particular care that we do not again unwittingly expose ourselves to the reproach of talking childishly.

Theod. I will try to avoid that error, as far as I am able.

Soc. In the first place, let us return to our old objection, and see whether we were right in blaming and taking offense at Protagoras on the ground that he assumed all to be equal and sufficient in wisdom; although he admitted that there was a better and worse, and that in respect of this, some excelled others, and these, as he said, were the wise.

Theod. That is true.

Soc. Then let us obtain from his own statement, in the fewest words possible, the basis of agreement.

Theod. How will you do that?

Soc. In this way:—His words are, that, 'to whom a thing seems,

that which seems is.

Theod. Yes, that is what he says.

Soc. And are not we, Protagoras, uttering the opinion of man, or rather of all mankind, when we say that every man thinks himself wiser than other men in some things, and their inferior in others? And in the hour of danger, when they are in perils of war, or of the sea, or of sickness, do they not look up to their commanders as gods, and expect salvation from them, only because they excel them in knowledge? Is not the world full of men in their several employments, who are looking for teachers and rulers of themselves and of the animals? and there are plenty who think that they are able to teach and able to rule. Now, in all this is implied that ignorance and wisdom exist among them, at least in their own opinion.

Theod. Certainly.

Soc. And wisdom is assumed by them to be truth. and ignorance falsehood?

Theod. Exactly.

Soc. How then, Protagoras, would you have us treat the argument? Shall we say that men have always true opinions, or sometimes true and sometimes false opinions? In either case, the result is that they have opinions which are not always true, but sometimes true and sometimes false. For tell me, Theodorus, do you suppose that any friend of Protagoras, or you yourself, would contend that no one deems another ignorant or mistaken in his opinion?

Theod. The thing is incredible, Socrates.

Soc. And yet that absurdity is necessarily involved in the thesis, that man is the measure of all things.

Theod. How is that?

Soc. Why, suppose that you determine in your own mind something to be true, and declare your opinion to me; let us assume, as he says, that this is true to you. Now, may not the rest of us be the judges of this opinion or judgment of yours, or do we think that you have always a true opinion? Are there not thousands upon thousands who, whenever you form a judgment, take up arms and have an opposite judgment and opinion, deeming that you judge falsely?

Theod. Yes, indeed, Socrates, thousands and tens of thousands, as Homer says, who give me a world of trouble.

Soc. And will you assert, in that case, that what you say is true to you and false to the ten thousand others?

Theod. That is the only inference.

Soc. And what is to be said of Protagoras himself? If neither he nor the multitude thought, as indeed they do not think, that man is the measure of all things, then the truth of which Protagoras wrote would be true to no one. But if you suppose that he himself thought this, and that the multitude does not agree with him, in the first place you will have to allow that the degree in which his truth is or is not true, depends upon the number of the suffrages.

Theod. That would follow if the truth is supposed to vary with individual opinion.

Soc. And the best of the joke is, that he acknowledges the truth of their opinion who believe his opinion to be false; for in admitting that the opinions of all men are true, in effect he grants that the opinion of his opponents is true.

Theod. Certainly.

Soc. And does he not allow that his own opinion is false, if he admits that the opinion of those who think him false is true?

Theod. That is inevitable.

Soc. But the other side do not admit that they speak falsely.

Theod. They do not.

Soc. And he, as may be inferred from his writings, agrees that this opinion is also true.

Theod. Clearly.

Soc. Then all mankind, including Protagoras, will contend, or rather, I should say that he will allow, when he concedes that his adversary has a true opinion—Protagoras, I say, will himself allow that neither dog nor any ordinary man is the measure of anything which he has not learned—am I not right?

Theod. Yes.

Soc. And the truth of Protagoras being doubted by all, will be true neither to himself nor to any one else?

Theod. I think, Socrates, that we are running my old friend too hard.

Soc. But I do not know that we are going beyond the truth. Doubtless, as he is older, he may be expected to be wiser than we are. And if he could only just get his head out of the world below, he would give both of us a sound basting—me for quibbling, and you for accepting my quibbles, and be off and underground again in a twinkling. But as he is not within call, we must make the best use of our own faculties, such as they are, and say honestly

what we think; and one thing which every man thinks is, that there are great differences in the understanding of men.

Theod. In that opinion I quite agree.

Soc. And is there not most likely to be firm ground in that distinction which we drew on behalf of Protagoras, viz. that immediate sensations, such as hot, dry, sweet, are in general only such as they appear, but that if judgments are allowed to differ at all, this certainty of sensation cannot be extended to the knowledge of health or disease, which every woman, child, or living creature is by no means able to cure, neither have they any perception of what is wholesome for themselves; and that in this, if in anything, the difference in different men will appear?

Theod. I quite agree in that.

Soc. Again, in politics, while affirming that right and wrong, honourable and disgraceful, holy and unholy, are in reality to each state such as the state thinks and makes lawful, and that in determining these matters no individual or state is wiser than another, still the followers of Protagoras will not deny that in determining the sphere of expediency one counsellor is better than another, and one state wiser than another; they will scarcely venture to maintain, that what a city deems expedient will always be really expedient. But in the other case, I mean when they speak of justice and injustice, piety and impiety, they are confident that these have no natural or essential basis—the truth is that which is agreed on at the time of the agreement, and as long as the agreement lasts; and this is the philosophy of many who do not altogether go along with Protagoras. Here is a new question offering, Theodorus, which is likely to be still longer than the last.

Theod. Well, Socrates, we have plenty of leisure.

Soc. That is true, and your remark recalls to my mind an observation which I have often made, that those who have passed their days in the pursuit of philosophy are ridiculously at fault when they have to appear and plead in court. How natural is this!

Theod. What do you mean?

Soc. I mean to say, that those who from their youth upwards have been knocking about in the courts and such like places, compared with those who have received a philosophical education, are slaves, and the others are freemen.

Theod. In what is the difference seen?

Soc. In the leisure of which you were speaking, and which a

freeman can always command; he has his talk out in peace, and, like ourselves, wanders at will from one subject to another, and from a second to a third, if his fancy prefers a new one, caring not whether his words are many or few; his only aim is to attain the truth. But the lawyer is always in a hurry; there is the water of the clepsydra driving him on, and not allowing him to expatiate at will; and there is his adversary standing over him, enforcing his rights; the affidavit, which in their phraseology is termed the brief, is recited; and from this he must not deviate. He is a servant, and is disputing about a fellow-servant before his master, who is seated, and has the cause in his hands; the trial is never about some indifferent matter, but always concerns himself; and often he has to run for his life. The consequence has been, that he has become keen and shrewd; he has learned how to flatter his master in word and indulge him in deed; but his soul is small and unrighteous. His slavish condition has deprived him of growth and uprightness and independence; dangers and fears, which were too much for his truth and honesty, came upon him in early years, when the tenderness of youth was unequal to them, and he has been driven into crooked ways; from the first he has practised deception and retaliation, and has become stunted and warped. And so he has passed out of youth into manhood, having no soundness in him; and is now, as he thinks, a master in wisdom. Such is the lawyer, Theodorus. Will you have the companion picture of the philosopher, who is of our brotherhood; or shall we return to the argument? Do not let us abuse the freedom of digression which we claim.

Theod. Nay, Socrates, let us finish what we were about; for you truly said that we belong to a brotherhood which is free, and are not the servants of the argument; but the argument is our servant, and must wait our leisure. Where is the judge or spectator who has a right to censure or control us, as he might the poets?

Soc. Then, as this is your wish, I will describe the leaders; for there is no use in talking about the inferior sort. In the first place, the lords of philosophy have never, from their youth upwards, known their way to the Agora, or the dicastery, or the council, or any other political assembly; they neither see nor hear the laws or votes of the state written or spoken; the eagerness of political societies in the attainment of offices — clubs, and banquets, and revels, and singing-maidens, do not enter even into their dreams. Whether any event has turned out well or ill in the city, what disgrace may have

descended to any one from his ancestors, male or female, are matters of which the philosopher no more knows than he can tell, as they say, how many pints are contained in the ocean. Neither is he conscious of his ignorance. For he does not hold aloof in order that he may gain a reputation; but the truth is, that the outer form of him only is in the city; his mind, disdaining the littlenesses and nothingnesses of human things, is 'flying all abroad,' as Pindar says, measuring with line and rule the things which are under and on the earth and above the heaven, interrogating the whole nature of each and all, but not condescending to anything which is within reach.

Theod. What do you mean, Socrates?

Soc. I will illustrate my meaning, Theodorus, by the jest which the clever, witty Thracian handmaid made about Thales, when he fell into a well as he was looking up at the stars. She said, that he was so eager to know what was going on in heaven, that he could not see what was before his feet. This is a jest which is equally applicable to all philosophers. For the philosopher is wholly unacquainted with his next door neighbour; he is ignorant, not only of what he is doing, but whether he is or is not a human creature; he is searching into the essence of man, and is unwearied in discovering what belongs to such a nature to do or suffer different from any other;—I think that you understand me, Theodorus?

Theod. I do, and what you say is true.

Soc. And thus, my friend, on every occasion, private as well as public, as I said at first, when he appears in a law-court, or in any place in which he has to speak of things which are at his feet and before his eyes, he is the jest, not only of Thracian handmaids but of the general herd, tumbling into wells and every sort of disaster through his inexperience. He looks such an awkward creature, and conveys the impression that he is stupid. When he is reviled, he has nothing personal to say in answer to the civilities of his adversaries, for he knows no scandals of any one, and they do not interest him; and therefore he is laughed at for his sheepishness; and when others are being praised and glorified, he cannot help laughing very sincerely in the simplicity of his heart; and this again makes him look like a fool. When he hears a tyrant or king eulogized, he fancies that he is listening to the praises of some keeper of cattle—a swineherd, or shepherd, or cowherd, who is being praised for the quantity of milk which he squeezes from them; and he remarks that the creature whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze the wealth, is of a

less tractable and more insidious nature. Then, again, he observes that the great man is of necessity as ill-mannered and uneducated as any shepherd—for he has no leisure, and he is surrounded by a wall, which is his mountain-pen. Hearing of enormous landed proprietors of ten thousand acres and more, our philosopher deems this to be a trifle, because he has been accustomed to think of the whole earth; and when they sing the praises of family, and say that some one is a gentleman because he has had seven generations of wealthy ancestors, he thinks that their sentiments only betray the dulness and narrowness of vision of those who utter them, and who are not educated enough to look at the whole, nor to consider that every man has had thousands and thousands of progenitors, and among them have been rich and poor, kings and slaves, Hellenes and barbarians, many times over. And when some one boasts of a catalogue of twenty-five ancestors, and goes back to Heracles, the son of Amphitryon, he cannot understand his poverty of ideas. Why is he unable to calculate that Amphitryon had a twenty-fifth ancestor, who might have been anybody, and was such as fortune made him, and he had a fiftieth, and so on? He is amused at the notion that he cannot do a sum, and thinks that a little arithmetic would have got rid of his senseless vanity. Now, in all these cases our philosopher is derided by the vulgar, partly because he is above them, and also because he is ignorant of what is before him, and always at a loss.

Theod. That is very true, Socrates.

Soc. But, O my friend, when he draws the other into upper air, and gets him out of his pleas and rejoinders into the contemplation of justice and injustice in their own nature and in their difference from one another and from all other things; or from the commonplaces about the happiness of kings to the consideration of government, and of human happiness and misery in general—what they are, and how a man should seek after the one and avoid the other—when that narrow, keen, little legal mind is called to account about all this, he gives the philosopher his revenge; for dizzied by the height at which he is hanging, and from which he looks into space, which is a strange experience to him, he being dismayed, and lost, and stammering out broken words, is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaidens or any other uneducated persons, for they have no eye for the situation, but by every man who has not been brought up as a slave. Such are the two characters, Theodorus: the one of the philosopher or gentleman, who may be excused for appearing simple and useless when he has to

perform some menial office, such as packing up a bag, or flavouring a sauce or fawning speech; the other, of the man who is able to do every kind of service smartly and neatly, but knows not how to wear his cloak like a gentleman; still less does he acquire the music of speech, or hymn the true life which is lived by immortals or men blessed of heaven.

Theod. If you could only persuade everybody, Socrates, as you do me, of the truth of your words, there would be more peace and fewer evils among men.

Soc. Evils, Theodorus, can never perish; for there must always remain something which is antagonistic to good. Of necessity, they hover around this mortal sphere and the earthly nature, having no place among the gods in heaven. Wherefore, also, we ought to fly away thither, and to fly thither is to become like God, as far as this is possible; and to become like him, is to become holy and just and wise. But, O my friend, you cannot easily convince mankind that they should pursue virtue or avoid vice, not for the reasons which the many give, in order, forsooth, that a man may seem to be good;—this is what they are always repeating, and this, in my judgment, is an old wives' fable. Let them hear the truth: In God is no unrighteousness at all—he is altogether righteous; and there is nothing more like him than he of us, who is the most righteous. And the true wisdom of men, and their nothingness and cowardice, are nearly concerned with this. For to know this is true wisdom and manhood, and the ignorance of this is too plainly folly and vice. All other kinds of wisdom or cunning, which seem only, such as the wisdom of politicians, or the wisdom of the arts, are coarse and vulgar. The unrighteous man, or the sayer and doer of unholy things, had far better not yield to the illusion that his roguery is cleverness; for men glory in their shame—they fancy that they hear others saying of them, 'these are not mere good-for-nothing persons, burdens of the earth, but such as men should be who mean to dwell safely in a state.' Let us tell them that they are all the more truly what they do not know that they are; for they do not know the penalty of injustice, which above all things they ought to know—not stripes and death, as they suppose, which evil-doers often escape, but a penalty which cannot be escaped.

Theod. What is that?

Soc. There are two patterns set before them in nature: the one, blessed and divine, the other godless and wretched; and they do not see, in their utter folly and infatuation, that they are growing like the

one and unlike the other, by reason of their evil deeds; and the penalty is, that they lead a life answering to the pattern which they resemble. And if we tell them, that unless they depart from their cunning, the place of innocence will not receive them after death; and that here on earth, they will live ever in the likeness of their own evil selves, and with evil friends—when they hear this they in their superior cunning will seem to be listening to fools.

Theod. Very true, Socrates.

Soc. Too true, my friend, as I well know; there is, however, one peculiarity in their case: when they begin to reason in private about their dislike of philosophy, if they have the courage to hear the argument out, and do not run away, they grow at last strangely discontented with themselves; their rhetoric fades away, and they seem to be no better than children. These, however, are digressions from which we must now desist, or they will overflow, and drown our original argument; to which, if you please, we will now return.

Theod. For my part, Socrates, I would rather have the digressions, for at my age I find them easier to follow; but if you wish, let us go back to the argument.

Soc. Had we not reached the point at which, as we were saying, the partisans of the perpetual flux, and of the identity of being and appearance, were confidently maintaining that the ordinances which the state commanded and thought just, were just to the state which imposed them, while they were in force; this was especially asserted of justice; but as to the good, no one had ever yet had the hardihood to contend that the ordinances which the state thought and enacted to be good, were really good while they lasted;—he who said this, would only be playing with the name 'good,' and would not really touch our question?

Theod. True.

Soc. Then I would not have him speak of the name, but of the thing which is intended by the name.

Theod. Very true.

Soc. Whatever name he gives to the thing, he would allow that the good or expedient is the aim of legislation, and that the state as far as possible imposes all laws with a view to the greatest expediency; can legislation have any other aim?

Theod. Certainly not.

Soc. But is the aim attained always? may not mistakes often occur?

Theod. Yes, I think that there are mistakes.

Soc. The possibility of error will be more distinctly recognized, if we put the question in reference to the whole class under which the good or expedient falls. That whole class has to do with the future, and laws are passed under the idea that they will be useful in after time; which, in other words, is the future.

Theod. Very true.

Soc. Suppose now, that we ask Protagoras, or one of his disciples, a question:—O, Protagoras, we will say to him, Man, as you declare, is the measure of all things—white, heavy, light: there is nothing of this sort of which he is not the judge; for he has the criterion of them in himself, and when he thinks what he feels, he thinks what is, and is true to himself. Is not that what they say?

Theod. Yes.

Soc. And do you extend your doctrine, Protagoras (as we should proceed to say to him) to the future as well as to the present; and has he the criterion not only of what is but of what will be, and does this always happen to him, as he expected? For example, take the case of heat:—When a private person thinks that he is going to have a fever, and that this kind of heat is coming on, and another person, who is a physician, thinks the contrary, whose opinion is likely to prove right? Or are they both right?—he will have a heat or fever in his own judgment, and not a fever in the physician's judgment?

Theod. That would be ludicrous.

Soc. And the vinegrower, if I am not mistaken, is likely to be a better prophet of the sweetness or dryness of the vintage which is not yet gathered than the musician?

Theod. Certainly.

Soc. And the musician will be a better judge than the gymnastic-master of the excellence of the music, which the gymnastic-master will himself approve, when he hears the performance?

Theod. Of course.

Soc. And the cook will be a better judge than the guest, who is not a cook, of the pleasure to be derived from the dinner which is in preparation; for of present or past pleasure we are not now arguing, but of the pleasure which will be and seem to be to each of us in the future; and the question is, who will be the best judge of that; would not you yourself, Protagoras, be a better judge of the topics which are likely to produce an effect upon us in a court than any

private individual?

Theod. Certainly, Socrates, he used to profess in the strongest manner that he was the superior of all men in this respect.

Soc. To be sure, friend; for who would have paid a large sum for the privilege of talking to him, if he had really persuaded his visitors that no one, whether prophet or any other, was better able to judge the true or probable event in the future than every man could for himself?

Theod. That is most certain.

Soc. And legislation and expediency are all concerned with the future; and every one will admit that states, in passing laws, must often fail of their highest interests?

Theod. Quite true.

Soc. Then we may fairly argue against your master, that he must admit one man to be wiser than another, and that the wiser is a measure; but I, who know nothing, am not at all obliged to accept the honour which the advocate of Protagoras was just now forcing upon me, whether I would or not, of being a measure of anything.

Theod. That is the way, Socrates, in which his theory is best refuted; although he is also caught in the authority which he assigns to the opinions of others, who palpably give the lie to his own doctrines.

Soc. There are many ways, Theodorus, in which the doctrine that the opinion of every man is true may be refuted; but there is more difficulty in proving that momentary states of feeling, out of which arise sensations and opinions in accordance with them, are also untrue. I may, however, be mistaken, and perhaps they are really unassailable, and those who say that there is evidence of them, and that they are matters of knowledge, may probably be right; in which case our friend Theaetetus has not been far from the mark in identifying perception and knowledge. Here, then, let us approach nearer, as the advocate of Protagoras desires, and give the truth of the universal flux a ring: is the theory sound or not? at any rate, no small war is raging about this way, and there are many combatants.

Theod. No small war, indeed, for in Ionia the sect makes rapid strides; the disciples of Heraclitus are most energetic upholders of the doctrine.

Soc. Then we are the more bound, my dear Theodorus, to examine the question from the beginning as set forth by themselves.

Theod. Certainly we are. About these speculations of Heraclitus, which, as you say, are as old as Homer, or even older still,

the Ephesians themselves, who profess to know them, are downright mad, and you cannot talk with them about them. For, in accordance with their text-books, they are always in motion; but as for dwelling upon an argument or a question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they are absolutely without the power of doing this; or rather, they have no particle of rest in them, and they are in a state of negation of rest which no words can express. If you ask any of them a question, he will produce, as from a quiver, sayings brief and dark, and shoot them at you; and if you enquire the reason of what he has said, you will be hit by some other newfangled word, and will make no way with any of them, nor they with one another; for their great care is, not to allow of any settled principle either in their arguments or in their minds, conceiving, as I imagine, that this would be stationary; and they are at war with the stationary, which they would like, if they could, to banish utterly.

Soc. I suppose, Theodorus, that you have only seen them when they were fighting, and have never stayed with them in time of peace, for they are no friends of yours; and their peace doctrines are only communicated by them at leisure, as I imagine, to those disciples of theirs whom they want to make like themselves.

Theod. Disciples! my good sir, they have none; men of this sort are not one another's disciples, but they grow up anyhow, and get their inspiration anywhere, each of them saying of his neighbour that he knows nothing. From these men, then, as I was going to remark, you will never get a reason, whether with their will or without their will; we must take the question out of their hands, and make the analysis ourselves, as if we were doing a geometrical problem.

Soc. That is very true; but as touching the said problem, have we not heard from the ancients, who concealed their wisdom from the many in poetical figures, that Oceanus and Tethys, the origin of all things, are streams, and that nothing is at rest; and now the moderns, in their superior wisdom, have declared the same openly, that the cobbler too may hear and learn of them, and no longer foolishly imagine that some things are at rest and others in motion—having learned that all is motion, he will duly honour his teachers? I had almost forgotten the opposite doctrine, Theodorus,

‘That is alone unmoved which is named the universe.’

This is the language of Parmenides, Melissus, and their followers, who stoutly maintain that all being is one and self-contained, and has

no place in which to move. What shall we say, friend, to all these people; for, advancing step by step, we have imperceptibly got between the combatants, and, unless we can protect our retreat, we shall pay the penalty of our rashness—like the players in the palaestra who are caught upon the line, and are dragged different ways by the two parties. Therefore I think that we had better begin by considering those whom we first accosted, 'the river-gods,' and, if we find any truth in them, we will pull ourselves over to their side, and try to get away from the others. But if the partisans of 'the whole' appear to speak more truly, we will fly off from the party which would move the immovable to them. And if we find that neither of them have anything reasonable to say, we shall be in a ridiculous position, having ourselves to assert our own poor opinion and reject that of ancient and famous men. O Theodorus, do you think that there is any use in proceeding when there is such a risk?

Theod. Nay, Socrates, not to examine thoroughly what the two parties have to say would be quite intolerable.

Soc. Then examine we must, if you will insist. The first question which, I fancy, has to be determined, is about motion. How do they conceive this when they say that all things are in motion? Do they mean that there is only one, or, as I incline to think, that there are two kinds of motion? I should like to have your opinion upon the point, that I may err, if I am to err, in your company; tell me, then, when a thing changes from one place to another, or goes round in the same place, is not that motion?

Theod. Yes.

Soc. And this may be assumed to be one kind of motion. But when a thing grows old, or becomes black from being white, or hard from being soft, or undergoes any other change, while remaining in the same place, may not that be properly described as motion of another kind?

Theod. That is my view.

Soc. Which is certainly the true view. I say, then, that there are these two kinds of motion, 'change,' and 'motion in place.'

Theod. You are right.

Soc. And now, having made this distinction, let us address ourselves to those who say that all is motion, and ask them whether all things according to them have the two kinds of motion, and are changed as well as move in place, or is one thing moved in both ways, and another only in one way?

Theod. Indeed, I do not know what to answer; but I think that they would say 'in both ways only.'

Soc. Yes, my friend; for, if not, then manifestly the same things would be in motion and at rest, and there would be no more truth in saying that all things are in motion, than that all things are at rest.

Theod. You speak most truly.

Soc. And if they are to be in motion, and nothing is to be devoid of motion, they must suppose that all things have always every sort of motion?

Theod. Most true.

Soc. Consider this further point: did we not understand them to explain the generation of heat, whiteness, or anything else, in some such manner as this:—were they not saying that each of them is moving between the agent and the patient, together with a perception, and the patient then becomes percipient but not perception, and the agent a quale but not a quality? I suspect that quality may appear a strange term to you, and that you do not understand the word when thus generalized. Then I will take particular cases: I mean to say that the producing power or agent becomes neither heat nor whiteness, but hot and white, and the like of other things. For I must repeat what I said before, that neither the agent nor patient have any absolute existence, but as they come together and generate sensations and objects of sense, the one becomes of a certain quality, and the other is percipient. You remember this?

Theod. Of course.

Soc. We may leave the rest of their theory unexamined, but we must not forget to ask them the only question with which we are concerned: Are all things in motion and flux? Is that what you say?

Theod. Yes, they will reply.

Soc. And they are moved in both those ways which we distinguished; that is to say, they move and are also changed?

Theod. Of course, if the motion is to be perfect.

Soc. If they only moved, and were not changed, we should be able to say what are the kinds of things which are in motion and flux?

Theod. Exactly.

Soc. But now, since not even white continues to flow white, and the very whiteness is a flux or change which is passing into another colour, and will not remain white, can the name of any colour be rightly applied to anything?

Theod. That is impossible, Socrates, either in the case of this or

of any other quality—if while we are using the word the object is escaping in the flux.

Soc. And what would you say of perceptions, such as sight and hearing, or any other kind of perception? Is there any stopping in the act of seeing and hearing?

Theod. That is not to be supposed, if all things are in motion.

Soc. Then we must not speak of seeing any more than of not seeing, nor of any perception more than of any non-perception, if all things have every kind of motion?

Theod. Certainly not.

Soc. Yet science is perception, as Theaetetus and I were saying.

Theod. That was said.

Soc. Then when we were asked what is knowledge, we no more answered what is knowledge than what is not knowledge?

Theod. That would seem to be the truth.

Soc. Here, then, is a fine result: we corrected our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest. But if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right: you may say that a thing is or is not this; or, if you prefer, 'becomes' this; and if we say 'becomes,' we shall not then hamper them with words expressive of rest.

Theod. You are quite right.

Soc. Yes, Theodorus, except in saying 'this' and 'not this.' But you ought not to use the word 'this' or 'not this,' for there is no motion in 'this' or 'not this,' the maintainers of the doctrine have as yet no words to express themselves, and must get a new language. I know of no word that will suit them, except, perhaps, 'in no way,' which is perfectly indefinite.

Theod. Yes, that manner of speaking is certainly true to their character.

Soc. And so, Theodorus, we have got rid of your friend, and have not yet assented to his doctrine, that every man is the measure of all things—he must be a wise man who is a measure; neither can we allow that knowledge is perception, certainly not on the hypothesis of a perpetual flux, unless our friend Theaetetus is able to convince us.

Theod. Very good, Socrates; and now that the argument about the doctrine of Protagoras has been completed, I am absolved from answering, according to the agreement.

Theat. Not, Theodorus, until you and Socrates have discussed

the doctrine of those who say that all things are at rest, as you were proposing.

Theod. You, Theaetetus, who are a young rogue, must not instigate your elders to a breach of faith, but prepare yourself to answer Socrates in the remainder of the argument.

Theaet. Yes, if he wishes; but I would rather have heard about the doctrine of rest.

Theod. Invite Socrates to an argument—invite horsemen to the open plain; do but ask him, and he will answer.

Soc. Nevertheless, Theodorus, I am afraid that I shall not be able to comply with the request of Theaetetus.

Theod. Not comply! for what reason?

Soc. My reason is that I have a kind of reverence; not so much for Melissus and the others, who say that 'all is one and at rest,' as for the great leader himself, Parmenides, venerable and awful, as in Homeric language he may be called;—him I should be ashamed to approach in a spirit unworthy of him. I met him when he was an old man, and I was a mere youth, and he appeared to me to have a glorious depth of mind. And I am afraid that we may not understand his language, and may fall short even more of his meaning; and I fear above all that the nature of knowledge, which is the main subject of our discussion, may be thrust out of sight by the unbidden guests who will come pouring in upon us, if they are permitted—besides, the question which we are now stirring is of immense extent, and will be treated unfairly if only considered by the way; or if treated adequately and at length, will put into the shade the question of science. But neither of these things ought to be allowed, and I must, if I can, by the midwives' art, try to deliver Theaetetus of his conceptions about knowledge.

Theaet. Very well; if you think that, do as you say.

Soc. Once more, Theaetetus, I will ask you to consider the original question: you were saying, were you not, that perception is knowledge?

Theaet. I was.

Soc. And if any one were to ask you: With what does a man see black and white colours? and with what does he hear sharp and flat sounds?—you would say, if I am not mistaken, 'With the eyes and with the ears.'

Theaet. I should.

Soc. The free use of words and phrases, rather than minute pre-

cision, is generally characteristic of a liberal education, and the opposite is pedantic; but sometimes this precision is necessary, and I believe that the answer which you have just given is open to the charge of incorrectness; for which is more correct, to say that we see or hear with the eyes and with the ears, or through the eyes and through the ears?

Theaet. I should say, Socrates, 'through,' rather than 'with.'

Soc. Yes, my boy; for no one can suppose that we are Trojan horses, in whom are perched several unconnected senses, not meeting in some one nature, of which they are the instruments, whether you term this soul or not, with which through these we perceive objects of sense.

Theaet. I agree with you in thinking that.

Soc. The reason why I am thus precise is, because I want to know whether we perceive black and white through the eyes indeed, but with one and the same part of ourselves, and again, other qualities through other organs, or whether, if asked the question, you would refer all such perceptions to the body. Perhaps, however, I had better allow you to answer for yourself. Tell me, then, are not the organs through which you perceive warm and hard and light and sweet, organs of the body?

Theaet. Of the body, certainly.

Soc. And you would admit that what you perceive through one faculty you cannot perceive through another; the objects of hearing, for example, cannot be perceived through sight, or the objects of sight through hearing?

Theaet. Of course I shall admit that.

Soc. If you have any thought about both of them, this common perception cannot come to you, either through the one or the other organ?

Theaet. It cannot.

Soc. How about sounds and colours: in the first place, you would admit that they both exist?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And that either of them is different from the other, and the same with itself?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. And that both are two, and each of them is one?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. You can further observe whether they are like or unlike

one another?

Theaet. I dare say.

Soc. But through what *do* you perceive all this about them? for you cannot apprehend, either through hearing or through seeing, that which they have in common. Let me give an illustration:—if I were to ask whether sounds and colours are saline or not (supposing that there were any meaning in such a question), you would be able to tell me what faculty would determine that—not sight nor hearing, as is evident, but something else?

Theaet. Certainly; the faculty of taste.

Soc. Very good; and what power or instrument will determine the general notions which are common, not only to the senses but to all things, and which you call being and not being, and the rest of them, about which I was just now asking—what organs will you assign for the perception of these?

Theaet. You are speaking of being and not being, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also of unity and other numbers applied to objects of sense; and you mean to ask, through what bodily organ the soul perceives odd and even numbers and other arithmetical notions:

Soc. You follow me excellently, Theaetetus; that is precisely what I am asking.

Theaet. Indeed, Socrates, I cannot answer; my only notion is, that they have no separate organ, but that the soul perceives the universals of all things by herself.

Soc. You are a beauty, Theaetetus, and not ugly, as Theodorus was saying; for he who utters the beautiful is himself beautiful and good. And besides being beautiful, you have done well in releasing me from a very long discussion, if you are clear that the soul views some things by herself and others through the bodily organs. For that was my own opinion, and I wanted you to agree with me.

Theaet. And that is manifest.

Soc. And to which class would you refer being or essence; for this, of all our notions, is the most universal?

Theaet. I should say, to that class which the soul seeks of herself.

Soc. And would you say this also of like and unlike, some and other?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. And would you say the same of the noble and base, and of good and evil?

Theaet. Those, as I conceive, are notions whose essences, above all others, the soul contemplates in their relations to one another, comparing with herself things past and present with the future.

Soc. And does she not perceive the hardness of that which is hard by the touch, and the softness of that which is soft equally by the touch?

Theaet. Yes.

Soc. But their existence and what they are, and their opposition to one another, and the essential nature of this opposition, the soul herself endeavours to decide for us; reviewing them and comparing them with one another?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body, are given at birth to men and animals by nature, but their reflections on these and on their relations to being and use, are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by education and long experience.

Theaet. Assuredly.

Soc. And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being?

Theaet. Impossible.

Soc. And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing?

Theaet. He cannot.

Soc. Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in that only, and not in the mere impression, truth and being can be attained?

Theaet. Clearly.

Soc. And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great a difference between them?

Theaet. That will not be right.

Soc. And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot?

Theaet. I should call all that perceiving—what other name could be given them?

Soc. Perception would be the collective name of them?

Theaet. Certainly.

Soc. Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being?

Theaet. Certainly not.

Soc. And therefore cannot have any part in science or know-

ledge?

Theaet. No.

Soc. Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science?

Theaet. That is evident, Socrates; and knowledge is now most clearly proved to be different from perception.

Soc. But the original aim of our discussion was to find out rather what knowledge is than what it is not; at the same time we have made some progress, for we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in that other process, however called, in which the mind is alone and engaged with being.

THE DOCTRINE OF IDEAS

PARMENIDES

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE

SOCRATES

ZENO

PARMENIDES

ARISTOTELES

ANTIPHON NARRATES THE DIALOGUE PROPER

WE WENT from our home at Clazomenae to Athens, and met Adeimantus and Glaucon in the Agora. Welcome, said Adeimantus, taking me by the hand; is there anything which we can do for you in Athens?

Why, yes, I said, I am come to ask a favour of you.

What is that? he said.

I want you to tell me the name of your half-brother, which I have forgotten; he was a mere child when I last came hither from Clazomenae, but that was a long time ago: your father's name, if I remember rightly, is Pyrilampes?

Yes, he said, and the name of our brother, Antiphon; but why do you ask?

Let me introduce some countrymen of mine, I said; they are lovers of philosophy, and have heard that Antiphon was in the habit of meeting Pythodorus, the friend of Zeno, and remembers certain arguments which Socrates and Zeno and Parmenides had together, and which Pythodorus had often repeated to him.

That is true.

And could we hear them? I asked.

Nothing easier, he replied; when he was a youth he made a careful study of the pieces; at present his thoughts run in another direction; like his grandfather, Antiphon, he is devoted to horses. But, if that is what you want, let us go and look for him; he dwells at Melita, which is quite near, and he has only just left us to go home.

Accordingly we went to look for him; he was at home, and in the act of giving a bridle to a blacksmith to be fitted. When he had done with the blacksmith, his brothers told him the purpose of our visit; and he saluted me as an acquaintance whom he remembered from my former visit, and we asked him to repeat the dialogue. At first he was not very willing, and complained of the trouble, but at length he consented. He told us that Pythodorous had described to him the appearance of Parmenides and Zeno; they came to Athens, he said, at the great Panathenaea; the former was, at the time of his visit, about 65 years old, very white with age, but well favoured. Zeno was nearly 40 years of age, of a noble figure and fair aspect; and in the days of his youth he was reported to have been beloved of Parmenides. He said that they lodged with Pythodorous in the Ceramicus, outside the wall, whither Socrates and others came to see them; they wanted to hear some writings of Zeno, which had been brought to Athens by them for the first time. He said that Socrates was then very young, and that Zeno read them to him in the absence of Parmenides, and had nearly finished when Pythodorous entered, and with him Parmenides and Aristoteles who was afterwards one of the Thirty; there was not much more to hear, and Pythodorus had heard Zeno repeat them before.

When the recitation was completed, Socrates requested that the first hypothesis of the first discourse might be read over again, and this having been done, he said: What do you mean, Zeno? Is your argument that the existence of many necessarily involves like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like; is that your position? Just that, said Zeno. And if the unlike cannot be like, or the like unlike, then neither can the many exist, for that would involve an impossibility. Is the design of your argument throughout to disprove the existence of the many? and is each of your treatises intended to furnish a separate proof of this, there being as many proofs in all as you have composed arguments, of the non-existence of the many? Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you?

No, said Zeno; you have quite understood the general drift of the treatise.

I see, Parmenides, said Socrates, that Zeno is your second self in his writings too; he puts what you say in another way, and half deceives us into believing that he is saying what is new. For you, in your compositions, say that the all is one, and of this you adduce excellent proofs: and he, on the other hand, says that the many is naught, and gives many great and convincing evidences of this. To deceive the world, as you have done, by saying the same thing in different ways, one of you affirming and the other denying the many, is a strain of art beyond the reach of most of us.

Yes, Socrates, said Zeno. But although you are as keen as a Spartan hound in pursuing the track, you do not quite apprehend the true motive of the performance, which is not really such an artificial piece of work as you imagine; there was no intention of concealment effecting any grand result—that was a mere accident. For the truth is, that these writings of mine were meant to protect the arguments of Parmenides against those who ridicule him, and urge the many ridiculous and contradictory results which were supposed to follow from the assertion of the one. My answer is addressed to the partizans of the many, and intended to show that greater or more ridiculous consequences follow from their hypothesis of the existence of the many if carried out, than from the hypothesis of the existence of the one. A love of controversy led me to write the book in the days of my youth, and some one stole the writings, and I had therefore no choice about the publication of them; the motive, however, of writing, was not the ambition of an old man, but the pugnacity of a young one. This you do not seem to see, Socrates; though in other respects, as I was saying, your notion is a very just one.

That I understand, said Socrates, and quite accept your account. But tell me, Zeno, do you not further think that there is an idea of likeness in the abstract, and another idea of unlikeness, which is the opposite of likeness, and that in these two, you and I and all other things to which we apply the term many, participate; and that the things which participate in likeness are in that degree and manner like; and that those which participate in unlikeness are in that degree unlike, or both like and unlike in the degree in which they participate in both? And all things may partake of both opposites, and be like and unlike to themselves, by reason of this participation. Even in that there is nothing wonderful. But if a person could prove the

absolute like to become unlike, or the absolute unlike to become like, that, in my opinion, would be a real wonder; not, however, if the things which partake of the ideas experience likeness and unlikeness—there is nothing extraordinary in this. Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and that the same is many by partaking of many, would that be very wonderful? But if he were to show me that the absolute many was one, or the absolute one many, I should be truly amazed. And I should say the same of other things. I should be surprised to hear that the genera and species had opposite qualities in themselves; but if a person wanted to prove of me that I was many and also one, there would be no marvel in that. When he wanted to show that I was many he would say that I have a right and a left side, and a front and a back, and an upper and a lower half, for I cannot deny that I partake of multitude; when, on the other hand he wants to prove that I am one, he will say, that we who are here assembled are seven, and that I am one and partake of the one, and in saying both he speaks truly. Or if a person shows that the same wood and stones and the like, being many are also one, we admit that he shows the existence of the one and many, but he does not show that the many are one or the one many; he is uttering not a wonder but a truism. If, however, as I was suggesting just now, we were to make an abstraction, I mean of like, unlike, one, many, rest, motion, and similar ideas, and then to show that these in their abstract form admit of admixture and separation, I should greatly wonder at that. This part of the argument appears to be treated by you, Zeno, in a very spirited manner; nevertheless, as I was saying, I should be far more amazed if any one found in the ideas themselves which are conceptions, the same puzzle and entanglement which you have shown to exist in visible objects.

While Socrates was saying this, Pythodorus thought that Parmenides and Zeno were not altogether pleased at the successive steps of the argument; but still they gave the closest attention, and often looked at one another, and smiled as if in admiration of him. When he had finished, Parmenides expressed these feelings in the following words:

Socrates, he said, I admire the bent of your mind towards philosophy; tell me now, was this your own distinction between abstract ideas and the things which partake of them? and do you think that there is an idea of likeness apart from the likeness which we possess, or of the one and many, or of the other notions of which Zeno has been speaking?

I think that there are such abstract ideas, said Socrates.

Parmenides proceeded. And would you also make abstract ideas of the just and the beautiful and the good, and of all that class of notions?

Yes, he said, I should.

And would you make an abstract idea of man distinct from us and from all other human creatures, or of fire and water?

I am often undecided, Parmenides, as to whether I ought to include them or not.

And would you feel equally undecided, Socrates, about things the mention of which may provoke a smile?—I mean such things as hair, mud, dirt, or anything else that is foul and base; would you suppose that each of these has an idea distinct from the phenomena with which we come into contact, or not?

Certainly not, said Socrates; visible things like these are such as they appear to us, and I am afraid that there would be an absurdity in assuming any idea of them, although I sometimes get disturbed, and begin to think that there is nothing without an idea; but then again, when I have taken up this position, I run away, because I am afraid that I may fall into a bottomless pit of nonsense, and perish; and I return to the ideas of which I was just now speaking, and busy myself with them.

Yes, Socrates, said Parmenides; that is because you are still young; the time will come when philosophy will have a firmer grasp of you, if I am not mistaken, and then you will not despise even the meanest things; at your age, you are too much disposed to look to the opinions of men. But I should like to know whether you mean that there are certain forms or ideas of which all other things partake, and from which they are named; that similars, for example, become similar, because they partake of similarity; and great things become great because they partake of greatness; and that just and beautiful things become just and beautiful, because they partake of justice and beauty?

Yes, certainly, said Socrates, that is my meaning.

And does not each individual partake either of the whole of the idea or of a part of the idea? Is any third way possible?

Impossible, he said.

Then do you think that the whole idea is one, and yet being one, exists in each one of many?

Why not, Parmenides? said Socrates.

Because one and the same existing as a whole in many separate

individuals, will thus be in a state of separation from itself.

Nay, replied the other; the idea may be like the day which is one and the same in many places, and yet continuous with itself; in this way each idea may be one and the same in all.

I like your way, Socrates, of dividing one into many; and if I were to spread out a sail and cover a number of men, that, as I suppose, in your way of speaking, would be one and a whole in or on many—that will be the sort of thing which you mean?

I am not sure.

And would you say that the whole sail is over each man, or a part only.

A part only.

Then, Socrates, the ideas themselves will be divisible, and the individuals will have a part only and not the whole existing in them?

That seems to be true.

Then would you like to say, Socrates, that the one idea is really divisible and yet remains one?

Certainly not, he said.

Suppose that you divide greatness, and that of many great things each one is great by having a portion of greatness less than absolute greatness—is that conceivable?

No.

Or will each equal part, by taking some portion of equality less than absolute equality, be equal to some other?

Impossible.

Or suppose one of us to have a portion of smallness; this is but a part of the small, and therefore the small is greater; and while the absolute small is greater, that to which the part of the small is added, will be smaller and not greater than before.

That is impossible, he said.

Then in what way, Socrates, will all things participate in the ideas, if they are unable to participate in them either as parts or wholes?

Indeed, he said, that is a question which is not easily determined.

Well, said Parmenides, and what do you say of another question?

What is that?

I imagine that the way in which you are led to assume the existence of ideas is as follows:—You see a number of great objects, and there seems to you to be one and the same idea of greatness pervading them all; and hence you conceive of a single greatness,

That is true, said Socrates.

And if you go on and allow your mind in like manner to contemplate the idea of greatness and these other greatnesses, and to compare them, will not another idea of greatness arise, which will appear to be the source of them all?

That is true.

Then another abstraction of greatness will appear over and above absolute greatness, and the individuals which partake of it; and then another, which will be the source of that, and then others, and so on; and there will be no longer a single idea of each kind, but an infinite number of them.

But may not the ideas, asked Socrates, be cognitions only, and have no proper existence except in our minds, Parmenides? For in that case there may be single ideas, which do not involve the consequences which were just now mentioned.

And can there be individual cognitions which are cognitions of nothing?

That is impossible, he said.

The cognition must be of something?

Yes.

Of something that is or is not?

Of something that is.

Must it not be of the unity or single nature which the cognition recognises as attaching to all?

Yes.

And will not this unity, which is always the same in all be the idea?

From that, again, there is no escape.

Then, said Parmenides, if you say that other things participate in the ideas, must you not say that everything is made up of thoughts or cognitions, and that all things think; or will you say that being thoughts they are without thoughts?

But that, said Socrates, is irrational. The more probable view, Parmenides, of these ideas is, that they are patterns fixed in nature, and that other things are like them, and resemblances of them; and that what is meant by the participation of other things in the ideas, is really assimilation to them.

But if, said he, the individual is like the idea, must not the idea also be like the individual, in as far as the individual is a resemblance of the idea? That which is like, cannot be conceived of as other

than the like of like.

Impossible.

And when two things are alike, must they not partake of the same idea.

They must.

And will not that of which the two partake, and which makes them alike, be the absolute idea [of likeness]?

Certainly.

Then the idea cannot be like the individual, or the individual like the idea; for if they are alike, some further idea of likeness will always arise, and if that be like anything else, another and another; and new ideas will never cease being created, if the idea resembles that which partakes of it?

Quite true.

The theory, then, that other things participate in the ideas by resemblance, has to be given up, and some other mode of participation devised?

That is true.

Do you see then, Socrates, how great is the difficulty of affirming self-existent ideas?

Yes, indeed.

And, further, let me say that as yet you only understand a small part of the difficulty which is involved in your assumption, that there are ideas of all things, which are distinct from them.

What difficulty? he said.

There are many, but the greatest of all is this:—If an opponent argues that these self-existent ideas, as we term them, cannot be known, no one can prove to him that he is wrong, unless he who is disputing their existence be a man of great genius and cultivation, and is willing to follow a long and laborious demonstration—he will remain unconvinced, and still insist that they cannot be known.

How is that, Parmenides? said Socrates.

In the first place, I think, Socrates, that you, or any one who maintains the existence of absolute ideas, will admit that they cannot exist in us.

Why, then they would be no longer absolute, said Socrates.

That is true, he said: and any relation in the absolute ideas, is a relation which is among themselves only, and has nothing to do with the resemblances, or whatever they are to be termed, which are in our sphere, and the participation in which gives us this or that name.

And the subjective notions in our mind, which have the same name with them, are likewise only relative to one another, and not to the ideas which have the same name with them, and belong to themselves, and not to the ideas.

How do you mean? said Socrates.

I may illustrate my meaning in this way, said Parmenides:—A master has a slave; now there is nothing absolute in the relation between them; they are both relations of some man to another man; but there is also an idea of mastership in the abstract, which is relative to the idea of slavery in the abstract; and this abstract nature has nothing to do with us, nor we with the abstract nature; abstract natures have to do with themselves alone, and we with ourselves. Do you see my meaning?

Yes, said Socrates, I quite see your meaning.

And does not knowledge, I mean absolute knowledge, he said, answer to very and absolute truth?

Certainly.

And each kind of absolute knowledge answers to each kind of absolute being?

Yes.

And the knowledge which we have, will answer to the truth which we have; and again, each kind of knowledge which we have, will be a knowledge of each kind of being which we have?

Certainly.

But the ideas themselves, as you admit, we have not, and cannot have?

No, we cannot.

And the absolute ideas or species, are known by the absolute idea of knowledge?

Yes.

And what is an idea which we have not got?

No.

Then none of the ideas are known to us, because we have no share in absolute knowledge?

They are not.

Then the ideas of the beautiful, and of the good, and the like, which we imagine to be absolute ideas, are unknown to us?

That appears to be the case.

I think that there is a worse consequence still.

What is that?

Would you, or would you not, say, that if there is such a thing as absolute knowledge, that must be a far more accurate knowledge than our knowledge, and the same of beauty and other things?

Yes.

And if there be anything that has absolute knowledge, there is nothing more likely than God to have this most exact knowledge?

Certainly.

But then, will God, having this absolute knowledge, have a knowledge of human things?

And why not?

Because, Socrates, said Parmenides, we have admitted that the ideas have no relation to human notions, nor human notions to them; the relations of either are in their respective spheres.

Yes, that has been admitted.


And if God has this truest authority, and this most exact knowledge, that authority cannot rule us, nor that knowledge know us, or any human thing; and in like manner, as our authority does not extend to the gods, nor our knowledge know anything which is divine, so by parity of reason they, being gods, are not our masters; neither do they know the things of men.

Yet, surely, said Socrates, to deprive God of knowledge is monstrous.

These, Socrates, said Parmenides, are a few, and only a few, of the difficulties which are necessarily involved in the hypothesis of the existence of ideas, and the attempt to prove the absoluteness of each of them; he who hears of them will doubt or deny their existence, and will maintain that even if they do exist, they must necessarily be unknown to man, and he will think that there is reason in what he says, and as we were remarking just now, will be wonderfully hard of being convinced; a man must be a man of real ability before he can understand that everything has a class and an absolute essence; and still more remarkable will he be who makes out all these things for himself, and can teach another to analyse them satisfactorily.

I agree with you, Parmenides, said Socrates; and what you say is very much to my mind.

And yet, Socrates, said Parmenides, if a man, fixing his mind on these and the like difficulties, refuses to acknowledge ideas or species of existences, and will not define particular species, he will be at his wit's end; in this way he will utterly destroy the power of reasoning; and that is what you seem to me to have particularly noted.



BOLOGNA HEAD FOR LEMNIAN ATHENA

After Phidias.

PHAEDO

SCENE :—THE PRISON OF SOCRATES

PLACE OF NARRATION :—PHILIUS

THE DIALOGUE describes the death of Socrates, gives a new development to the doctrine of Ideas, and discusses the question of immortality.

PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE

PHAEDO, THE NARRATOR

SIMMIAS

ECHECRATES

CEBES

SOCRATES

CRITO

APPOLODORUS

ATTENDANT OF THE PRISON

ECHECRATES. Were you yourself, Phaedo, in the prison with Socrates on the day when he drank the poison?

Phaedo. Yes, Echecrates, I was.

Ech. I wish that you would tell me about his death. What did he say in his last hours? We were informed that he died by taking poison, but no one knew anything more; for no Phliasian ever goes to Athens now, and a long time has elapsed since any Athenian found has way to Phlius, and therefore we had no clear account.

Phaed. Did you not hear of the proceedings at the trial?

Ech. Yes; some one told us about the trial, and we could not understand why, having been condemned, he was put to death, as appeared, not at the time, but long afterwards. What was the reason of this?

Phaed. An accident, Echecrates. The reason was that the stern of the ship which the Athenians sent to Delos happened to have been crowned on the day before he was tried.

Ech. What is this ship?

Phaed. This is the ship in which, as the Athenians say, Theseus went to Crete when he took with him the fourteen youths, and was

the saviour of them and of himself. And they were said to have vowed to Apollo at the time, that if they were saved they would make an annual pilgrimage to Delos. Now this custom still continues, and the whole period of the voyage to and from Delos, beginning when the priest of Apollo crowns the stern of the ship, is a holy season, during which the city is not allowed to be polluted by public executions; and often, when the vessel is detained by adverse winds, there may be a very considerable delay. As I was saying, the ship was crowned on the day before the trial, and this was the reason why Socrates lay in prison and was not put to death until long after he was condemned.

Ech. What was the manner of his death, Phaedo? What was said or done? And which of his friends had he with him? Or were they not allowed by the authorities to be present? And did he die alone?

Phaed. No; there were several of his friends with him.

Ech. If you have nothing to do, I wish that you would tell me what passed, as exactly as you can.

Phaed. I have nothing to do, and will try to gratify your wish. For to me too there is no greater pleasure than to have Socrates brought to my recollection; whether I speak myself or hear another speak of him.

Ech. You will have listeners who are of the same mind with you, and I hope that you will be as exact as you can.

Phaed. I remember the strange feeling which came over me at being with him. For I could hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and therefore I did not pity him, Echecrates; his mien and his language were so noble and fearless in the hour of death that to me he appeared blessed. I thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine call, and that he would be happy, if any man ever was, when he arrived there; and therefore I did not pity him as might seem natural at such a time. But neither could I feel the pleasure which I usually felt in philosophical discourse (for philosophy was the theme of which we spoke). I was pleased and I was also pained, because I knew that he was soon to die, and this strange mixture of feeling was shared by us all; we were laughing and weeping by turns, especially the excitable Apollodorus—you know the sort of man?

Ech. Yes.

Phaed. He was quite overcome ; and I myself, and all of us were greatly moved.

Ech. Who were present.

Phaed. Of native Athenians there were, besides Apollodorus, Critobulus and his father Crito, Hermogenes, Epigenes, Aeschines, and Antisthenes ; likewise Ctesippus of the deme of Paeania, Menexenus, and some others ; but Plato, if I am not mistaken, was ill.

Ech. Were there any strangers ?

Phaed. Yes, there were ; Simmias the Theban, and Cebes, and Phaenodorus ; Euclid and Terpsion, who came from Megara.

Ech. And was Aristippus there, and Cleombrotus ?

Phaed. No, they were said to be in Aegina.

Ech. Any one else ?

Phaed. I think that these were about all.

Ech. And what was the discourse of which you spoke ?

Phaed. I will begin at the beginning, and endeavour to repeat the entire conversation. You must understand that we had been previously in the habit of assembling early in the morning at the court in which the trial was held, and which is not far from the prison. There we remained talking with one another until the opening of the prison doors (for they were not opened very early), and then went in and generally passed the day with Socrates. On the last morning the meeting was earlier than usual ; this was owing to our having heard on the previous evening that the sacred ship had arrived from Delos, and therefore we agreed to meet very early at the accustomed place. On our going to the prison, the jailer who answered the door, instead of admitting us, came out and bade us wait and he would call us. 'For the eleven,' he said, 'are now with Socrates ; they are taking off his chains, and giving orders that he is to die to-day.' He soon returned and said that we might come in. On entering we found Socrates just released from chains, and Xanthippe, whom you know, sitting by him, and holding his child in her arms. When she saw us she uttered a cry and said, as women will : 'O Socrates, this is the last time that either you will converse with your friends, or they with you.' Socrates turned to Crito and said : 'Crito, let some one take her home.' Some of Crito's people accordingly led her away, crying out and beating herself. And when she was gone, Socrates, sitting up on the couch, began to bend and rub his leg, saying, as he rubbed : How singular is the thing called pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, which might be thought to be the opposite of it ; for they never come

to a man together, and yet he who pursues either of them is generally compelled to take the other. They are two, and yet they grow together out of one head or stem; and I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had noticed them, he would have made a fable about God trying to reconcile their strife, and when he could not, he fastened their heads together; and this is the reason why when one comes the other follows, as I find in my own case pleasure comes following after the pain in my leg which was caused by the chain.

Upon this Cebes said: I am very glad indeed, Socrates, that you mentioned the name of Aesop. For that reminds me of a question which has been asked by others, and was asked of me only the day before yesterday by Evenus the poet, and as he will be sure to ask again, you may as well tell me what I should say to him, if you would like him to have an answer. He wanted to know why you who never before wrote a line of poetry, now that you are in prison are putting Aesop into verse, and also composing that hymn in honour of Apollo.

Tell him, Cebes, he replied, that I had no idea of rivalling him or his poems; which is the truth, for I knew that I could not do that. But I wanted to see whether I could purge away a scruple which I felt about certain dreams. In the course of my life I have often had intimations in dreams 'that I should make music.' The same dream came to me sometimes in one form, and sometimes in another, but always saying the same or nearly the same words: Make and cultivate music, said the dream. And hitherto I had imagined that this was only intended to exhort and encourage me in the study of philosophy, which has always been the pursuit of my life, and is the noblest and best of music. The dream was bidding me do what I was already doing, in the same way that the competitor in a race is bidden by the spectators to run when he is already running. But I was not certain of this, as the dream might have meant music in the popular sense of the word, and being under sentence of death, and the festival giving me a respite, I thought that I should be safer if I satisfied the scruple, and, in obedience to the dream, composed a few verses before I departed. And first I made a hymn in honour of the god of the festival, and then considering that a poet, if he is really to be a poet or maker, should not only put words together but make stories, and as I have no invention, I took some fables of Aesop, which I had ready at hand and knew, and turned them into verse. Tell Evenus this, and bid him be of good cheer; say that I would have him come after me if he be a wise man, and not tarry; and that to-day I am likely to be

going, for the Athenians say that I must.

Simmias said: What a message for such a man! having been a frequent companion of his I should say that, as far as I know him, he will never take your advice unless he is obliged.

Why, said Socrates. Is not Evenus a philosopher?

I think that he is, said Simmias.

Then he, or any man who has the spirit of philosophy, will be willing to die, though he will not take his own life, for that is held not to be right.

Here he changed his position, and put his legs off the couch on to the ground, and during the rest of the conversation he remained sitting.

Why do you say, inquired Cebes, that a man ought not to take his own life, but that the philosopher will be ready to follow the dying?

Socrates replied: And have you, Cebes and Simmias, who are acquainted with Philolaus, never heard him speak of this?

I never understood him, Socrates.

My words, too, are only an echo; but I am very willing to say what I have heard: and indeed, as I am going to another place, I ought to be thinking and talking of the nature of the pilgrimage which I am about to make. What can I do better in the interval between this and the setting of the sun?

Then tell me, Socrates, why is suicide held not to be right? as I have certainly heard Philolaus affirm when he was staying with us at Thebes; and there are others who say the same, although none of them has ever made me understand him.

But do your best, replied Socrates, and the day may come when you will understand. I suppose that you wonder why, as most things which are evil may be accidentally good, this is to be the only exception (for may not death, too, be better than life in some cases?), and why, when a man is better dead, he is not permitted to be his own benefactor, but must wait for the hand of another.

By Jupiter! yes, indeed, said Cebes laughing, and speaking in his native Doric.

I admit the appearance of inconsistency, replied Socrates; but there may not be any real inconsistency after all in this. There is a doctrine uttered in secret that man is a prisoner who has no right to open the door of his prison and run away; this is a great mystery which I do not quite understand. Yet I too believe that the gods are

our guardians, and that we are a possession of theirs. Do you not agree?

Yes, I agree to that, said Cebes.

And if one of your own possessions, an ox or an ass, for example, took the liberty of putting himself out of the way when you had given no intimation of your wish that he should die, would you not be angry with him, and would you not punish him if you could?

Certainly, replied Cebes.

Then there may be reason in saying that a man should wait, and not take his own life until God summons him, as he is now summoning me.

Yes, Socrates, said Cebes, there is surely reason in that. And yet how can you reconcile this seemingly true belief that God is our guardian and we his possessions, with that willingness to die which we were attributing to the philosopher? That the wisest of men should be willing to leave this service in which they are ruled by the gods who are the best of rulers, is not reasonable, for surely no wise man thinks that when set at liberty he can take better care of himself than the gods take of him. A fool may perhaps think this—he may argue that he had better run away from his master, not considering that his duty is to remain to the end, and not to run away from the good, and that there is no sense in his running away. But the wise man will want to be ever with him who is better than himself. Now this, Socrates, is the reverse of what was just now said; for upon this view the wise man should sorrow and the fool rejoice at passing out of life.

The earnestness of Cebes seemed to please Socrates. Here, said he, turning to us, is a man who is always inquiring, and is not to be convinced all in a moment, nor by every argument.

And in this case, added Simmias, his objection does appear to me to have some force. For what can be the meaning of a truly wise man wanting to fly away and lightly leave a master who is better than himself. And I rather imagine that Cebes is referring to you; he thinks that you are too ready to leave us, and too ready to leave the gods who, as you acknowledge, are our good rulers.

Yes, replied Socrates; there is reason in that. And this indictment you think that I ought to answer as if I were in court?

That is what we should like, said Simmias.

Then I must try to make a better impression upon you than I did when defending myself before the judges. For I am quite ready to acknowledge, Simmias and Cebes, that I ought to be grieved at

death, if I were not persuaded that I am going to other gods who are wise and good (of this I am as certain as I can be of anything of the sort), and to men departed (though I am not so certain of this) who are better than those whom I leave behind; and therefore I do not grieve as I might have done, for I have good hope that there is yet something remaining for the dead, and as has been said of old, some far better thing for the good than for the evil.

But do you mean to take away your thoughts with you, Socrates, said Simmias? Will you not communicate them to us?—the benefit is one in which we too may hope to share. Moreover, if you succeed in convincing us, that will be an answer to the charge against yourself.

I will do my best, replied Socrates. But you must first let me hear what Crito wants; he was going to say something to me.

Only this, Socrates, replied Crito:—the attendant who is to give you the poison has been telling me that you are not to talk much, and he wants me to let you know this; for that by talking, heat is increased, and this interferes with the action of the poison; those who excite themselves are sometimes obliged to drink the poison two or three times.

Then, said Socrates, let him mind his business and be prepared to give the poison two or three times, if necessary; that is all.

I was almost certain that you would say that, replied Crito; but I was obliged to satisfy him.

Never mind him, he said.

And now I will make answer to you, O my judges, and show that he who has lived as a true philosopher has reason to be of good cheer when he is about to die, and that after death he may hope to receive the greatest good in the other world. And how this may be, Simmias and Cebes, I will endeavour to explain. For I deem that the true disciple of philosophy is likely to be misunderstood by other men; they do not perceive that he is ever pursuing death and dying; and if this is true, why, having had the desire of death all his life long, should he repine at the arrival of that which he has been always pursuing and desiring?

Simmias laughed and said: Though not in a laughing humour, I swear that I cannot help laughing, when I think what the wicked world will say when they hear this. They will say that this is very true, and our people at home will agree with them in saying that the life which philosophers desire is truly death, and that they have found them out to be deserving of the death which they desire.

And they are right, Simmias, in saying this, with the exception of the words 'they have found them out;' for they have not found out what is the nature of this death which the true philosopher desires, or how he deserves or desires death. But let us leave them and have a word with ourselves: Do we believe that there is such a thing as death?

To be sure, replied Simmias.

And is this anything but the separation of soul and body? And being dead is the attainment of this separation when the soul exists in herself, and is parted from the body and the body is parted from the soul—that is death?

Exactly: that and nothing else, he replied.

And what do you say of another question, my friend, about which I should like to have your opinion, and the answer to which will probably throw light on our present inquiry: Do you think that the philosopher ought to care about the pleasures—if they are to be called pleasures of eating and drinking?

Certainly not, answered Simmias.

And what do you say of the pleasures of love—should he care about them?

By no means.

And will he think much of the other ways of indulging the body, for example, the acquisition of costly raiment, or sandals or other adornments of the body? Instead of caring about them, does he not rather despise anything more than nature needs? What do you say?

I should say that the true philosopher would despise them.

Would you not say that he is entirely concerned with the soul and not with the body? He would like, as far as he can, to be quit of the body and turn to the soul.

That is true.

In matters of this sort philosophers, above all other men, may be observed in every sort of way to dis sever the soul from the body.

That is true.

Whereas, Simmias, the rest of the world are of opinion that a life which has no bodily pleasures and no part in them is not worth having; but that he who thinks nothing of bodily pleasures is almost as though he were dead.

That is quite true.

What again shall we say of the actual acquirement of knowledge?—is the body, if invited to share in the inquiry, a hinderer or a helper? I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them? Are they

not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? and yet, if even they are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of the other senses?—for you will allow that they are the best of them?

Certainly, he replied.

Then when does the soul attain truth?—for in attempting to consider anything in company with the body she is obviously deceived.

Yes, that is true.

Then must not existence be revealed to her in thought, if at all?

Yes.

And thought is best when the mind is gathered into herself and none of the things trouble her—neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure,—when she has as little as possible to do with the body, and has no bodily sense or feeling, but is aspiring after being?

That is true.

And in this the philosopher dishonours the body; his soul runs away from the body and desires to be alone and by herself?

That is true.

Well, but there is another thing, Simmias: Is there or is there not an absolute justice?

Assuredly there is.

And an absolute beauty and absolute good?

Of course.

But did you ever behold any of them with your eyes?

Certainly not.

Or did you ever reach them with any other bodily sense? (and I speak not of these alone, but of absolute greatness, and health, and strength, and of the essence or true nature of everything). Has the reality of them ever been perceived by you through the bodily organs? or rather, is not the nearest approach to the knowledge of their several natures made by him who so orders his intellectual vision as to have the most exact conception of the essence of that which he considers?

Certainly.

And he attains to the knowledge of them in their highest purity who goes to each of them with the mind alone, not allowing when in the act of thought the intrusion or introduction of sight or any other sense in the company of reason, but with the very light of the mind in her clearness penetrates into the very light of truth in each; he has got rid, as far as he can, of eyes and ears and of the whole body, which he conceives of only as a disturbing element, hindering the soul from the acquisition of knowledge when in company with her—is not this

the sort of man who, if ever man did, is likely to attain the knowledge of existence?

There is admirable truth in that, Socrates, replied Simmias.

And when they consider all this, must not true philosophers make a reflection, of which they will speak to one another in such words as these: We have found, they will say, a path of speculation which seems to bring us and the argument to the conclusion, that while we are in the body, and while the soul is mingled with this mass of evil, our desire will not be satisfied, and our desire is of the truth. For the body is a source of endless trouble to us by reason of the mere requirement of food; and also is liable to diseases which overtake and impede us in the search after truth: and by filling us as full of loves, and lusts, and fears, and fancies, and idols, and every sort of folly, prevents our ever having, as people say, so much as a thought. For whence come wars, and fightings, and factions? whence but from the body and the lusts of the body? For wars are occasioned by the love of money, and money has to be acquired for the sake and in the service of the body; and in consequence of all these things the time which ought to be given to philosophy is lost. Moreover, if there is time and an inclination towards philosophy, yet the body introduces a turmoil and confusion and fear into the course of speculation, and hinders us from seeing the truth; and all experience shows that if we would have pure knowledge of anything we must be quit of the body, and the soul in herself must behold all things in themselves: then, I suppose, that we shall attain that which we desire, and of which we say that we are lovers, and that is wisdom; not while we live, but after death, as the argument shows; for if while in company with the body, the soul cannot have pure knowledge, one of two things seems to follow—either knowledge is not to be attained at all, or, if at all, after death. For then, and not till then, the soul will be in herself alone and without the body. In this present life, I reckon that we make the nearest approach to knowledge when we have the least possible concern or interest in the body, and are not saturated with the bodily nature, but remain pure until the hour when God himself is pleased to release us. And then the foolishness of the body will be cleared away and we shall be pure and hold converse with other pure souls, and know of ourselves the clear light everywhere; and this is surely the light of truth. For no impure thing is allowed to approach the pure. These are the sort of words, Simmias, which the true lovers of wisdom cannot help saying to one another, and thinking. You will agree with me in that?

Certainly, Socrates.

But if this is true, O my friend, then there is great hope that, going whither I go, I shall there be satisfied with that which has been the chief concern of you and me in our past lives. And now that the hour of departure is appointed to me, this is the hope with which I depart, and not I only, but every man who believes that he has his mind purified.

Certainly, replied Simmias.

And what is purification but the separation of the soul from the body, as I was saying before; the habit of the soul gathering and collecting herself into herself, out of all the courses of the body; the dwelling in her own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as she can;—the release of the soul from the chains of the body?

Very true, he said.

And what is that which is termed death, but this very separation and release of the soul from the body?

To be sure, he said.

And the true philosophers, and they only, study and are eager to release the soul. Is not the separation and release of the soul from the body their especial study?

That is true.

And, as I was saying at first, there would be a ridiculous contradiction in men studying to live as nearly as they can in a state of death, and yet repining when death comes.

Certainly.

Then Simmias, as the true philosophers are ever studying death, to them, of all men, death is the least terrible. Look at the matter in this way:—how inconsistent of them to have been always enemies of the body, and wanting to have the soul alone, and when this is granted to them, to be trembling and repining; instead of rejoicing at their departing to that place where, when they arrive, they hope to gain that which in life they loved (and this was wisdom), and at the same time to be rid of the company of their enemy. Many a man has been willing to go to the world below in the hope of seeing there an earthly love, or wife, or son, and conversing with them. And will he who is a true lover of wisdom, and is persuaded in like manner that only in the world below he can worthily enjoy her, still repine at death? Will he not depart with joy? Surely, he will, my friend, if he be a true philosopher. For he will have a firm conviction that there only, and nowhere else, he can find wisdom in her purity. And if this be

true, he would be very absurd, as I was saying, if he were to fear death.

He would indeed, replied Simmias.

And when you see a man who is repining at the approach of death, is not his reluctance a sufficient proof that he is not a lover of wisdom, but a lover of the body, and probably at the same time a lover of either money or power, or both?

That is very true, he replied.

There is a virtue, Simmias, which is named courage. Is not that a special attribute of the philosopher?

Certainly.

Again, there is temperance. Is not the calm, and control, and disdain of the passions which even the many call temperance, a quality belonging only to those who despise the body, and live in philosophy?

That is not to be denied.

For the courage and temperance of other men, if you will consider them, are really a contradiction.

How is that, Socrates?

Well, he said, you are aware that death is regarded by men in general as a great evil.

That is true, he said.

And do not courageous men endure death because they are afraid of yet greater evils?

That is true.

Then all but the philosophers are courageous only from fear, and because they are afraid; and yet that a man should be courageous from fear, and because he is a coward, is surely a strange thing.

Very true.

And are not the temperate exactly in the same case? They are temperate because they are intemperate—which may seem to be a contradiction, but is nevertheless the sort of thing which happens with this foolish temperance. For there are pleasures which they must have, and are afraid of losing; and therefore they abstain from one class of pleasures because they are overcome by another: and whereas intemperance is defined as 'being under the dominion of pleasure,' they overcome only because they are overcome by pleasure. And that is what I mean by saying that they are temperate through intemperance.

That appears to be true.

Yet the exchange of one fear or pleasure or pain for another fear or pleasure or pain, which are measured like coins, the greater with the less, is not the exchange of virtue. O my dear Simmias, is there

not one true coin for which all things ought to exchange?—and that is wisdom; and only in exchange for this, and in company with this, is anything truly bought or sold, whether courage or temperance or justice. And is not all true virtue the companion of wisdom, no matter what fears or pleasures or other similar goods or evils may or may not attend her? But the virtue which is made up of these goods, when they are severed from wisdom and exchanged with one another, is a shadow of virtue only, nor is there any freedom or health or truth in her; but in the true exchange there is a purging away of all these things, and temperance, and justice, and courage, and wisdom herself, are a purgation of them. And I conceive that the founders of the mysteries had a real meaning and were not mere triflers when they intimated in a figure long ago that he who passed unsanctified and uninitiated into the world below will live in a slough, but that he who arrives there after initiation and purification will dwell with the gods. For ‘many,’ as they say in the mysteries, ‘are the thyrsus-bearers, but few are the mystics,’—meaning, as I interpret the words, the true philosophers. In the number of whom I have been seeking, according to my ability, to find a place during my whole life;—whether I have sought in a right way or not, and whether I have succeeded or not, I shall truly know in a little while, if God will, when I myself arrive in the other world: that is my belief. And now Simmias and Cebes, I have answered those who charge me with not grieving or repining at parting from you and my masters in this world; and I am right in not repining, for I believe that I shall find other masters and friends who are as good in the world below. But all men cannot receive this, and I shall be glad if my words have any more success with you than with the judges of Athenians.

Cebes answered: I agree, Socrates, in the greater part of what you say. But in what relates to the soul, men are apt to be incredulous; they fear that when she leaves the body her place may be nowhere, and that on the very day of death she may be destroyed and perish—immediately on her release from the body, issuing forth like smoke or air and vanishing away into nothingness. For if she could only hold together and be herself after she was released from the evils of the body, there would be good reason to hope, Socrates, that what you say is true. But much persuasion and many arguments are required in order to prove that when the man is dead the soul yet exists, and has any force or intelligence.

True, Cebes, said Socrates; and shall I suggest that we talk a little

of the probabilities of these things?

I am sure, said Cebes, that I should greatly like to know your opinion about them.

I reckon, said Socrates, that no one who heard me now, not even if he were one of my old enemies, the comic poets, could accuse me of idle talking about matters in which I have no concern. Let us then, if you please, proceed with the inquiry.

Whether the souls of men after death are or are not in the world below, is a question which may be argued in this manner:—The ancient doctrine of which I have been speaking affirms that they go from hence into the other world, and return hither, and are born from the dead. Now if this be true, and the living come from the dead, then our souls must be in the other world, for if not, how could they be born again? And this would be conclusive, if there were any real evidence that the living are only born from the dead; but if there is no evidence of this, then other arguments will have to be adduced.

That is very true, replied Cebes.

Then let us consider this question, not in relation to man only, but in relation to animals generally, and to plants, and to everything of which there is generation, and the proof will be easier. Are not all things which have opposites generated out of their opposites? I mean such things as good and evil, just and unjust—and there are innumerable other opposites which are generated out of opposites. And I want to show that this holds universally of all opposites; I mean to say, for example, that anything which becomes greater must become greater after being less.

True.

And that which becomes less must have been once greater and then become less.

Yes.

And the weaker is generated from the stronger, and the swifter from the slower.

Very true.

And the worse is from the better, and the more just is from the more unjust?

Of course.

And is this true of all opposites? and are we convinced that all of them are generated out of opposites?

Yes.

And in this universal opposition of all things, are there not also

two intermediate processes which are ever going on, from one to the other, and back again; where there is a greater and a less there is also an intermediate process of increase and diminution, and that which grows is said to wax, and that which decays to wane?

Yes, he said.

And there are many other processes, such as division and composition, cooling and heating, which equally involve a passage into and out of one another. And this holds of all opposites, even though not always expressed in words—they are generated out of one another, and there is a passing or process from one to the other of them?

Very true, he replied.

Well, and is there not an opposite of life, as sleep is the opposite of waking?

True, he said.

And what is that?

Death, he answered.

And these then are generated, if they are opposites, the one from the other, and have there their two intermediate processes also?

Of course.

Now, said Socrates, I will analyze one of the two pairs of opposites which I have mentioned to you, and also its intermediate processes, and you shall analyze the other to me. The state of sleep is opposed to the state of waking, and out of sleeping waking is generated, and out of waking, sleeping; and the process of generation is in the one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up. Are you agreed about that?

Quite agreed.

Then, suppose that you analyze life and death to me in the same manner. Is not death opposed to life?

Yes.

And they are generated one from the other?

Yes.

What is generated from life?

Death.

And what from death?

I can only say in answer—life.

Then the living, whether things or persons, Cebes, are generated from the dead?

That is clear, he replied.

Then the inference is that our souls are in the world below?

That is true.

And one of the two processes or generations is visible—for surely the act of dying is visible?

Surely, he said.

And may not the other be inferred as the complement of nature, who is not to be supposed to go on one leg only? And if not, a corresponding process of generation in death must also be assigned to her?

Certainly, he replied.

And what is that process?

Revival.

And revival, if there be such a thing, is the birth of the dead into the world of the living?

Quite true.

Then here is a new way in which we arrive at the inference that the living come from the dead, just as the dead come from the living; and if this is true, then the souls of the dead must be in some place out of which they come again. And this, as I think, has been satisfactorily proved.

Yes, Socrates, he said; all this seems to flow necessarily out of our previous admissions.

And that these admissions were not unfair, Cebes, he said, may be shown, as I think, in this way: If generation were in a straight line only, and there were no compensation or circle in nature, no turn or return into one another, then you know that all things would at last have the same form and pass into the same state, and there would be no more generation of them.

What do you mean? he said.

A simple thing enough, which I will illustrate by the case of sleep, he replied. You know that if there were no compensation of sleeping and waking, the story of the sleeping Endymion would in the end have no meaning, because all other things would be asleep too, and he would not be thought of. Or if there were composition only, and no division of substances, then the chaos of Anaxagoras would come again. And in like manner, my dear Cebes, if all things which partook of life were to die, and after they were dead remained in the form of death, and did not come to life again, all would at last die, and nothing would be alive—how could this be otherwise? For if the living spring from any others who are not the dead, and they die, must not all things at last be swallowed up in death?

There is no escape from that, Socrates, said Cebes; and I think that what you say is entirely true.

Yes, he said, Cebes, I entirely think so too; and we are not walking in a vain imagination: but I am confident in the belief that there truly is such a thing as living again, and that the living spring from the dead, and that the souls of the dead are in existence, and that the good souls have a better portion than the evil.

Cebes added: Your favourite doctrine, Socrates, that knowledge is simply recollection, if true, also necessarily implies a previous time in which we learned that which we now recollect. But this would be impossible unless our soul was in some place before existing in the human form; here then is another argument of the soul's immortality.

But tell me, Cebes, said Simmias, interposing, what proofs are given of this doctrine of recollection? I am not very sure at this moment that I remember them.

One excellent proof, said Cebes, is afforded by questions. If you put a question to a person in a right way, he will give a true answer of himself, but how could he do this unless there were knowledge and right reason already in him? And this is most clearly shown when he is taken to a diagram or to anything of that sort.

But if, said Socrates, you are still incredulous, Simmias, I would ask you whether you may not agree with me when you look at the matter in another way;—I mean, if you are still incredulous as to whether knowledge is recollection?

Incredulous, I am not, said Simmias; but I want to have this doctrine of recollection brought to my own recollection, and, from what Cebes has said, I am beginning to recollect and be convinced: but I should still like to hear what more you have to say.

[This is what I should say, he replied:—We should agree, if I am not mistaken, that what a man recollects he must have known at some previous time.

Very true.

And what is the nature of this recollection? And, in asking this, I mean to ask, whether when a person has already seen or heard or in any way perceived anything, and he knows not only that, but something else of which he has not the same but another knowledge, we may not fairly say that he recollects that which comes into his mind. Are we agreed about that?

What do you mean?

I mean what I may illustrate by the following instance:—The

knowledge of a lyre is not the same as the knowledge of a man?

True.

And yet what is the feeling of lovers when they recognize a lyre, or a garment, or anything else which the beloved has been in the habit of using? Do not they, from knowing the lyre, form in the mind's eye an image of the youth to whom the lyre belongs? And this is recollection: and in the same way any one who sees Simmias may remember Cebes; and there are endless other things of the same nature.

Yes, indeed, there are,—endless, replied Simmias.

And this sort of thing, he said, is recollection, and is most commonly a process of recovering that which has been forgotten through time and inattention.

Very true, he said.

Well; and may you not also from seeing the picture of a horse or a lyre remember a man? and from the picture of Simmias, you may be led to remember Cebes?

True.

Or you may also be led to the recollection of Simmias himself?

True, he said.

And in all these cases, the recollection may be derived from things either like or unlike?

That is true.

And when the recollection is derived from like things, then there is sure to be another question, which is—whether the likeness of that which is recollected is in any way defective or not?

Very true, he said.

And shall we proceed a step further, and affirm that there is *such* a thing as equality, not of wood with wood, or of stone with stone, but that, over and above this, there is equality in the abstract? Shall we affirm this?

Affirm, yes, and swear to it, replied Simmias, with all the confidence in life.

And do we know the nature of this abstract essence?

To be sure, he said.

And whence did we obtain this knowledge? Did we not see equalities of material things, such as pieces of wood and stones, and gather from them the *idea* of an equality which is different from them?—you will admit that? Or look at the matter again in this way:—Do not the same pieces of wood or stone appear at one time equal, and at another unequal?

That is certain.

But are real equals ever unequal? or is the idea of equality ever inequality?

That surely was never yet known, Socrates.

Then these (so-called) equals are not the same with the idea of equality?

I should say, clearly not, Socrates.

And yet from these equals, although differing from the idea of equality, you conceived and attained that idea?

Very true, he said.

Which might be like, or might be unlike them?

Yes.

But that makes no difference: whenever from seeing one thing you conceive another, whether like or unlike, there must surely have been an act of recollection?

Very true.

But what would you say of equal portions of wood and stone, or other material equals? and what is the impression produced by them? Are they equals in the same sense as absolute equality? or do they fall short of this in a measure?

Yes, he said, in a very great measure too.

And must we not allow, that when I or any one look at any object, and perceive that the object aims at being some other thing, but falls short of, and cannot attain to it,—he who makes this observation must have had a previous knowledge of that to which, as he says, the other, although similar, was inferior?

Certainly.

And has not this been our own case in the matter of equals and of absolute equality?

Precisely.

Then we must have known absolute equality previously to the time when we first saw the material equals, and reflected that all these apparent equals aim at this absolute equality, but fall short of it?

That is true.

And we recognize also that this absolute equality has only been known, and can only be known, through the medium of sight or touch, or of some other sense. And this I would affirm of all such conceptions.

Yes, Socrates, as far as the argument is concerned, one of them is the same as the other.

And from the senses then is derived the knowledge that all sensible things aim at an idea of equality of which they fall short—is not that true?

Yes.

Then before we began to see or hear or perceive in any way, we must have had a knowledge of absolute equality, or we could not have referred to that the equals which are derived from the senses?—for to that they all aspire, and of that they fall short?

That, Socrates, is certainly to be inferred from the previous statements.

And did we not see and hear and acquire our other senses as soon as we were born?

Certainly.

Then we must have acquired the knowledge of the ideal equal at some previous to this?

Yes.

That is to say, before we were born, I suppose?

True.

And if we acquired this knowledge before we were born, and were born having it, we also knew before we were born and at the instant of birth not only the equal or the greater or the less, but all other ideas; for we are not speaking only of equality absolute, but of beauty, good, justice, holiness, and all which we stamp with the name of the essence in the dialectical process, when we ask and answer questions. Of all this we may certainly affirm that we acquired the knowledge before birth.

That is true.

But if, after having acquired, we have not forgotten that which we acquired, then we must always have been born with knowledge, and shall always continue to know as long as life lasts—for knowing is the acquiring and retaining knowledge and not forgetting. Is not forgetting, Simmias, just the losing of knowledge?

Quite true, Socrates.

But if the knowledge which we acquired before birth was lost by us at birth, and if afterwards by the use of the senses we recovered that which we previously knew, will not that which we call learning be a process of recovering our knowledge, and may not this be rightly termed recollection by us?

Very true.

For this is clear—that when we perceived something, either by

the help of sight, or hearing, or some other sense, there was no difficulty in receiving from this conception of some other thing like or unlike which had been forgotten and which was associated with this; and therefore, as I was saying, one of two alternatives follows:—either we had this knowledge at birth, and continued to know through life; or, after birth, those who are said to learn only remember, and learning is recollection only.

Yes, that is quite true, Socrates.

And which alternative, Simmias, do you prefer? Had we the knowledge at our birth, or did we remember afterwards the things which we knew previously to our birth?

I cannot decide at the moment.

At any rate you can decide whether he who has knowledge ought or ought not to be able to give a reason for what he knows.

Certainly, he ought.

But do you think that every man is able to give a reason about these very matters of which we are speaking?

I wish that they could, Socrates, but I greatly fear that to-morrow at this time there will be no one able to give a reason worth having.

Then you are not of opinion, Simmias, that all men know these things?

Certainly not.

Then they are in process of recollecting that which they learned before?

Certainly.

But when did our souls acquire this knowledge?—not since we were born as men?

Certainly not.

And therefore, previously?

Yes.

Then, Simmias, our souls must have existed before they were in the form of man—without bodies, and must have had intelligence.

Unless indeed you suppose, Socrates, that these notions were given us at the moment of birth; for this is the only time that remains.

Yes, my friend, but when did we lose them? for they are not in us when we are born—that is admitted. Did we lose them at the moment of receiving them, or at some other time?

No, Socrates, I perceive that I was unconsciously talking nonsense.

Then may we not say, Simmias, that if, as we are always repeating,

there is an absolute beauty, and goddness, and essence in general, and to this, which is now discovered to be a previous condition of our being, we refer all our sensations, and with this compare them—assuming this to have a prior existence, then our souls must have had a prior existence, but if not, there would be no force in the argument. There can be no doubt that if these absolute ideas existed before we were born, then our souls must have existed before we were born, and if not the ideas, then not the souls.

Yes, Socrates; I am convinced that there is precisely the same necessity for the existence of the soul before birth, and of the essence of which you are speaking: and the argument arrives at a result which happily agrees with my own notion. For there is nothing which to my mind is so evident as that beauty, good, and other notions of which you were just now speaking, have a most real and absolute existence; and I am satisfied with the proof.

Well, but is Cebes equally satisfied? for I must convince him too.

I think, said Simmias, that Cebes is satisfied: although he is the most incredulous of mortals, yet I believe that he is convinced of the existence of the soul before birth. But that after death the soul will continue to exist is not yet proven even to my own satisfaction. I cannot get rid of the feeling of the many to which Cebes was referring—the feeling that when the man dies the soul may be scattered, and that this may be the end of her. For admitting that she may be generated and created in some other place, and may have existed before entering the human body, why after having entered in and gone out again may she not herself be destroyed and come to an end?

Very true, Simmias, said Cebes; that our soul existed before we were born was the first half of the argument, and this appears to have been proven; that the soul will exist after death as well as before birth is the other half of which the proof is still wanting, and has to be supplied:

But that proof, Simmias and Cebes, has been already given, said Socrates, if you put the two arguments together—I mean this and the former one, in which we admitted that everything living is born of the dead. For if the soul existed before birth, and in coming to life and being born can be born only from death and dying, must she not after death continue to exist, since she has to be born again? surely the proof which you desire has been already furnished. Still I suspect that you and Simmias would be glad to probe the argument further: like children, you are haunted with a fear that when the soul leaves

the body, the wind may really blow her away and scatter her; especially if a man should happen to die in stormy weather and not when the sky is calm.

Cebes answered with a smile: Then, Socrates, you must argue us out of our fears—and yet, strictly speaking, they are not our fears, but there is a child within us to whom death is a sort of hobgoblin; him too we must persuade not to be afraid when he is alone with him in the dark.

Socrates said: Let the voice of the charmer be applied daily until you have charmed him away.

And where shall we find a good charmer of our fears, Socrates, when you are gone?

Hellas, he replied, is a large place, Cebes, and has many good men, and there are barbarous races not a few: seek for him among them all, far and wide, sparing neither pains nor money; for there is no better way of using your money. And you must not forget to seek for him among yourselves too; for he is nowhere more likely to be found.

The search, replied Cebes, shall certainly be made. And now, if you please, let us return to the point of the argument at which we digressed.

By all means, replied Socrates; what else should I please?

Very good, he said.

Must we not, said Socrates, ask ourselves some question of this sort?—What is that which, as we imagine, is liable to be scattered away, and about which we fear? and what again is that about which we have no fear? And then we may proceed to inquire whether that which suffers dispersion is or is not of the nature of soul—our hopes and fears as to our own souls will turn upon that.

That is true, he said.

Now the compound or composite may be supposed to be naturally capable of being dissolved in like manner as of being compounded; but that which is uncompounded, and that only, must be, if anything is, indissoluble.

Yes; that is what I should imagine, said Cebes.

And the uncompounded may be assumed to be the same and unchanging, whereas the compound is always changing and never the same?

That I also think, he said.

Then now let us return to the previous discussion. Is that idea

or essence, which in the dialectical process we define as essence or true existence—whether essence of equality, beauty, or anything else—are these essences, I say, liable at times to some degree of change? or are they each of them always what they are, having the same simple self-existent and unchanging forms, and not admitting of variation at all, or in any way, or at any time?

They must be always the same, Socrates, replied Cebes.

And what would you say of the many beautiful—whether men or horses or garments or any other things which may be called equal or beautiful,—are they all unchanging and the same always, or quite the reverse? May they not rather be described as almost always changing and hardly ever the same, either with themselves or with one another?

The latter, replied Cebes; they are always in a state of change.

And these you can touch and see and perceive with the senses, but the unchanging things you can only perceive with the mind—they are invisible and are not seen?

That is very true, he said.

Well then, he added, let us suppose that there are two sorts of existences—one seen, the other unseen.

Let us suppose them.

The seen is the changing, and the unseen is the unchanging?

That may be also supposed.

And, further, is not one part of us body, and the rest of us soul?

To be sure.

And to which class may we say that the body is more alike and akin?

Clearly to the seen: no one can doubt that.

And is the soul seen or not seen?

Not by man, Socrates.

And by 'seen' and 'not seen' is meant by us that which is or is not visible to the eye of man?

Yes, to the eye of man.

And what do we say of the soul?—is that seen or not seen?

Not seen.

Unseen then?

Yes.

Then the soul is more like to the unseen, and the body to the seen?

That is most certain, Socrates.

And were we not saying long ago that the soul when using the

body as an instrument of perception, that is to say, when using the sense of sight or hearing or some other sense (or the meaning of perceiving through the body is perceiving through the senses)—were we not saying that the soul too is then dragged by the body into the region of the changeable, and wanders and is confused; the world spins round her, and she is like a drunkard when under their influence?

Very true.

But when returning into herself she reflects; then she passes into the realm of purity, and eternity, and immortality, and unchangeableness, which are her kindred, and with them she ever lives, when she is by herself and is not let or hindered; then she ceases from her erring ways, and being in communion with the unchanging is unchanging. And this state of the soul is called wisdom?

That is well and truly said, Socrates, he replied.

And to which class is the soul more nearly alike and akin, as far as may be inferred from this argument, as well as from the preceding one?

I think, Socrates, that, in the opinion of every one who follows the argument, the soul will be infinitely more like the unchangeable—even the most stupid person will not deny that.

And the body is more like the changing?

Yes.

Yet once more consider the matter in this light: When the soul and the body are united, then nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and the body to obey and serve. Now which of these two functions is akin to the divine? and which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal that which is subject and servant?

True.

And which does the soul resemble?

The soul resembles the divine, and the body the mortal—there can be no doubt of that, Socrates.

Then reflect, Cebes: is not the conclusion of the whole matter this—that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intelligible, and uniform, and indissoluble, and unchangeable; and the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintelligible, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. Can this, my dear Cebes, be denied?

No indeed.

But if this is true, then is not the body liable to speedy dissolution? and is not the soul almost or altogether indissoluble?

Certainly.

And do you further observe, that after a man is dead, the body, which is the visible part of man, and has a visible framework, which is called a corpse, and which would naturally be dissolved and decomposed and dissipated, is not dissolved or decomposed at once, but may remain for a good while, if the constitution be sound at the time of death, and the season of the year favorable? For the body when shrunk and embalmed, as is the custom in Egypt, may remain almost entire through infinite ages; and even in decay, still there are some portions, such as the bones and ligaments, which are practically indestructible. You allow that?

Yes.

And are we to suppose that the soul, which is invisible, in passing to the true Hades, which like her is invisible, and pure, and noble, and on her way to the good and wise God, whither, if God will, my soul is also soon to go,—that the soul, I repeat, if this be her nature and origin, is blown away and perishes immediately on quitting the body, as the many say? That can never be, my dear Simmias and Cebes. The truth rather is, that the soul which is pure at departing draws after her no bodily taint, having never voluntarily had connection with the body, which she is ever avoiding, herself gathered into herself; (for such abstraction has been the study of her life. And what does this mean but that she has been a true disciple of philosophy, and has practised how to die easily? And is not philosophy the practice of death?)

Certainly.

That soul, I say, herself invisible, departs to the invisible world—to the divine and immortal and rational: thither arriving, she lives in bliss and is released from the error and folly of men, their fears and wild passions and all other human ills, and for ever dwells, as they say of the initiated, in company with the gods? Is not this true, Cebes?

Yes, said Cebes, beyond a doubt.

But the soul which has been polluted, and is impure at the time of her departure, and is the companion and servant of the body always, and is in love with and fascinated by the body and by the desires and pleasures of the body, until she is led to believe that the truth only exists in a bodily form, which a man may touch and see and taste and use for the purposes of his lusts,—the soul, I mean, accustomed

to hate and fear and avoid the intellectual principle, which to the bodily eye is dark and invisible, and can be attained only by philosophy ;—do you suppose that such a soul as this will depart pure and unalloyed?

That is impossible, he replied.

She is engrossed by the corporeal, which the continual association and constant care of the body have made natural to her.

Very true.

And this, my friend, may be conceived to be that heavy, weighty, earthy element of sight by which such a soul is depressed and dragged down again into the visible world, because she is afraid of the invisible and of the world below,—prowling about tombs and sepulchres, in the neighbourhood of which, as they tell us, are seen certain ghostly apparitions of souls which have not departed pure, but are cloyed with sight and therefore visible.

That is very likely, Socrates.

Yes, that is very likely, Cebes ; and these must be the souls, not of the good, but of the evil, who are compelled to wander about such places in payment of the penalty of their former evil way of life ; and they continue to wander until the desire which haunts them is satisfied and they are imprisoned in another body. And they may be supposed to be fixed in the same natures which they had in their former life.

What natures do you mean, Socrates?

I mean to say that men who have followed after gluttony, and wantonness, and drunkenness, and have had no thought of avoiding them, would pass into asses and animals of that sort. What do you think?

I think that exceedingly probable.

And those who have chosen the portion of injustice, and tyranny, and violence, will pass into wolves, or hawks and kites ;—whither else can we suppose them to go?

Yes, said Cebes ; that is doubtless the place of natures such as theirs.

And there is no difficulty, he said, in assigning to all of them places answering to their several natures and propensities?

There is not, he said.

Even among them some are happier than others ; and the happiest both in themselves and their place of abode are those who have practised the evil and social virtues which are called temperance and justice, and are acquired by habit and attention without philosophy and

mind.

Why are they the happiest?

Because they may be expected to pass into some gentle social nature which is like their own, such as that of bees or ants, or even back again into the form of man, and just and moderate men spring from them.

That is not impossible.

But he who is a philosopher or lover of learning, and is entirely pure at departing, is alone permitted to reach the gods. And this is the reason, Simmias and Cebes, why the true votaries of philosophy abstain from all fleshly lusts, and endure and refuse to give themselves up to them,—not because they fear poverty or the ruin of their families, like the lovers of money, and the world in general; nor like the lovers of power and honour, because they dread the dishonour or disgrace of evil deeds.

No, Socrates, that would not become them, said Cebes.

No indeed, he replied; and therefore they who have a care of their souls, and do not merely live in the fashions of the body, say farewell to all this; they will not walk in the ways of the blind: and when philosophy offers them purification and release from evil, they feel that they ought not to resist her influence, and to her they incline, and whither she leads they follow her.

What do you mean, Socrates?

I will tell you, he said. The lovers of knowledge are conscious that their souls when philosophy receives them, are simply fastened and glued to their bodies: the soul is only able to view existence through the bars of a prison, and not in her own nature; she is wallowing in the mire of all ignorance; and philosophy, seeing the terrible nature of her confinement, and that the captive through desire is led to conspire in her own captivity (for the lovers of knowledge are aware that this was the original state of the soul, and that when she was in this state philosophy received and gently counselled her, and wanted to release her, pointing out to her that the eye is full of deceit, and also the ear and the other senses, and persuading her to retire from them in all but the necessary use of them, and to be gathered up and collected into herself, and to trust only to herself and her own intuitions of absolute existence, and mistrust that which comes to her through others and is subject to vicissitude)—philosophy shows her that this is visible and tangible, but that what she sees in her own nature is intellectual and invisible. And the soul of the true philoso-

pher thinks that she ought not to resist this deliverance, and therefore abstains from pleasures and desires and pains and fears, as far as she is able; reflecting that when a man has great joys or sorrows or fears or desires, he suffers from them, not the sort of evil which might be anticipated—as for example, the loss of his health or property which he has sacrificed to his lusts—but he has suffered an evil greater far, which is the greatest and worst of all evils, and one of which he never thinks.

And what is that, Socrates? said Cebes.

Why this: When the feeling of pleasure or pain in the soul is most intense, all of us naturally suppose that the subject of this intense feeling is then plainest and truest: but this is not the case.

Very true.

And this is the state in which the soul is most enthralled by the body.

How is that?

Why, because each pleasure and pain is a sort of nail which nails and rivets the soul to the body, and engrosses her and makes her believe that to be true which the body affirms to be true; and from agreeing with the body and having the same delights she is obliged to have the same habits and ways, and is not likely ever to be pure at her departure to the world below, but is always saturated with the body; so that she soon sinks into another body and there germinates and grows, and has therefore no part in the communion of the divine and pure and simple.

That is most true, Socrates, answered Cebes.

And this, Cebes, is the reason why the true lovers of knowledge are temperate and brave; and not for the reason which the world gives.

Certainly not.

Certainly not! For not in that way does the soul of a philosopher reason; she will not ask philosophy to release her in order that when released she may deliver herself up again to the thralldom of pleasures and pains, doing a work only to be undone again, weaving instead of unweaving her Penelope's web. But she will make herself a calm of passion, and follow reason, and dwell in her, beholding the true and divine (which is not matter of opinion), and thence derive nourishment. Thus she seeks to live while she lives, and after death she hopes to go to her own kindred and to be freed from human ills. Never fear, Simmias and Cebes, that a soul which has been thus nurtured and has had these pursuits, will at her departure from the body

be scattered and blown away by the winds and be nowhere and nothing.

When Socrates had done speaking, for a considerable time there was silence; he himself and most of us appeared to be meditating on what had been said; only Cebes and Simmias spoke a few words to one another. And Socrates observing this asked them what they thought of the argument, and whether there was anything wanting? For, said he, much is still open to suspicion and attack, if anyone were disposed to sift the matter thoroughly. If you are talking of something else I would rather not interrupt you, but if you are still doubtful about the argument do not hesitate to say exactly what you think, and let us have anything better which you can suggest; and if I am likely to be of any use, allow me to help you.

Simmias said: I must confess, Socrates, that doubts did arise in our minds, and each of us was urging and inciting the other to put the question which we wanted to have answered and which neither of us liked to ask, fearing that our importunity might be troublesome under present circumstances.

Socrates smiled, and said: O Simmias, how strange that is; I am not very likely to persuade other men that I do not regard my present situation as a misfortune, if I am unable to persuade you, and you will keep fancying that I am at all more troubled now than at any other time. Will you not allow that I have as much of the spirit of prophecy in me as the swans? For they, when they perceive that they must die, having sung all their life long, do then sing more than ever, rejoicing in the thought that they are about to go away to the god whose ministers they are. But men, because they are themselves afraid of death, slanderously affirm of the swans that they sing a lament at the last, not considering that no bird sings when cold, or hungry, or in pain, not even the nightingale, nor the swallow, nor yet the hoopoe; which are said indeed to tune a lay of sorrow, although I do not believe this to be true of them any more than of the swans. But because they are sacred to Apollo, and have the gift of prophecy, and anticipate the good things of another world, therefore they sing and rejoice in that day more than ever they did before. And I too, believing myself to be the consecrated servant of the same God, and the fellow-servant of the swans, and thinking that I have received from my master gifts of prophecy which are not inferior to theirs, would not go out of life less merrily than the swans. Cease to mind then about this, but speak and ask anything which you like, while the eleven magistrates of Athens allow.

Well, Socrates, said Simmias, then I will tell you my difficulty, and Cebes will tell you his. For I dare say that you, Socrates, feel as I do, how very hard or almost impossible is the attainment of any certainty about questions such as these in the present life. And yet I should deem him a coward who did not prove what is said about them to the uttermost, or whose heart failed him before he had examined them on every side. For he should persevere until he has attained one of two things: either he should discover or learn the truth about them; or, if this is impossible, I would have him take the best and most irrefragable of human notions, and let this be the raft upon which he sails through life—not without risk, I admit, if he cannot find some word of God which will more surely and safely carry him. And now, as you bid me, I will venture to question you, as I should not like to reproach myself hereafter with not having said at the time what I think. For when I consider the matter, either alone or with Cebes, the argument does certainly appear to me, Socrates, to be not sufficient.

Socrates answered: I dare say, my friend, that you may be right, but I should like to know in what respect the argument is not sufficient.

In this respect, replied Simmias:—might not a person use the same argument about harmony and the lyre—might he not say that harmony is a thing invisible, incorporeal, fair, divine, abiding in the lyre which is harmonized, but that the lyre and the strings are matter and material, composite, earthy, and akin to mortality? And when some one breaks the lyre, or cuts and rends the strings, then he who takes this view would argue as you do, and on the same analogy, that the harmony survives and has not perished; for you cannot imagine, as he would say, that the lyre without the strings, and the broken strings themselves remain, and yet that the harmony, which is of heavenly and immortal nature and kindred, has perished—and perished too before the mortal. That harmony, he would say, certainly exists somewhere, and the wood and strings will decay before that decays. For I suspect, Socrates, that the notion of the soul which we are all of us inclined to entertain, would also be yours, and that you too would conceive the body to be strung up, and held together, by the elements of hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, and that the soul is the harmony or due proportionate admixture of them. And, if this is true, the inference clearly is, that when the strings of the body are unduly loosened or overstrained through disorder or other injury, then the soul, though most divine, like other harmonies of music or of works of art, of course perishes at once; although the material remains

of the body may last for a considerable time, until they are either decayed or burnt. Now if any one maintained that the soul, being the harmony of the elements of the body, first perishes in that which is called death, how shall we answer him?

Socrates looked round at us as his manner was, and said with a smile: Simmias has reason on his side; and why does not some one of you who is abler than myself answer him? for there is force in his attack upon me. But perhaps, before we answer him, we had better also hear what Cebes has to say against the argument—this will give us time for reflection, and when both of them have spoken, we may either assent to them, if their words appear to be in consonance with the truth, or if not, we may take up the other side, and argue with them. Please to tell me then, Cebes, he said, what was the difficulty which troubled you?

Cebes said: I will tell you. My feeling is that the argument is still in the same position, and open to the same objections which were urged before; for I am ready to admit that the existence of the soul before entering into the bodily form has been very ingeniously, and, as I may be allowed to say, quite sufficiently proven; but the existence of the soul after death is still, in my judgment, unproven. Now my objection is not the same as that of Simmias; for I am not disposed to deny that the soul is stronger and more lasting than the body, being of opinion that in all such respects the soul very far excels the body. Well then, says the argument to me, why do you remain unconvinced?—When you see that the weaker is still in existence after the man is dead, will you not admit that the more lasting must also survive during the same period of time? Now I, like Simmias, must employ a figure; and I shall ask you to consider whether the figure is to the point. The parallel which I will suppose is that of an old weaver, who dies, and after his death somebody says:—He is not dead, he must be alive; and he appeals to the coat which he himself wove and wore, and which is still whole and undecayed. And then he proceeds to ask of some one who is incredulous, whether a man lasts longer, or the coat which is in use and wear; and when he is answered that a man lasts far longer, thinks that he has thus certainly demonstrated the survival of the man, who is the more lasting, because the less lasting remains. But that, Simmias, as I would beg you to observe, is not the truth; every one sees that he who talks thus is talking nonsense. For the truth is, that this weaver, having worn and woven many such coats, though he outlived several of them, was himself out-

lived by the last; but this is surely very far from proving that a man is slighter and weaker than a coat. Now the relation of the body to the soul may be expressed in a similar figure; for you may say with reason that the soul is lasting, and the body weak and shortlived in comparison. And every soul may be said to wear out many bodies, especially in the course of a long life. For if while the man is alive the body deliquesces and decays, and yet the soul always weaves her garment anew and repairs the waste, then of course, when the soul perishes, she must have on her last garment, and this only will survive her; but then again, when the soul is dead, the body will at last show its native weakness, and soon pass into decay. And therefore this is an argument on which I would rather not rely as proving that the soul exists after death. For suppose that we grant even more than you affirm as within the range of possibility, and besides acknowledging that the soul existed before birth, admit also that after death the souls of some are existing still, and will exist, and will be born and die again and again, and that there is a natural strength in the soul which will hold out and be born many times—for all this, we may be still inclined to think that she will weary in the labours of successive births, and may at last succumb in one of her deaths and utterly perish; and this death and dissolution of the body which brings destruction to the soul may be unknown to any of us, for no one of us can have had any experience of it: and if this be true, then I say that he who is confident in death has but a foolish confidence, unless he is able to prove that the soul is altogether immortal and imperishable. But if he is not able to prove this, he who is about to die will always have reason to fear that when the body is disunited, the soul also may utterly perish.

All of us, as we afterwards remarked to one another, had an unpleasant feeling at hearing them say this. When we had been so firmly convinced before, now to have our faith shaken seemed to introduce a confusion and uncertainty, not only into the previous argument, but into any future one; either we were not good judges, or there were no real grounds of belief.

Ech. There I feel with you—indeed I do, Phaedo, and when you were speaking, I was beginning to ask myself the same question: What argument can I ever trust again? For what could be more convincing than the argument of Socrates, which has now fallen into discredit? That the soul is a harmony is a doctrine which has always had a wonderful attraction for me, and, when mentioned, came back

to me at once, as my own original conviction. And now I must begin again and find another argument which will assure me that when the man is dead the soul dies not with him. Tell me, I beg, how did Socrates proceed? Did he appear to share the unpleasant feeling which you mention? or did he receive the interruption calmly and give a sufficient answer? Tell us, as exactly as you can, what passed.

Phaed. Often, Echecrates, as I have admired Socrates, I never admired him more than at that moment. That he should be able to answer was nothing, but what astonished me was, first, the gentle and pleasant and approving manner in which he regarded the words of the young men, and then his quick sense of the wound which had been inflicted by the argument, and his ready application of the healing art. He might be compared to a general rallying his defeated and broken army, urging them to follow him and return to the field of argument.

Ech. How was that?

Phaed. You shall hear, for I was close to him on his right hand, seated on a sort of stool, and he on a couch which was a good deal higher. Now he had a way of playing with my hair, and then he smoothed my head, and pressed the hair upon my neck, and said:—To-morrow, Phaedo, I suppose that these fair locks of yours will be severed.

Yes, Socrates, I suppose that they will, I replied.

Not so, if you will take my advice.

What shall I do with them? I said.

To-day, he replied, and not to-morrow, if this argument dies and cannot be brought to life again by us, you and I will both shave our locks: and if I were you, and could not maintain my ground against Simmias and Cebes, I would myself take an oath, like the Argives, not to wear hair any more until I had renewed the conflict and defeated them.

Yes, I said; but Heracles himself is said not to be a match for two.

Summon me then, he said, and I will be your Iolaus until the sun goes down.

I summon you rather, I said, not as Heracles summoning Iolaus, but as Iolaus might summon Heracles.

That will be all the same, he said. But first let us take care that we avoid a danger.

And what is that? I said.

The danger of becoming misologists, he replied, which is one of the very worst things that can happen to us. For as there are mis-

anthropists or haters of men, there are also misologists or haters of ideas, and both spring from the same cause, which is ignorance of the world. Misanthropy arises from the too great confidence of inexperience;—you trust a man and think him altogether true and good faithful, and then in a little while he turns out to false and knavish; and then another and another, and when this has happened several times to a man, especially within the circle of his own most trusted friends, as he deems them, and he has often quarrelled with them, he at last hates all men, and believes that no one has any good in him at all. I dare say that you must have observed this.

Yes, I said.

And is not this discreditable? The reason is, that a man, having to deal with other men, has no knowledge of them; for if he had knowledge, he would have known the true state of the case, that few are the good and few the evil, and that the great majority are in the interval between them.

How do you mean? I said.

I mean, he replied, as you might say of the very large and very small—that nothing is more uncommon than a very large or very small man; and this applies generally to all extremes, whether of great and small, or swift and slow, or fair and foul, or black and white: and whether the instances you select be men or dogs or anything else, few are the extremes, but many are in the mean between them. Did you never observe this?

Yes, I said, I have.

And do you not imagine, he said, that if there were a competition of evil, the first in evil would be found to be very few?

Yes, that is very likely, I said.

Yes, that is very likely, he replied; not that in this respect arguments are like men—there I was led on by you to say more than I had intended; but the point of comparison was, that when a simple man who has no skill in dialectics believes an argument to be true which he afterwards imagines to be false, whether really false or not, and then another and another, he has no longer any faith left, and great disputers, as you know, come to think at last that they have grown to be the wisest of mankind; for they alone perceive the utter unsoundness and instability of all arguments, or indeed, of all things, which, like the currents in the Euripus, are going up and down in never-ceasing ebb and flow.

Yes, Phaedo, he replied, and very melancholy too, if there be

such a thing as truth or certainty or power of knowing at all, that a man should have lighted upon some argument or other which at first seemed true and then turned out to be false, and instead of blaming himself and his own want of wit, because he is annoyed, should at last be too glad to transfer the blame from himself to arguments in general; and for ever afterwards should hate and revile them, and lose the truth and knowledge of existence.

Yes, indeed, I said; that is very melancholy.

Let us then, in the first place, he said, be careful of admitting into our souls the notion that there is no truth or health or soundness in any arguments at all; but let us rather say that there is as yet no health in us, and that we must quit ourselves like men and do our best to gain health—you and all other men with a view to the whole of your future life, and I myself with a view to death. For at this moment I am sensible that I have not the temper of a philosopher; like the vulgar, I am only a partisan. For the partisan, when he is engaged in a dispute, cares nothing about the rights of the question, but is anxious only to convince his hearers of his own assertion. And the difference between him and me at the present moment is only this—that whereas he seeks to convince his hearers that what he says is true, I am rather seeking to convince myself; to convince my hearers is a secondary matter with me. And do but see how much I gain by this. For if what I say is true, then I do well to be persuaded of the truth; but if there be nothing after death, still, during the short time that remains, I shall save my friends from lamentations, and my ignorance will not last, and therefore no harm will be done. This is the state of mind, Simmias and Cebes, in which I approach the argument. And I would ask you to be thinking of the truth and not of Socrates: agree with me, if I seem to you to be speaking the truth; or if not, withstand me might and main, that I may not deceive you as well as myself in my enthusiasm, and like the bee, leave my sting in you before I die.

And now let us proceed, he said. And first of all let me be sure that I have in my mind what you were saying. Simmias, if I remember rightly, has fears and misgivings whether the soul, being in the form of harmony, although a fairer and diviner thing than the body, may not perish first. On the other hand, Cebes appeared to grant that the soul was more lasting than the body, but he said that no one could know whether the soul, after having worn out many bodies, might not perish herself and leave her last body behind her; and that this is death, which is the destruction not of the body but of the soul,

for in the body the work of destruction is ever going on. Are not these, Simmias and Cebes, the points which we have to consider?

They both agreed to this statement of them.

He proceeded: And did you deny the force of the whole preceding argument, or of a part only?

Of a part only, they replied.

And what did you think, he said, of that part of the argument in which we said that knowledge was recollection only, and inferred from this that the soul must have previously existed somewhere else before she was enclosed in the body? Cebes said that he had been wonderfully impressed by that part of the argument, and that his conviction remained unshaken. Simmias agreed, and added that he himself could hardly imagine the possibility of his ever thinking differently about that.

But, rejoined Socrates, you will have to think differently, my Theban friend, if you still maintain that harmony is a compound, and that the soul is a harmony which is made out of strings set in the frame of the body; for you will surely never allow yourself to say that a harmony is prior to the elements which compose the harmony.

No, Socrates, that is impossible.

But do you not see that you are saying this when you say that the soul existed before she took the form and body of man, and was made up of elements which as yet had no existence? For harmony is not a sort of thing like the soul, as you suppose; but first the lyre, and the strings, and the sounds exist in a state of discord, and then harmony is made last of all, and perishes first. And how can such a notion of the soul as this agree with the other?

Not at all, replied Simmias.

And yet, he said, there surely ought to be harmony when harmony is the theme of discourse.

There ought, replied Simmias.

But there is no harmony, he said, in the two propositions that knowledge is recollection, and that the soul is a harmony. Which of them then will you retain?

I think, he replied, that I have a much stronger faith, Socrates, in the first of the two, which has been fully demonstrated to me, than in the latter, which has not been demonstrated at all, but rests only on probable and plausible grounds; and I know too well that these arguments from probabilities are impostors, and unless great caution is observed in the use of them, they are apt to be deceptive—in geom-

etry, and in other things too. But the doctrine of knowledge and recollection has been proven to me on trustworthy grounds; and the proof was that the soul must have existed before she came into the body, because to her belongs the essence of which the very name implies existence. Having, as I am convinced, rightly accepted this conclusion, and on sufficient grounds, I must, as I suppose, cease to argue or allow others to argue that the soul is a harmony.

Let me put the matter, Simmias, he said, in another point of view: Do you imagine that a harmony or any other composition can be in a state other than that of the elements, out of which it is compounded?

Certainly not.

Or do or suffer anything other than they do or suffer?

He agreed.

Then a harmony does not lead the parts or elements which make up the harmony, but only follows them.

He assented.

For harmony cannot possibly have any motion, or sound, or other quality which is opposed to the parts.

That would be impossible, he replied.

And does not every harmony depend upon the manner in which the elements are harmonized?

I do not understand you, he said.

I mean to say that a harmony admits of degrees, and is more of a harmony, and more completely a harmony, when more completely harmonized, if that be possible; and less of a harmony, and less completely a harmony, when less harmonized.

True.

But does the soul admit of degrees? or is one soul in the very least degree more or less, or more or less completely, a soul than another?

Not in the least.

Yet surely one soul is said to have intelligence and virtue, and to be good, and another soul is said to have folly and vice, and to be an evil soul: and this is said truly?

Yes, truly.

But what will those who maintain the soul to be a harmony say of this presence of virtue and vice in the soul?—will they say that here is another harmony, and another discord, and that the virtuous soul is harmonized, and herself being harmony has another harmony within her, and that the vicious soul is inharmonical and has no harmony within her?

I cannot say, replied Simmias; but I suppose that something of that kind would be asserted by those who take this view.

And the admission is already made that no soul is more a soul than another; and this is equivalent to admitting that harmony is not more or less harmony, or more or less completely a harmony?

Quite true.

And that which is not more or less a harmony is not more or less harmonized?

True.

And that which is not more or less harmonized cannot have more or less of harmony, but only an equal harmony?

Yes, an equal harmony.

Then one soul not being more or less absolutely a soul than another, is not more or less harmonized?

Exactly.

And therefore has neither more nor less of harmony or of discord?

She has not.

And having neither more nor less of harmony or of discord, one soul has no more vice or virtue than another, if vice be discord and virtue harmony?

Not at all more.

Or speaking more correctly, Simmias, the soul, if she is a harmony, will never have any vice; because a harmony, being absolutely a harmony, has no part in the inharmonical.

No.

And therefore a soul which is absolutely a soul has no vice?

How can she have, consistently with the preceding argument?

Then, according to this, if the souls of all animals are equally and absolutely souls, they will be equally good?

I agree with you, Socrates, he said.

And can all this be true, think you? he said; and are all these consequences admissible—which nevertheless seem to follow from the assumption that the soul is a harmony?

Certainly not, he said.

Once more, he said, what ruling principle is there of human things other than the soul, and especially the wise soul? Do you know of any?

Indeed, I do not.

And is the soul in agreement with the affections of the body? or is she at variance with them? For example, when the body is hot

and thirsty, does not the soul incline us against drinking? and when the body is hungry, against eating? And this is only one instance out of ten thousand of the opposition of the soul to the things of the body.

Very true.

But we have already acknowledged that the soul, being a harmony, can never utter a note at variance with the tensions and relaxations and vibrations and other affections of the strings out of which she is composed; she can only follow, she cannot lead them?

Yes, he said, we acknowledged that, certainly.

And yet do we not now discover the soul to be doing the exact opposite—leading the elements of which she is believed to be composed; almost always opposing and coercing them in all sorts of ways throughout life, sometimes more violently with the pains of medicine and gymnastic; then again more gently;—threatening and also reprimanding the desires, passions, fears, as if talking to a thing which is not herself, as Homer in the *Odyssey* represents Odysseus doing in the words:—

‘He beat his breast, and thus reproached his heart:

Endure, my heart; far worse hast thou endured!’

Do you think that Homer could have written this under the idea that the soul is a harmony capable of being led by the affections of the body, and not rather of a nature which leads and masters them; and herself a far diviner thing than any harmony?

Yes, Socrates, I quite agree to that.

Then, my friend, we can never be right in saying that the soul is a harmony, for that would clearly contradict the divine Homer as well as ourselves.

True, he said.

Thus much, said Socrates, of Harmonia, your Theban goddess, Cebes, who has not been ungracious to us, I think; but what shall I say to the Theban Cadmus, and how shall I propitiate him?

I think that you will discover a way of propitiating him, said Cebes; I am sure that you have answered the argument about harmony in a manner that I could never have expected. For when Simias mentioned his objection, I quite imagined that no answer could be given to him, and therefore I was surprised at finding that his argument could not sustain the first onset of yours, and not possibly the other, whom you call Cadmus, may share a similar fate.

Nay, my good friend, said Socrates, let us not boast, lest some evil eye should put to flight the word which I am about to speak. That, however, may be left in the hands of those above; while I draw near in Homeric fashion, and try the mettle of your words. Briefly, the sum of your objection is as follows:—You want to have proven to you that the soul is imperishable and immortal, and you think that the philosopher who is confident in death has but a vain and foolish confidence, if he thinks that he will fare better than one who has led another sort of life, in the world below, unless he can prove this: and you say that the demonstration of the strength and divinity of the soul, and of her existence prior to our becoming men, does not necessarily imply her immortality. Granting that the soul is longlived, and has known and done much in a former state, still she is not on that account immortal; and her entrance into the human form may be a sort of disease which is the beginning of dissolution, and may at last, after the toils of life are over, end in that which is called death. And whether the soul enters into the body once only or many times, that, as you would say, makes no difference in the fears of individuals. For any man, who is not devoid of natural feeling, has reason to fear, if he has no knowledge or proof of the soul's immortality. That is what I suppose you to say, Cebes, which I designedly repeat, in order that nothing may escape us, and that you may, if you wish, add or subtract nothing.

But, said Cebes, as far as I see at present, I have nothing to add or subtract; you have expressed my meaning.

Socrates paused awhile, and seemed to be absorbed in reflection. At length he said: This is a very serious enquiry which you are raising, Cebes, involving the whole question of generation and corruption, about which I will, if you like, give you my own experience; and you can apply this, if you think that anything which I say will avail towards the solution of your difficulty.

I should very much like, said Cebes, to hear what you have to say.

Then I will tell you, said Socrates. When I was young, Cebes, I had a prodigious desire to know that department of philosophy which is called Natural Science; this appeared to me to have lofty aims, as being the science which has to do with the causes of things, and which teaches why a thing is, and is created and destroyed; and I was always agitating myself with the consideration of such questions as these:—Is the growth of animals the result of some decay

which the hot and cold principle contract, as some have said? Is the blood the element with which we think, or the air, or the fire? or perhaps nothing of this sort—but the brain may be the originating power of the perceptions of hearing and sight and smell, and memory and opinion may come from them, and science may be based on memory and opinion when no longer in motion, but at rest. And then I went on to examine the decay of them, and then to the things of heaven and earth, and at last I concluded that I was wholly incapable of these inquiries, as I will satisfactorily prove to you. For I was fascinated by them to such a degree that my eyes grew blind to things that I had seemed to myself, and also to others, to know quite well; and I forgot what I had before thought to be self-evident, that the growth of man is the result of eating and drinking; for when by the digestion of food flesh is added to flesh and bone to bone, and whenever there is an aggregation of congenial elements, the lesser bulk becomes larger and the small man greater. Was not that a reasonable notion?

Yes, said Cebes, I think so.

Well; but let me tell you something more. There was a time when I thought that I understood the meaning of greater and less pretty well; and when I saw a great man standing by a little one, I fancied that one was taller than the other by a head; and still more clearly did I seem to perceive that ten is two more than eight, and that two cubits are more than one, because two is twice one.

And what is now your notion of such matters? said Cebes.

I should be far enough from imagining, he replied, that I knew the cause of any of them, indeed I should, for I cannot satisfy myself that when one is added to one, the one to which the addition is made becomes two, or that the two units added together make two by reason of the addition. For I cannot understand how, when separated from the other, each of them was one and not two, and now, when they are brought together, the mere juxtaposition of them can be the cause of their becoming two: nor can I understand how the division of one is the way to make two; for then a different cause would produce the same effect,—as in the former instance the addition and juxtaposition of one to one was the cause of two, in this the separation and subtraction of one from the other would be the cause. Nor am I any longer satisfied that I understand the reason why one or anything else either is generated or destroyed or is at all, but I have in my mind some confused notion of another method, and can never admit this.

Then I heard some one who had a book of Anaxagoras, as he said, out of which he read that mind was the disposer and cause of all, and I was quite delighted at the notion of this, which appeared admirable, and I said to myself: If mind is the disposer, mind will dispose all for the best, and put each particular in the best place; and I argued that if any one desired to find out the cause of the generation or destruction or existence of anything, he must find out what state of being or suffering or doing was best for that thing, and therefore a man had only to consider the best for himself and others, and then he would also know the worse, for that the same science comprised both. And I rejoiced to think that I had found in Anaxagoras a teacher of the causes of existence such as I desired, and I imagined that he would tell me first whether the earth is flat or round; and then he would further explain the cause and the necessity of this, and would teach me the nature of the best and show that this was best; and if he said that the earth was in the centre, he would explain that this position was the best, and I should be satisfied if this were shown to me, and not want any other sort of cause. And I thought that I would then go on and ask him about the sun and moon and stars, and that he would explain to me their comparative swiftness, and their returnings and various states, and how their several affections, active and passive, were all for the best. For I could not imagine that when he spoke of mind as the disposer of them, he would give any other account of their being as they are, except that this was best; and I thought that when he had explained to me in detail the cause of each and the cause of all, he would go on to explain to me what was best for each and what was best for all. I had hopes which I would not have sold for much, and I seized the books and read them as fast as I could in my eagerness to know the better and the worse.

What hopes I had formed, and how grievously was I disappointed! As I proceeded, I found my philosopher altogether forsaking mind or any other principle of order, but having recourse to air, and ether, and water, and other eccentricities. I might compare him to a person who began by maintaining generally that mind is the cause of the actions of Socrates, but who, when he endeavoured to explain the causes of my several actions in detail, went on to show that I sit here because my body is made up of bones and muscles; and the bones, as he would say, are hard and have ligaments which divide them, and the muscles are elastic, and they cover the bones, which have also a covering or environment of flesh and skin which

contains them; and as the bones are lifted at their joints by the contraction or relaxation of the muscles, I am able to bend my limbs, and this is why I am sitting here in a curved posture;—that is what he would say, and he would have a similar explanation of my talking to you, which he would attribute to sound, and air, and hearing, and he would assign ten thousand other causes of the same sort, forgetting to mention the true cause, which is, that the Athenians have thought fit to condemn me, and accordingly I have thought it better and more right to remain here and undergo my sentence; for I am inclined to think that these muscles and bones of mine would have gone off to Megara or Boeotia—by the dog of Egypt they would, if they had been guided only by their own idea of what was best, and if I had not chosen as the better and nobler part, instead of playing truant and running away, to undergo any punishment which the state inflicts. There is surely a strange confusion of causes and conditions in all this. It may be said, indeed, that without bones and muscles and the other parts of the body I cannot execute my purposes. But to say that I do as I do because of them, and that this is the way in which mind acts, and not from the choice of the best, is a very careless and idle mode of speaking. I wonder that they cannot distinguish the cause from the condition, which the many, feeling about in the dark, are always mistaking and misnaming. And thus one man makes a vortex all round and steadies the earth by the heaven; another gives the air as a support to the earth, which is a sort of broad trough. Any power which in disposing them as they are disposes them for the best never enters into their minds, nor do they imagine that there is any superhuman strength in that; they rather expect to find another Atlas of the world who is stronger and more everlasting and more containing than the good is, and are clearly of opinion that the obligatory and containing power of the good is as nothing; and yet this is the principle which I would fain learn if any one would teach me. But as I have failed either to discover myself, or to learn of any one else, the nature of the best, I will exhibit to you, if you like, what I have found to be the second best mode of inquiring into the cause.

I should very much like to hear that, he replied.

Socrates proceeded:—I thought that as I had failed in the contemplation of true existence, I ought to be careful that I did not lose the eye of my soul; as people may injure their bodily eye by observing and gazing on the sun during an eclipse, unless they take the

precaution of only looking at the image reflected in the water, or in some similar medium. That occurred to me, and I was afraid that my soul might be blinded altogether if I looked at things with my eyes or tried by the help of the senses to apprehend them. And I thought that I had better have recourse to ideas, and seek in them the truth of existence. I dare say that the simile is not perfect—for I am very far from admitting that he who contemplates existences through the medium of ideas, sees them only 'through a glass darkly,' any more than he who sees them in their working and effects. However, this was the method which I adopted: I first assumed some principle which I judged to be the strongest, and then I affirmed as true whatever seemed to agree with this, whether relating to the cause or to anything else; and that which disagreed I regarded as untrue. But I should like to explain my meaning clearly, as I do not think that you understand me.

No indeed, replied Cebes, not very well.

There is nothing new, he said, in what I am about to tell you; but only what I have been always and everywhere repeating in the previous discussion and on other occasions: I want to show you the nature of that cause which has occupied my thoughts, and I shall have to go back to those familiar words which are in the mouth of every one, and first of all assume that there is an absolute beauty and goodness, and greatness, and the like; grant me this, and I hope to be able to show you the nature of the cause, and to prove the immortality of the soul.

Cebes said: You may proceed at once with the proof, as I readily grant you this.

Well, he said, then I should like to know whether you agree with me in the next step; for I cannot help thinking that if there be anything beautiful other than absolute beauty, that can only be beautiful in as far as it partakes of absolute beauty—and this I should say of everything. Do you agree in this notion of the cause?

Yes, he said, I agree.

He proceeded: I know nothing and can understand nothing of any other of those wise causes which are alleged; and if a person says to me that the bloom of colour, or form, or anything else of that sort is a source of beauty, I leave all that, which is only confusing to me, and simply and singly, and perhaps foolishly, hold and am assured in my own mind that nothing makes a thing beautiful but the presence and participation of beauty in whatever way or manner obtained; for

as to the manner I am uncertain, but I stoutly contend that by beauty all beautiful things become beautiful. That appears to me to be the only safe answer that I can give, either to myself or to any other, and to that I cling, in the persuasion that I shall never be overthrown, and that I may safely answer to myself or any other, that by beauty beautiful things become beautiful. Do you not agree to that?

Yes, I agree.

And that by greatness only great things become great and greater greater, and by smallness the less become less.

True.

Then if a person remarks that A is taller by a head than B, and B less by a head than A, you would refuse to admit this, and would stoutly contend that what you mean is only that the greater is greater by, and by reason of, smallness; and thus you would avoid the danger of saying that the greater is greater and the less less by the measure of the head, which is the same in both, and would also avoid the monstrous absurdity of supposing that the greater man is greater by reason of the head, which is small. Would you not be afraid of that?

Indeed, I should, said Cebes, laughing.

In like manner you would be afraid to say that ten exceeded eight by, and by reason of, two; but would say by, and by reason of, number; or that two cubits exceed one cubit by a half, but by magnitude?—that is what you would say, for there is the same danger in both cases.

Very true, he said.

Again, would you not be cautious of affirming that the addition of one to one, or the division of one, is the cause of two? And you would loudly asseverate that you know of no way in which anything comes into existence except by participation in its own proper essence, and consequently, as far as you know, the only cause of two is the participation in quality; that is, the way to make two, and the participation in one is the way to make one. You would say: I will let alone puzzles of division and addition—wiser heads than mine may answer them; inexperienced as I am, and ready to start, as the proverb says, at my own shadow, I cannot afford to give up the sure ground of a principle. And if any one assails you there, you would not mind him, or answer him, until you had seen whether the consequences which follow agree with one another or not, and when you are further required to give an explanation of this principle, you would go on to assume a higher principle, and the best of the higher ones

until you found a resting-place; but you would not confuse the principle and the consequences in your reasoning, like the Eristics—at least if you wanted to discover real existence. Not that this confusion signifies to them who never care or think about the matter at all, for they have the wit to be well pleased with themselves however great may be the turmoil of their ideas. But you, if you are a philosopher, will, I believe, do as I say.

What you say is most true, said Simmias and Cebes, both speaking at once.

Ech. Yes, Phaedo; and I don't wonder at their assenting. Any one who has the least sense will acknowledge the wonderful clearness of Socrates' reasoning.

Phaed. Certainly, Echecrates; and that was the feeling of the whole company at the time.

Ech. Yes, and equally of ourselves, who were not of the company, and are now listening to your recital. But what followed?

Phaed. After all this was admitted, and they had agreed about the existence of ideas and the participation in them of the other things which derive their names from them, Socrates, if I remember rightly, said:—

This is your way of speaking; and yet when you say that Simmias is greater than Socrates and less than Phaedo, do you not predicate of Simmias both greatness and smallness?

Yes, I do.

But still you allow that Simmias does not really exceed Socrates, as the words may seem to imply, because he is Simmias, but by reason of the size which he has; just as Simmias does not exceed Socrates because he is Simmias, any more than because Socrates is Socrates, but because he has smallness when compared with the greatness of Simmias?

True.

And if Phaedo exceeds him in size, this is not because Phaedo is Phaedo, but because Phaedo has greatness relatively to Simmias, who is comparatively smaller?

That is true.

And therefore Simmias is said to be great, and is also said to be small, because he is in a mean between them, exceeding the smallness of the one by his greatness, and allowing the greatness of the other to exceed his smallness. He added, laughing, I am speaking like a book, but I believe that what I am saying is true.

Simmias assented to this.

The reason why I say this, is that I want you to agree with me in thinking, not only that absolute greatness will never be great and also small, but that greatness in us or in the concrete will never admit the small or admit of being exceeded: instead of this one of two things will happen, either the greater will fly or retire before the opposite, which is the less, or at the advance of the less will cease to exist; but will not, if allowing or admitting smallness, be changed by that; even as I, having received and admitted smallness when compared with Simmias, remain just as I was, and am the same small person. And as the idea of greatness cannot condescend ever to be or become small, in like manner the smallness in us cannot be or become great; nor can any other opposite which remains the same ever be or become its own opposite, but either passes away or perishes in the change.

That, replied Cebes, is quite my notion.

One of the company, though I do not exactly remember which of them, on hearing this, said: By heaven, is not this the direct contrary of what was admitted before—that out of the greater came the less and out of the less the greater, and that opposites were simply generated from opposites; whereas now this seems to be utterly denied.

Socrates inclined his head to the speaker and listened. I like your courage, he said, in reminding us of this. But you do not observe that there is a difference in the two cases. For then we were speaking of opposites in the concrete, and now of the essential opposite which, as is affirmed, neither in us nor in nature can ever be at variance with itself: then, my friend, we were speaking of things in which opposites are inherent and which are called after them, but now about the opposites which are inherent in them and which give their name to them; these essential opposites will never, as we maintain, admit of generation into or out of one another. At the same time, turning to Cebes, he said: Were you at all disconcerted, Cebes, at our friend's objection?

That was not my feeling, said Cebes; and yet I cannot deny that I am apt to be disconcerted.

Then we are agreed after all, said Socrates, that the opposite will never in any case be opposed to itself?

To that we are quite agreed, he replied.

Yet once more let me ask you to consider the question from another point of view, and see whether you agree with me:—There is

a thing which you term heat, and another thing which you term cold?

Certainly.

But are they the same as fire and snow?

Most assuredly not.

Heat is not the same as fire, nor is cold the same as snow?

No.

And yet you will surely admit, that when snow, as was before said, is under the influence of heat, they will not remain snow and heat; but at the advance of the heat, the snow will either retire or perish?

Very true, he replied.

And the fire too at the advance of the cold will either retire or perish; and when the fire is under the influence of the cold, they will not remain as before, fire and cold.

That is true, he said.

And in some cases the name of the idea is not confined to the idea; but anything else which, not being the idea, exists only in the form of the idea, may also lay claim to it. I will try to make this clearer by an example:—The odd number is always called by the name of odd?

Very true.

But is this the only thing which is called cold? Are there not other things which have their own name, and yet are called odd, because, although not the same as oddness, they are never without oddness?—that is what I mean to ask—whether numbers such as the number three are not of the class of odd. And there are many other examples: would you not say, for example, that three may be called by its proper name, and also be called odd, which is not the same with three? and this may be said not only of three but also of five, and every alternate number—each of them without being oddness is odd, and in the same way two and four, and the whole series of alternate numbers, has every number even, without being evenness. Do you admit that?

Yes, he said, how can I deny that?

Then now mark the point at which I am aiming:—not only do essential opposites exclude one another, but also concrete things, which, although not in themselves opposed, contain opposites; these, I say, also reject the idea which is opposed to that which is contained in them, and at the advance of that they either perish or withdraw. There is the number three for example;—will not that endure anni-

hilation or anything sooner than be converted into an even number, remaining three?

Very true, said Cebes.

And yet, he said, the number two is certainly not opposed to the number three?

It is not.

Then not only do opposite ideas repel the advance of one another, but also there are other things which repel the approach of opposites.

That is quite true, he said.

Suppose, he said, that we endeavour, if possible, to determine what those are.

By all means.

Are they not, Cebes, such as compel the things of which they have possession, not only to take their own form, but also the form of some opposite?

What do you mean?

I mean, as I was just now saying, and have no need to repeat to you, that those things which are possessed by the number three must not only be three in number, but must also be odd.

Quite true.

And on this oddness of which the number three has the impress, the opposite idea will never intrude?

No.

And this impress was given by the odd principle?

Yes.

And to the odd is opposed the even?

True.

Then the idea of the even number will never arrive at three?

No.

Then three has no part in the even?

None.

Then the triad or number three is uneven?

Very true.

To return then to my distinction of natures which are not opposites, and yet do not admit opposites: as in this instance, three, although not opposed to the even, does not any the more admit of the even, but always brings the opposite into play on the other side; or as two does not receive the odd, or fire the cold—from these examples (and there are many more of them) perhaps you may be able to arrive at the general conclusion, that not only opposites will not receive

opposites, but also that nothing which brings the opposite will admit the opposite of that which it brings in that to which it is brought. And here let me recapitulate—for there is no harm in repetition. The number five will not admit the nature of the even, any more than ten, which is the double of five, will admit the nature of the odd — the double, though not strictly opposed to the odd, rejects the odd altogether. Nor again will parts in the ratio of 3:2, nor any fraction in which there is a half, nor again in which there is a third, admit the notion of the whole, although they are not opposed to the whole. You will agree to that?

Yes, he said, I entirely agree and go along with you in that.

And now, he said, I think that I may begin again; and to the question which I am about to ask I will beg you to give not the old safe answer, but another, of which I will offer you an example; and I hope that you will find in what has been just said another foundation which is as safe. I mean that if any one asks you 'what that is, the inherence of which makes the body hot,' you will reply not heat (this is what I call the safe and stupid answer), but fire, a far better answer, which we are now in a condition to give. Or if any one asks you 'why a body is diseased,' you will not say from disease, but from fever; and instead of saying that oddness is the cause of odd numbers, you will say that the monad is the cause of them: and so of things in general, as I dare say that you will understand sufficiently without my adducing any further examples.

Yes, he said, I quite understand you.

Tell me, then, what is that the inherence of which will render the body alive?

The soul, he replied.

And is this always the case?

Yes, he said, of course.

Then whatever the soul possesses, to that she comes bearing life?

Yes, certainly.

And is there any opposite to life?

There is, he said.

And what is that?

Death.

Then the soul, as has been acknowledged, will never receive the opposite of what she brings. And now, he said, what did we call that principle which repels the even?

The odd.

And that principle which repels the musical, or the just?

The unmusical, he said, and the unjust.

And what do we call that principle which does not admit of death?

The immortal, he said.

And does the soul admit of death?

No.

Then the soul is immortal?

Yes, he said.

And may we say that this is proven?

Yes, abundantly proven, Socrates, he replied.

And supposing that the odd were imperishable, must not three be imperishable?

Of course.

And if that which is cold were imperishable, when the warm principle came attacking the snow, must not the snow have retired whole and unmelted—for it could never have perished, nor could it have remained and admitted the heat?

True, he said.

Again, if the uncooling or warm principle were imperishable, the fire when assailed by cold would not have perished or have been extinguished, but would have gone away unaffected?

Certainly, he said.

And the same may be said of the immortal: if the immortal is also imperishable, the soul when attacked by death cannot perish; for the preceding argument shows that the soul will not admit of death, or ever be dead, any more than three or the odd number will admit of the even, or fire, or the heat in the fire, of the cold. Yet a person may say: 'But although the odd will not become even at the approach of the even, why may not the odd perish and the even take the place of the odd?' Now to him who makes this objection, we cannot answer that the odd principle is imperishable; for this has not been acknowledged, but if this had been acknowledged, there would have been no difficulty in contending that at the approach of the even the odd principle and the number three took up their departure; and the same argument would have held good of fire and heat and any other thing.

Very true.

And the same may be said of the immortal; if the immortal is also imperishable, then the soul will be imperishable as well as immortal; but if not, some other proof of her imperishableness will have

to be given.

No other proof is needed, he said; for if the immortal, being eternal, is liable to perish, then nothing is imperishable.

Yes, replied Socrates, all men will agree that God, and the essential form of life, and the immortal in general, will never perish.

Yes, all men, he said—that is true; and what is more, gods, if I am not mistaken, as well as men.

Seeing then that the immortal is indestructible, must not the soul, if she is immortal, be also imperishable?

Most certainly.

Then when death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be supposed to die, but the immortal goes out of the way of death and is preserved safe and sound?

True.

Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world!

I am convinced, Socrates, said Cebes, and have nothing more to object; but if my friend Simmias, or any one else, has any further objection, he had better speak out, and not keep silence, since I do not know how there can ever be a more fitting time to which he can defer the discussion, if there is anything which he wants to say or have said.

But I have nothing more to say, replied Simmias; nor do I see any room for uncertainty, except that which arises necessarily out of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man, and which I cannot help feeling.

Yes, Simmias, replied Socrates, that is well said: and more than that, first principles, even if they appear certain, should be carefully considered; and when they are satisfactorily ascertained, then, with a sort of hesitating confidence in human reason, you may, I think, follow the course of the argument; and if this is clear, there will be no need for any further inquiry.

That, he said, is true.

But then, O my friends, he said, if the soul is really immortal, what care should be taken of her, not only in respect of the portion of time which is called life, but of eternity! And the danger of neglecting her from this point of view does indeed appear to be awful. If death had only been the end of all, the wicked would have had a good bargain in dying, for they would have been happily quit not only of their body, but of their own evil together with their souls. But now,

as the soul plainly appears to be immortal, there is no release or salvation from evil except the attainment of the highest virtue and wisdom. For the soul when on her progress to the world below takes nothing with her but nurture and education; which are indeed said greatly to benefit or greatly to injure the departed, at the very beginning of his pilgrimage in the other world.

For after death, as they say, the genius of each individual, to whom he belonged in life, leads him to a certain place in which the dead are gathered together for judgment, whence they go into the world below, following the guide, who is appointed to conduct them from this world to the other: and when they have there received their due and remained their time, another guide brings them back again after many revolutions of ages. Now this journey to the other world is not, as Aeschylus says in the *Telephus*, a single and straight path—no guide would be wanted for that, and no one could miss a single path; but there are many partings of the road, and windings, as I must infer from the rites and sacrifices which are offered to the gods below in places where three ways meet on earth. The wise and orderly soul is conscious of her situation, and follows in the path; but the soul which desires the body, and which, as I was relating before, has long been fluttering about the lifeless frame and the world of sight, is after many struggles and many sufferings hardly and with violence carried away by her attendant genius, and when she arrives at the place where the other souls are gathered, if she be impure and have done impure deeds, or been concerned in foul murders or other crimes which are the brothers of these, and the works of brothers in crime—from that soul every one flees and turns away; no one will be her companion, no one her guide, but alone she wanders in extremity of evil until certain times are fulfilled, and when they are fulfilled, she is borne irresistibly to her own fitting inhabitation; as every pure and just soul which has passed through life in the company and under the guidance of the gods has also her own proper home.

Now the earth has divers wonderful regions, and is indeed in nature and extent very unlike the notions of geographers, as I believe on the authority of one who shall be nameless.

What do you mean, Socrates? said Simmias. I have myself heard many descriptions of the earth, but I do not know in what you are putting your faith, and I should like to know.

Well, Simmias, replied Socrates, the recital of a tale does not, I think, require the art of Glaucus; and I know not that the art of Glau-

cus could prove the truth of my tale, which I myself should never be able to prove, and even if I could, I fear, Simmias, that my life would come to an end before the argument was completed. I may describe to you, however, the form and regions of the earth according to my conception of them.

That, said Simmias, will be enough.

Well then, he said, my conviction is, that the earth is a round body in the centre of the heavens, and therefore has no need of air or any similar force as a support, but is kept there and hindered from falling or inclining any way by the equability of the surrounding heaven and by her own equipoise. For that which, being in equipoise, is in the centre of that which is equably diffused, will not incline any way in any degree, but will always remain in the same state and not deviate. And this is my first notion.

Which is surely a correct one, said Simmias.

Also I believe that the earth is very vast, and that we who dwell in the region extending from the river Phasis to the Pillars of Hercules along the borders of the sea, are just like ants or frogs about a marsh, and inhabit a small portion only, and that many others dwell in many like places. For I should say that in all parts of the earth there are hollows of various forms and sizes, into which the water and the mist and the air collect; and that the true earth is pure and in the pure heaven, in which also are the stars—that is the heaven which is commonly spoken of as the ether, of which this is but the sediment collecting in the hollows of the earth. But we who live in these hollows are deceived into the notion that we are dwelling above on the surface of the earth; which is just as if a creature who was at the bottom of the sea were to fancy that he was on the surface of the water, and that the sea was the heaven through which he saw the sun and the other stars,—he having never come to the surface by reason of his feebleness and sluggishness, and having never lifted up his head and seen, nor ever heard from one who had seen, this other region which is so much purer and fairer than his own. Now this is exactly our case: for we are dwelling in a hollow of the earth, and fancy that we are on the surface; and the air we call the heaven, and in this we imagine that the stars move. But this is also owing to our feebleness and sluggishness, which prevent our reaching the surface of the air: for if any man could arrive at the exterior limit, or take the wings of a bird and fly upward, like a fish who puts his head out and sees this world, he would see a world beyond; and, if the

nature of man could sustain the sight, he would acknowledge that this was the place of the true heaven and the true light and the true stars. For this earth, and the stones, and the entire region which surrounds us, are spoilt and corroded, like the things in the sea which are corroded by the brine; for in the sea too there is hardly any noble or perfect growth, but clefts only, and sand, and an endless slough of mud; and even the shore is not to be compared to the fairer sights of this world. And greater far is the superiority of the other. Now of that upper earth which is under the heaven, I can tell you a charming tale, Simmias, which is well worth hearing.

And we, Socrates, replied Simmias, shall be charmed to listen.

The tale, my friend, he said, is as follows:—In the first place, the earth, when looked at from above, is like one of those balls which have leather coverings in twelve pieces, and is of divers colours, of which the colours which painters use on earth are only a sample. But there the whole earth is made up of them, and they are brighter far and clearer than ours; there is a purple of wonderful lustre, also the radiance of gold, and the white which is in the earth is whiter than any chalf or snow. Of these and other colours the earth is made up, and they are more in number and fairer than the eye of man has ever seen; and the very hollows (of which I was speaking) filled with air and water are seen like light flashing amid the other colours, and have a colour of their own, which gives a sort of unity to the variety of earth. And in this fair region everything that grows—trees, and flowers, and fruits—are in a like degree fairer than any here; and there are hills, and stones in them in a like degree smoother, and more transparent, and fairer in colour than our highly-valued emeralds and sardonyxes and jaspers, and other gems, which are but minute fragments of them: for there all the stones are like our precious stones, and fairer still. The reason of this is, that they are pure, and not, like our precious stones, infected or corroded by the corrupt briny elements which coagulate among us, as well as in animals and plants. They are the jewels of the upper earth, which also shines with gold and silver and the like, and they are visible to sight and large abundant and found in every region of the earth, and blessed is he who sees them. And upon the earth are animals and men, some in a middle region, others dwelling about the air as we dwell about the sea; others in islands which the air flows round, near the continent: and in a word, the air is used by them as the water and the sea are by us, and the ether is to them what the air is to us. Moreover, the tem-

perament of their seasons is such that they have no disease, and live much longer than we do, and have sight and hearing and smell, and all the other senses, in far greater perfection, in the same degree that air is purer than water or the ether than air. Also they have temples and sacred places in which the gods really dwell, and they hear their voices and receive their answers, and are conscious of them and hold converse with them, and they see the sun, moon, and stars as they really are, and their other blessedness is of a piece with this.

Such is the nature of the whole earth, and of the things which are around the earth; and there are divers regions in the hollows on the face of the globe everywhere, some of them deeper and also wider than that which we inhabit, others deeper and with a narrower opening than ours, and some are shallower and wider; all have numerous perforations, and passages broad and narrow in the interior of the earth, connecting them with one another; and there flows into and out of them, as into basins, a vast tide of water, and huge subterranean streams of perennial rivers, and springs hot and cold, and a great fire, and great rivers of fire, and streams of liquid mud, thin or thick (like the rivers of mud in Sicily, and the lava streams which follow them), and the regions about which they happen to flow are filled up with them. And there is a sort of swing in the interior of the earth which moves all this up and down. Now the swing is on this wise:—There is a chasm which is the vastest of them all, and pierces right through the whole earth; this is that which Homer describes in the words:—

‘Far off, where is the inmost depth beneath the earth;’

and which he in other places, and many other poets, have called *Tartarus*. And the swing is caused by the streams flowing into and out of this chasm, and they each have the nature of the soil through which they flow. And the reason why the streams are always flowing in and out, is that the watery element has no bed or bottom, and is surging and swinging up and down, and the surrounding wind and air do the same; they follow the water up and down, hither and thither, over the earth—just as in respiring the air is always in process of inhalation and exhalation;—and the wind swinging with the water in and out produces fearful and irresistible blasts: when the waters retire with a rush into the lower parts of the earth, as they are called, they flow through the earth into those regions, and fill them up as with the alternate motion of a pump, they again fill the hollows here,

and when these are filled, flow through subterranean channels and find their way to their several places, forming seas, and lakes, and rivers, and springs. Thence they again enter the earth, some of them making a long circuit into many lands, others going to few places and those not distant; and again fall into Tartarus, some at a point a good deal lower than that at which they rose, and others not much lower, but all in some degree lower than the point of issue. And some burst forth again on the opposite side, and some on the same side, and some wind round the earth with one or many folds like the coils of a serpent, and descend as far as they can, but always return and fall into the lake. The rivers on either side can descend only to the centre and no further, for to the rivers on both sides the opposite side is a precipice.

Now these rivers are many, and mighty, and diverse, and there are four principal ones, of which the greatest and outermost is that called Oceanus, which flows round the earth in a circle; and in the opposite direction flows Acheron, which passes under the earth through desert places, into the Acherusian lake: this is the lake to the shores of which the souls of the many go when they are dead, and after waiting an appointed time, which is to some a longer and to some a shorter time, they are sent back again to be born as animals. The third river rises between the two, and near the place of rising pours into a vast region of fire, and forms a lake larger than the Mediterranean Sea, boiling with water and mud; and proceeding muddy and turbid, and winding about the earth, comes, among other places, to the extremities of the Acherusian lake, but mingles not with the waters of the lake, and after making many coils about the earth plunges into Tartarus at a deeper level. This is that Pyriphlegethon, as the stream is called, which throws up jets of fire in all sorts of places. The fourth river goes out on the opposite side, and falls first of all into a wild and savage region, which is all of a dark blue colour, like lapis lazuli; and this is that river which is called the Stygian river, and falls into and forms the Lake Styx, and after falling into the lake and receiving strange powers in the waters, passes under the earth, winding round in the opposite direction to Pyriphlegethon, and meeting in the Acherusian lake from the opposite side. And the water of this river too mingles with no other, but flows round in a circle and falls into Tartarus over against Pyriphlegethon; and the name of this river, as the poets say, is Cocytus.

Such is the nature of the other world; and when the dead arrive

at the place to which the genius of each severally conveys them, first of all, they have sentence passed upon them, as they have lived well and piously or not. And those who appear to have lived neither well nor ill, go to the river Acheron, and mount such conveyances as they can get, and are carried in them to the lake, and there they dwell and are purified of their evil deeds, and suffer the penalty of the wrongs which they have done to others, and are absolved, and receive the rewards of their good deeds according to their deserts. But those who appear to be incurable by reason of the greatness of their crimes—who have committed many and terrible deeds of sacrilege, murders foul and violent, or the like—such are hurled into Tartarus which is their suitable destiny, and they never come out. Those again who have committed crimes, which, although great, are not unpardonable—who in a moment of anger, for example, have done violence to a father or a mother, and have repented for the remainder of their lives, or, who have taken the life of another under the like extenuating circumstances—these are plunged into Tartarus, the pains of which they are compelled to undergo for a year, but at the end of the year the wave casts them forth—mere homicides by way of Cocytus, parricides and matricides by Pyriphlegethon—and they are borne to the Acherusian lake, and there they lift up their voices and call upon the victims whom they have slain or wronged, to have pity on them, and to receive them, and to let them come out of the river into the lake. And if they prevail, then they come forth and cease from their troubles; but if not, they are carried back again into Tartarus and from thence into the rivers unceasingly, until they obtain mercy from those whom they wronged: for that is the sentence inflicted upon them by their judges. Those also who are remarkable for having led holy lives are released from this earthly prison, and go to their pure home which is above, and dwell in the purer earth; and those who have duly purified themselves with philosophy, live henceforth altogether without the body, in mansions fairer far than these, which may not be described, and of which the time would fail me to tell.

Wherefore, Simmias, seeing all these things, what ought not we to do in order to obtain virtue and wisdom in this life? Fair is the prize, and the hope great!

I do not mean to affirm that the description which I have given of the soul and her mansions is exactly true—a man of sense ought hardly to say that. But I do say that, inasmuch as the soul is shown to be immortal, he may venture to think, not improperly or un-

worthily, that something of the kind is true. The venture is a glorious one, and he ought to comfort himself with words like these, which is the reason why I lengthen out the tale. Wherefore, I say, let a man be of good cheer about his soul, who has cast away the pleasures and ornaments of the body as alien to him, and rather hurtful in their effects, and has followed after the pleasures of knowledge in this life; who has adorned the soul in her own proper jewels, which are temperance, and justice, and courage, and nobility, and truth—in these arrayed she is ready to go on her journey to the world below, when her time comes. You, Simmias and Cebes, and all other men, will depart at some time or other. Me already, as the tragic poet would say, the voice of fate calls. Soon I must drink the poison; and I think that I had better repair to the bath first, in order that the women may not have the trouble of washing my body after I am dead.

When he had done speaking, Crito said: And have you any commands for us, Socrates—anything to say about your children, or any other matter in which we can serve you?

Nothing particular, he said: only, as I have always told you, I would have you look to yourselves; that is a service which you may always be doing to me and mine as well as to yourselves. And you need not make professions; for if you take no thought for yourselves, and walk not according to the precepts which I have given you, not now for the first time, the warmth of your professions will be of no avail.

We will do our best, said Crito. But in what way would you have us bury you?

In any way that you like; only you must get hold of me, and take care that I do not walk away from you. Then he turned to us, and added with a smile:—I cannot make Crito believe that I am the same Socrates who have been talking and conducting the argument; he fancies that I am the other Socrates whom he will soon see, a dead body—and he asks, How shall he bury me? And though I have spoken many words in the endeavour to show that when I have drunk the poison I shall leave you and go to the joys of the blessed,—these words of mine, with which I comforted you and myself, have had, as I perceive, no effect upon Crito. And therefore I want you to be surety for me now, as he was surety for me at the trial: but let the promise be of another sort; for he was my surety to the judges that I would remain, but you must be my surety to him that I shall not remain, but go away and depart; and then he will suffer less at my

death, and not be grieved when he sees my body being burned or buried. I would not have him sorrow at my hard lot, or say at the burial, Thus we lay out Socrates, or, Thus we follow him to the grave or bury him; for false words are not only evil in themselves, but they infect the soul with evil. Be of good cheer then, my dear Crito, and say that you are burying my body only, and do with that as is usual, and as you think best.

When he had spoken these words, he arose and went into the bath-chamber with Crito, who bid us wait; and we waited, talking and thinking of the subject of discourse, and also of the greatness of our sorrow; he was like a father of whom we were being bereaved, and we were about to pass the rest of our lives as orphans. When he had taken the bath his children were brought to him—he had two young sons and an elder one; and the women of his family also came, and he talked to them and gave them a few directions in the presence of Crito; and he then dismissed them and returned to us.

Now the hour of sunset was near, for a good deal of time had passed while he was within. When he came out, he sat down with us again after his bath, but not much was said. Soon the jailer, who was the servant of the eleven, entered and stood by him, saying:—To you, Socrates, whom I know to be the noblest and gentlest and best of all who ever came to this place, I will not impute the angry feelings of other men, who rage and swear at me, when, in obedience to the authorities, I bid them drink the poison—indeed, I am sure that you will not be angry with me; for others, as you are aware, and not I, are the guilty cause. And so fare you well, and try to bear lightly what must needs be; you know my errand. Then bursting into tears he turned away and went out.

Socrates looked at him and said: I return your good wishes, and will do as you bid. Then turning to us, he said, How charming the man is: since I have been in prison he has always been coming to see me, and at times he would talk to me, and was as good as could be to me, and now see how generously he sorrows for me. But we must do as he says, Crito; let the cup be brought, if the poison is prepared: if not, let the attendant prepare some.

Yet, said Crito, the sun is still upon the hill-tops, and many a one has taken the draught late, and after the announcement has been made to him, he has eaten and drunk, and indulged in sensual delights; do not hasten then, there is still time.

Socrates said: Yes, Crito, and they of whom you speak are right

in doing thus, for they think that they will gain by the delay; but I am right in not doing thus, for I do not think that I should gain anything by drinking the poison a little later; I should be sparing and saving a life which is already gone; I could only laugh at myself for this. Please then to do as I say, and not to refuse me.

Crito, when he heard this, made a sign to the servant; and the servant went in, and remained for some time, and then returned with the jailer carrying the cup of poison. Socrates said: You, my good friend, who are experienced in these matters, shall give me directions how I am to proceed. The man answered: You have only to walk about until your legs are heavy, and then to lie down, and the poison will act. At the same time he handed the cup to Socrates, who in the easiest and gentlest manner, without the least fear or change of colour or feature, looking at the man with all his eyes, Echecrates, as his manner was, took the cup and said: What do you say about making a libation out of this cup to any god? May I, or not? The man answered: We only prepare, Socrates, just so much as we deem enough. I understand, he said: yet I may and must pray to the gods to prosper my journey from this to that other world—may this then, which is my prayer, be granted to me. Then holding the cup to his lips, quite readily and cheerfully he drank off the poison. And hitherto most of us had been able to control our sorrow; but now when we saw him drinking, and saw too that he had finished the draught, we could no longer forbear, and in spite of myself my own tears were flowing fast; so that I covered my face and wept over myself, for certainly I was not weeping over him, but at the thought of my own calamity in having lost such a companion. Nor was I the first, for Crito, when he found himself unable to restrain his tears, had got up and moved away, and I followed; and at that moment, Appollodorus, who had been weeping all the time, broke out into a loud cry which made cowards of us all. Socrates alone retained his calmness: What is this strange outcry? he said. I sent away the women mainly in order that they might not offend in this way, for I have heard that a man should die in peace. Be quiet then, and have patience. When we heard that, we were ashamed, and refrained our tears; and he walked about until, as he said, his legs began to fail, and then he lay on his back, according to the directions, and the man who gave him the poison now and then looked at his feet and legs; and after a while he pressed his foot hard, and asked him if he could feel; and he said, No; and then his leg, and so upwards and upwards, and

showed us that he was cold and stiff. And he felt them himself, and said: When the poison reaches the heart, that will be the end. He was beginning to grow cold about the groin, when he uncovered his face, for he had covered himself up, and said (they were his last words) —he said: Crito, I owe a cock to Asclepius; will you remember to pay the debt? The debt shall be paid, said Crito; is there anything else? There was no answer to this question; but in a minute or two a movement was heard, and the attendants uncovered him; his eyes were set, and Crito closed his eyes and mouth.

Such was the end, Echecrates, of our friend, whom I may truly call the wisest, and justest, and best of all the men whom I have ever known.

TRANSLATION OF B. JOWETT.

THE IDEAL STATE

SOCRATES IS THE NARRATOR

ORIGIN AND EDUCATION

A STATE, I said, arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other origin of a State be imagined?

None, he replied.

Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to supply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for another; and when these helpers and partners are gathered together in one habitation the body of inhabitants is termed a State.

True, he said.

And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.

Very true.

Then, I said, let us begin and create a State; and yet the true creator is necessity, who is the mother of our invention.

True, he replied.

Now the first and greatest of necessities is food, which is the con-

dition of life and existence.

Certainly.

The second is a dwelling, and the third clothing and that sort of thing.

True.

And now let us see how our city will be able to supply this great demand. We may suppose that one man is a husbandman, another a builder, some one else a weaver—shall we add to them a shoemaker, or perhaps some other purveyor to our bodily wants?

Quite right.

The barest notion of a State must include four or five men.

Clearly.

And now then will they proceed? Will each give the result of his labours to all?—the husbandman, for example, producing for four, and labouring in the production of food for himself and others four times as long and as much as he needs to labour; or shall he leave others and not be at the trouble of producing for them, but produce a fourth for himself in a fourth of the time, and in the remaining three fourths of his time be employed in making a house or a coat or a pair of shoes?

Adeimantus thought that the former would be the better way.

I dare say that you are right, I replied, for I am reminded as you speak that we are not all alike; there are diversities of natures among us which are adapted to different occupations.

Very true.

And will you have a work better done when the workman has many occupations, or when he has only one?

When he has only one.

Further, there can be no doubt that a work is spoilt when not done at the right time?

No doubt of that.

For business is not disposed to wait until the doer of the business is at leisure; but the doer must be at command, and make the business his first object.

He must.

Thus then all things are produced more plentifully and easily and of a better quality when one man does one thing which is natural to him and is done at the right time, and leaves other things.

Undoubtedly.

Then more than four citizens will be required, for the husbandman

will not make his own plough or mattock, or other implements of agriculture, if they are to be good for anything. Neither will the builder make his tools—and he too, needs many; and the same may be said of the weaver and shoemaker.

True.

Then carpenters, and smiths, and other artisans, will be sharers in our little State, which is already beginning to grow?

True.

Yet even if we add neatherds, shepherds, and other herdsmen, in order that our husbandmen may have oxen to plough with, and builders as well as husbandmen have the use of beasts of burden for their carrying, and weavers and curriers of their fleeces and skins,—still our State will not be very large.

That is true; yet neither will that be a very small State which contains all these.

Further, I said, to place the city on a spot where no imports are required is wellnigh impossible.

Impossible.

Then there must be another class of citizens who will bring the required supply from another city?

There must.

But if the trader goes empty-handed, taking nothing which those who are to supply the need want, he will come back empty-handed.

That is certain.

And therefore what they produce at home must be not only enough for themselves, but such both in quantity and quality as to accommodate those from whom their wants are supplied.

That is true.

Then more husbandmen and more artisans will be required?

They will.

Not to mention the importers and exporters, who are called merchants.

Yes.

Then we shall want merchants?

We shall.

And if merchandise is to be carried over the sea, skillful sailors will be needed, and in considerable numbers?

Yes, in considerable numbers.

Then, again, within the city, how will they exchange their pro-

ductions? and this, as you may remember, was the object of our society.

The way will be, that they will buy and sell.

Then they will need a market-place, and a money-token for purposes of exchange.

Certainly.

Suppose now that a husbandman, or possibly an artisan, brings some production to market, and he comes at a time when there is no one to exchange with him,—is he to leave his work and sit idle in the market-place?

Not at all; he will find people there who, seeing this want, take upon themselves the duty of sale. In well-ordered states they are commonly those who are the weakest in bodily strength, and therefore unable to do anything else; for all they have to do is to be in the market, and take money of those who desire to buy goods, and in exchange for goods to give money to those who desire to sell.

This want, then, will introduce retailers into our State. Is not 'retailer' the term which is applied to those who sit in the market-place buying and selling, while those who wander from one city to another are called merchants?

Yes, he said.

And there is another class of servants, who are intellectually hardly on the level of companionship; still they have plenty of bodily strength for labour, which accordingly they sell, and are called, if I do not mistake, hirelings, hire being the name which is given to the price of their labour.

True.

Then hirelings will help to make our population.

And now, Adeimantus, is our State matured and perfected?

Surely.

Where, then, is justice, and where is injustice, and in which part of the State are they to be found?

Probably in the relations of these citizens with one another. I cannot imagine any other place in which they are more likely to be found.

I dare say that you are right in that suggestion, I said; still, we had better consider the matter further, and not shrink from the task.

First, then, let us consider what will be their way of life, now that we have thus established them. Will they not produce corn, and wine, and clothes, and shoes, and build houses for themselves? And when

they are housed, they will work in summer commonly stripped and barefoot, but in winter substantially clothed and shod. They will feed on barley and wheat, baking the wheat and kneading the flour, making noble puddings and loaves; these they will serve upon a mat of reeds or clean leaves, themselves reclining the while upon beds of yew or myrtle boughs. And they and their children will feast, drinking of the wine which they have made, wearing garlands on their heads, and having the praises of the gods on their lips, living in sweet society, and having a care that their families do not exceed their means; for they will have an eye to poverty or war.

But, said Glaucon, interposing, you have not given them a relish to their meal.

True, I replied, I had forgotten that; of course they will have a relish—salt, and olives, and cheese, and onions, and cabbages or other country herbs which are fit for boiling; and we shall give them a desert of figs, and pulse, and beans, and myrtle-berries, and beech-nuts, which they will roast at the fire, drinking in moderation. And with such a diet they may be expected to live in peace to a good old age, and bequeath a similar life to their children after them.

Yes, Socrates, he said, and if you were making a city of pigs, how else would you feed the beasts?

But what would you have, Glaucon? I replied.

Why, he said, you should give them the proprieties of life. People who are to be comfortable are accustomed to lie on sofas, and dine off tables, and they should have dainties and dessert in the modern fashion.

Yes, said I, now I understand; the question which you would have me consider is, not only how a State, but how a luxurious State is to be created; and possibly there is no harm in this, for in such a State we shall be more likely to see how justice and injustice grow up. I am certainly of opinion that the true State, and that which may be said to be a healthy constitution, is the one which I have described. But if you would like to see the inflamed constitution, there is no objection to this. For I suppose that many will be dissatisfied with the simpler way of life. They will be for adding sofas, and tables, and other furniture; also dainties, and perfumes, and incense, and courtesans, and cakes, not of one sort only, but in profusion and variety; our imagination must not be limited to the necessities of which I was at first speaking, such as houses, and clothes, and shoes; but the art of the painter and embroiderer will have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and other materials of art will be required.

True, he said.

Then we must enlarge our borders; for the original healthy State is too small. Now will the city have to fill and swell with a multitude of callings which go beyond what is required by any natural want; such as the whole tribe of hunters and actors, of which one large class have to do with figures and colours, another are musicians; there will be poets and their attendant train of rhapsodists, players, dancers, contractors; also makers of divers kinds of utensils, not forgetting women's ornaments. And we shall want more servants. Will not tutors be also in request, and nurses wet and dry, tirewomen and barbers, as well as confectioners and cooks; and swineherds, too, who were not needed and therefore not included in the former edition of our State, but needed in this? They must not be forgotten: and there will be hosts of animals, if people are to eat them.

Certainly.

And living in this way we shall have much greater need of physicians than before?

Much greater.

And the country which was enough to support the original inhabitants will be too small now, and not enough?

Quite true.

Then a slice of our neighbours' land will be wanted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth?

That, Socrates, will be unavoidable.

And then we shall go to war, Glaucon,—that will be the next thing.

So we shall, he replied.

Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, thus much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in States, private as well as public.

Undoubtedly.

Then our State must once more enlarge; and this time the enlargements will be nothing short of a whole army, which will have to go out and fight with the invaders for all that we have, as well as for the precious souls whom we were describing above.

Why? he said; are they not capable of defending themselves?

No, I said; not if you and all of us were right in the principle which was acknowledged at the first creation of the State: that prin-

ciple was, as you will remember, that one man could not practise many arts.

Very true, he said.

But is not war an art?

Certainly.

And an art requiring as much attention as shoemaking?

Quite true.

And the shoemaker was not allowed to be a husbandman, or a weaver, or a builder—in order that we might have our shoes well made; but to him and to every other worker one work was assigned by us for which he was fitted by nature, and he was to continue working all his life long at that and at no other, and not to let opportunities slip, and then he would become a good workman. And is there any more important work than to be a good soldier? But is war an art so easily acquired that a man may be a warrior who is also a husbandman, or shoemaker, or other artisan; although no one in the world would be a good dice or draught player who merely took up the game as a recreation, and had not from his earliest years devoted himself to this and nothing else? The mere handling of tools will not make a man a skilled workman, or master of defence, nor be of any use to him who knows not the nature of each, and has never bestowed any attention upon them. How then will he who takes up a shield or other implement of war all in a day become a good fighter, whether with heavy-armed or any other kind of troops?

Yes, he said, the tools which would teach their own use would be of rare value.

And the greater the business of the guardian is, I said, the more time, and art, and skill will be needed by him?

That is what I should suppose, he replied.

Will he not also require natural gifts?

Certainly.

We shall have to select natures which are suited to their task of guarding the city?

That will be our duty.

And anything but an easy duty, I said; but still we must endeavour to do our best as far as we can?

We must.

The dog is a watcher, I said, and the guardian is also a watcher; and regarding them in this point of view only, is not the noble youth very like a well-bred dog?

How do you mean?

I mean that both of them ought to be quick to observe, and swift to overtake the enemy; and strong too if, when they have caught him, they have to fight with him.

All these qualities, he replied, will certainly be required.

Well, and your guardian must be brave if he is to fight well?

Certainly.

And is he likely to be brave who has no spirit, whether horse or dog or any other animal. Did you never observe how the presence of spirit makes the soul of any creature absolutely fearless and invincible?

Yes; I have observed that.

Then now we have a clear idea of both the bodily qualities which are required in the guardian.

True.

And also of the mental ones; his soul is to be full of spirit?

Yes.

But then, Glaucon, those spirited natures are apt to be furious with one another, and with everybody else.

That is a difficulty, he replied.

Whereas, I said, they ought to be gentle to their friends, and dangerous to their enemies; or, instead of their enemies destroying them, they will destroy themselves.

True, he said.

What is to be done then, I said; how shall we find a gentle nature which has also a great spirit, for they seem to be inconsistent with one another?

True.

And yet he will not be a good guardian who is wanting in either of these two qualities; and, as the combination of them appears to be impossible, this is equivalent to saying that to be a good guardian is also impossible.

I am afraid that is true, he replied.

Here feeling perplexed I began to think over what preceded. My friend, I said, we deserve to be in a puzzle; for if we had only kept the simile before us, the perplexity in which we are entangled would never have arisen.

What do you mean? he said.

I mean to say that there are natures gifted with those opposite qualities, the combination of which we are denying.

And where do you find them?

Many animals, I replied, furnish examples of them; our friend the dog is a very good one: you know that well-bred dogs are perfectly gentle to their familiars and acquaintances, and the reverse to strangers.

I know that.

Then there is nothing impossible or out of the order of nature in our finding a guardian who has a similar combination of qualities?

Certainly not.

Would you not say that he should combine with the spirited nature the qualities of a philosopher?

I do not apprehend your meaning.

The trait of which I am speaking, I replied, may be also seen in the dog, and is very remarkable in an animal.

What trait?

Why a dog, whenever he sees a stranger, is angry; when an acquaintance, he welcomes him, although the one has never done him any harm, nor the other any good. Did this never strike you as curious?

I never before made the observation myself, though I quite recognize the truth of your remark.

And surely this instinct of the dog is very charming;—your dog is a true philosopher.

Why?

Why, because he distinguishes the face of a friend and of an enemy only by the criterion of knowing and not knowing. And must not the creature be fond of learning who determines what is friendly and what is unfriendly by the test of knowledge and ignorance?

Most assuredly.

And is not the love of learning the love of wisdom, which is philosophy?

They are the same, he replied.

And may we not say confidently of man also, that he who is likely to be gentle to his friends and acquaintances, must by nature be a lover of wisdom and knowledge?

That we may safely affirm.

Then he who is to be a really good and noble guardian of the State will require to unite in himself philosophy and spirit and swiftness and strength?

Undoubtedly.

Then we have found the desired natures; and now that we have found them, how are they to be reared and educated? Is this an enquiry which may be fairly expected to throw light on the greater enquiry which is our final end—How do justice and injustice grow up in States? for we do not want to admit anything which is superfluous, or leave out anything which is really to the point.

Adeimantus thought that the enquiry would be of use to us.

Then, I said, my dear friend, the task must not be given up, even if somewhat long.

Certainly not.

Come then, and like story-tellers, let us be at leisure, and our story shall be the education of our heroes.

By all means.

And what shall be their education? Can we find a better than the old-fashioned sort?—and this has two divisions, gymnastic for the body, and music for the soul.

True.

Music is taught first, and gymnastic afterwards.

Certainly.

And when you speak of music, do you rank literature under music or not?

I do.

And literature may be either true or false?

Yes.

And the young are trained in both kinds, and in the false before the true?

I do not understand your meaning, he said.

You know, I said, that we begin by telling children stories which, though not wholly destitute of truth, are in the main fictitious; and these stories are told them when they are not of an age to learn gymnastics.

Very true.

That was my meaning in saying that we must teach music before gymnastics.

Quite right, he said.

You know also that the beginning is the chiefest part of any work, especially in a young and tender thing; for that is the time at which the character is formed and most readily receives the desired impression.

Quite true.

And shall we just carelessly allow children to hear any casual tales which may be framed by casual persons, and to receive into their minds notions which are the very opposite of those which are to be held by them when they are grown up?

We cannot allow that.

Then the first thing will be to have a censorship of the writers of fiction, and let the censors receive any tale of fiction which is good, and reject the bad; and we will desire mothers and nurses to tell their children the authorized ones only. Let them fashion the mind with these tales, and not the tender frame with the hands only. At the same time, most of those which are now in use will have to be discarded.

Of what tales are you speaking? he said.

You may find a model of the lesser in the greater, I said; for they are necessarily cast in the same mould, and there is the same spirit in both of them.

That may be very true, he replied; but I don't as yet know what you would term the greater.

Those, I said, which are narrated by Homer and Hesiod, and the rest of the poets, who have ever been the great story-tellers of mankind.

But which are the stories that you mean, he said; and what fault do you find with them?

A fault which is most serious, I said; the fault of telling a lie, and a bad lie.

But when is this fault committed?

Whenever an erroneous representation is made of the nature of gods and heroes,—like the drawing of a limner which has not the shadow of a likeness to the truth.

Yes, he said, that sort of thing is certainly very blameable; but what are the stories which you mean?

First of all, I said, there was that greatest of all lies in high places, which the poet told about Uranus, and which was an immoral lie too,—I mean what Hesiod says that Uranus did, and what Cronus did to him. (*Theogony*, 154, 459.) The fact is, that the doings of Cronus, and the sufferings which his son inflicted upon him, even if they were true, ought not to be lightly told to young and simple persons; if possible, they had better be buried in silence. But if there is an absolute necessity for their mention, a very few might hear them in a mystery, and then let them sacrifice not a common (Eleusinian) pig,

but some huge and unprocurable victim; this would have the effect of very greatly reducing the number of the hearers.

Why, yes, said he, those stories are certainly objectionable.

Yes, Adeimantus, they are stories not to be narrated in our State; the young man should not be told that in committing the worst of crimes he is far from doing anything outrageous, and that he may chastise his father when he does wrong in any manner that he likes, and in this will only be following the example of the first and greatest among the gods.

I quite agree with you, he said; in my opinion those stories are not fit to be repeated.

Neither, if we mean our future guardians to regard the habit of quarrelling as dishonourable, should anything be said of the wars in heaven, and of the plots and fightings of the gods against one another, which are quite untrue. Far be it from us to tell them of the battles of the giants, and embroider them on garments; or of all the innumerable other quarrels of gods and heroes with their friends and relations. If they would only believe us we would tell them that quarrelling is unholy, and that never up to this time has there been any quarrel between citizens; this is what old men and old women should begin by telling children, and the same when they grow up. And these are the sort of fictions which the poets should be required to compose. But the narrative of Hephaestus binding Here his mother, or how on another occasion Zeus sent him flying for taking her part when she was being beaten,—such tales must not be admitted into our State, whether they are supposed to have an allegorical meaning or not. For the young man cannot judge what is allegorical and what is literal, and anything that he receives into his mind at that age is apt to become indelible and unalterable; and therefore the tales which they first hear should be models of virtuous thoughts.

There you are right, he replied; that is quite essential: but, then, where are such models to be found? and what are the tales in which they are contained? when that question is asked, what will be our answer?

I said to him, You and I, Adeimantus, are not poets in what we are about just now, but founders of a State: now the founders of a State ought to know the general forms in which poets should cast their tales, and the limits which should be observed by them, but they are not bound themselves to make the tales.

That is true, he said; but what are these forms of theology which **you** mean?

Something of this kind, I replied:—God is always to be represented as he truly is; that is one form which is equally to be observed in every kind of verse, whether epic, lyric, or tragic.

Right.

And is he not truly good? and must he not be represented **as** such?

Certainly.

And no good thing is hurtful?

No, indeed.

And that which is not hurtful hurts not?

Certainly not.

And that which hurts not does no evil?

No.

And that which does no evil is the cause of no evil?

Impossible.

And the good is the advantageous?

Yes.

And the good is the cause of well-being?

Yes.

The good is not the cause of all things, but of the good only, and **not** the cause of evil?

Assuredly.

Then God, if he be good, is not the author of all things, as the many assert, but he is the cause of a few things only, and not of most things that occur to men; for few are the goods of human life, and many are the evils, and the good only is to be attributed to him: of the evil other causes have to be discovered.

That appears to me to be most true, he said.

Then we must not listen to Homer or any other poet who is guilty of the folly of saying that

‘At the threshold of Zeus lie two casks full of lots, one of good, the other of evil,’

and that he to whom Zeus gives a mixture of the two

‘Sometimes meets with good, at other times with evil fortune;’
but that he to whom is given the cup of unmingled ill,

‘Him wild hunger drives over the divine earth.’

And again—

‘Zeus, who is the dispenser of good and evil to us.’

And if any one asserts that the violation of oaths and treaties of which Pandarus was the real author, was brought about by Athene and Zeus, or that the strife and conflict of the gods was instigated by Themis and Zeus, he shall not have our approval; neither will we allow young men to hear the words of Aeschylus, when he says, that ‘God plants guilt among men when he desires utterly to destroy a house.’ And if a poet writes of the sufferings of Niobe, which is the subject of the tragedy in which these iambic verses occur, or of the house of Pelops, or of the Trojan war, or any similar theme, either we must not permit him to say that these are the works of God, or, if they are of God, he must devise some such explanation of them as we are seeking: he must say that God did what was just and right, and they were the better for being punished; but that those who are punished are miserable, and God the author of their misery;—that the poet is not to be permitted to say, though he may say that the wicked are miserable because they require to be punished, and are benefited by receiving punishment from God; but that God being good is the author of evil to any one, that is to be strenuously denied, and not allowed to be sung or said in any well-ordered commonwealth by old or young. Such a fiction is suicidal, ruinous, impious.

I agree with you, he replied, about this law, and am ready to give my assent.

Let this then be one of the rules of recitation and invention,—that God is not the author of evil, but of good only.

That will do, he said.

And what do you think of another principle? Shall I ask you whether God is a magician, that he should appear insidiously now in one shape, and now in another—sometimes himself changing and becoming different in form, sometimes deceiving us with the appearance of such transformations; or is he one and the same immutably fixed in his own proper image?

I cannot answer you without more thought.

Well, I said; but if we suppose a change in God or in anything else, that change must be effected either by another or by himself?

That is most certain.

And things which are at their best are also least liable to be altered or discomposed; for example, when healthiest and strongest the human frame is least liable to be affected by meats, and drinks and labours, and the plant which is in the fullest vigour also suffers least from heat or wind, or other similar accidents.

Of course.

And this is true of the soul as well as of the body; the bravest and wisest soul will be least affected by any external influence.

True.

And further, I conceive that this principle applies to all works of art—vessels, houses, garments; and that when well made and in good condition, they are least altered by time and circumstances.

That is true.

Then everything which is well made by art of nature, or both, is liable to receive the least change at the hands of others? and God and his attributes are absolutely perfect?

Of course.

He is therefore least likely to take many forms.

He is.

But suppose again that he changes and transforms himself?

Clearly, he said, that must be the case if he is changed at all.

And will he then change himself for the better, or for the worse?

If he change at all he must change for the worse, for we cannot suppose that he is deficient in virtue or beauty.

Very true, Adeimantus; but then, would any one, whether God or man, desire to change for the worse?

That cannot be.

Then God too cannot be willing to change; being, as is supposed, the fairest and best that is conceivable, he remains absolutely and for ever in his own form.

That necessarily follows, he said, in my judgment.

Then, I said, my dear friend, let none of the poets tell us that

‘The gods, in the disguise of strangers, prowl about cities having diverse forms;’

and let no one slander Proteus and Thetis, neither let anyone, either in tragedy or any other kind of poetry, introduce Here disguised in the likeness of a priestess,

‘asking an alms for the life-giving daughters of the river Inachus;’

let us have no more lies of that sort. Neither must we have mothers under the influence of the poets scaring their children with abominable tales

‘of certain gods who go about by night in the likeness, as is said, of strangers from every land;’

let them beware lest they blaspheme against the gods, and at the same time make cowards of their children.

That ought certainly to be prohibited, he said.

But still you may say that although God is himself unchangeable, he may take various forms in order to bewitch and deceive us.

Suppose that, he replied.

Well, but can you imagine that God will be willing to lie, whether in word or action, by making a false representation of himself?

I cannot say, he replied.

Do you not know, I said, that the true lie, if I may use such an expression, is hated of gods and men?

What do you mean? he said.

I mean this, I said,—that no one is willing to be deceived in that which is the truest and highest part of himself, or about the truest and highest matters; there he is most afraid of a lie having possession of him.

Still, he said, I do not comprehend you.

The reason is, I replied, that you attribute some grand meaning to me; whereas all that I am saying is, that deception, or being deceived or uninformed about true being in the highest faculty, which is the soul, and in that part of them to have and to hold the lie, is what mankind least like;—that, I say, is what they utterly detest.

There is nothing more hateful to them.

And, as I was just now saying, this ignorance in the soul of the lie within may be called the true lie; for the lie in words is only a kind of imitation and shadowy image of a previous affection of the soul, not pure unadulterated falsehood. Am I not right in saying this?

Perfectly right.

The true lie is hated not only by the gods, but also by men.

Yes.

Whereas the lie in words is in certain cases useful and not hateful; in dealing with enemies—that would be an instance; or again, as a cure or preventive of the madness of so-called friends; also in the tales of mythology, of which we were just now speaking—because

we do not know the truth about ancient traditions, we make falsehood as much like truth as we can, and there is use in this.

Very true, he said.

But can any of these reasons apply to God. Can we suppose that he is ignorant of antiquity, and therefore has recourse to invention?

That would be ridiculous, he said.

The lying poet then has no place in God?

I should say not.

But peradventure he may tell a lie because he is afraid of enemies?

That is inconceivable.

But he may have friends who are senseless or mad?

But no mad or senseless person can be a friend of God.

Then no motive can be imagined why God should lie?

None.

Then the superhuman and divine is absolutely incapable of falsehood?

Yes.

Then is God perfectly simple and true both in deed and word; he changes not; he deceives not, either by dream or waking vision, by sign or word.

Your words, he answered, are the very expression of my own feelings.

You agree with me, I said, that this is the second type or mould in which we are to cast our ideas about divine things; the gods are not magicians who transform themselves, neither do they deceive mankind in word or deed.

I grant that.

Then, although we are lovers of Homer, we do not love the lying dream which Zeus sends to Agamemnon; neither will we praise the verses of Aeschylus in which Thetis says that Apollo at her nuptials

‘Was celebrating in song her fair progeny whose days were to be long, and to know no sickness. And gathering all in one he raised a note of triumph over the blessedness of my lot, and cheered my soul. And I thought that the word of Phoebus being prophetic and divine would not fail. And now he himself who uttered the strain, he who was present at the banquet, and who said this. .he was the very one who slew my son.’

These are the kind of sentiments about the gods which will arouse our anger; and he who utters them shall be refused a chorus; neither

shall we allow them to enter into education, meaning, as we do, that our guardians, as far as men can be, should be true worshippers of the Gods and like them.

I entirely agree, he said, in the propriety of these principles, and promise to make them my laws.—The Republic, Bk. II.

TRANSLATION OF B. JOWETT.

COMMUNITY IN THE STATE

Here, then, is one difficulty in our law about women which we have escaped; the wave has not swallowed us up alive for enacting that the guardians of either sex should have all their pursuits in common; to the utility and possibility of this the argument is its own witness.

Yes, he said; that was a mighty wave which you have escaped.

Yes, I said, but a much greater is coming; you will not think much of this when you see the next.

Go on, he said; let me see.

The law, I said, which is the sequel of this and of all that has preceded, is to this effect,—‘that the wives of these guardians are to be common, and their children also common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent.’

Yes, he said, that is a much greater wave than the other; and the utility as well as the possibility of such a law is far more doubtful.

I do not think, I said, that there can be any dispute about the very great utility of having wives and children in common; the possibility is quite another matter, and will be very much disputed.

I think, he said, that a good many doubts may be raised about both questions.

You insist on joining the two questions, I said. Now I meant that you should admit the utility; and in this way, as I thought, I should escape from one of them, and then there would remain only the possibility.

But that little attempt is detected, and therefore you will please to give a defence of both.

Well, I said, I submit to my fate, yet grant me a little favour: let

me feast my mind as day-dreamers are in the habit of feasting themselves with their own dreams when they are walking alone; for before they have discovered any means of effecting their wishes—that is a matter which never troubles them—they would rather not tire themselves by thinking about possibilities; but assuming that what they desire is already theirs, they pursue their plan, and delight in detailing what they are going to do when their wish has come true—that is a way which they have of not doing much good to a capacity which was never good for much. And I too am beginning to lose heart, and would wish to reserve the question of possibility; and assuming this, for the present only, if you will allow me I will proceed to enquire what measures the rulers will take for the execution of the plan, which, if executed, I will prove to be of the greatest use to the State and to the guardians. I will ask you, if you have no objection, to assist me, first of all, in considering the advantages of this, and then I will return to the question of possibility.

I have no objection; proceed.

First, I think that if our rulers and their auxiliaries are to be worthy of the name which they bear, there must be willingness to obey in the one and the power of command in the other; the guardians must themselves obey the laws and imitate their spirit in the details which are entrusted to them.

That is right, he said.

You, I said, in the capacity of their legislator, having selected the men, will now select the women who are most akin to them and give them to them, and they will live in common houses and meet at common meals. None of them will have anything specially his or her own; and they will be together and associate at gymnastic exercises, and be brought up together. And so they will be drawn by a necessity of their natures to have intercourse with each other; necessity is not too strong a word I think?

Yes, he said;—necessity, not geometrical, but another sort of necessity which lovers know, and which is far more convincing and constraining to the mass of mankind.

True, I said; and this, Glaucon, like all the rest, must proceed after an orderly fashion,—in a city of the blessed, licentiousness is an unholy thing which the rulers will forbid.

Yes, he said, and so they ought.

Then clearly our plan will be to make matrimony as holy as possible, and the most beneficial marriages will be the most holy?

Exactly.

And how can marriages be made most beneficial?—that is a question which I put to you, because I observe in your house hunting dogs and of the nobler sort of birds not a few. Now, do tell me, did you ever attend to their pairing and breeding?

In what respect?

Why, in the first place, although they are all of a good sort, are not some better than others?

True.

And do you breed from them all indifferently, or do you take care to breed from the best only?

From the best.

And do you take the oldest or the youngest, or only those that are of ripe age?

I choose only those of ripe age.

And if none of this care was taken in the breeding, your dogs and birds would deteriorate?

Certainly.

And the same principle holds of horses and of animals in general. Undoubtedly.

Good heavens! my dear friend, I said, what consummate skill will our rulers need if the same principle holds of the human species!

Certainly, the same principle holds; but why does this involve such a high requirement?

Because, I said, our rulers will have to practise upon the body corporate with medicines. Now you know that when patients do not require medicines, but have only to be put under a regimen, the inferior sort of practitioner is deemed to be good enough; but when medicine has to be given, then the doctor should be more of a man.

That is quite true, he said; but what do you mean?

I mean, I replied, that our rulers will find a considerable dose of falsehood and deceit necessary for the good of their subjects: we were saying that they might be used with advantage as medicines.

True, he said.

And this lawful use of them seems likely to be often needed in the regulations of marriages and births.

How will that be?

Why, I said, the principle has been already laid down that the best of either sex should be united with the best as often as possible, and the inferior with the inferior; and they are to rear the offspring

of the one sort of union, but not of the other; for this is the only way of keeping the flock in prime condition. Now these goings on must be a secret which the rulers only know, or there will be a further danger of our herd, as the guardians may be termed, breaking out into rebellion.

Very true, he said.

Had we not better appoint certain festivals at which the brides and bridegrooms will meet, and there will be sacrifices offered and suitable hymeneal songs composed by our poets: the number of weddings is a matter which must be left to the discretion of the rulers, whose aim will be to preserve the average of population; and there are many things which they will have to consider, such as the effects of wars and diseases and any similar agencies, in order to prevent the State becoming either too large or too small.

Very true, he replied.

We shall have to invent some ingenious kind of lots which the less worthy may draw on each occasion of meeting, and then he will accuse his own ill-luck and not the rulers.

To be sure, he said.

And I think that our braver and better youth, besides their other honours and rewards, might have greater facilities of intercourse with women given them; their bravery is a good pretext, and such fathers ought to have as many sons as possible.

True.

And the proper officers, whether male or female or both, for offices are to be held by women as well as by men—

Yes.

The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, they will conceal in some mysterious, unknown place. Decency will be respected.

Yes, he said, that will require to be done if the breed of the guardians is to be kept pure.

They will provide for their nurture, and will bring the mothers to the fold when they are full of milk, taking the greatest possible care that no mother recognizes her own child; and other wet-nurses may be had if any more are required. Care will also be taken that the process of suckling shall not be tedious to them; and they will have

no trouble or getting up at night, but will hand over all this to the nurses and attendants.

You suppose the wives of our guardians to have a fine easy time of it when they are having children.

Why, said I, and so they ought. Let us, however, proceed with our scheme. As we were saying, the parents should be in the prime of life.

Very true.

And what is the prime of life? May not that be defined as a period of about twenty years in a woman's life, and thirty in a man's?

Which years do you mean to include?

A woman, I said, may begin to bear children to the State at twenty years of age, and continue to bear until forty; a man may begin at five-and-twenty, when he has passed the point at which the speed of life is greatest, and continue to beget children until he be fifty-five.

Certainly, he said, both in men and women that is the prime of physical as well as of intellectual vigour.

Any one above or below those ages who takes part in the public hymeneals shall be said to have done an unholy and unrighteous thing; he is the father of a child who, if he steals into life, will have been conceived under other auspices than those of sacrifice and prayers, which at each hymeneal priestesses and priests and the whole city will offer, that the new generation may be better and more useful than their good and useful parents: instead of this his child will be the offspring of darkness and strange lust.

Very true, he replied.

And the same law will apply to any one of those within the prescribed age who forms a connection with any woman in the prime of life without the sanction of the rulers; for we shall say that he is raising up a bastard to the State, uncertified and unconsecrated.

Very true, he replied.

This applies, however, only to those who are within the specified age: after that we allow them to range at will, except that a man may not marry his daughter or his daughter's daughter, or his mother or his mother's mother; and women, on the other hand, are prohibited from marrying their sons or fathers, or son's son or father's father, and so on in either direction. And we grant all this, accompanying the permission with strict orders to them to do all they can to prevent any embryo which may come into being from seeing the light; and if any force a way to the birth, they must understand that the offspring

of such an union cannot be maintained, and make their arrangements accordingly.

That also, he said, is a reasonable proposition. But how will they know who are fathers and daughters, and so on?

They will never know. The way will be this:—dating from the day of the hymeneal, the bridegroom who was then married will call all the male children who are born ten and seven months afterwards his sons, and the female children his daughters, and they will call him father, and he will call their children's children his grandchildren, and they will call the elder generation grandfathers and grandmothers. And those who were born at the same time with them they will term brothers and sisters, and they are not to intermarry. This, however, is not to be understood as an absolute prohibition of such marriages; if the lot favours them, and they have the sanction of the Pythian oracle, the law will still allow them.

Quite right, he replied.

Such is the scheme according to which the guardians of our State are to have their wives and families in common. I must now make the argument prove that this community is consistent with the rest of our policy, and also that nothing can be better—that is what you want?

Yes, certainly.

And shall we begin by asking ourselves what we conceive to be the greatest good, and what ought to be the chief aim of the legislator in the organization of a State, and what is the greatest evil, and then consider whether our previous description has the mark and stamp of the good or of the evil?

By all means.

And can there be any greater evil than discord and distraction and plurality where unity ought to reign? or any greater good than the bond of unity?

There cannot.

And there is unity where there is community of pleasures and pains—where all the citizens are glad or sorry on the same occasions?

No doubt.

Yes; and where there is no common but only private feeling, that disorganizes a State—when you have one half of the world triumphing and the other sorrowing at the same events happening to the city and the citizens?

Certainly.

Such differences commonly originate in a disagreement about the use of the terms 'meum,' and 'tuum,' mine and his.

Exactly.

And is not that the best-ordered State in which the greatest number of persons apply the terms 'mine' and 'not mine' in the same way to the same thing?

True, very true.

Or that again which most nearly approaches to the condition of the individual—as in the body, when but a finger is hurt, the whole frame, drawn towards the soul and forming one realm under the ruling power therein, feels the hurt and sympathizes all together with the part affected, and then we say that the man has a pain in his finger; or again, in any other part, when there is a sensation of pain or pleasure at suffering or alleviation of suffering, the same expression is used?

Yes, he replied, that is as you say; and I agree with you that in the best-ordered State there is the nearest approach to this common feeling which you describe.

Then when any one of the citizens experiences any good or evil, the whole State will make his case their own, and either rejoice or sorrow with him?

Yes, he said, that will be true in a well-ordered State.

It will now be time, I said, for us to return to our State and see whether this or any other form is most in accordance with these principles.

Very good.

Our State like every other has rulers and subjects.

That is true.

All of whom will call one another citizens?

Of course.

But is there not another name which people give to their rulers in other States?

Generally they call them masters, but in democratic States they simply call them rulers.

And what name besides that of citizens do the people give the rulers in our State?

The name of preservers and auxiliaries, he replied.

And what do the rulers call the people?

Their maintainers and foster-fathers.

And what do they call them in other States?

Slaves.

And what do the rulers call one another in other States?

Fellow-rulers.

And what in ours?

Fellow-guardians.

Did you ever know an example in other States of a ruler who would speak of one of his colleagues as a friend and of another as alien to him?

Yes, that is very common.

And the friend he describes and regards as one in whom he has an interest, and the other as one in whom he has no interest.

Exactly.

But would any of your guardians speak of one of their fellows as a friend and of another as alien to him?

Certainly not; for every one whom they meet will be regarded by them either as a brother or sister, or father or mother, or son or daughter, or as the child or parent of those who are thus connected with him.

That is an admirable answer, I said; but let me ask you one small question: Will you give them the names of family ties only, or are they in all their actions to conform to these names? For example, in the use of the word 'father', would the care of a father be implied and the filial reverence and duty and obedience to him which the law commands? and is the violator of these duties to be regarded as an impious and unrighteous person who is not likely to receive much good either from the hands of God or man? Are these to be the strains which the children will hear repeated in their ears by all the citizens about their parents and kindred when they are pointed out to them?

These, he said, and none other; for what can be more ridiculous than for them to utter the names of family ties with the lips only and not to act upon them?

Then in our city the language of harmony and concord will be more often heard than in any other. As I was describing before, when any one is well or ill, the universal word will be 'mine is well' or 'mine is ill.'

Most true.

And were we not saying also that they would have their pleasures and pains in common, and that their mode of thinking or speaking would coincide with the fact?

Yes, and that is true.

And they will have a common interest in the same which they will call 'my own,' and having this common interest they will have a common feeling of pleasure and pain?

Yes, they will have a far greater community of feeling.

And the reason of this, over and above the general constitution of the State, will be that the guardians have a community of women and children?

That will be the chief reason.

And that this unity of feeling will be the greatest good was implied in our own comparison of a well-ordered State to the relation of the body and the members, when affected by pleasure or pain?

That was acknowledged, and very rightly.

Then the community of wives and children is clearly the source of the greatest good to the State?

Certainly.

And this agrees with the other principle which we were affirming,—that the guardians were not to have houses or lands or any other property; their pay was to be their food, which they were to receive from the other citizens, and they were only to spend in common: that was all designed to preserve their true character of guardians.

Right, he replied.

Both the community of property and the community of families, as I am saying, tend to make them more truly guardians; they will not tear the city in pieces by differing about 'meum' and 'tuum;' the one dragging any acquisition which he has made into a private house which is his, and which has a separate wife and separate children and private pleasures and pains; but all are affected as far as may be by all the same pleasures and pains because they are all of one opinion about what is near and dear to them, and therefore all tend towards a common end.

Certainly, he replied.

And as they have nothing but their persons which they can call their own, suits and complaints will have no existence among them; they will be free from all those quarrels of which money or children or relations are the occasion.

That of course follows.

Neither can trials for assault or insult ever be expected to occur among them. For that equals should defend themselves against equals we shall surely maintain to be fair and right; and in this way we shall oblige them to keep themselves in condition.

That is good, he said.

Yes; and there is this further good in the law—that if a man has cause of offence against another he will satisfy his resentment and be less likely to make a commotion in the State.

Certainly.

To the elder shall be assigned the duty of ruling and chastising the younger.

Clearly.

Nor can there be a doubt that the younger will not strike or do any other violence to an elder, unless the magistrates command him; nor is he likely to be disrespectful to him in any way. For there are two guardians, shame and fear, mighty to prevent him: shame, which makes men refrain from laying hands on those who are to them in the relation of parents; fear, that the injured one will be succoured by the others who are his brothers, sons, fathers.

That is true, he replied.

Then in every way the laws will help the citizens to keep peace with one another.

Yes, there will be a certainty of peace.

And as the guardians will never quarrel among themselves there will be no danger of the rest of the city being divided either against them or against one another.

None whatever.

I hardly like to speak of the little meannesses of which they will be rid, for they are beneath mention. Such, for example, as the flattery of the rich by the poor, and all the pains and pangs of bringing up a family, finding the money to buy the necessaries of their household, borrowing and then repudiating, getting how they can, and giving the money into the hands of women and slaves to keep: what people suffer in this way is mean enough and obvious enough, and not worth speaking of.

Yes, he said, a man has no need of eyes in order to perceive that.

And from all that they will be delivered, and their life will be blessed as the life of Olympic victors and yet more blessed.

How can that be?

Why, I said, they are counted happy in receiving a part only of the happiness which is the lot of our citizens, who have won a more glorious victory and have a more complete maintenance at the public cost. For the victory which they have won is the salvation of the whole State; and the crown with which they and their children are

crowned is the fullness of all that life needs; they receive rewards from the hands of their country while living and after death have an honourable burial.

Yes, he said, they are indeed glorious rewards.

Do you remember, I said, how in the course of the previous discussion some one who shall be nameless accused us of making our guardians unhappy—they had nothing and might have possessed all things—to whom we replied that on some future occasion we might perhaps consider the question, but that, as at present advised, we would make our guardians truly guardians, and that we were not fashioning any particular class with a view to their happiness, but in order that the whole State might be the happiest possible?

Yes, I remember.

And what do you say now that the life of our protector is made out to be far better and nobler than that of Olympic victors; will you compare such a life with that of shoemakers, or any other artisans, or of husbandmen?

Certainly not.

At the same time I ought to repeat what I was then saying, that if any of our guardians shall get into his head the youthful conceit, that he being a guardian ought to have a happiness which would make him no longer a guardian, and is not content with this safe and harmonious life, than which, in our judgment, there never was a better, but shall proceed to monopolize the State, then he will have to learn out of Hesiod, that he verily was a wise man who said 'half is better than the whole.'

If he were to consult me, I should say to him: Stay where you are, having the promise of such a life.

And you agree then, I said, that men and women are to have a common way of life such as we have described—common education, common children; and they are to watch over the citizens in common whether abiding in the city or going out to war; they are to guard together, and to hunt together like dogs; and always and in all things women are to share with the men? And this will be for the best, and in doing this they will not violate the natural relation?

I agree with you, he replied.—The Republic, Bk. V.

DIODENES THE CYNIC

DIODENES THE CYNIC was born about 412 B. C. at Sinope in Asia Minor. He typifies the theory that the chief good is freedom from wants. His home at Athens was a tub, and his wealth was on his back. His life and sayings are a protest against civilization itself, but have their value as against the luxuriousness of such a civilization as was that of Athens.

He was captured by pirates and sold in the slave-mart of Crete to Xenitades of Corinth. He passed the rest of his life as a tutor, dying about 323 B. C. He left no writings, but some of his most characteristic sayings are given below,

CHARACTERISTIC SAYINGS

HE WAS very violent in expressing his haughty disdain of others. He said that the school (schola) of Euclides was gall (chola). And he used to call Plato's discussions (diatriba) disguise (katatriba). It was also a saying of his that the Dionysian games were a great marvel to fools; and that the demagogues were the ministers of the multitude. He used likewise to say, "that when in the course of his life he beheld pilots and physicians, and philosophers, he thought man the wisest of all animals; but when again he beheld interpreters of dreams and soothsayers, and those who listened to them, and men puffed up with glory or riches, then he thought that there was not a more foolish animal than man." Another of his sayings was, "that he thought a man ought oftener to provide himself with a reason than with a halter."

On one occasion, when he noticed Plato at a very costly entertainment tasting some olives, he said, "O you wise man! why, after having sailed to Sicily for the sake of such a feast, do you not now enjoy what you have before you?" And Plato replied, "By the gods, Diogenes, while I was there I ate olives and all such things a great deal." Diogenes rejoined, "What then did you want to sail to Syracuse for? Did not Attica at that time produce any olives?" But Phavorinus, in his Universal History, tells this story of Aristippus. At another time he was eating dried figs, when Plato met him, and he said to him, "You may have a share of these;" and as he took some and ate them, he said, "I said that you might have a share of them, not that you might eat them all." On one occasion Plato had invited some friends who had come to him from Dionysius to a banquet, and Diogenes trampled on his carpets, and said, "Thus I trample on the empty pride of Plato;" and Plato made him answer, "How much arrogance are you displaying, O Diogenes! when you think that you are not arrogant at all." But, as others tell the story, Diogenes said, "Thus I trample on the pride of Plato;" and that Plato rejoined, "With quite as much pride yourself, O Diogenes." Sotion too, in his fourth book, states that the Cynic made the following speech to Plato: Diogenes once asked him for some wine, and then for some dried figs; so he sent him an entire jar full; and Diogenes said to him, "Will you, if you are asked how many two and two make, answer twenty? In this way, you neither give with any reference to what you are asked for, nor do you answer with reference to the question put to you." He used also to ridicule him as an interminable talker. When he was asked where in Greece he saw virtuous men; "Men," said he, "nowhere; but I see good boys in Lacedæmon." On one occasion, when no one came to listen to him while he was discoursing seriously, he began to whistle. And then when people flocked round him, he reproached them for coming with eagerness to folly, but being lazy and indifferent about good things. One of his frequent sayings was, "That men contended with one another in punching and kicking, but that no one showed any emulation in the pursuit of virtue." He used to express his astonishment at the grammarians for being desirous to learn everything about the misfortunes of Ulysses, and being ignorant of their own. He used also to say, "That the musicians fitted the strings to the lyre properly, but left all the habits of their soul ill-arranged." And, "That mathematicians kept their eyes fixed on the sun and moon, and overlooked what was under their feet." "That orators were anxious to speak justly, but not at all about

acting so." Also, "That misers blamed money, but were preposterously fond of it." He often condemned those who praise the just for being superior to money, but who at the same time are eager themselves for great riches. He was also very indignant at seeing men sacrifice to the gods to procure good health, and yet at the sacrifice eating in a manner injurious to health. He often expressed his surprise at slaves, who, seeing their masters eating in a gluttonous manner, still do not themselves lay hands on any of the eatables. He would frequently praise those who were about to marry, and yet did not marry; or who were about to take a voyage, and yet did not take a voyage; or who were about to engage in affairs of state, and did not do so; and those who were about to rear children, yet did not rear any; and those who were preparing to take up their abode with princes, and yet did not take it up. One of his sayings was, "That one ought to hold out one's hand to a friend without closing the fingers."

Hermippus, in his *Sale of Diogenes*, says that he was taken prisoner and put up to be sold, and asked what he could do; and he answered, "Govern men." And so he bade the crier "give notice that if any one wants to purchase a master, there is one here for him." When he was ordered not to sit down; "It makes no difference," said he, "for fish are sold, be where they may." He used to say, that he wondered at men always ringing a dish or jar before buying it, but being content to judge of a man by his look alone. When Xenocrates bought him, he said to him that he ought to obey him even though he was his slave; for that a physician or a pilot would find men to obey them even though they might be slaves.

V. And Eubulus says, in his essay entitled, *The Sale of Diogenes*, that he taught the children of Xenocrates, after their other lessons, to ride, and shoot, and sling, and dart. And then in the gymnasium he did not permit the trainer to exercise them after the fashion of athletes, but exercised them himself to just the degree sufficient to give them a good colour and good health. And the boys retained in their memory many sentences of poets and prose writers, and of Diogenes himself; and he used to give them a concise statement of everything in order to strengthen their memory, and at home he used to teach them to wait upon themselves; contenting themselves with plain food, and drinking water. And he accustomed them to cut their hair close, and to eschew ornament, and to go without tunics or shoes, and to keep silent, looking at nothing except themselves as they walked along. He used also to take them out hunting; and they paid the greatest attention and

respect to Diogenes himself, and spoke well of him to their parents.

On one occasion he saw a child drinking out of its hands, and so he threw away the cup which belonged to his wallet, saying, "That child has beaten me in simplicity." He also threw away his spoon, after seeing a boy, when he had broken his vessel, take up his lentils with a crust of bread. And he used to argue thus,—“Everything belongs to the gods; and wise men are the friends of the gods. All things are in common among friends; therefore everything belongs to wise men.”

Plato defined man thus: "Man is a two-footed, featherless animal," and was much praised for the definition; so Diogenes plucked a cock and brought it into his school, and said, "This is Plato's man." On which account this addition was made to the definition, "With broad flat nails." A man once asked him what was the proper time for supper, and he made answer, "If you are a rich man, whenever you please; and if you are a poor man, whenever you can." When he was at Megara he saw some sheep carefully covered over with skins, and the children running about naked; and so he said, "It is better at Megara to be a man's ram, than his son." A man once struck him with a beam, and then said, "Take care." "What," said he, "are you going to strike me again?" He used to say that the demagogues were the servants of the people; and garlands the blossoms of glory. Having lighted a candle in the day time, he said, "I am looking for a man." On one occasion he stood under a fountain, and as the bystanders were pitying him, Plato, who was present, said to them, "If you wish really to show your pity for him, come away;" intimating that he was only acting thus out of a desire for notoriety. Once, when a man had struck him with his fist, he said, "O Hercules, what a strange thing that I should be walking about with a helmet on without knowing it!"

When Midias struck him with his fist and said, "There are three thousand drachmas for you;" the next day Diogenes took the cestus of a boxer and beat him soundly, and said, "There are three thousand drachmas for you."

When Plato was discoursing about his "ideas," and using the nouns "tableness" and "cupness;" "I, O Plato!" interrupted Diogenes, "see a table and a cup, but I see no tableness or cupness." Plato made answer, "That is natural enough, for you have eyes, by which a cup and a table are contemplated; but you have not intellect, by which tableness and cupness are seen."

On one occasion, he was asked by a certain person, "What sort of a man, O Diogenes, do you think Socrates?" and he said, "A mad-

man." Another time, the question was put to him, when a man ought to marry? and his reply was, "Young men ought not to marry yet, and old men never ought to marry at all." When asked what he would take to let a man give him a blow on the head?" he replied, "A helmet." Seeing a youth smartening himself up very carefully, he said to him, "If you are doing that for men, you are miserable; and if for women, you are profligate." Once he saw a youth blushing, and addressed him, "Courage, my boy, that is the complexion of virtue." Having once listened to two lawyers, he condemned them both; saying, "That the one had stolen the thing in question, and that the other had not lost it." When asked what wine he liked to drink, he said, "That which belongs to another." A man said to him one day, "Many people laugh at you." "But I," he replied, "am not laughed down." When a man said to him, that it was a bad thing to live; "Not to live," said he, "but to live badly." When some people were advising him to make search for a slave who had run away," he said, "It would be a very absurd thing for Manes to be able to live without Diogenes, but for Diogenes not to be able to live without Manes."

When Craterus entreated him to come and visit him, he said, "I would rather lick up salt at Athens, than enjoy a luxurious table with Craterus." On one occasion, he met Anaximenes, the orator, who was a fat man, and thus accosted him: "Pray give us, who are poor, some of your belly; for by so doing you will be relieved yourself, and you will assist us." And once, when he was discussing some point, Diogenes held up a piece of salt fish, and drew off the attention of his hearers; and as Anaximenes was indignant at this, he said, "See, one pennyworth of salt fish has put an end to the lecture of Anaximenes." Being once reproached for eating in the market-place he made answer, "I did, for it was in the market-place that I was hungry." Some authors also attribute the following repartee to him. Plato saw him washing vegetables, and so, coming up to him, he quietly accosted him thus, "If you had paid court to Dionysius, you would not have been washing vegetables." And," he replied, with equal quietness, "if you had washed vegetables, you would never have paid court to Dionysius." When a man said to him once, "Most people laugh at you;" "And very likely," he replied, "the asses laugh at them; but they do not regard the asses, neither do I regard them." Once he saw a youth studying philosophy, and said to him, "Well done; inasmuch as you are leading those who admire your person to contemplate the beauty of your mind."—
Diogenes Lærtius.

ARISTOTLE

ARISTOTLE, the Stagairite, was the son of Nicomachos, the physician of the king of Macedonia. He was born in 384 B. C., and entered the Academy under Plato when eighteen. After Plato's death, in 348 B. C., Aristotle left Athens and in 343 B. C., became the teacher of Alexander. When Alexander invaded Asia, Aristotle returned to Athens, and founded a school in the Lyceum. Twelve years later, he was exiled as a friend of Alexander, and soon after, in 322 B. C., died at Chalcis.

Since Plato had found universal truth only in connection with classes of things, Aristotle started with an examination of the relation of the particular to the general. Thus was born logic. He studied the interrelations of things and made a list of them in the categories. He took up the nature of Being, and while admitting Plato's theory that the individual thing exists as it does only because in it the general concept realizes itself, maintained that the general concept exists only in the individual thing. He argued for the necessity of a First Mover and its existence as an individuality and a self-conscious mentality, a God that moves matter but is not moved. This philosophy he applied in his *Ethics* to the inner life, and in his *Politics* to man's social state.

The above points have all been illustrated in his work given below. He also developed Rhetoric to almost its present advancement, and was great, also, as a scientist, though out of his extensive collections of data, no principle was evolved to be handed down to the world.

HERACLES

After Lysippus. In the Louvre.

LYSIPPUS was born at Sicyon in Achaea and flourished during the reign of Alexander (around 324 B. C.) He was the only worker in bronze to whom that victor gave permission to execute his statute.

The type of Heracles shown in our photogravure was created by Lysippus.

EXHIBIT

STATE OF NEW YORK

In SENATE,
January 1, 1911.
REPORT
OF THE
COMMISSIONERS OF THE LAND OFFICE
IN RESPONSE TO A RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE SENATE
MAY 1, 1909.
ALBANY: J. B. LEECH, STATE PRINTER, 1911.





FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTIONS IN LOGIC

ENUMERATION OF THE CATEGORIES

OF THINGS incomplex enunciated, each signifies either substance, or Quality, or Relation, or Where, or When, or Position, or Possession, or Action, or Passion. But Substance is (to speak generally), as "man," "horse;" Quantity, as "two" or "three cubits;" Quality, as "white," a "grammatical thing;" Relation as "a double," "a half," "greater;" Where, as "in the Forum," "in the Lyceum;" When, as "yesterday," "last year;" Position, as "he reclines," "he sits;" Possession, as "he is shod," "he is armed;" Action, as "he cuts," "he burns;" Passion, as "he is cut," "he is burnt." Now each of the above, considered by itself, is predicated neither affirmatively nor negatively, but from the connexion of these with each other, affirmation or negation arises. For every affirmation or negation appears to be either true or false, but of things enunciated without any connection, none is either true or false, as "man," "white," "runs," "conquers."

OF SUBSTANCE

Substance, in its strictest, first, and chief sense, is that which is neither predicated of any subject, nor is in any; as "a certain man," or "a certain horse." But secondary substances are they, in which as species, those primarily-named substances are inherent, that is to say, both these and the genera of these species; as "a certain man" exists in "man," as in a species, but the genus of the species is "animal;" these, therefore, are termed secondary substances, as both "man" and "animal." But it is evident from what has been said, that of those things which are predicated of a subject, both the name and the definition must be predicated of the subject, as "man" is predicated of "some certain man," as of a subject, and the name, at least, is predicated, for you will predicate "man" of "some certain man," and the definition of man will be predicated of "some certain man," for "a certain man"

is both "man" and "animal;" wherefore both the name and the definition will be predicated of a subject. But of things which are in a subject, for the most part, neither the name nor the definition is predicated of the subject, yet with some, there is nothing to prevent the name from being sometimes predicated of the subject, though the definition cannot be so; as "whiteness" being in a body, as in a subject, is predicated of the subject (for the body is termed "white"), but the definition of "whiteness" can never be predicated of body. All other things, however, are either predicated of primary substances, as of subjects, or are inherent in them as in subjects; this, indeed, is evident, from several obvious instances, thus "animal" is predicated of "man," and therefore is also predicated of some "certain man," for if it were predicated of no "man" particularly, neither could it be of "man" universally. Again, "color" is in "body," therefore also is it in "some certain body," for if it were not in "some one" of bodies singularly, it could not be in "body" universally; so that all other things are either predicated of primary substances as of subjects, or are inherent in them as in subjects; if therefore the primal substances do not exist, it is impossible that any one of the rest should exist.

But of secondary substances, species is more substance than genus; for it is nearer to the primary substance, and if any one explain what the primary substance is, he will explain it more clearly and appropriately by giving the species, rather than the genus; as a person defining "a certain man" would do so more clearly, by giving "man" than "animal," for the former is more the peculiarity of "a certain man," but the latter is more common. In like manner, whoever explains what "a certain tree" is, will define it in a more known and appropriate manner, by introducing "tree" than "plant." Besides the primary substances, because of their subjection to all other things, and these last being either predicated of them, or being in them, are for this reason, especially, termed substances. Yet the same relation as the primary substances bear to all other things, does species bear to genus, for species is subjected to genus since genera are predicated of species, but species are not reciprocally predicated of genera, whence the species is rather substance than the genus.

Of species themselves, however, as many as are not genera, are not more substance, one than another, for he will not give a more appropriate definition of "a certain man," who introduces "man," than he who introduces "horse," into the definition of "a certain horse;" in like manner of primary substances, one is not more substance than

another, for "a certain man" is not more substance than "a certain ox." With reason therefore after the first substances, of the rest, species and genera alone are termed secondary substances, since they alone declare the primary substances of the predicates; thus, if any one were to define what "a certain man" is, he would, by giving the species or the genus, define it appropriately, and will do so more clearly by introducing "man" than "animal;" but whatever else he may introduce, he will be introducing, in a manner, foreign to the purpose, as if he were to introduce "white," or "runs," or any thing else of the kind, so that with propriety of the others, these alone are termed substances. Moreover, the primary substances, because they are subject to all the rest, and all the others are predicated of, or exist in, these, are most properly termed substances, but the same relation which the primary substances bear to all other things, do the species and genera of the first substances bear to all the rest, since of these, are all the rest predicated, for you will say that "a certain man" is "a grammarian," and therefore you will call both "man" and "animal" "a grammarian," and in like manner of the rest.

It is common however to every substance, not to be in a subject, for neither is the primal substance in a subject, nor is it predicated of any; but of the secondary substances, that none of them is in a subject, is evident from this; "man" is predicated of "some certain" subject "man," but is not in a subject, for "man" is not in "a certain man." So also "animal" is predicated of "some certain" subject "man," but "animal" is not "a certain man." Moreover of those which are, in the subject, nothing prevents the name from being sometimes predicated of the subject, but that the definition should be predicated of it, is impossible. Of secondary substances, however, the definition and the name are both predicated of the subject, for you will predicate the definition of "a man" concerning "a certain man," and likewise the definition of "animal," so that substance may not be amongst the number of those things which are in a subject.

This, however, is not the peculiarity of substance, but difference also is of the number of those things not in a subject; for "pedestrian" and "biped" are indeed predicated of "a man" as of a subject, but are not in a subject, for neither "biped" nor "pedestrian" is in "man." The definition also of difference is predicated of that, concerning which difference is predicated, so that if "pedestrian" be predicated of "man," the definition also of "pedestrian" will be predicated of man, for "man" is "pedestrian." Nor let the parts of substances, being in wholes as in

subjects, perplex us, so that we should at any time be compelled to say, that they are not substances; for in this manner, things would not be said to be in a subject, which are in any as parts. It happens indeed both to substances and to differences alike, that all things should be predicated of them univocally, for all the categories from them are predicated either in respect of individuals or of species, since from the primary substance there is no category, for it is predicated in respect of the individual, but genus in respect both to species and to individuals, so also differences are predicated as to species and as to individuals. Again, the primary substances take the definition of species and of genera, and the species the definition of the genus, for as many things as are said of the predicate, so many also will be said of the subject, likewise both the species and the individuals accept the definition of the differences: those things at least were univocal, of which the name is common and the definition the same, so that all which arise from substances and differences are predicated univocally.

Nevertheless every substance appears to signify this particular thing: as regards then the primary substances, it is unquestionably true that they signify a particular thing, for what is signified is individual, and one in number, but as regards the secondary substances, it appears in like manner that they signify this particular thing, by the figure of appellation, when any one says "man" or "animal," yet it is not truly so, but rather they signify a certain quality, for the subject is not one, as the primary substance, but "man" and "animal" are predicated in respect of many. Neither do they signify simply a certain quality, as "white," for "white" signifies nothing else but a thing of a certain quality, but the species and the genus determine the quality, about the substance, for they signify what quality a certain substance possesses: still a wider limit is made by genus than by species, for whoever speaks of "animal," comprehends more than he who speaks of "man."

It belongs also to substance that there is no contrary to them, since what can be contrary to the primary substance, as to a certain "man," or to a certain "animal," for there is nothing contrary either at least to "man" or to "animal?" Now this is not the peculiarity of substance, but of many other things, as for instance of quantity; for there is no contrary to "two" cubits nor to "three" cubits, nor to "ten," nor to any thing of the kind, unless some one should say that "much" is contrary to "little," or "the great" to "the small;" but of definite quantities, none is contrary to the other. Substance, also, appears not to receive

greater or less; I mean, not that one substance is not, more or less, substance, than another, for it has been already said that it is, but that every substance is not said to be more or less, that very thing, that it is; as if the same substance be "man" he will not be more or less "man;" neither himself than himself, nor another "man" than another, for one "man" is not more "man" than another, as one "white thing" is more and less "white" than another, and one "beautiful" thing more and less "beautiful" than another, and "the same thing" more or less than "itself;" so a body being "white," is said to be more "white" now, than it was before, and if "warm" is said to be more or less "warm." Substance at least is not termed more or less substance, since "man" is not said to be more "man" now, than before, nor any one of such other things as are substances; hence substance is not capable of receiving the greater and the less.

It appears, however, to be especially the peculiarity of substance, that being one and the same in number, it can receive contraries, which no one can affirm of the rest which are not substances, as that being one in number, they are capable of contraries. Thus "color," which is one and the same in number, is not "white" and "black," neither the same action, also one in number, both bad and good; in like manner of other things as many as are not substances. But substance being one, and the same in number, can receive contraries, as "a certain man" being one and the same, is at one time, white, and at another, black, and warm and cold, and bad and good. In respect of none of the rest does such a thing appear, except some one should object, by saying, that a sentence and opinion are capable of receiving contraries, for the same sentence appears to be true and false; thus if the statement be true that "some one sits," when he stands up, this very same statement will be false. And in a similar manner in the matter of opinion, for if any one should truly opine that a certain person sits, when he rises up he will opine falsely, if he still holds the same opinion about him. Still, if any one, should even admit this, yet there is a difference in the mode. For some things in substances, being themselves changed, are capable of contraries, since cold, being made so, from hot, has changed, for it is changed in quality, and black from white, and good from bad: in like manner as to other things, each one of them receiving change is capable of contraries. The sentence indeed and the opinion remain themselves altogether immovable, but the thing being moved, a contrary is produced about them; the sentence indeed remains the same, that "some one sits," but the thing being moved, it

becomes at one time, true, and at another, false. Likewise as to opinion, so that in this way, it will be the peculiarity of substance, to receive contraries according to the change in itself, but if any one admitted this, that a sentence and opinion can receive contraries, this would not be true. For the sentence and the opinion are not said to be capable of contraries in that they have received any thing, but, in that about something else, a passive quality has been produced, for in that a thing is, or is not, in this, is the sentence said to be true, or false, not in that itself, is capable of contraries. In short, neither is a sentence nor an opinion moved by any thing, whence they cannot be capable of contraries, no passive quality being in them; substance at least, from the fact of itself receiving contraries, is said in this to be capable of contraries, for it receives disease and health, whiteness and blackness, and so long as it receives each of these, it is said to be capable of receiving contraries. Wherefore it will be the peculiarity of substance, that being the same, and one in number, according to change in itself, it is capable of receiving contraries; and concerning substance this may suffice.

OF PROPOSITION, TERM, SYLLOGISM, AND ITS ELEMENTS

It is first requisite to say what is the subject, concerning which, and why, the present treatise is undertaken, namely, that it is concerning demonstration, and for the sake of demonstrative science; we must afterwards define, what is a proposition, what a term, and what a syllogism, also what kind of syllogism is perfect, and what imperfect; lastly, what it is for a thing to be, or not to be, in a certain whole, and what we say it is to be predicated of every thing, or of nothing (of a class).

A proposition then is a sentence which affirms or denies something of something, and this is universal, or particular, or indefinite; I denominate universal, the being present with all or none; particular, the being present with something, or not with something, or not with every thing; but the indefinite the being present or not being present, without the universal or particular (sign); as for example, that there is the same science of contraries, or that pleasure is not good. But a demonstrative proposition differs from a dialectic in this, that the demonstra-

tive is an assumption of one part of the contradiction, for a demonstrator does not interrogate, but assume, but the dialectic is an interrogation of contradiction. As regards however forming a syllogism from either proposition, there will be no difference between one and the other, since he who demonstrates and he who interrogates syllogize, assuming that something is or is not present with something. Wherefore a syllogistic proposition will be simply an affirmation or negation of something concerning something, after the above-mentioned mode: it is however demonstrative if it be true, and assumed through hypotheses from the beginning, and the dialectic proposition is to him who inquires an interrogation of contradiction, but to him who syllogizes, an assumption of what is seen and probable, as we have shown in the *Topics*. What therefore a proposition is, and wherein the syllogistic demonstrative and dialectic differ, will be shown accurately in the following treatises, but for our present requirements what has now been determined by us may perhaps suffice. Again, I call that a "term," into which a proposition is resolved, as for instance, the predicate and that of which it is predicated, whether to be or not to be is added or separated. Lastly, a syllogism is a sentence in which certain things being laid down, something else different from the premises necessarily results, in consequence of their existence. I say that, "in consequence of their existence," something results through them, but though something happens through them, there is no need of any external term in order to the existence of the necessary (consequence). Wherefore I call a perfect syllogism that which requires nothing else, beyond (the premises) assumed, for the necessary (consequence) to appear: but an imperfect syllogism, that which requires besides, one or more things, which are necessary, through the supposed terms, but have not been assumed through propositions. But for one thing to be in the whole of another, and for one thing to be predicated of the whole of another, are the same thing, and we say it is predicated of the whole, when nothing can be assumed of the subject, of which the other may not be asserted, and as regards being predicated of nothing, in like manner.

AN EXAMINATION INTO EXISTENCE

CHAPTER I.

THE SUBJECT OF SPECULATIVE SCIENCE is Being, for the first principles and causes of substances are under investigation. Being is not only the most fundamental constituent of the universe, if it be regarded as one whole, but if things exist in harmony with the categories, Being would be first in order, then quality, then quantity; though it is true that the other categories such as qualities and motions do not have any absolute existence at all, and the same is the case with (such negatives as) not-white or not-straight, notwithstanding the fact that we use such expressions as "not-white exists."

No one of the other categories, then, implies an independent existence. This statement is corroborated by the work of the philosophers of antiquity, for it was the principles and causes and elements of Being that were from time to time investigated. The philosophers of the present era, to be sure, have rather sought to maintain that universals are essences, for general concepts are universals and they hold these concepts to be first principles and essences, probably because their method of investigation has sprung from logic. The philosophers of old, however, regarded particular things to be themselves essences, for example, fire and earth, but not body in general.

There are three kinds of essences. Two of these may be apprehended by the senses, one of them being eternal and the other subject to decay, as plants and animals. Whether the sensible essence which is eternal has one or many elements is open to discussion. The third essence is unchangeable and is maintained by some to have an independent existence. This again, certain persons make of two kinds, while others consider as of the same nature Ideas (general concepts) and mathematical entities, whereas still others admit only the latter to be essences.

The first two kinds of essences belong to physical science, for they are subject to alterations. The third essence, on the supposition that there is no principle common to all three, belongs to a separate science.

CHAPTER II.

Substances that can be perceived by the senses are subject to change. Now on the theory that changes take place between the things that are contrary to each other or intermediate between these contraries, and not between all things that are different (for example, voice is not a thing that becomes white) something must exist able to undergo a differentiation into contrary states, for the contrary states themselves do not change. This underlying substance, moreover, no doubt continues permanent, but its contrary states do not continue permanent; hence, there must exist a third something besides these contraries,—that is, matter. If then, changes are of four kinds, according to quiddity, or quality, or quantity, or location: and if simple generation and degeneration are the changes according to quiddity; increase and lessening, according to quantity; alteration according to quality; and motion according to place,—if all this is the case, I say, the several changes, such as are involved in particular things, would take place into contrary states. Hence, it is necessary for matter to be able to undergo a change into contrary states.

As the nature of an individual thing is two-fold, everything which undergoes a change, is changed from that which is an individuality in possibility, into an existence in actuality, as for example, from what is white in capacity or potentiality into what is white in actuality. The same is the case with increase and diminution. Wherefore, it is not only possible that all things may spring from a non-individuality (as matter) by accident, but it is likewise true that all things take their generation from a previous individuality, I speak of what is an existence in potentiality taking its generation from a nonentity in action.

This (that all things are from one matter) is the unit of Anaxagoras (for it is better to believe this than those philosophers who think that all things exist at the same time); and it is equivalent to the philosophic doctrine of mixture maintained by Empedocles and Anaximander and is somewhat like the supposition of Democritus that all things existed at the same time in potentiality but not actually.

Here, then, these philosophers would allude to matter, that is, the material cause. All things, however, that undergo a change involve matter, but different individual things involve different matter and the things that are eternal, if they are subject to a cycle of changes, even

though not to actual generation, involve matter, though not matter subject to generation, but merely to motion from place to place.

One might raise the inquiry—from what kind of non-individuality generation can arise? Now non-existence is itself of a three-fold nature. If something else actually exists, generation may proceed from this, though not from anything whatsoever, but one particular thing will be generated from another. It is not enough to say that all things exist at once, for existences differ in the matter involved. If not, why would not one thing only be generated, rather than things infinite in number? The human mind, for example, is such a unity. If matter, also, were a unity, all would have come into actual existence of which the matter alone exists in potentiality.

Therefore there are three (inherent) causes and three elements. Two resulting in contraries of which one sort constitutes the formal principle and the species; and the second lack of such a principle, while the third cause is matter.

CHAPTER III.

It now remains for us to inform our readers that neither matter or form is generated. I speak thus of things in their ultimate condition. For everything that passes through any change is altered both by something and into something. I mean by that which is the first impartor of motion; by *of something* I mean of matter; and by *into something* I mean the form (imparted to it). Now the progression extends to infinity, if (for example) not only the brass becomes spherical, but the spherical (form) or the brass (matter) is also generated. Hence we must sooner or later make a stop in the series.

After this investigation we must show how each substance springs from one synonymous with itself, for those things generated by nature as well as other things are substances. Now, things are produced by art or by nature or by chance or of their own accord. Art indeed, involves a first principle that exists in another agent, whereas nature involves a first principle that exists in the thing itself—thus, man begets man.

The remaining causes are those not included under art or nature.

Essences are also three in number. One of these is matter, which is the certain particular thing because of its manifestation as such, for whatever things are (organic) unities and not merely united by

cohesion involve both matter and a subject. Another of these essences is the nature of the individual thing, and in this nature there is the handing down of a certain uniformity. The third essence is that which results from these two, and is classified as the individual thing itself, (for example) Socrates or Callias.

In some cases, therefore, the individual thing involves no existence except that of a composite substance, thus the form of a house (has no independent existence), unless art itself is this form. Neither is there any generation or decay of such forms, but in one way they are, and in another are not, the part of the house itself that is unconnected with matter; and of health (also) and everything that is produced by art. If forms exist at all, it is in connection with those things that are generated by nature; wherefore Plato was doubtless wise in affirming that forms belong to whatever things involve a natural existence, on the theory of the existence of forms separate from and independent of these natural objects, such (for example) as fire, flesh, the head, etc. For all these things are matter and belong to being itself,—I mean to such a description of matter as is ultimate.

Thus some causes, those that impart motion, exist as individual things previously generated, whereas other causes, acting as the formal elements are generated at the same time as their results.

When a man is healthy, sound health is present with him and the form of the brazen sphere exists at the same time as the brazen sphere.

Whether anything remains after the separation of the form from the matter we must examine. In case of some forms there is no difficulty in this occurring. Such a case might be that of the soul—not, to be sure, of every soul, for that this should be so of every soul, is perhaps not possible.

It is evident therefore, that it need not necessarily follow on account of these facts that ideas should have a separate existence, for man begets man, the individual begets another individual, and the case is similar with the arts, for the art of medicine is the formal principle of health.

CHAPTER IV.

In regard to causes and first principles, they in a way differ inasmuch as they belong to different things, yet in another way this is

not true. Seeking generally, and by analogy, the causes and first principles of all things may be said to be the same. Yet one might raise the inquiry whether the first principles and elements of substances, and of things that have only a relative existence, such as is the case with the categories, are different or the same; yet for the principles and elements of all things to be the same would be absurd, for relatives would take their existence from the same things as substances. What could this (underlying) unity be? for besides substances and the rest of the categories predicted of things, there is nothing (in them) that is common. The element, however, is prior to the things of which it is an element, but certainly substance is neither an element of relatives, nor is any one of these relatives an element of substance. But how is it possible for there to be one element for all things? for none of the elements can be identical with a compound of the elements, as, for instance, neither B nor A can be the same as BA. Neither, moreover, can one element of the things that are intellectual, as, for example, unity or individuality, be the essence of all things, for these also are present in compounds. None of them, then, will exist independently either as a substance or quality, (though they may in some other way). The elements of all things, therefore, are not identical.

Or shall we say, as already affirmed, that in one way it is true (that the elements of things are identical) and in another way not? as in regard to sensible bodies that which is hot exists in a way as a form, and cold in a way exists as the absence of heat; while on the other hand matter exists as that which primarily and essentially embraces both of these in potentiality and substances, moreover, include both these things and such as consist of the things of which these are first principles.

If any individual thing is produced from what is hot or what is cold, for example, flesh or bone, yet what is thus generated must be different from heat and cold. The first principles and elements of these things I acknowledge are the same, but there are different elements to different things. We cannot say without doubt that the case stands in this way with all things, but by analogy the elements and first principles of all things would be the same.

We might thus say that there are three elements of individuality; form and lack of form and matter. Each of these, however, varies as it is connected with each different genus—as color—white, black, surface, light, darkness, air and from these combined come forth day and night.

Since, however, not only forms that are inherent (in the individual thing) are causes, but also external things, as, for example, what imparts motion, it is evident that a first cause may be different from an element (inherent cause), yet both are causes and into these is the first principle divided. What exists as the imparters of motion or rest may constitute in a way a first principle and essence.

Thus there are existing three elements, according to analogy, but four causes and first principles. Where the subject is different, the cause is different; the first cause is, as it were, the imparters of motion and varies as the individual effect varies,—thus health may be considered the formal cause, disease lack of it, the body matter, while the imparters of motion is the art of medicine. Once more, a house is the formal cause—a confusion of the materials the lack of it (or limiting cause), the bricks are the matter (or material cause), and the imparters of motion, or the efficient cause, is the art of the architect. Into such causes is the first principle divided.

Since the imparters of motion to physical or natural things is man; and to things springing from the mind is form or the lack of it, from one point of view there would be three causes, from another four, for the art of the physician produces health, the art of the builder the form of the house, and man man. In addition to these, as that which is the primary principle of all things, is the something which imparts motion or is the efficient cause of all things.

CHAPTER V.

Since some things involve an independent existence and others do not, the former are substances and these must be considered the causes of all things, because the passive conditions and affections of things do not involve an existence independent of substances. Such substances will further constitute soul and body, or understanding and desire and body. In another way also, first principles are the same. Consider, for instance, the case of energy (or actuality) and capacity (or potentiality). These both vary as the individual things that involve them vary and they exist in different ways, for in some things the same thing exists sometimes actually, and sometimes only potentially—as in wine or flesh, or in man. Nevertheless, these both are included in the list of the causes above mentioned, for form, no doubt, is an actuality, if it be something which has an independent existence and which is a re-

sult of both potentiality and actuality. This is also the case with the lack of something—for example, such a thing as darkness, or a creature which is not well, but matter exists in potentiality, for it is endowed with the possibility of becoming both contrary states. Yet, in another way, those things which involve different matter and different form, differ actually and potentially. The cause of a man, that is, the material cause, is both the elements fire and earth. Another cause is his proper form and anything extrinsic, if this there be, such I mean, as his father; besides these, the sun and the oblique circle, which are neither material, nor formal, nor limiting causes, nor of the same species, but imparters of motion. Further, we should note as regards causes, that some are universal and some not. The original first principles of all things are those which actually existed in the first thing and whatever else existed in potentiality. Universals—that is, class concepts—have practically no separate existence, for the individual thing is a cause of the individual. Man, to be sure, is the formal principle of every man, yet no universal man exists, so Peleus is the cause of Achilles, and your father of you, and this particular letter B is the cause of the syllable BA.

In the next place, the forms of the substances are first principles, but there are various causes and elements in various things, as has been stated. Thus, the elements of things, not belonging to the same genus, such as colours, sounds, substances, quantities, are not the same except by analogy.

The causes, too, of the things that do belong to the same species vary, though not in species. But since the matter in individual things differs, both your matter and form and that which imparts action and the species differ in their constituents from mine, though considering the universal as the formal principle, they are the same. Hence, as to the question,—What are the first principles or elements of substances and of relations and qualities, whether they are identical or vary—it is clear, that, if things are spoken of altogether, the same principles and elements are involved in everything, but if things are spoken of separately, the first principles of each are not identical, but different. Thus they are the same by analogy, I grant, because there is matter, form, and the lack of it, and that which gives motion. In like manner the cause of substances are the causes of all things, because, if the substances should be destroyed, all things would be destroyed; moreover, that which is first, must exist in actuality. And seeing that these

primary things are neither to be considered genera, nor spoken of altogether, they differ, for some of them are contraries. Moreover, different kinds of matter are also called causes. We have then stated what the first principles of sensibles are, of what kind they are, and how they are the same and how different.

CHAPTER VI.

Since there have been discovered three essences—two natural or physical and one unchangeable, we must attempt, in regard to this unchangeable essence, to demonstrate that it is an eternal, unchangeable substance, for the first of individual things were substances, and if we suppose all of them to be changeable, then all things are changeable. It is impossible, however, that in such a case, motion should either be generated or stopped, for it must have always been in existence and the same is true with duration, for it is impossible for there to be anything prior or subsequent, if time or duration has no existence. Motion, then, is thus continuous as is also duration, for duration is either the same as motion or a certain state of rest. But there is no motion that is continuous except a local or topical motion. This involves the circular form. Yet, without doubt, in the case of anything capable of being moved or causing motion, but not actually doing so, motion will have no existence, for it is possible for the potential not to become the actual. Thus even if we could make essences eternal as those do, who consider forms or ideas to be such essences, yet there is nothing gained, unless there is also assumed some first principle able to produce a change. Nor would eternal elements be able to do this, nor would anything but the forms themselves exist, for if the essence cannot act there will be no motion in existence. Nor will there be if the substance do act, unless the essence thereof is a potentiality, for there will not exist any perpetual motion since it is possible for that to exist in actuality. It is necessary, then, for there to be a first principle of this nature, the essence of which is energy. Moreover, such principles cannot involve a connection with matter, for they must be eternal, if anything at all is to be eternal. They must then exist as an energy. This, however, involves some doubt, for it might seem proper that what acts should exist entirely in a state of potentiality, and that everything endowed with capability should not fully act. For this reason we might suppose potentiality

(as of matter) to be a thing that precedes actuality, but if this were true, no individual thing need be in existence, for it is possible for a thing to possess the power of existing and yet not exist.

If, however, the truth were as the theologians say, I mean those who generate all things from Night—or as the natural philosophers say, who declare all things to have (always) existed at the same time, the same difficulty will follow. For how, may I inquire, will matter be set in motion, if there be nothing actually existing as a cause. The material of a house will not move of its own accord, but the builder's art will move it, nor does the menstrual blood move itself, nor earth, but seeds and human seed.

Hence, some philosophers, as Leucippus and Plato, fall back upon an energy that is always acting. For they declare motion to be always in existence, but why, and of what kind, they do not say, nor how this is true. Nor do they add a cause of this perpetual motion. Now nothing is set in motion without cause, but there must always be some individual cause in existence. Thus, a thing is moved in this way by nature, and again by some force, either mind or something else in a different way.

What is the nature, then, of the primordial motion? for this must be able to vary as much as possible. But Plato certainly cannot call that the first principle, which he sometimes so considers, which imparts motion to itself; for he (also) says that subsequent to and yet coincident with the world is the soul. Hence the assumption, then, of the previous existence of potentiality to actuality (or energy) is in one way correct but in another not. And how this is so has been explained.

The possibility that energy (or actuality) is antecedent to potentiality is maintained by Anaxagoras, (for the understanding exists as an energy), and by Empedocles in his doctrine of Harmony and Discord, and this is corroborated in the thesis of certain thinkers such as Leucippus about the existence of perpetual motion. Chaos or night, therefore, did not exist for an eternity, but the same things always existed as do now, either in a system of cycle-like changes, or otherwise, that is, supposing energy to be prior to potentiality.

On the other supposition then, that each individual thing has always been part of a circle of changes, there must be something that continually puts forth energy in a way (to create things). And, besides, if generation and degeneration are to follow (one upon the other) there must be, also, an energy acting at one time to create and at another to destroy.

Now it must either act in this way by its very nature, of its own accord, or in some other way, for some other cause. In other words, it must act in harmony with what is primary or original. But it certainly must act in accord with what is primary, for what is primary is a source of energy both to itself and what is secondary. Therefore the primary substance is the highest cause; for the primary substance is the cause of the individual things continually coming into existence in a like form, while something else would be the cause of the manifestation of energy in different ways. But of the continual coming into existence of things in different ways, both the primary substance and the primary energy would be the cause. Hence it is that motions occur in this way. Why then, need we look for other first principles?

CHAPTER VII.

But since the truth lies thus,—(and it surely does), for if not, things would spring from Night and from all things at the same time and from nothing—the above question may be decided that there is always something in existence, which is being moved with a perpetual, that is, a cycle-like, motion. This is evident, not merely from reason, but from the facts themselves. Hence, the first universe would be eternal. There is also then, something that causes motion. Since that which has motion imparted to it and which in turn, imparts motion, can be only a medium, there is, therefore, something which, not being acted upon, yet acts, which is eternal and at the same time both substance and energy.

It causes movement in the same way as what is desirable and what is intelligible cause (our) movements, although they are not themselves moved. But the basis of these qualities is the same. For the object of our desire is that which appears worthy of approval, while the thing selected to begin with by our will, actually is approved. Now we desire a thing because it appears choice; it does not appear choice because we desire it. For the perception is a first cause, but the judgment is decided by what is intelligible, and the second relation (choiceworthiness) includes essentially what is intelligible. The first substance is interrelated with this desire and judgment, and that absolute substance, which exists as an energy, consists of this desire and judgment. What is simple or absolute, however, is not the same as unity, but absolute defines the way in which the thing itself exists. Certainly, however,

both what is choiceworthy and what is desirable for its own sake belong to the same set of relations. And what is first is invariably the most excellent, or amounts to that which is analogous to it. That the final cause (of things) exists in something itself immovable, the above analysis makes evident, for the final cause of anything is something which is in existence, while the thing caused is not. Now that which first causes motion, does so as a thing that is loved, and what has motion (thus) caused in it causes in turn motion in other things.

If indeed, a thing is acted upon, it need not exist as an energy. Therefore, we suppose that the primary motion is an energy also, as much as the thing is moved, it is possible for this motion to change in place, but not in nature. Since, however, there is something which causes motion, though itself immovable and itself an energy—this cannot change the nature of its existence, for the primary motion and especially that which is circular is the cause of these changes, but the First Mover imparts motion to that.

Moreover, this immovable First Mover must be an individuality and inasmuch as it necessarily exists, insomuch is its existence an excellent one. And in this way does it constitute a first principle, for what is necessary exists in these ways; first through what is accomplished by force because opposed to free will; second, as that without which a thing does not exist in perfection; third, as that which could not be different from what it is, but has an absolute existence. From a First Principle then, of this nature, such I mean, as embraced in the supposition of a First Mover, have sprung heaven and nature. The life of this First Mover, which our own life for a limited time resembles, is of the nature that is the best. The First Mover, to begin with, continues in the enjoyment of the life principle eternally. With us, of course, such a thing would be impossible, but not so with the First Mover, since energy or activity itself causes pleasure or satisfaction on his part; because vigilance, activity of the senses, and perception in general are most fruitful of pleasure or satisfaction. The case is the same with the expectations and memories.

Now the perception of such an Essence is the perception of what is in its essence the best, and the perception most characteristic of such an Essence is the perception which is most essential. The mind, however perceives itself by becoming part of what falls as its object within its province, for it becomes an object of perception by a laying-hold-of and an act of mental apprehension. Thus the mind and the object of its own perception are the same, for what receives the impressions

of objects and is itself an essence is the mind, and while receiving these impressions, it is exerting energy or, existing in a state of activity.

(Such contemplation) seems to belong to the First Mover rather than to the mind of mortals. It is a divine characteristic which our mind appears to possess. This contemplation is what is most agreeable and excellent. If then, God, has in this way so excellent an eternal existence, such a one as we have for a limited time, the Divine Nature is worthy of admiration, and if he possesses it in a still greater degree, the Divine Nature will be still more admirable. The Deity, then, will be likely to exist in this manner, and at all events, the principle of life is inherent in him, for the energy or activity of the mind is life, and God, as shown above, is this energy. Energy as an essence is part of God, or belongs to God, as his highest and eternal life. Our statement is, that the Deity is a Being that is eternal and of the highest nature. So that with the Deity, life and time are uninterrupted and everlasting, for this constitutes the very being of God.

Many philosophers, however, such as the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, maintain the ground that what is best and most perfect is not to be found in the first principle of things, because though the first principles both of plants and animals are causes, yet what is best and perfect is only in the created things which are the results of these first principles; but those who have these opinions have not formed them correctly. The (undeveloped) seed springs from other natures that are antecedent and developed. And seed is not the first thing, but that which is completed is; so we may say that a man exists prior to the seed, not the man which is being generated from the seed, but another, from whom the seed springs. It is evident from the statements made above that there exists an eternal Essence that is unchangeable; and has an existence independent of sensibles. It has also been shown that it is impossible for this Essence to have any magnitude, but that it is devoid of parts and indivisible. For it causes motion throughout eternity and nothing finite involves infinite potentiality. Now every magnitude is either finite or infinite and for the reason mentioned, such a substance would not be a finite magnitude, and it cannot involve an infinite magnitude, because, in brief, there is no infinite magnitude in existence. Undoubtedly, also, it has been shown that such a Being is neither acted upon nor changeable, for all other movements are subsequent to that which is internal or local. These points, then, show why the Deity is liable to exist in this way.—The *Metaphysics*, Bk. XI.

THE BASIS OF ETHICS

AND HERE we will close this digression, and return to the question of what is that highest human good of which we are in quest. It is clear that every course of action and every art has its own peculiar good; for the good sought by medicine is one, and the good sought by tactics is another; and of all other arts the same rule holds. What, then, is in each case the chief good? Surely it will be that to which all else that is done is but a means. And this in medicine will be health, and in tactics victory, and in architecture a house, and so forth in other cases; and in all free action, that is to say in all purpose or conscious choice of means to a desired end, it will be that end; for it is with this in view that we always take all the other steps in the particular action. And so, if there be but one end of all things that we do, this will be, in all human action, the chief good; while, if there be more than one, it will be their sum. Our argument, therefore, has now returned to the question from which is originally digressed, and which we must endeavour yet more thoroughly to clear up. Now, since there are clearly many and diverse ends, some of which we occasionally choose as means, such as wealth, or pipes, or instruments generally, it is evident that all of these various ends cannot be final; whereas the chief good is clearly a something absolutely final. So that, if there be but one thing alone that is final, this will be the good of which we are in quest; and, if there be more than one, then it will be the most final among them. Now we call that which is pursued for its own sake more final than that which is pursued as a means to something further; and that which is never chosen as a means we call more final than any such things as are chosen both as ends in themselves and as means to this; while, to sum up, we call that alone absolutely final which is in all cases to be chosen as an end, and never as a means. And happiness would seem to be pre-eminently such; for happiness we always choose as an end, and never as a means; while honour, and pleasure, and reason, and, generally, every kind of virtue we do indeed choose as ends (for we should choose each one of them, even if they bore no good fruit), but we choose them also for the sake of happiness, thinking that by their means we

shall be happy. But happiness itself no man ever chooses for the sake of these things, or indeed as a means to aught beyond itself. And the all-sufficiency of happiness clearly leads to the same conclusion; for the final human good is always held to be all-sufficient. Nor do we understand that the range of this all-sufficient is to be restricted to the individual in a life of isolation, but rather hold that it also includes his parents, and his children, and his wife, and indeed his friends generally, and his fellow-citizens, since man's true nature is to be citizen of a free state. And yet some limit must be fixed herein; for were one so to extend this as to take in a man's ancestors, and his descendants, and the friends of his friends, the circle would become infinite. This question, however, we will consider at some other time, and for the present will define as all-sufficient that which alone and by itself can make our life desirable, and supply all our needs. And we are of opinion that happiness is such. And, moreover, happiness is the most desirable of all things, in that there is nothing else which is on a par with it, and so capable of being added to it. Were not this so, then the addition of any such other good, no matter how small, would evidently render it more desirable. For such addition would constitute a surplus of good; and of any two goods the greater is always the more choiceworthy. Happiness, then, is clearly a something complete in itself, and all-sufficient, forming the one end of all things done by man.

But still to say nothing more about happiness than that it is the greatest of all goods is clearly but little better than a truism, and one seems to yearn for a yet more exact and definite account. This we shall most probably obtain from the consideration of what it is that man, as man, has to do. For, as in the case of flute players, and of sculptors, and of all craftsmen, and indeed of all those who have any work of their own to do, or who can originate any special train of action, it is in this their especial work or function that their chief good and greatest welfare lie, so too ought it to be in the case of man as man, if as man he has any special functions of his own. Are we then to believe that man as carpenter, or that man as cobbler, has a function of his own, and so can originate an especial course of action; while as man he lacks this, and has no task assigned him by nature? Shall we not rather say that exactly as the eye, and the hand, and the foot, and each of the various members, evidently has its office, so too, beyond and beside all these, must be assigned an office to man, as such? And, if so, what are we to say that this office is? Life he has in common even with plants, whereas what we seek is that, whatever it is, that is especial and peculiar

to himself. The life of mere nutrition and growth may therefore be set aside. Next to this in order is what may be called the life of the senses. But even this is shared by horses, and by oxen, and by beasts. There only remains what may be described as a life of free moral action, belonging to that part of us which possesses reason, and which may possess it, either as being obedient to its commands, or as properly possessing and exercising it in consecutive thought. And, as this life can be conceived in two aspects, we will take it in its active state, for then more properly is it called life. If, then, the function or office of man as such be an active life or activity of the soul in accordance with reason, or at least not without reason, and if we say that the work of such an one and that of such an one who is good of his sort differ not in kind, as in the case of a harper and of a good harper—and if we are to say this in every case, our conception of the work itself remaining unaltered by any additional excess of excellence; a harper's work being to play the harp, and the work of a good harper to play it well—if all this be so, and if we are to take as the function of man a certain kind of life, and to make this life consist in an activity of the soul, that is to say in moral action consciously accompanied by reason; and to take as the function of the good man the doing all this well and perfectly, remembering that it is its own excellence alone that causes each thing to be well and properly completed—then, if all this be so, we shall find that the chief good of man consists in an activity of the soul in accordance with its own excellence (or, in other words, such that the essential conditions of its excellence are fulfilled), and, if there be many such excellencies or virtues, then in accordance with the best and the most perfect among them. And we must further add the condition of a complete life; for a single day, or even a short period of happiness, no more makes a blessed and a happy man than one sunny day or one swallow a spring.

And now, since happiness is an activity of the soul in accordance with perfect virtue, we must inquire what is virtue; for thus perhaps we shall be in a better position to consider the nature of happiness. He who is a political philosopher in the true sense of the word will give virtue his most thorough attention, his object being to make the citizens good, and, so, obedient to the laws. And, as instances of this, we have the lawgivers of Crete and of Lacedæmon, and all such others as are upon record like to these. And so, since the discussion of virtue is the province of political science, it is clear that the present investigation will harmonize with our original purpose. We have therefore to consider

virtue, that is to say, of course, the virtue of man ; for it was man's highest good, and man's happiness, of which we were in quest. And by man's virtue we understand not that of the body but that of the soul, since we have defined happiness as an activity of the soul. And, if this be so, it is clear that the politician must no less know about the soul than he who is to heal the eye must know about the body as a whole, and all the more so in that the art political is higher and nobler than is medicine. And indeed physicians of the higher and better sort interest themselves no little in the knowledge of the body as a whole. And hence it follows that the politician must consider about the soul, and must consider it with this end in view, that is to say so far only as is sufficient for our present object ; for further minuteness of discussion would only entail more labour than is needed for our purpose. Now, concerning the soul, even ordinary language lays down certain sufficient distinctions, of which we will make use ; as, for example, that the soul has two parts, the one irrational, the other possessed of reason. Whether these parts are distinct in the same sense as the members of the body, and all else that is capable of physical division, or rather are only distinct in thought, being in their own nature absolutely inseparable, exactly as are concavity and convexity in an arc, is a question immaterial to our purpose. And, again, of the irrational part itself, there is yet a further part that would seem to be common to man with other living things, and to form the soul of plants. I speak of that principle which is the cause of all nutrition and growth. For a vital faculty of this nature one assigns to all things that assimilate nutriment, as even to the foetus ; and this self-same faculty one also assigns to the full-grown being, since such a substitution is more reasonable than it is to hold that any substitution has taken place. Any excellence or virtue that this part of our soul possesses is clearly not peculiar to man, but is shared by him with animals and with plants. It is in sleep, indeed, that this part or faculty of our soul is most active, and it is in sleep that the good man and the bad are least distinguishable from one another ; whence has come the saying, that for one half their lives the happy in no way differ from the wretched. Nor could we expect it to be otherwise. For sleep is a torpor of our soul, in so far as it can be called morally good or bad, save only where to some slight extent certain of the movements of active life carry themselves on into our slumber, and so render the dreams of the good better than are those of ordinary men. On these matters, however, we have now said enough, and here we will close our discussion of the nutritive soul, since nature has given it no

part in that virtue which is peculiarly human. And, again, there would seem to be another element in the soul, which also is irrational, and which yet to some extent partakes of reason. For, in the self-restrained, and also in the incontinent man, we give praise to their reason, that is to say to the rational portion of their soul, for that it exhorts them as is right, and to the best course. But there is clearly, in each of them, a something else, of its own nature opposed to reason, which conflicts with reason, and strives to counteract it. For, exactly as a palsied limb, when a man purposes to move it to the right, swings round on the contrary to the left, so too is it with the soul of the incontinent man; for his impulses run counter to his reason. Only, whereas in the body we can see the part that so moves, in the soul we cannot see it. And yet, perhaps, we must none the less on this account hold that there is in the soul an element contradistinguished from reason, which sets itself in opposition to reason, and goes its way against it; although wherein precisely it is distinct from reason concerns us not. And yet even this part too has clearly, as we have said, some share in reason, for in the self-restrained man it certainly obeys his reason. And, in the man who is thoroughly temperate and brave, it is perhaps yet more amenable; for in him all his members are in harmony with reason. Hence, then, it clearly appears that the irrational part of our soul has two members, of which one, the nutritive, is in no way concerned with reason; while the other, the concupiscent, or, more generally, the appetitive part, in a certain sense partakes of reason, in so far as it listens to reason, and obeys its commands. It is in this sense that we speak of showing a rational obedience to one's father, or to one's friends, and not in that in which we speak of a rational understanding of mathematical truths. And, that the irrational part of our soul is to some extent amenable to reason, all admonition, all rebuke, all exhortation, is a proof. And hence, since even this part of our souls is in a certain sense to be called rational, it follows that the rational element in us will also have two parts, the one in its own right possessing reason in itself, while the other is obedient to reason, as is a son to his father. And, in accordance with this division, we can classify the virtues, and call some of them intellectual and others moral—philosophy, appreciation, and prudence being excellences or virtues of the intellect, while liberality and temperance are moral virtues, or virtues of the character, we do not say that he is a philosopher, or a man of quick appreciation, but that he is gentle or temperate. And yet we none the less praise the wise man

also for his state of mind, and understanding by virtue a praiseworthy state of mind.

II.

I. There are, then, two kinds of virtue, the intellectual and the moral, of which the intellectual owes, for the most part, its birth and growth to a course of inference, so that for its perfection it needs experience, and consequently length of time; while moral virtue, on the other hand, is acquired by habit; the very word 'moral,' indeed, varying but little etymologically from its root, 'habit.' And hence too it is clear that no one of the moral virtues is an innate law of our nature. For no law of nature can be altered by habit. A stone, which of its own nature moves downwards, no force of habit will ever accustom to move upwards, nor would one ever habituate it to such a motion by hurling it upwards any number of times. Neither could fire be thus brought to move downwards, nor, in short, can the action of any natural law whatever be altered by habituation. Neither, then, are the moral virtues an innate law of our nature, nor is their acquisition a contravention of any such law; but nature has given us a capability for them, and we become perfected in them by habituation. And, again, in the case of all things innate or connate in us, we have the faculty first, and afterwards we manifest its acts. Of this the senses are a clear instance, for we did not acquire them by repeated acts of sight, or of hearing; we did not, that is to say, acquire these faculties by practising their acts; but, on the contrary, we had the faculty in question before we practised its acts. But the virtues we acquire by previous practice of their acts, exactly as we acquire our knowledge of the various arts. For, in the case of the arts, that which we have to be taught to do, that we learn to do by doing it. We become masons, for instance, by building; and harpers by playing upon the harp. And so, in like manner, we become just by doing what is just, temperate by doing what is temperate, and brave by doing what is brave. And to this the practice of States bears witness, for lawgivers make the citizens virtuous by a course of habituation. It is this that every lawgiver has in view; all want of success in this respect argues defective legislation; and it is herein that a good State differs from a bad. And, moreover, it is from and by acts of the same kind that all virtue has both its development and its decay, exactly as has all artistic skill. For it is by playing upon the harp that men become

either good harpers, or else bad; and of masons, and indeed of all other craftsmen, the same rule holds good. For if men build well they will become good masons, and if badly bad. Were not this so, no art would have needed an apprenticeship, but men would have been either good craftsmen or else bad from the very first. And so, too, is it with the virtues. For, accordingly as we bear ourselves in our transactions with other men, so do we become either just or unjust; and, accordingly as we bear ourselves in dangers, and accustom ourselves to act as cowards or as brave, so do we become either cowards or brave. And of all lust, and of all anger, the same rule holds good. For men become either temperate and gentle, or intemperate and hasty, accordingly as they bear themselves in such matters either one way or the other. And, indeed, in a word, it is by acts of like nature with themselves that all habits are formed. And hence it becomes our duty to see that our acts are of a right character. For, as our acts vary, our habits will follow in their course. It makes no little difference, then, to what kind of habituation we are subjected from our youth up; but it is, on the contrary, an important matter, or, rather, all-important.

Since, then, the present treatise is not intended like certain others to give mere abstract knowledge,—for our investigations are not undertaken merely that we may know what virtue is (else wherein would they benefit us?), but rather that we may ourselves become virtuous,—we must therefore now consider after what fashion we are to mould our acts. For it is our acts, as we have said, that determine the character of our habits. That they must be in accordance with right reason is an element common to them with other things, and which may with safety be assumed of them; and what this right reason is, and what is its relation to the virtues, we will hereinafter explain. And here again, before proceeding further, it must be understood that all statements concerning human action are to be taken as being true only in rough outline, and not as being mathematically exact; as indeed we said at first when we showed that only such proof is to be expected as the matter admits. Men's actions and interests are no more a matter of fixed rule than are the conditions of health. And, since the general principles of morality are of this nature, still less accurate will be their application to particular cases. Such application falls under no known art or traditional system of rules, so that we must, on the occasion of each separate action, be to a great extent guided by the circumstances of the time, exactly as we are in the practice of medicine and of navigation. But, albeit that the difficulties of the present subject are such,

we must none the less do the best that we can. First of all, then, we may observe that in all human matters excess and defect are alike prejudicial; as we can see (to take things seen for evidence of things unseen) in the case of strength and of health. For too much and too little exercise both alike destroy our strength; and in like manner too much meat and drink, and too little, both alike destroy our health; while to eat and to drink in moderation, and to take exercise in moderation, both produces, and increases, and preserves health and strength. And so, too, is it with temperance, and with bravery, and with the other virtues. For he who shuns all dangers, and who is frightened at everything, and who never bears a bold front, becomes a coward; while he who never fears anything at all, and who enters upon every venture, becomes fool-hardy. And so, too, he who takes his fill of every pleasure, and who refrains from none, becomes depraved; while he who shuns all pleasures alike, as do the churlish, becomes insensible. For both temperance and bravery are destroyed by excess and by defect, and are preserved in perfection by moderation. And not only is it from and by the same kind of acts that all virtue has its birth, and its increase, and its decay, but it is also in this same class of acts that the energies in which it manifests itself will lie. And in more obvious matters, such as strength for example, the same rule holds good. For strength is produced by eating much food, and by undergoing much severe labor, and no one can do this so well as he who is strong. And so, too, is it with the virtues. For by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and when temperate we are best able so to abstain. And the same rule holds good of bravery. For by accustoming ourselves to bear our soul above all terrors, and to confront them boldly, we become brave. And it is when we are brave that we shall best be able to meet dangers with a bold front. And as the test of our habits we must take the pleasure or the pain that results from our acts. For he who abstains from the pleasures of the body, and who takes delight in such abstinence, is a temperate man, while he to whom such abstinence gives pain is depraved. And he who faces danger, and does so with delight, or at any rate without pain, he is brave; while he who feels pain in acting thus is a coward. It is, indeed, with pleasure and with pain that moral virtue is concerned; for it is pleasure that leads us into disgraceful acts, pain that forces us to abstain from acts noble. So that, as Plato says, we ought to have been trained from our youth up to feel pleasure and pain in fitting objects; for this, and this alone, is good education. Moreover, since it is our actions, that is to say our

emotions, that are the field of moral virtue, and since either pleasure or pain follows upon every emotion, and upon every action, it becomes clear that virtue is concerned with pleasure and with pain. And punishment, which is inflicted in the shape of pain, is a proof of this. For punishment is intended as a moral medicine, and the nature of all medicines is to act as the contraries of the diseases which they cure. And moreover, as we have said before, all mental habits are of their very nature directed towards and concerned with those same things by which they are made either better or worse. And it is through the action of pleasures and of pains that they become bad, in that we pursue, or, as the case may be, avoid these pleasures or pains either when they are such that we ought not to do so, or upon wrong occasions, or in a wrong manner; or fall into some other of the various forms of error that are logically conceivable. And hence it is that virtue has been defined as a state of tranquillity and of freedom from emotion,—but inaccurately. For this definition is too general, needing such additions as, “as we ought,” “as we ought not,” “when we ought,” and all such other determinations as are logically possible. And we may therefore regard it as established that moral virtue is concerned in such a manner with pleasures and with pains as to produce from them the best possible results,—vice the worst. The following considerations will also serve to make the matter clear. There are three things that determine us for pursuit, and three for avoidance; the good, the useful, and the pleasant, and their three contraries, the bad, the hurtful, and the painful. And with respect to all of these the judgment of the virtuous man is unerring, and that of the vicious man prone to error; but most of all is it so with respect to pleasure. For pleasure is a motive which man shares with the animals, and which is an element in all objects of choice; since even the good and the useful are, both, clearly pleasant. Moreover, the love of pleasure has been nurtured within us from our cradle, and it is hard to bleach our lives of an emotion with which they have been thus ingrained. Moreover, pleasure and pain are as a rule by which we measure our actions, some amongst us more exactly, some less. So that with them our treatise as a whole must perforce deal. For it makes no little difference to our actions whether we feel pleasure and pain as we ought, or whether we feel them as we ought not. Moreover, it is harder to fight with pleasure than, as Heraclitus says, with anger. And it is always with that which is the more difficult that all art and all virtue are concerned; for in such a matter to do well is the more excellent. So that, for this

reason again, both virtue, and with it the art political, the object of which is virtue, will be entirely concerned with our pleasures, and with our pains; which whoso uses well, the same will be good; whoso badly, bad.

Thus, then, have we shown that virtue is concerned with pleasures and with pains; and that, if the acts from which it has its birth continue to be done in like manner, it waxes; while, if they be done otherwise, it wanes; and, further, that the field wherein its acts lie is the same as that from which it had its birth.

But again, a difficulty arises as to the exact meaning of our assertion that we must do just acts if we wish to become just, and temperate acts if we wish to become temperate. For, it may be said, if men do acts which are just and temperate, they cannot but be already just and temperate; exactly as, for a man to produce a grammatical or a musical result, he must already be a grammarian or a musician. But then is this quite true even of the arts? Is it not possible, for example, to spell a word correctly by chance, or from dictation? Whereas then, and then only, can a man be said to be a grammarian when he has produced a grammatical result, and produced it grammatically, that is to say in virtue of a knowledge of grammar which he himself possesses. And, even were this not so, there is no such exact analogy between the arts and the virtues. The excellence of art lies in its results, and it is therefore quite sufficient if these results be so produced as in themselves to fulfil certain required conditions. But moral acts are not said to be done virtuously, as justly, for example, or temperately, if in themselves they fulfil certain conditions, but only when certain conditions are fulfilled by him who does the act. In the first place, he must know what it is that he is doing. Secondly, he must act with deliberate purpose, and must choose the act for its own sake. Thirdly, he must so act from a fixed and unalterable habit of mind. Now, as regards our artistic skill, none of these conditions need be taken into any account, except that we must know what it is that we are doing. But, where virtue is concerned, such mere knowledge is in itself of little or of no import, while the other conditions (which are only to be acquired by repeated practice of just and of temperate acts) are so far from being of but little weight that they are the only things that are of any weight at all. Our actions, then, are said to be just and temperate when they are such as the just or temperate man would do. While the just or temperate man is not merely he who does such acts, but he who does them as do the just and temperate. It is with good reason, then, that

we assert that the just man becomes such by doing just acts and the temperate man by doing temperate acts, while that, if he refrain from such acts, a man will never have even a prospect of becoming virtuous. But the many do not act upon this rule; they rather betake themselves to mere talk about what is right, deluding themselves into the belief that they are philosophers, and are consequently upon the high road to virtue; but, in reality, acting not unlike a sick man who listens attentively to his physicians, and then carries out none of their advice. And, as surely as such treatment will never give a healthy body, so such philosophy as this will never give a healthy soul.

Let us after this, inquire what is the genus of virtue. Now, since there are but three possible kinds of mental states or conditions, to-wit, emotions, capabilities, and habits, one of these three classes must be the genus of virtue. As instances of emotions may be named lust, anger, fear, pride of strength, envy, delight, affection, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, or in a word any immediate state of mind followed by a pleasure or by a pain; while a capability or faculty is that in virtue of which we are said to be capable of such or such an emotion, as of anger for instance, or of pain or of pity; and a habit is that in virtue of which we stand in a certain relation towards our emotions for good or for bad; our relation to anger, for example, being bad, if we feel anger either too violently or over slightly, but good if we feel it in moderation. And so, too, is it with all the other emotions. Now neither the virtues nor the vices are emotions. For with reference to our emotions we are not spoken of as good or bad, as we are with reference to our virtues and our vices. And, again, with reference to our emotions no praise or blame is ever given to us. A man, for example, is never praised for being afraid, or for being angry; nor is a man blamed for simply feeling anger, but for the manner in which he feels it. But with reference to our virtues and our vices we are praised and blamed. Moreover, neither anger nor fear springs from purpose, whereas the virtues, if not to be absolutely identified with purpose, most certainly involved such purpose, and imply it. And, again, with reference to the emotions we say that a man is thus or thus affected, but with reference to the virtues and the vices we do not talk of his affection, but of his disposition. Hence, too, it follows that the virtues and the vices are not mere capabilities. For we are not said to be good or bad, nor are we praised or blamed, in that we are simply capable of feeling such or such an emotion. And, moreover, our capabilities are either innate or connate, which our virtues and

our vices are not, as we have said before. So that, since the virtues are neither emotions, nor capabilities, it remains that they must be habits.

Thus, then, we have ascertained what is the genus of virtue. It remains to determine its differentia, and to say wherein it can be distinguished from other habits. We must premise that every excellence or virtue perfects that thing of which it is the virtue, and causes it to discharge its especial function well. This special excellence of the eye, for example, makes the eye good, and perfects its function; for it is only by the virtue of the eye that we can see well. So, too, the excellence of the horse makes it a good horse, swift, and strong to carry its rider, and bold to face his enemies. And if this be true, as it is in all cases, it follows that the virtue of man will be such a habit as will make him a good man, and enable him to discharge his especial function well. And how this is to be brought about we have already said; but we shall make the matter yet clearer if we consider wherein exactly it is that the nature of moral virtue consists. In everything that is continuous, and consequently capable of division, we can mark off an amount which will be either more than, or less than, or equal to the remainder; and can do so either objectively, that is to say with reference to the matter in question, or subjectively, that is to say with reference to ourselves. Now that which is equal is a mean between excess and defect. And by the means of the matter I understand that which, as is the point of bisection in a line, is equally distant from either extreme, and which is for all persons alike one and the same. But by the means with reference to ourselves I understand that which is neither too much for us nor too little, and which consequently is not any one fixed point which for all alike remains the same. If, for example, ten pounds be too much and two pounds be too little, we take as the mean with reference to the matter six pounds, which itself exceed two pounds by as much as they are exceeded by ten. This is what is called a mean in arithmetical progression. But the mean with reference to ourselves must not be thus fixed. For it does not follow that, if ten pounds of meat be too much to eat, and two pounds be too little, our trainer will therefore order us six pounds. This may be either too little for him who is to take it, or too much. For Milo, for example, it would be too little, while for one who is to begin training it would be too much. And in running, and in wrestling, the same rule holds good. And so, too, all skilled artists avoid the excess and the defect, while they seek and choose the mean, that is to say not the absolute but

the relative mean. And since it is thus that all skilled knowledge perfects its results, by keeping the mean steadily in view, and by modelling its work upon it, whence it comes that we are wont to say, at the termination of any good work, that neither to it can anything be added, nor from it can anything be taken away; inasmuch as excess and defect destroy perfection, while moderation preserves it; since, then, all good artists, as we have said, always work with the mean in view, and since virtue is, as also is nature, more exact and higher than is any art, it follows that virtue also will aim at the mean. And when I say virtue I mean moral virtue, for moral virtue is concerned with our emotions, that is to say with our actions; and in these excess and defect are to be found, and also moderation. Fear, for example, and confidence, and desire, and anger, and pity, and, generally, any pleasure or pain, we can feel both more and less than we ought, and in either case we feel them not well. But to feel them when we ought, and at what we ought, and towards whom we ought, and for the right motive, and as we ought—in all this lies the mean, and, with the mean, perfection; and these are the characteristics of virtue. And so, too, with reference to our actions, no less than our emotions, excess and defect are possible, and with them consequently moderation. Now virtue is concerned with our emotions and with our actions. It is in these that excess is an error, and that defect is blamed as a fault; while moderation meets with praise and with success, both of which things are marks of virtue. And hence it is that all virtue is a mean, in that it aims at that which is the mean. Moreover, the forms of wrong are manifold (for evil is of the infinite, as said the allegory of the Pythagoreans, and good of the finite), while of right the form is but one. Hence the one is easy, the other hard; easy is it to miss, hard to hit our aim. And from this again it follows that to vice belong excess and defect, and to virtue belongs moderation.

One path hath righteousness, but many sin.

Moral virtue, then, is a certain formed state, or habit of purpose, which conforms to the relative mean in action, and which is determined to that mean by reason, or as the prudent man would determine it. And it is the mean between two vices, the one of which consists in excess, and the other in defect. So that the vices sometimes fall short of what is right in our emotions and in our actions, and sometimes exceed it, while virtue finds the mean and chooses it. And consequently in its essence, and by its real definition, virtue is a mean; but

as regards perfection and goodness it is an extreme. It is not every action, however, or every emotion that allows of moderation. There are some the very name of which is sufficient to class them with the vices; such as are, for instance, malice, shamelessness, envy, among our emotions; and among our acts, adultery, theft, and homicide. For all these things, and all others such, are blamed in that they are absolutely bad in themselves, not in that the excess or the defect of them is bad. In such matters one can never act rightly, but is always wrong; nor can one talk upon such occasions of behaving ill, or of behaving well; as, for example, by committing adultery with whom one ought, and when one ought, and as one ought; for to do any one of these things is wrong, whatever be the circumstances of the case. One might as well insist upon a mean and an excess and a defect of injustice, and of cowardice, and of debauchery; so making a mean in an absolute excess, and a defect in an absolute defect. Whereas, just as there can be no excess or defect in temperance, or in bravery,—such a mean being as it were the indivisible point at the apex of a triangle,—so, too, in the case of the vices above quoted, neither a mean nor an excess nor a defect is possible; but under whatever circumstances such acts are committed they are wrong. For, to sum up, the mean of an excess or of a defect, no less than the excess or the defect of a mean, is a self-contradictory conception.

But we must not rest content with a statement thus purely general; we must also confirm it by an application to particulars. In all questions of human action broad generalisations are apt to be void of content, and consequently unsatisfactory, the truth rather lying in particular propositions. For the field of action lies in particulars, and with these particulars our generalisations must concord. Our confirmatory instances we will draw from the recognized catalogue of the virtues. Now, with regard to the emotions of fear, of pride, and of strength, bravery is the mean. Of those who run into excess, he who shows excess of fearlessness has no name (as, indeed, is the case with many moral states), and he who runs into excess of pride of strength is foolhardy; while the coward is he who is either over-fearful, or deficient in proper confidence. Temperance, again, is a mean, and debauchery is an excess, not with respect to all pains and pleasures, but only to some, and concerned with pleasures rather than with pains. That a man's sense of pleasure should be deficient is a case that rarely or never occurs, and hence such a character has as yet found no name. But, provisionally, such men may be called insensible or ascetic. With

respect to the giving and the taking of money, the mean is liberality, the excess and the defect are prodigality and illiberality. These vices are contradictorily opposed to each other, each being an excess of that of which the other is a defect. For the prodigal runs into excess in the giving of money, but in taking his due into defect; while the illiberal man is over-greedy in the receipt of money, and in giving it falls short of the true mean. We are now giving a mere summary outline, such being for the present sufficient for our purpose. Hereinafter these various states shall be more minutely described. With regard to money there are also certain other moral states. Magnificence is a mean (the magnificent man differing from the liberal in that the latter is concerned with small matters, the former with great), while its excess is bad taste and vulgarity; and its defect is pettiness. These two vices differ from the excess and the defect of liberality; and wherein the difference consists we will hereafter show. And, again, with regard to honor and dishonor, the mean state is high-mindedness; its excess is what has been called "chirking vanity," and its defect is feebleness of spirit. And, in like manner as we said when we contrasted magnificence with liberality that liberality differed from it in that it was concerned with small sums, so, too, is there a virtue which stands in a similar relation to high-mindedness, dealing with small honor, while high-mindedness deals with great. For one can aim at honor both as one ought, and more than one ought, and less than one ought. He whose craving for honor is excessive is said to be ambitious, and he who is deficient in this respect unambitious; while he who observes the mean has no peculiar name. Indeed, all these states are really nameless, except that of the ambitious man, which is known as ambition. Hence it arises that those who have run into either extreme lay claim to the mean, as a kind of border march; and hence, too, we at times call him who is in the mean state ambitious, and at times again we call him unambitious. And on some occasions we praise the ambitious man, and on others again the unambitious man. Our reasons for this shall be given hereafter; meantime let us complete our enumeration of the virtues, drawing our distinctions by the aid of the method which has guided us all along. Anger, again, admits of an excess, and of a defect, and of a mean. These states can hardly be said to have any names of their own; but, as we call him gentle who is in the mean state, we hence will call the mean state itself gentleness; while, of those who fall into the extremes, he who errs on the side of excess may be called hasty, and his vice is hastiness; he whose error is one of defect

spiritless, and the defect in question want of proper spirit. And there are also three other mean states, which to some extent resemble one another, and are yet distinct. They resemble one another in that they are all concerned with the daily intercourse of men in their speech and in their actions, and they are distinct in that the one is concerned with what is truthful in such matters, and the other two with what is pleasant. And of these two latter the field of the one is our amusements, that of the other all the circumstances of our daily life. We must then place these also in our list, so as to still further strengthen our conviction that in all cases the mean state is praiseworthy, the extremes neither right nor praiseworthy, but blameable. The majority of these states are nameless; but we must endeavor, as we have done with others, to coin a name for each of them, that we may thereby give precision to our treatise, and render its course intelligible. With regard to truth then he who is in the mean is the truthful man, and the mean state itself may be called truthfulness, while all pretence to more than our merits is braggartry, and he who advances such pretences is a braggart. And, on the other hand, all dissimulation of our powers is irony, as it is to be seen in the ironical man. And, as regards the elements of pleasure in our amusements, he who hits the mean is the witty man; and his moral state is wittiness, while the excess is gross buffoonery, and he who displays it is a buffoon; and, on the other hand, he who is deficient in wit is a boor, and his habit is boorishness. And, as regards the other aspect of pleasure in our life as a whole, he who is pleasant as he ought to be is a friendly man, and the mean state is friendliness, while he who runs into excess, if it be with no particular object in view, is over-polite, but, if it be to serve his own ends, is a sycophant; while he again who errs on the side of defect, and who never lays himself out to please others, is quarrelsome and peevish. There are, moreover, certain mean states in our emotions, and in the circumstances with which our emotions are concerned. Shame, for instance, is not a virtue, and yet he who shows a proper shame is praised. For in these matters we say that such a man is in the mean, and that such another runs into excess, as does the over-bashful man who feels shame at everything, while he who is deficient in this respect, or he who never displays shame at all, is called shameless; and he again who hits the mean is said to show a proper sense of shame. Lastly, righteous indignation is a mean between envy and malignity. These are states concerned with the pleasures and the pains caused by the fortunes of our neighbors. For he who feels righteous indigna-

tion is grieved when he sees the ungodly in prosperity. The envious man, on the other hand, runs into excess, and is grieved at the prosperity of all alike; while the malignant man, so far from feeling pain at the prosperity of the ungodly, actually rejoices thereat. But concerning all these states we shall have fitting occasion to speak elsewhere; and so too concerning justice, which is a word used in more than one sense, we will elsewhere distinguish between its two kinds, and will show how each of them is a mean. And we will then, in like manner, proceed to the discussion of the intellectual virtues.

There are, then, three states of mind, to-wit, two vices—that of excess, and that of defect; and one virtue—the mean; and all these are in a certain sense opposed to one another; for the extremes are not only opposed to the mean, but also to one another; and the mean is opposed to the extremes. For, exactly as that which is equal is, at the same time, greater as compared with that which is less, and less as compared with that which is greater; so, too, the mean states are in excess as compared with their defects, and are defective as compared with their excesses, both where our emotions are concerned, and where our actions. For the brave man, if he be compared with the coward, seems foolhardy: and, if with the foolhardy man, seems a coward; and so, too, the really temperate man, if he be compared with the ascetic, appears to be debauched; and, if with the debauched man, to be ascetic. Similarly, the liberal man, if contrasted with the illiberal man, will seem a prodigal; but, if with the prodigal, he will seem illiberal. And hence those who run into either extreme delight to contrast themselves with him who is in the mean, by identifying him with the man who falls into the opposite extreme. And thus the coward calls the brave man foolhardy, and the foolhardy man calls him a coward; and, with regard to all the other virtues and vices, a similar rule holds good. Virtue, then, and vice are thus mutually opposed to one another. But still the extremes are more opposed to each other than they are to the mean, for they are further removed from one another than they are from the mean; exactly as the greater differs more from the less, and the less from the greater, than does either from that which is exactly equal. And in some cases, again, the one extreme is more like the mean than is the other. Foolhardiness, for example, is more like valor than is cowardice, and prodigality is more like liberality than is stinginess. Thus, then, it is the two extremes that are the most unlike each other; and, inasmuch as the definition of contraries is “all such things as are farthest removed from one another,” it follows that the further

things be removed from one another the more contrary will they be. And, again, in some cases it is the defect, and in others the excess that is the more opposed to the mean. To bravery, for example, it is not so much foolhardiness, its excess, that is opposed, as cowardice, its defect; and to temperance it is not so much asceticism, its defect, that is opposed, as debauchery, its excess. And there are two reasons why this happens, one of which lies in the very nature of the matter itself. For, in that the one extreme is nearer to, and so more like the mean than is the other, we oppose to the mean, as its contrary, not so much this extreme as the other. Since, for example, foolhardiness is more like courage, and is nearer to it than is cowardice, it is cowardice rather than foolhardiness that we contrast with courage. For that extreme which is the more removed from the mean would seem to be the more opposed to it. This, then, is one cause, dependent upon the very nature of the matter itself, while there is another which depends upon ourselves. For that extreme towards which we are of our own natures prone to drift would seem to be more opposed to the mean than is the other. Inasmuch as, for example, we are of our own nature prone to pleasure, we drift towards intemperance rather than towards a Spartan life. And, as we say that that extreme towards which runs our bent is the more opposed to the mean than is the other, we therefore hold that intemperance, the excess, is more opposed to temperance than is asceticism.

And now we have sufficiently shown that moral virtue is a mean, and how, and that it is a mean between two vices, that of excess and that of defect, and that it is a mean in that it aims at a mean in our emotions and in our actions. And hence we can see that it is no small task to be good. No small task is it to hit the mean in each case. It is not, for example, any chance comer, but only the geometer, who can find the center of a given circle. And, so, too, to get angry is an easy matter, and in any man's power; or to give away money or to spend it; but to decide to whom to give it, and how large a sum, and when, and for what purpose, and how, is neither in every man's power, nor an easy matter. Hence it is that such excellence is rare and praiseworthy and noble. Hence, too, he who aims at the mean must, first and foremost, keep well away from that extreme which is the more opposed to the mean. Such is Calypso's counsel—

Clear of this surge and spray steer wide thy barque.

For of the two extremes the one is full-fraught with danger, the

other less. Since, then, to keep exactly to the mid-channel is hard, we must choose the least of two evils, and, as the saying is, make a losing tack. And this we shall best do by observing the rule here laid down. And we must, moreover, consider towards which extreme it is that we ourselves are the most inclined to drift; for no two men have the same natural bent. Our test herein will be the pleasure or the pain which we feel upon each occasion. And we must strive to drag ourselves in exactly the counter course, much as they do who straighten warped timbers. For the further we remove ourselves from error the nearer shall we come to the mean. But most of all must we upon all occasions keep a watchful guard against that which gives us pleasure, and against Pleasure herself. For we cannot pass judgment upon her unmoved by her bribes. As, then, the elders of the people felt towards Helen, so, too, must we feel towards her, and must upon each such occasion repeat their sentence. For so shall we put her from us, and be less liable to sin. And, in brief, to act thus is our best chance to hit the mean. And yet this is no easy rule, and least easy to apply. No light task is it to determine how, and with whom, and for what, and for how long it is fitting to give way to anger. For there are times when we praise those who show defect of spirit and call them gentle, and at times again we exculpate hot temper by the title of manliness. In any case, however, he who steps but little wide of the good is not blamed, whether he inclines towards excess or towards defect. But he is blamed who strays far wide, for such an one cannot be erring unawares. And yet it is no easy matter to determine by precise rule up to what point, and how far, error is free from blame. For no matter of immediate perception is easy to determine, and all such questions as this are in their very nature particular matters of fact, which must be decided by immediate perception, and not by argument. This much, however, is clear, that in all matters the mean state is the praiseworthy, but that in some cases we must, if anything, decline towards the excess, and in others towards the defect; for thus shall we most easily hit the mean, and with it that which is our good.—The Nicomachean Ethics.

POLITICAL IDEAS

ORIGIN OF THE STATE

Every state is a community of some kind, and every community is established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of all, and which embraces all the rest, aims, and in a greater degree than any other, at the highest good.

Now there is an erroneous opinion that a statesman, king, householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household; over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no difference between a great household and a small state. The distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when, according to the principles of the political science, the citizens rule and are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.

But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in what they differ from one another, and whether any scientific distinction can be drawn between the different kinds of rule.

He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether a state or anything else will obtain the clearest view of them. In the first place (1) there must be a union of those who cannot exist without each other; for example, male and female, that the race may continue; and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants,

mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of themselves. And (2) there must be a union of natural ruler and subject, that both may be preserved. For he who can foresee with his mind is by nature intended to be lord and master, and he who can work with his body is a subject, and by nature a slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Nature, however, has distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many uses; she makes each thing, for a single use, and every instrument is best made when intended for one and not many uses. But among barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves, male and female. Wherefore the poets say,

‘It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians;’

as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature one.

Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and slave, the family first arises, and Hesiod is right when he says,—

‘First house and wife and an ox for the plough,’

for the ox is the poor man’s slave. The family is the association established by nature for the supply of men’s every day wants, and the members of it are called by Charondas ‘companions of the cupboard’ [*homosipuous*], and by Epimenides the Cretan, ‘companions of the manger’ [*homokapous*]. But when several families are united, and the association aims at something more than the supply of daily needs, then comes into existence the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to be that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and grandchildren, who are said to be ‘suckled with the same milk.’ And this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came together, as the barbarians still are. Every family is ruled by the eldest, and therefore in the colonies of the family the kingly form of government prevailed because they were of the same blood. As Homer says [of the Cyclopes]:—

‘Each one gives law to his children and to his wives.’

For they lived dispersedly, as was the manner in ancient times. Wherefore men say that the gods have a king, because they themselves either are or were in ancient times under the rule of a king. For they im-

agine, not only the forms of the gods, but their ways of life to be like their own.

When several villages are united in a single community, perfect and large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life. And therefore, if the earlier forms of society are natural, so is the state, for it is the end of them, and the [completed] nature is the end. For what each thing is when fully developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man, a horse, or a family. Besides, the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best.

Hence it is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a state, is either above humanity, or below it; he is the

‘Tribeless, lawless, hearthless one,’

whom Homer denounces—the outcast who is a lover of war; he may be compared to a bird which flies alone.

Now the reason why man is more of a political animal than bees or any other gregarious animals is evident. Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere sound is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals (for their nature attains to the perception of pleasure and pain and the intimation of them to one another, and no further), the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and inexpedient, and likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, of just and unjust, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.

Thus the state is by nature clearly prior to the family and to the individual, since the whole is of necessity prior to the part; for example, if the whole body be destroyed, there will be no foot or hand, except in an equivocal sense, as we might speak of a stone hand, for when destroyed the hand will be no better. But things are defined by their working and power; and we ought not to say that they are the same when they are no longer the same, but only that they have the same name. The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficing;

and therefore he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state. A social instinct is implanted in all men by nature, and yet he who first founded the state was the greatest of benefactors. For man, when perfected, is the best of animals, but, when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all; since armed injustice is the more dangerous, and he is equipped at birth with the arms of intelligence and with moral qualities which he may use for the worst ends. Wherefore, if he have not virtue, he is the most unholy and the most savage of animals, and the most full of lust and gluttony. But justice is the bond of men in states, and the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society.

Seeing then that the state is made up of households, before speaking of the state, we must speak of the management of the household. The parts of the household are the persons who compose it, and a complete household consists of slaves and freemen. Now we should begin by examining everything in its least elements; and the first and least parts of a family are master and slave, husband and wife, father and children. We have therefore to consider what each of these three relations is and ought to be:—I mean the relation of master and servant, of husband and wife, and thirdly of parent and child.—*Politics*, I.

THE IDEAL STATE

He who would duly enquire about the best form of a state ought first to determine which is the most eligible life; while this remains uncertain the best form of the state must also be uncertain; for, in the natural order of things, those may be expected to lead the best life who are governed in the best manner of which their circumstances admit. We ought therefore to ascertain, first of all, which is the most generally eligible life, and then whether the same life is or is not best for the state and for individuals.

Assuming that enough has been already said in exoteric discourses concerning the best life, we will now only repeat the statements contained in them. Certainly no one will dispute the propriety of that partition of goods which separates them into three classes, viz. eternal goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul, or deny that

the happy man must have all three. For no one would maintain that he is happy who has not in him a particle of courage or temperance or justice or prudence, who is afraid of every insect which flutters past him, and will commit any crime, however great, in order to gratify his lust of meat or drink, who will sacrifice his dearest friend for the sake of half-a-farthing, and is as feeble and false in mind as a child or a madman. These propositions are universally acknowledged as soon as they are uttered, but men differ about the degree or relative superiority of this or that good. Some think that a very moderate amount of virtue is enough, but set no limit to their desires of wealth, property, power, reputation, and the like. To whom we reply by an appeal to facts, which easily prove that mankind do not acquire or preserve virtue by the help of external goods, but external goods by the help of virtue, and that happiness, whether consisting in pleasure or virtue, or both, is more often found with those who are most highly cultivated in their mind and in their character, and have only a moderate share of external goods, than among those who possess external goods to a useless extent but are deficient in higher qualities; and this is not only matter of experience, but, if reflected upon, will easily appear to be in accordance with reason. For, whereas external goods have a limit, like any other instrument, and all things useful are of such a nature that where there is too much of them they must either do harm, or at any rate be of no use, to their possessors, every good of the soul, the greater it is, is also of greater use, if the epithet useful as well as noble is appropriate to such subjects. No proof is required to show that the best state of one thing in relation to another is proportioned to the degree of excellence by which the natures corresponding to those states are separated from each other: so that, if the soul is more noble than our possessions or our bodies, both absolutely and in relation to us, it must be admitted that the best state of either has a similar ratio to the other. Again, it is for the sake of the soul that goods external and goods of the body are eligible at all, and all wise men ought to choose them for the sake of the soul, and not the soul for the sake of them.

Let us acknowledge then that each one has just so much of happiness as he has of virtue and wisdom, and of virtuous and wise action. God is a witness to us of this truth, for he is happy and blessed, not by reason of any external good, but in himself and by reason of his own nature. And herein of necessity lies the difference between good fortune and happiness; for external goods come of themselves, and

chance is the author of them, but no one is just or temperate by or through chance. In like manner, and by a similar train of argument, the happy state may be shown to be that which is [morally] best and which acts rightly; and rightly it cannot act without doing right actions, and neither individual nor state can do right actions without virtue and wisdom. Thus the courage, justice, and wisdom of a state have the same form and nature as the qualities which give the individual who possesses them the name of just, wise, or temperate.

Thus much may suffice by way of preface: for I could not avoid touching upon these questions, neither could I go through all the arguments affecting them; these must be reserved for another discussion.

Let us assume then that the best life, both for individuals and states, is the life of virtue, having external goods enough for the performance of good actions. If there are any who controvert our assertion, we will in this treatise pass them over, and consider their objections hereafter.

There remains to be discussed the question, Whether the happiness of the individual is the same as that of the state, or different? Here again there can be no doubt—no one denies that they are the same. For those who hold that the well-being of the individual consists in his wealth, also think that riches make the happiness of the whole state, and those who value most highly the life of a tyrant deem that city the happiest which rules over the greatest number; while they who approve an individual for his virtue say that the more virtuous a city is, the happier it is. Two points here present themselves for consideration: first (1), which is the more eligible life, that of a citizen who is a member of a state, or that of an alien who has no political ties; and again (2), which is the best form of constitution or the best condition of a state, either on the supposition that political privileges are given to all, or that they are given to a majority only? Since the good of the state and not of the individual is the proper subject of political thought and speculation, and we are engaged in a political discussion, while the first of these two points has a secondary interest for us, the latter will be the main subject of our inquiry.

Now it is evident that the form of government is best in which every man, whoever he is, can act for the best and live happily. But even those who agree in thinking that the life of virtue is the most eligible raise a question, whether the life of business and politics is or is not more eligible than one which is wholly independent of external goods, I mean than a contemplative life, which by some is

maintained to be the only one worthy of a philosopher. For these two-lives—the life of the philosopher and the life of the statesman—appear to have been preferred by those who have been most keen in the pursuit of virtue, both in our own and in other ages. Which is the better is a question of no small moment; for the wise man, like the wise state, will necessarily regulate his life according to the best end. There are some who think that while a despotic rule over others is the greatest injustice, to exercise a constitutional rule over them, even though not unjust, is a great impediment to a man's individual well-being. Others take an opposite view; they maintain that the true life of man is the practical and political, and that every virtue admits of being practised, quite as much by statesmen and rulers as by private individuals. Others, again, are of opinion that arbitrary and tyrannical rule alone consists with happiness; indeed, in some states the entire aim of the laws is to give men despotic power over their neighbours. And, therefore, although in most cities the laws may be said generally to be in a chaotic state, still, if they aim at anything, they aim at the maintenance of power: thus in Lacedaemon and Crete the system of education and the greater part of the laws are framed with a view to war. And in all nations which are able to gratify their ambition, military power is held in esteem, for example among the Scythians and Persians and Thracians and Celts. In some nations there are even laws tending to stimulate the warlike virtues, as at Carthage, where we are told that men obtain the honour of wearing as many rings as they have served campaigns. There was once a law in Macedonia that he who had not killed an enemy should wear a halter, and among the Scythians no one who had not slain his man was allowed to drink out of the cup which was handed round at a certain feast. Among the Iberians, a warlike nation, the number of enemies whom a man has slain is indicated by the number of obelisks which are fixed in the earth round his tomb; and there are numerous practices among other nations of a like kind, some of them established by law and others by custom. Yet to a reflecting mind it must appear very strange that the statesman should be always considering how he can dominate and tyrannize over others, whether they will or not. How can that which is not even lawful be the business of the statesman or the legislator? Unlawful it certainly is to rule without regard to justice, for there may be might where there is no right. The other arts and sciences offer no parallel; a physician is not expected to persuade or coerce his patients, nor a pilot the passengers in his ship. Yet many

appear to think that a despotic government is a true political form, and what men affirm to be unjust and inexpedient in their own case they are not ashamed of practising towards others; they demand justice for themselves, but where other men are concerned they care nothing about it. Such behaviour is irrational; unless the one party is born to command, and the other born to serve, in which case men have a right to command, not indeed all their fellows, but only those who are intended to be subjects; just as we ought not to hunt mankind, whether for food or sacrifice, but only the animals which are intended for food or sacrifice, that is to say, such wild animals as are eatable. And surely there may be a city happy in isolation, which we will assume to be well-governed (for it is quite possible that a city thus isolated might be well-administered and have good laws); but such a city would not be constituted with any view to war or the conquest of enemies,—all that sort of thing must be excluded. Hence we see very plainly that warlike pursuits, although generally to be deemed honourable, are not the supreme end of all things, but only means. And the good lawgiver should enquire how states and races of men and communities may participate in a good life, and in the happiness which is attainable by them. His enactments will not be always the same; and where there are neighbours he will have to deal with them according to their characters, and to see what duties are to be performed towards each. The end at which the best form of government should aim may be properly made a matter of future consideration.

Let us now address those who, while they agree that the life of virtue is the most eligible, differ about the manner of practising it. For some renounce political power, and think that the life of the freeman is different from the life of the statesman and the best of all; but others think the life of the statesman best. The argument of the latter is that he who does nothing cannot do well, and that virtuous activity is identical with happiness. To both we say: 'you are partly right and partly wrong.' The first class are right in affirming that the life of the freeman is better than the life of the despot; for there is nothing grand or noble in having the use of a slave, in so far as he is a slave; or in issuing commands about necessary things. But it is an error to suppose that every sort of rule is despotic like that of a master over slaves, for there is as great a difference between the rule over freemen and the rule over slaves as there is between slavery by nature and freedom by nature, about which I have said enough at the commencement of this treatise. And it is equally a mistake to place inactivity above action,

for happiness is activity, and the actions of the just and wise are the realization of much that is noble.

But perhaps some one, accepting these premises, may still maintain that supreme power is the best of all things, because the possessors of it are able to perform the greatest number of noble actions. If so, the man who is able to rule, instead of giving up anything to his neighbour, ought rather to take away his power; and the father should make no account of his son, nor the son of his father, nor friend of friend; they should not bestow a thought on one another in comparison with this higher object, for the best is the most eligible and 'doing well' is the best. There might be some truth in such a view if we assume that robbers and plunderers attain the chief good. But this can never be; and hence we infer the view to be false. For the actions of a ruler cannot really be honourable, unless he is as much superior to other men as a husband is to a wife, or a father to his children, or a master to his slaves. And therefore he who violates the law can never recover by any success, however great, what he has already lost in departing from virtue. For equals share alike in the honourable and the just, as is just and equal. But that the unequal should be given to equals, and the unlike to those who are like, is contrary to nature, and nothing which is contrary to nature is good. If, therefore, there is any one superior in virtue and in the power of performing the best actions, him we ought to follow and obey, but he must have the capacity for action as well as virtue.

If we are right in our view, and happiness is assumed to be virtuous activity, the active life will be the best, both for the city collectively, and for individuals. Not that a life of action must necessarily have relation to others, as some persons think, nor are those ideas only to be regarded as practical which are pursued for the sake of practical results, but much more the thoughts and contemplations which are independent and complete in themselves; since virtuous activity, and therefore action, is an end, and even in the case of external actions the directing mind is most truly said to act. Neither, again, is it necessary that states which are cut off from others and choose to live alone should be inactive; for there may be activity also in the parts; there are many ways in which the members of a state act upon one another. The same thing is equally true of every individual. If this were otherwise, God and the universe, who have no external actions over and above their own energies, would be far enough from perfection. Hence it is

evident that the same life is best for each individual, and for states, and for mankind collectively.

Thus far by way of introduction. In what has preceded I have discussed other forms of government; in what remains the first point to be considered is what should be the conditions of the ideal or perfect state; for the perfect state cannot exist without a due supply of the means of life. And therefore we must pre-suppose many purely imaginary conditions, but nothing impossible. There will be, a certain number of citizens, a country in which to place them, and the like. As the weaver or shipbuilder or any other artisan must have the material proper for his work (and in proportion as this is better prepared, so will the result of his art be nobler), so the statesman or legislator must also have the materials suited to him.

First among the materials required by the statesman is population: he will consider what should be the number and character of the citizens, and then what should be the size and character of the country. Most persons think that a state in order to be happy ought to be large; but even if they are right, they have no idea what is a large and what a small state. For they judge of the size of the city by the number of the inhabitants; whereas they ought to regard, not their number, but their power. A city too, like an individual, has a work to do; and that city which is best adapted to the fulfilment of its work is to be deemed greatest, in the same sense of the word great in which Hippocrates might be called greater, not as a man, but as a physician, than some one else who was taller. And even if we reckon greatness by numbers, we ought not to include everybody, for there must always be in cities a multitude of slaves and sojourners and foreigners; but we should include those only who are members of the state, and who form an essential part of it. The number of the latter is a proof of the greatness of a city; but a city which produces numerous artisans and comparatively few soldiers cannot be great, for a great city is not to be confounded with a populous one. Moreover, experience shows that a very populous city can rarely, if ever, be well governed; since all cities which have a reputation for good government have a limit of population. We may argue on grounds of reason, and the same result will follow. For law is order, and good law is good order; but a very great multitude cannot be orderly: to introduce order into the unlimited is the work of a divine power—of such a power as holds together the universe. Beauty is realized in number and magnitude, and the state which combines magnitude with good order must necessarily

be the most beautiful. To the size of states there is a limit, as there is to other things, plants, animals, implements; for none of these retain their natural power when they are too large or too small, but they either wholly lose their nature, or are spoiled. For example, a ship which is only a span long will not be a ship at all, nor a ship a quarter of a mile long; yet there may be a ship of a certain size, either too large or too small, which will still be a ship, but bad for sailing. In like manner a state when composed of too few is not as a state ought to be, self-sufficing; when of too many, though self-sufficing in all mere necessities, it is a nation and not a state, being almost incapable of constitutional government. For who can be the general of such a vast multitude, or who the herald, unless he have the voice of a Stentor?

A state then only begins to exist when it has attained a population sufficient for a good life in the political community: it may indeed somewhat exceed this number. But, as I was saying, there must be a limit. What should be the limit will be easily ascertained by experience. For both governors and governed have duties to perform; the special functions of a governor are to command and to judge. But if the citizens of a state are to judge and to distribute offices according to merit, then they must know each other's characters; where they do not possess this knowledge, both the election to offices and the decision of lawsuits will go wrong. When the population is very large they are manifestly settled at haphazard, which clearly ought not to be. Besides, in an over-populous state foreigners and metics will readily acquire the rights of citizens, for who will find them out? Clearly then the best limit of the population of a state is the largest number which suffices for the purposes of life, and can be taken in at a single view. Enough concerning the size of a city.

Much the same principle will apply to the territory of the state: every one would agree in praising the state which is most entirely self-sufficing; and that must be the state which is all-producing, for to have all things and to want nothing is sufficiency. In size and extent it should be such as may enable the inhabitants to live temperately and liberally in the enjoyment of leisure. Whether we are right or wrong in laying down his limit we will enquire more precisely hereafter, when we have occasion to consider what is the right use of property and wealth: a matter which is much disputed, because men are inclined to rush into one of two extremes, some into meanness, others into luxury.

It is not difficult to determine the general character of the territory

which is required ; there are, however, some points on which military authorities should be heard ; they tell us that it should be difficult of access to the enemy, and easy of egress to the inhabitants. Further, we require that the land as well as the inhabitants of whom we were just now speaking should be taken in at a single view, for a country which is easily seen can be easily protected. As to the position of the city, if we could have what we wish, it should be well-situated in regard both to sea or land. This then is one principle, that it should be a convenient centre for the protection of the whole country : the other is, that it should be suitable for receiving the fruits of the soil, and also for the bringing in of timber and any other products.

Whether a communication with the sea is beneficial to a well-ordered state or not is a question which has often been asked. It is argued that the introduction of strangers brought up under other laws, and the increase of population, will be adverse to good order (for a maritime people will always have a crowd of merchants coming and going), and that intercourse by sea is inimical to good government. Apart from these considerations, it would be undoubtedly better, both with a view to safety and to the provision of necessities, that the city and territory should be connected with the sea ; the defenders of a country, if they are to maintain themselves against an enemy, should be easily relieved both by land and by sea ; and even if they are not able to attack by sea and land at once, they will have less difficulty in doing mischief to their assailants on one element, if they themselves can use both. Moreover, it is necessary that they should import from abroad what is not found in their own country, and that they should export what they have in excess ; for a city ought to be a market, not indeed for others, but for herself.

Those who make themselves a market for the world only do so for the sake of revenue, and if a state ought not to desire profit of this kind it ought not to have such an emporium. Now a days we often see in countries and cities dockyards and harbours very conveniently placed outside the city, but not too far off ; and they are kept in dependence by walls and similar fortifications. Cities thus situated manifestly reap the benefit of intercourse with their ports ; and any harm which is likely to accrue may be easily guarded against by the laws, which will pronounce and determine who may hold communication with one another, and who may not.

There can be no doubt that the possession of a moderate naval force is advantageous to a city ; the citizens require such a force for

their own needs, and they should also be formidable to their neighbours in certain cases, or, if necessary, able to assist them by sea as well as by land. The proper number or magnitude of this naval force is relative to the character of the state; for if her function is to take a leading part in politics, her naval power should be commensurate with the scale of her enterprizes. The population of the state need not be much increased, since there is no necessity that the sailors should be citizens: the marines who have the control and command will be freemen, and belong also to the infantry; and wherever there is a dense population of Perioeci and husbandmen, there will always be sailors more than enough. Of this we see instances at the present day. The city of Heraclea, for example, although small in comparison with many others, can man a considerable fleet. Such are our conclusions respecting the territory of the state, its harbour, its towns, its relations to the sea, and its maritime power.

Having spoken of the number of the citizens, we will proceed to speak of what should be their character. This is a subject which can be easily understood by any one who casts his eye on the more celebrated states of Hellas, and generally on the distribution of races in the habitable world. Those who live in a cold climate and in [northern] Europe are full of spirit, but wanting in intelligence and skill; and therefore they keep their freedom, but have no political organization, and are incapable of ruling over others. Whereas the natives of Asia are intelligent and inventive, but they are wanting in spirit, and therefore they are always in a state of subjection and slavery. But the Hellenic race, which is situated between them, is likewise intermediate in character, being high-spirited and also intelligent. Hence it continues free, and is the best-governed of any nation, and, if it could be formed into one state, would be able to rule the world. There are also similar differences in the different tribes of Hellas; for some of them are of a one-sided nature, and are intelligent or courageous only, while in others there is a happy combination of both qualities. And clearly those whom the legislator will most easily lead to virtue may be expected to be both intelligent and courageous. Some [like Plato] say that the guardians should be friendly towards those whom they know, fierce towards those whom they do not know. Now, passion is the quality of the soul which begets friendship and inspires affection; notably the spirit within us is more stirred against our friends and acquaintances than against those who are unknown to us, when we think that we are despised by them; for which reason Archilochus,

complaining of his friends, very naturally addresses his soul in these words,

‘For wert thou not plagued on account of friends?’

The power of command and the love of freedom are in all men based upon this quality, for passion is commanding and invincible. Nor is it right to say that the guardians should be fierce towards those whom they do not know, for we ought not to be out of temper with any one; and a lofty spirit is not fierce by nature, but only when excited against evil-doers. And this, as I was saying before, is a feeling which men show most strongly towards their friends if they think they have received a wrong at their hands: as indeed is reasonable; for, besides the actual injury, they seem to be deprived of a benefit by those who owe them one. Hence the saying,

‘Cruel is the strife of brethren;’

and again,

‘They who love in excess also hate in excess.’

Thus we have nearly determined the number and character of the citizens of our state, and also the size and nature of their territory. I say ‘nearly,’ for we ought not to require the same minuteness in theory as in fact.

As in other natural compounds the conditions of a composite whole are not necessarily organic parts of it, so in a state or in any other combination forming a unity not everything is a part, which is a necessary condition. The members of an association have necessarily some one thing the same and common to all, in which they share equally or unequally; for example, food or land or any other thing. But where there are two things of which one is a means and the other an end, they have nothing in common except that the one receives what the other produces. Such, for example, is the relation in which workmen and tools stand to their work; the house and the builder have nothing in common, but the art of the builder is for the sake of the house. And so states require property, but property, even though living beings are included in it, is no part of a state; for a state is not a community of living beings only, but a community of equals, aiming at the best life possible. Now, whereas happiness is the highest good, being a realization and perfect practice of virtue, which some attain, while others have little or none of it, the various qualities of men are

clearly the reason why there are various kinds of states and many forms of government ; for different men seek after happiness in different ways and by different means, and so make for themselves different modes of life and forms of government. We must see also how many things are indispensable to the existence of a state, for what we call the parts of a state will be found among them. Let us then enumerate the functions of a state, and we shall easily elicit what we want :

First, there must be food ; secondly, arts, for life requires many instruments ; thirdly, there must be arms, for the members of a community have need of them in order to maintain authority both against disobedient subjects and against external assailants ; fourthly, there must be a certain amount of revenue, both for internal needs, and for the purposes of war ; fifthly, or rather first, there must be a care of religion, which is commonly called worship ; sixthly, and most necessary of all, there must be a power of deciding what is for the public interest, and what is just in men's dealings with one another.

These are the things which every state may be said to need. For a state is not a mere aggregate of persons, but a union of them sufficing for the purposes of life ; and if any of these things be wanting, it is simply impossible that the community can be self-sufficing. A state then should be framed with a view to the fulfilment of these functions. There must be husbandmen to procure food, and artisans, and a warlike and a wealthy class, and priests, and judges to decide what is just and expedient.

Having determined these points, we have in the next place to consider whether all ought to share in every sort of occupation. Shall every man be at once husbandman, artisan, councillor, judge, or shall we suppose the several occupations just mentioned assigned to different persons ? or thirdly, shall some employments be assigned to individuals and others common to all ? The question, however, does not occur in every state ; as we were saying, all may be shared by all, or not all by all, but only some by some ; and hence arise the differences of states, for in democracies all share in all, in oligarchies the opposite practice prevails. Now, since we are here speaking of the best form of government, and that under which the state will be most happy (and happiness, as has been already said, cannot exist without virtue), it clearly follows that in the state which is best governed the citizens who are absolutely and not merely relatively just men must not lead the life of mechanics or tradesmen, for such a life is ignoble and inimical to virtue. Neither must they be husbandmen, since leis-

ure is necessary both for the development of virtue and the performance of political duties.

Again, there is in a state a class of warriors, and another of councillors, who advise about the expedient and determine matters of law, and these seem in an especial manner parts of a state. Now, should these two classes be distinguished, or are both functions to be assigned to the same persons? Here again there is no difficulty in seeing that both functions will in one way belong to the same, in another, to different persons. To different persons in so far as their employments are suited to different ages of life, for the one requires wisdom, and the other strength. But on the other hand, since it is an impossible thing that those who are able to use or to resist force should be willing to remain always in subjection, from this point of view the persons are the same; for those who carry arms can always determine the fate of the constitution. It remains therefore that both functions of government should be entrusted to the same persons, not, however, at the same time, but in the order prescribed by nature, who has given to young men strength and to older men wisdom. Such a distribution of duties will be expedient and also just, and is founded upon a principle of proportion. Besides, the ruling class should be the owners of property, for they are citizens, and the citizens of a state should be in good circumstances; whereas mechanics or any other class whose art excludes the art of virtue have no share in the state. This follows from our first principle, for happiness cannot exist without virtue, and a city is not to be termed happy in regard to a portion of the citizens, but in regard to them all. And clearly property should be in their hands, since the husbandmen will of necessity be slaves or barbarians or Perioeci.

Of the classes enumerated there remain only the priests, and the manner in which their office is to be regulated is obvious. No husbandman or mechanic should be appointed to it; for the gods should receive honour from the citizens only. Now since the body of the citizens is divided into two classes, the warriors and the councillors; and it is befitting that the worship of the gods, should be duly performed, and also a rest provided in their service for those who from age have given up active life—to the old men of these two classes should be assigned the duties of the priesthood.

We have shown what are the necessary conditions, and what the parts of a state: husbandmen, craftsmen, and labourers of all kinds are necessary to the existence of states, but the parts of the state are

the warriors and councillors. And these are distinguished severally from one another, the distinction being in some cases permanent, in others not.

It is no new or recent discovery of political philosophers that the state ought to be divided into classes, and that the warriors should be separated from the husbandmen. The system has continued in Egypt and in Crete to this day, and was established, as tradition says, by a law of Sesostris in Egypt and of Minos in Crete. The institution of common tables also appears to be of ancient date, being in Crete as old as the reign of Minos, and in Italy far older. The Italian historians say that there was a certain Italus king of Oenotria, from whom the Oenotrians were called Italians, and who gave the name of Italy to the promontory of Europe lying between the Scylletic and Lametic Gulfs, which are distant from one another only half-a-day's journey. They say that this Italus converted the Oenotrians from shepherds into husbandmen, and besides other laws which he gave them, was the founder of their common meals; even in our day some who are derived from him retain this institution and certain other laws of his. On the side of Italy towards Tyrrhenia dwelt the Opici, who are now, as of old, called Ausones; and on the side towards Iapygia and the Ionian Gulf, in the district called Syrtis, the Chones, who are likewise of Oenotrian race. From this part of the world originally came the institution of common tables; the separation into castes [which was much older] from Egypt, for the reign of Sesostris is of far greater antiquity than that of Minos. It is true indeed that these and many other things have been invented several times over in the course of ages, or rather times without number; for necessity may be supposed to have taught men the inventions which were absolutely required, and when these were provided, it was natural that other things which would adorn and enrich life should grow up by degrees. And we may infer that in political institutions the same rule holds. Egypt witnesses to the antiquity of all things, for the Egyptians appear to be of all people the most ancient; and they have laws and a regular constitution [existing from time immemorial]. We should therefore make the best use of what has been already discovered, and try to supply defects.

I have already remarked that the land ought to belong to those who possess arms and have a share in the government, and that the husbandmen ought to be a class distinct from them; and I have determined what should be the extent and nature of the territory. Let me proceed to discuss the distribution of the land, and the character of the

agricultural class; for I do not think that property ought to be common, as some maintain, but only that by friendly consent there should be a common use of it; and that no citizen should be in want of subsistence.

As to common meals, there is a general agreement that a well-ordered city should have them; and we will hereafter explain what are our own reasons for taking this view. They ought, however, to be open to all the citizens. And yet it is not easy for the poor to contribute the requisite sum out of their private means, and to provide also for their household. The expense of religious worship should likewise be a public charge. The land must therefore be divided into two parts, one public and the other private, and each part should be subdivided, half of the public land being appropriated to the service of the gods, and the other half used to defray the cost of the common meals; while of the private land, half should be near the border, and the other near the city, so that each citizen having two lots they may all of them have land in both places; there is justice and fairness in such a division, and it tends to inspire unanimity among the people in their border wars. Where there is not this arrangement, some of them are too ready to come to blows with their neighbours, while others are so cautious that they quite lose the sense of honour. Wherefore there is a law in some places which forbids those who dwell near the border to take part in public deliberations about wars with neighbours, on the ground that their interests will pervert their judgment. For the reasons already mentioned then, the land should be divided in the manner described. The very best thing of all would be that the husbandmen should be slaves, not all of the same race and not spirited, for if they have no spirit they will be better suited for their work, and there will be no danger of their making a revolution. The next best thing would be that they should be perioeci of foreign race, and of a like inferior nature; some of them should be the slaves of individuals, and employed on the private estates of men of property, the remainder should be the property of the state and employed on the common land. I will hereafter explain what is the proper treatment of slaves, and why it is expedient that liberty should be always held out to them as the reward of their services.

We have already said that the city should be open to the land and to the sea, and to the whole country as far as possible. In respect of the place itself our wish would be to find a situation for it, fortunate in four things. The first, health—this is a necessity: cities which lie

towards the east, and are blown upon by winds coming from the east, are the healthiest; next in healthfulness are those which are sheltered from the north wind, for they have a milder winter. The site of the city should likewise be convenient both for political administration and for war. With a view to the latter it should afford easy egress to the citizens, and at the same time be inaccessible and difficult of capture to enemies. There should be a natural abundance of springs and fountains in the town, or, if there is a deficiency of them, great reservoirs may be established for the collection of rain-water, such as will not fail when the inhabitants are cut off from the country by war. Special care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants, which will depend chiefly on the healthiness of the locality and of the quarter to which they are exposed, and secondly, on the use of pure water; this latter point is by no means a secondary consideration. For the elements which we use most and oftenest for the support of the body contribute most to health, and among these are water and air. Wherefore, in all wise states, if there is a want of pure water, and the supply is not all equally good, the drinking water ought to be separated from that which is used for other purposes.

As to strongholds, what is suitable to different forms of government varies: thus an acropolis is suited to an oligarchy or a monarchy, but a plain to a democracy; neither to an aristocracy, but rather a number of strong places. The arrangement of private houses is considered to be more agreeable and generally more convenient, if the streets are regularly laid out after the modern fashion which Hippodamus introduced, but for security in war the antiquated mode of building, which made it difficult for strangers to get out of a town and for assailants to find their way in, is preferable. A city should therefore adopt both plans of building: it is possible to arrange the houses irregularly, as husbandmen plant their vines in what are called 'clumps.' The whole town should not be laid out in straight lines, but only certain quarters and regions; thus security and beauty will be combined.

As to walls, those who say that cities making any pretension to military virtue should not have them, are quite out of date in their notions; and they may see the cities which prided themselves on this fancy confuted by facts. True, there is little courage shown in seeking for safety behind a rampart when an enemy is similar in character and not much superior in number; but the superiority of the besiegers may be and often is beyond the power of men to resist, and too much

for the valour of a few; and if they are to be saved and to escape defeat and outrage, the strongest wall will be the best defence of the warrior, more especially now that catapults and siege engines have been brought to such perfection. To have no walls would be as foolish as to choose a site for a town in an exposed country, and to level the heights; or as if an individual were to leave his house unwalled, lest the inmates should become cowards. Nor must we forget that those who have their cities surrounded by walls may either take advantage of them or not, but cities which are unwalled have no choice.

If our conclusions are just, not only should cities have walls, but care should be taken to make them ornamental, as well as useful for warlike purposes, and adapted to resist modern inventions. For as the assailants of a city do all they can to gain an advantage, so the defenders should make use of any means of defence which have been already discovered, and should devise and invent others, for when men are well prepared no enemy even thinks of attacking them.

As the walls are to be divided by guardhouses and towers built at suitable intervals, and the body of citizens must be distributed at common tables, the idea will naturally occur that we should establish some of the common tables in the guardhouses. The arrangement might be as follows: the principal common tables of the magistrates will occupy a suitable place, and there also will be the buildings appropriated to religious worship except in the case of those rites which the law or the Pythian oracle has restricted to a special locality. The site should be a spot seen far and wide, which gives due elevation to virtue and towers over the neighbourhood. Near this spot should be established an agora, such as that which the Thessalians call the 'freemen's agora;' from this all trade should be excluded, and no mechanic, husbandman, or any such person allowed to enter, unless he be summoned by the magistrates. It would be a charming use of the place, if the gymnastic exercises of the elder men were performed there. For in this noble practice different ages should be separated, and some of the magistrates should stay with the boys, while the grown-up men remain with the magistrates [i.e. in the freeman's agora]; for the presence of the magistrates is the best mode of inspiring true modesty and ingenuous fear. There should also be a traders' agora, distinct and apart from the other, in a situation which is convenient for the reception of goods both by sea and land.

But in speaking of the magistrates we must not forget another section of the citizens, viz. the priests, for whom public tables should

likewise be provided in their proper place near the temples. The magistrates who deal with contracts, indictments, summonses, and the like, and those who have the care of the agora and of the city respectively, ought to be established near the agora and in some public place of meeting; the neighbourhood of the traders' agora will be a suitable spot; the upper agora we devote to the life of leisure, the other is intended for the necessities of trade.

The same order should prevail in the country, for there too the magistrates, called by some 'Inspectors of Forests,' and by others 'Wardens of the Country,' must have guardhouses and common tables while they are on duty; temples should also be scattered throughout the country, dedicated, some to gods, and some to heroes.

But it would be a waste of time for us to linger over details like these. The difficulty is not in imagining but in carrying them out. We may talk about them as much as we like, but the execution of them will depend upon fortune. Wherefore let us say no more about these matters for the present.

Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to determine out of what and what sort of elements the state which is to be happy and well-governed should be composed. There are two things in which all well-being consists, one of them is the choice of a right end and aim of action, and the other the discovery of the actions which are means towards it; for the means and the end may agree or disagree. Sometimes the right end is set before men, but in practice they fail to attain it; in other cases they are successful in all the means, but they propose to themselves a bad end, and sometimes they fail in both. Take, for example, the art of medicine; physicians do not always understand the nature of health, and also the means which they use may not effect the desired end. In all arts and sciences both the end and the means should be equally within our control.

The happiness and well-being which all men manifestly desire, some have the power of attaining, but to others, from some accident or defect of nature, the attainment of them is not granted; for a good life requires a supply of external goods, in a less degree when men are in a good state, in a greater degree when they are in a lower state. Others again, who possess the condition of happiness, go utterly wrong from the first in the pursuit of it. But since our object is to discover the best form of government, that, namely, under which a city will be best governed, and since the city is best governed which has the greatest opportunity of obtaining happiness, it is evident that

we must clearly ascertain the nature of happiness.

We have said in the *Ethics*, if the arguments there adduced are of any value, that happiness is the realization and perfect exercise of virtue, and this not conditional, but absolute. And I used the term 'conditional' to express that which is good in itself. Take the case of just actions; just punishments and chastisements do indeed spring from a good principle, but they are good only because we cannot do without them—it would be better that neither individuals nor states should need anything of the sort—but actions which aim at honour and advantage are absolutely the best. The conditional action is only the choice of a lesser evil; whereas these are the foundation and creation of good. A good man may make the best even of poverty and disease, and the other ills of life; but he can only attain happiness under the opposite conditions. As we have already said in the *Ethics*, the good man is he to whom, because he is virtuous, the absolute good is his good. It is also plain that his use of other goods must be virtuous and in the absolute sense good. This makes men fancy that external goods are the cause of happiness, yet we might as well say that a brilliant performance on the lyre was to be attributed to the instrument and not to the skill of the performer.

It follows then from what has been said that some things the legislator must find ready to his hand in a state, others he must provide. And therefore we can only say: May our state be constituted in such a manner as to be blessed with the goods of which fortune disposes (for we acknowledge her power); whereas virtue and goodness in the state are not a matter of chance but the result of knowledge and purpose. A city can be virtuous only when the citizens who have a share in the government are virtuous, and in our state all the citizens share in the government; let us then enquire how a man becomes virtuous. For even if we could suppose all the citizens to be virtuous, and not each of them, yet the latter would be better, for in the virtue of each the virtue of all is involved.

There are three things which make men good and virtuous: these are nature, habit, reason. In the first place, every one must be born a man and not some other animal; in the second place, he must have a certain character, both of body and soul. But some qualities there is no use in having at birth, for they are altered by habit, and there are some gifts of nature which may be turned by habit to good or bad. Most animals lead a life of nature, although in lesser particulars some are influenced by habit as well. Man has reason, in addition, and man

only. Wherefore nature, habit, reason must be in harmony with one another ; [for they do not always agree] ; men do many things against habit and nature, if reason persuades them that they ought. We have already determined what natures are likely to be most easily moulded by the hands of the legislator. All else is the work of education ; we learn some things by habit and some by instruction.

Since every political society is composed of rulers and subjects, let us consider whether the relations of one to the other should interchange or be permanent. For the education of the citizens will necessarily vary with the answer given to this question. Now, if some men excelled others in the same degree in which gods and heroes are supposed to excel mankind in general, having in the first place a great advantage even in their bodies, and secondly in their minds, so that the superiority of the governors over their subjects was patent and undisputed, it would clearly be better that once for all the one class should rule and the others serve. But since this is unattainable, and kings have no marked superiority over their subjects, such as Scylax affirms to be found among the Indians, it is obviously necessary on many grounds that all the citizens alike should take their turn of governing and being governed. Equality consists in the same treatment of similar persons, and no government can stand which is not founded upon justice. For [if the government be unjust] every one in the country unites with the governed in the desire to have a revolution, and it is an impossibility that the members of the government can be so numerous as to be stronger than all their enemies put together. Yet that governors should excel their subjects is undeniable. How all this is to be effected, and in what way they will respectively share in the government, the legislator has to consider. The subject has been already mentioned. Nature herself has given the principle of choice when she made a difference between old and young (though they are really the same in kind), of whom she fitted the one to govern and the others to be governed. No one takes offence at being governed when he is young, nor does he think himself better than his governors, especially if he will enjoy the same privilege when he reaches the required age.

We conclude that from one point of view governors and governed are identical, and from another different. And therefore their education must be the same and also different. For he who would learn to command well must, as men say, first of all learn to obey. As I observed in the first part of this treatise, there is one rule which is for

the sake of the rulers and another rule which is for the sake of the ruled; the former is a despotic, the latter a free government. Some commands differ not in the thing commanded, but in the intention with which they are imposed. Wherefore, many apparently menial offices are an honour to the free youth by whom they are performed; for actions do not differ as honourable or dishonourable in themselves so much as in the end and intention of them. But since we say that the virtue of the citizen and ruler is the same as that of the good man, and that the same person must first be a subject and then a ruler, the legislator has to see that they become good men, and by what means this may be accomplished, and what is the end of the perfect life.

Now the soul of man is divided into two parts, one of which has reason in itself, and the other, not having reason in itself, is able to obey reason. And we call a man good because he has the virtues of these two parts. In which of them the end is more likely to be found is no matter of doubt to those who adopt our division; for in the world both of nature and of art the inferior always exists for the sake of the better or superior, and the better or superior is that which has reason. The reason too, in our ordinary way of speaking, is divided into two parts, for there is a practical and a speculative reason, and there must be a corresponding division of actions; the actions of the naturally better principle are to be preferred by those who have it in their power to attain to both or to all, for that is always to every one the most eligible which is the highest attainable by him. The whole of life is further divided into two parts, business and leisure, war and peace, and all actions into those which are necessary and useful, and those which are honourable. And the preference given to one or the other class of actions must necessarily be like the preference given to one or the other part of the soul and its actions over the other; there must be war for the sake of peace, business for the sake of leisure, things useful and necessary for the sake of things honourable. All these points the statesman should keep in view when he frames his laws; he should consider the parts of the soul and their functions, and above all the better and the end; he should also remember the diversities of human lives and actions. For men must engage in business and go to war, but leisure and peace are better; they must do what is necessary and useful, but what is honourable is better. In such principles children and persons of every age which requires education should be trained. Whereas even the Hellenes of the present day, who are reputed to be best governed, and the legislators who gave

them their constitutions, do not appear to have framed their governments with a regard to the best end, or to have given them laws and education with a view to all the virtues, but in a vulgar spirit have fallen back on those which promised to be more useful and profitable. Many modern writers have taken a similar view: they commend the Lacedaemonian constitution, and praise the legislator for making conquest and war his sole aim, a doctrine which may be refuted by argument and has long ago been refuted by facts. For most men desire empire in the hope of accumulating the goods of fortune; and on this ground Thibron and all those who have written about the Lacedaemonian constitution have praised their legislator, because the Lacedaemonians, by a training in hardships, gained great power. But surely they are not a happy people now that their empire has passed away, nor was their legislator right. How ridiculous is the result, if, while they are continuing in the observance of his laws and no one interferes with them, they have lost the better part of life. These writers further err about the sort of government which the legislator should approve, for the government of freemen is noble, and implies more virtue than despotic government. Neither is a city to be deemed happy or a legislator to be praised because he trains his citizens to conquer and obtain dominion over their neighbours, for there is great evil in this. On a similar principle any citizen who could, would obviously try to obtain the power in his own state,—the crime which the Lacedaemonians accuse king Pausanias of attempting, although he had so great honour already. No such principle and no law having this object is either statesmanlike or useful or right. For the same things are best both for individuals and for states, and these are the things which the legislator ought to implant in the minds of his citizens. Neither should men study war with a view to the enslavement of those who do not deserve to be enslaved; but first of all they should provide against their own enslavement, and in the second place obtain empire for the good of the governed, and not for the sake of exercising a general despotism, and in the third place they should seek to be masters only over those who deserve to be slaves. Facts, as well as arguments, prove that the legislator should direct all his military and other measures to the provision of leisure and the establishment of peace. For most of these military states are safe only while they are at war, but fall when they have acquired their empire; like unused iron they rust in time of peace. And for this the legislator is to blame, he never having taught them how to lead the life of peace.

Since the end of individuals and of states is the same, the end of the best man and of the best state must also be the same; it is therefore evident that there ought to exist in both of them the virtues of leisure; for peace, as has been often repeated, is the end of war, and leisure of toil. But leisure and cultivation may be promoted, not only by those virtues which are practised in leisure, but also by some of those which are useful to business. For many necessities of life have to be supplied before we can have leisure. Therefore a city must be temperate and brave, and able to endure: for truly, as the proverb says, 'There is no leisure for slaves,' and those who cannot face danger like men are the slaves of any invader. Courage and endurance are required for business and philosophy for leisure, temperance and justice for both, more especially in times of peace and leisure, for war compels men to be just and temperate, whereas the enjoyment of good fortune and the leisure which comes with peace tends to make them insolent. Those then, who seem to be the best-off and to be in the possession of every good, have special need of justice and temperance,—for example, those (if such there be, as the poets say) who dwell in the Islands of the Blest; they above all will need philosophy and temperance and justice, and all the more the more leisure they have, living in the midst of abundance. There is no difficulty in seeing why the state that would be happy and good ought to have these virtues. If it be disgraceful in men not to be able to use the goods of life, it is peculiarly disgraceful not to be able to use them in time of peace,—to show excellent qualities in action and war, and when they have peace and leisure to be no better than slaves. Wherefore we should not practise virtue after the manner of the Lacedaemonians. For they, while agreeing with other men in their conception of the highest goods, differ from the rest of mankind in thinking that they are to be obtained by the practice of a single virtue. And since these goods and the enjoyment of them are clearly greater than the enjoyment derived from the virtues of which they are the end, we must now consider how and by what means they are to be attained.

We have already determined that nature and habit and reason are required, and what should be the character of the citizens has also been defined by us. But we have still to consider whether the training of early life is to be that of reason or habit, for these two must accord, and when in accord they will then form the best of harmonies. Reason may make mistakes and fail in attaining the highest ideal of life, and there may be a like evil influence of habit. Thus much is

clear in the first place, that, as in all other things, birth implies some antecedent principle, and that the end of anything has a beginning in some former end. Now, in men reason and mind are the end towards which nature strives, so that the birth and moral discipline of the citizens ought to be ordered with a view to them. In the second place, as the soul and the body are two, we see also that there are two parts of the soul, the rational and the irrational, and two corresponding states—reason and appetite. And as the body is prior in order of generation to the soul, so the irrational is prior to the rational. The proof is that anger and will and desire are implanted in children from their very birth, but reason and understanding are developed as they grow older. Wherefore, the care of the body ought to precede that of the soul, and the training of the appetitive part should follow: none the less our care of it must be for the sake of the reason, and our care of the body for the sake of the soul.

Since the legislator should begin by considering how the frames of the children whom he is rearing may be as good as possible, his first care will be about marriage — at what age should his citizens marry, and who are fit to marry? In legislating on this subject he ought to consider the persons and their relative ages, that there may be no disproportion in them, and that they may not differ in their bodily powers, as will be the case if the man is still able to beget children while the woman is unable to bear them, or the woman able to bear while the man is unable to beget, for from these causes arise quarrels and differences between married persons. Secondly, he must consider the time at which the children will succeed to their parents; there ought not to be too great an interval of age, for then the parents will be too old to derive any pleasure from their affection, or to be of any use to them. Nor ought they to be too nearly of an age; to youthful marriages there are many objections—the children will be wanting in respect to the parents, who will seem to be their contemporaries, and disputes will arise in the management of the household. Thirdly, and this is the point from which we digressed, the legislator must mould to his will the frames of newly-born children. Almost all these objects may be secured by attention to one point. Since the time of generation is commonly limited within the age of seventy years in the case of a man, and of fifty in the case of a woman, the commencement of the union should conform to these periods. The union of male and female when too young is bad for the procreation of children; in all other animals the offspring of the young are small

and ill-developed, and generally of the female sex, and therefore also in man, as is proved by the fact that in those cities in which men and women are accustomed to marry young, the people are small and weak; in childbirth also younger women suffer more, and more of them die; some persons say that this was the meaning of the response once given to the Troezenians—['Shear not the young field,']—the oracle really meant that many died because they married too young; it had nothing to do with the ingathering of the harvest. It also conduces to temperance not to marry too soon; for women who marry early are apt to be wanton; and in men too the bodily frame is stunted if they marry while they are growing (for there is a time when the growth of the body ceases). Women should marry when they are about eighteen years of age, and men at seven and thirty; then they are in the prime of life, and the decline in the powers of both will coincide. Further, the children, if their birth takes place at the time that may reasonably be expected, will succeed in their prime, when the fathers are already in the decline of life, and have nearly reached their term of three-score years and ten.

Thus much of the age proper for marriage: the season of the year should also be considered; according to our present custom, people generally limit marriage to the season of winter, and they are right. The precepts of physicians and natural philosophers about generation should also be studied by the parents themselves; the physicians give good advice about the right age of the body, and the natural philosophers about the winds; of which they prefer the north to the south.

What constitution in the parent is most advantageous to the offspring is a subject which we will hereafter consider when we speak of the education of children, and we will only make a few general remarks at present. The temperament of an athlete is not suited to the life of a citizen, or to health, or to the procreation of children, any more than the valetudinarian or exhausted constitution, but one which is in a mean between them. A man's constitution should be inured to labour, but not to labour which is excessive or of one sort only, such as is practised by athletes; he should be capable of all the actions of a freeman. These remarks apply equally to both parents.

Women who are with child should be careful of themselves; they should take exercise and have a nourishing diet. The first of these prescriptions the legislator will easily carry into effect by requiring that they shall take a walk daily to some temple, where they can worship the gods who preside over birth. Their minds, however, unlike

their bodies, they ought to keep unexercised, for the offspring derive their natures from their mothers as plants do from the earth.

As to the exposure and rearing of children, let there be a law that no deformed child shall live, but where there are too many (for in our state population has a limit), when couples have children in excess, and the state of feeling is averse to the exposure of offspring, let abortion be procured before sense and life have begun; what may or may not be lawfully done in these cases depends on the question of life and sensation.

And now, having determined at what ages men and women are to begin their union, let us also determine how long they shall continue to beget and bear offspring for the state; men who are too old, like men who are too young, produce children who are defective in body and mind; the children of very old men are weakly. The limit, then, should be the age which is the prime of their intelligence, and this in most persons, according to the notion of some poets who measure life by periods of seven years, is about fifty; at four or five years later, they should cease from having families; and from that time forward only cohabit with one another for the sake of health, or for some similar reason.

As to adultery, let it be held disgraceful for any man or woman to be unfaithful when they are married, and called husband and wife. If during the time of bearing children anything of the sort occur, let the guilty person be punished with a loss of privileges in proportion to the offence.

After the children have been born, the manner of rearing them may be supposed to have a great effect on their bodily strength. It would appear from the example of animals, and of those nations who desire to create the military habit, that the food which has most milk in it is best suited to human beings; but the less wine the better, if they would escape diseases. Also all the motions to which children can be subjected at their early age are very useful. But in order to preserve their tender limbs from distortion, some nations have had recourse to mechanical appliances which straighten their bodies. To accustom children to the cold from their earliest years is also an excellent practice, which greatly conduces to health, and hardens them for military service. Hence many barbarians have a custom of plunging their children at birth into a cold stream; others, like the Celts, clothe them in a light wrapper only. For human nature should be early habituated to endure all which by habit it can be made to endure;

but the process must be gradual. And children, from their natural warmth, may be easily trained to bear cold. Such care should attend them in the first stage of life.

The next period lasts to the age of five; during this no demand should be made upon the child for study or labour, lest its growth be impeded; and there should be sufficient motion to prevent the limbs from being inactive. This can be secured, among other ways, by amusement, but the amusement should not be vulgar or tiring or riotous. The Directors of Education, as they are termed, should be careful what tales or stories the children hear, for the sports of children are designed to prepare the way for the business of later life, and should be for the most part imitations of the occupations which they will hereafter pursue in earnest. Those are wrong who [like Plato] in the Laws attempt to check the loud crying and screaming of children, for these contribute towards their growth, and, in a manner, exercise their bodies. Straining the voice has an effect similar to that produced by the retention of the breath in violent exertions. Besides other duties, the Directors of Education should have an eye to their bringing up, and should take care that they are left as little as possible with slaves. For until they are seven years old they must live at home; and therefore, even at this early age, all that is mean and low should be banished from their sight and hearing. Indeed, there is nothing which the legislator should be more careful to drive away than indecency of speech; for the light utterance of shameful words is akin to shameful actions. The young especially should never be allowed to repeat or hear anything of the sort. A freeman who is found saying or doing what is forbidden, if he be too young as yet to have the privilege of a place at the public tables, should be disgraced and beaten, and an elder person degraded as his slavish conduct deserves. And since we do not allow improper language, clearly we should also banish pictures or tales which are indecent. Let the rulers take care that there be no image or picture representing unseemly actions, except in the temples of those gods at whose festivals the law permits even ribaldry, and whom the law also permits to be worshipped by persons of mature age on behalf of themselves, their children, and their wives. But the legislator should not allow youth to be hearers of satirical Iambic verses or spectators of comedy until they are of an age to sit at the public tables and to drink strong wine; by that time education will have armed them against the evil influences of such representations.

We have made these remarks in a cursory manner,—they are enough for the present occasion; but hereafter we will return to the subject and after a fuller discussion determine whether such liberty should or should not be granted, and in what way granted, if at all. Theodorus, the tragic actor, was quite right in saying that he would not allow any other actor, not even if he were quite second-rate, to enter before himself, because the spectators grew fond of the voices which they first heard. And the same principle of association applies universally to things as well as persons, for we always like best whatever comes first. And therefore youth should be kept strangers to all that is bad, and especially to things which suggest vice or hate. When the five years have passed away, during the two following years they must look on at the pursuits which they are hereafter to learn. There are two periods of life into which education has to be divided, from seven to the age of puberty, and onwards to the age of one and twenty. [The poets] who divide ages by sevens are not always right: we should rather adhere to the divisions actually made by nature; for the deficiencies of nature are what art and education seek to fill up.

Let us then first enquire if any regulations are to be laid down about children, and secondly, whether the care of them should be the concern of the state or of private individuals, which latter is in our own day the common custom, and in the third place, what these regulations should be.—Politics, VII.

No one will doubt that the legislator should direct his attention above all to the education of youth, or that the neglect of education does harm to states. The citizen should be moulded to suit the form of government under which he lives. For each government has a peculiar character which originally formed and which continues to preserve it. The character of democracy creates democracy, and the character of oligarchy creates oligarchy; and always the better the character, the better the government.

Now for the exercise of any faculty or art a previous training and habituation are required; clearly therefore for the practice of virtue. And since the whole city has one end, it is manifest that education should be one and the same for all, and that it should be public, and not private,—not as at present, when every one looks after his own children separately, and gives them separate instruction of the sort which he thinks best; the training in things which are of common interest should be the same for all. Neither must we suppose that

any one of the citizens belongs to himself, for they all belong to the state, and are each of them a part of the state, and the care of each is inseparable from the care of the whole. In this particular the Lacedaemonians are to be praised, for they take the greatest pains about their children, and make education the business of the state.

That education should be regulated by law and should be an affair of state is not to be denied, but what should be the character of this public education, and how young persons should be educated, are questions which remain to be considered. For mankind are by no means agreed about the things to be taught, whether we look to virtue or the best life. Neither is it clear whether education is more concerned with intellectual or with moral virtue. The existing practice is perplexing; no one knows on what principle we should proceed—should the useful in life, or should virtue, or should the higher knowledge, be the aim or our training; all three opinions have been entertained. Again, about the means there is no agreement; for different persons, starting with different ideas about the nature of virtue, naturally disagree about the practice of it. There can be no doubt that children should be taught those useful things which are really necessary, but not all things; for occupations are divided into liberal and illiberal; and to young children should be imparted only such kinds of knowledge as will be useful to them without vulgarizing them. And any occupation, art, or science, which makes the body or soul or mind of the freeman less fit for the practice or exercise of virtue, is vulgar; wherefore we call those arts vulgar which tend to deform the body, and likewise all paid employments, for they absorb and degrade the mind. There are also some liberal arts quite proper for a freeman to acquire, but only in a certain degree, and if he attend to them too closely, in order to attain perfection in them, the same evil effects will follow. The object also which a man sets before him makes a great difference; if he does or learns anything for his own sake or for the sake of his friends, or with a view to excellence, the action will not appear illiberal; but if done for the sake of others, the very same action will be thought menial and servile. The received subjects of instruction, as I have already remarked, are partly of a liberal and partly of an illiberal character.

The customary branches of education are in number four; they are—(1) reading and writing, (2) gymnastic exercises, (3) music, to which is sometimes added (4) drawing. Of these, reading and writing and drawing are regarded as useful for the purposes of life in a

variety of ways, and gymnastic exercises are thought to infuse courage. Concerning music a doubt may be raised—in our own day most men cultivate it for the sake of pleasure, but originally it was included in education, because nature, herself, as has been often said, requires that we should be able, not only to work well, but to use leisure well; for, as I must repeat once and again, the first principle of all action is leisure. Both are required, but leisure is better than occupation; and therefore the question must be asked in good earnest, what ought we to do when at leisure? Clearly we ought not to be amusing ourselves, for then amusement would be the end of life. But if this is inconceivable, and yet amid serious occupations amusement is needed more than at other times (for he who is hard at work has need of relaxation, and amusement gives relaxation, whereas occupation is always accompanied with exertion and effort), at suitable times we should introduce amusements, and they should be our medicines, for the emotion which they create in the soul is a relaxation, and from the pleasure we obtain rest. Leisure of itself gives pleasure and happiness and enjoyment of life, which are experienced, not by the busy man, but by those who have leisure. For he who is occupied has in view some end which he has not attained; but happiness is an end which all men deem to be accompanied with pleasure and not with pain. This pleasure, however, is regarded differently by different persons, and varies according to the habit of individuals; the pleasure of the best man is the best, and springs from the noblest sources. It is clear then that there are branches of learning and education which we must study with a view to the enjoyment of leisure, and these are to be valued for their own sake; whereas those kinds of knowledge which are useful in business are to be deemed necessary, and exist for the sake of other things. And therefore our fathers admitted music into education, not on the ground either of its necessity or utility, for it is not necessary, nor indeed useful in the same manner as reading and writing, which are useful in money-making, in the management of a household, in the acquisition of knowledge and in political life, nor like drawing, useful for a more correct judgment of the works of artists, nor again like gymnastic, which gives health and strength; for neither of these is to be gained from music. There remains, then, the use of music for intellectual enjoyment in leisure; which appears to have been the reason of its introduction, this being one of the ways in which it is thought that a freeman should pass his leisure; as Homer says—

‘How good is it to invite men to the pleasant feast,’
and afterwards he speaks of others whom he describes as inviting

‘The bard who would delight them all.’

And in another place Odysseus says there is no better way of passing life than when

‘Men’s hearts are merry and the banqueters in the hall, sitting in order, hear the voice of the minstrel.’

It is evident, then, that there is a sort of education in which parents should train their sons, not as being useful or necessary, but because it is liberal or noble. Whether this is of one kind only, or of more than one, and if so, what they are, and how they are to be imparted, must hereafter be determined. Thus much we are now in a position to say that the ancients witness to us; for their opinion may be gathered from the fact that music is one of the received and traditional branches of education. Further, it is clear that children should be instructed in some useful things,—for example, in reading and writing,—not only for their usefulness, but also because many other sorts of knowledge are acquired through them. With a like view they may be taught drawing, not to prevent their making mistakes in their purchases, or in order that they may not be imposed upon in the buying or selling of articles, but rather because it makes them judges of the beauty of the human form. To be always seeking after the useful does not become free and exalted souls. Now it is clear that in education habit must go before reason, and the body before the mind; and therefore boys should be handed over to the trainer, who creates in them the proper habit of body, and to the wrestling-master, who teaches them their exercises.

Of those states which in our own day seem to take the greatest care of children, some aim at producing in them an athletic habit, but they only injure their forms and stunt their growth. Although the Lacedaemonians have not fallen into this mistake, yet they brutalize their children by laborious exercises which they think will make them courageous. But in truth, as we have often repeated, education should not be exclusively directed to this or to any other single end. And even if we suppose the Lacedaemonians to be right in their end, they do not attain it. For among barbarians and among animals courage is found associated, not with the greatest ferocity, but with

a gentle and lion-like temper. There are many races who are ready enough to kill and eat men, such as the Achaeans and Heniochi, who both live about the Black Sea; and there are other inland tribes, as bad or worse, who all live by plunder, but have no courage. It is notorious that the Lacedaemonians, while they were themselves assiduous in their laborious drill, were superior to others, but now they are beaten both in war and gymnastic exercises. For their ancient superiority did not depend on their mode of training their youth, but only on the circumstance that they trained them at a time when others did not. Hence we may infer that what is noble, not what is brutal, should have the first place; no wolf or other wild animal will face a really noble danger; such dangers are for the brave man. And parents who devote their children to gymnastics while they neglect their necessary education, in reality vulgarize them; for they make them useful to the state in one quality only, and even in this the argument proves them to be inferior to others. We should judge the Lacedaemonians not from what they have been, but from what they are; for now they have rivals who compete with their education; formerly they had none.

It is an admitted principle, that gymnastic exercises should be employed in education, and that for children they should be of a lighter kind, avoiding severe regimen or painful toil, lest the growth of the body be impaired. The evil of excessive training in early years is strikingly proved by the example of the Olympic victors; for not more than two or three of them have gained a prize both as boys and as men; their early training and severe gymnastic exercises exhausted their constitutions. When boyhood is over, three years should be spent in other studies; the period of life which follows may then be devoted to hard exercise and strict regimen. Men ought not to labour at the same time with their minds and with their bodies; for the two kinds of labour are opposed to one another, the labour of the body impedes the mind, and the labour of the mind the body.—Politics, VIII.

TRANSLATION OF E. JOWETT.

ZENO THE STOIC

ZENO THE STOIC was born about 350 B. C., the son of a Phoenician merchant in Cittium, Cyprus. A shipwreck is supposed to have left Zeno at Athens, where he became a pupil of the cynic Crates, and finally founded his own school. His writings are lost. He died about 258 B. C.

The stoics slightly modified the cynic assumption that virtue is freedom from wants, by making it the superiority to pleasure, trouble, desire, and fear, arrived at by calm submission to natural law, and out of this conformity to natural law they developed the idea of duty. Their doctrines spread to Rome and because in harmony with the sterner side of Roman character, exerted great influence from the days of Cato to those of Marcus Aurelius.

CHARACTERISTICS

I. ZENO was the son of Innaseas, or Demeas, and a native of Citium, in Cyprus, which is a Grecian city, partly occupied by a Phoenician colony.

II. He had his head naturally bent on one side, as Timotheus, the Athenian, tells us, in his work on Lives. And Apollonius, the Tyrian, says that he was thin, very tall, of a dark complexion; in reference to which some one once called him an Egyptian Clematis, as Chrysippus relates in the first volume of his Proverbs: he had fat, flabby, weak legs, on which account Persæus, in his Convivial Reminiscences, says that he used to refuse many invitations to supper; and he was very

fond, as it is said, of figs both fresh and dried in the sun.

III. He was a pupil, as has been already stated, of Crates. After that, they say that he became a pupil of Stilpon and of Xenocrates, for ten years, as Timocrates relates in his *Life of Dion*. He is also said to have been a pupil of Polemo. But Hecaton, and Apollonius, of Tyre, in the first book of his essay on Zeno, says that when he consulted the oracle, as to what he ought to do to live in the most excellent manner, the god answered him that he ought to become of the same complexion as the dead, on which he inferred that he ought to apply himself to the reading of the books of the ancients. Accordingly, he attached himself to Crates in the following manner. Having purchased a quantity of purple from Phœnicia, he was shipwrecked close to the Piræus; and when he had made his way from the coast as far as Athens, he sat down by a bookseller's stall, being now about thirty years of age. And as he took up the second book of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* and began to read it, he was delighted with it, and asked where such men as were described in that book lived: and as Crates happened very seasonably to pass at the moment, the bookseller pointed him out, and said, "Follow that man." From that time forth he became a pupil of Crates; but though he was in other respects very energetic in his application to philosophy, still he was too modest for the shamelessness of the Cynics. On which account, Crates, wishing to cure him of false shame, gave him a jar of lentil porridge to carry through the Ceramicus; and when he saw that he was ashamed, and that he endeavored to hide it, he struck the jar with his staff, and broke it; and, as Zeno fled away, and the lentil porridge ran all down his legs, Crates called after him, "Why do you run away, my little Phœnician, you have done no harm?" For some time then he continued a pupil of Crates, and when he wrote his treatise entitled the *Republic*, some said, jokingly, that he had written it upon the tail of the dog.

IV. And besides his *Republic*, he was the author also of the following works:—a treatise on a *Life according to Nature*; one on *Appetite, or the Nature of Man*; one on *Passions*; one on the *Becoming*; one on *Law*; one on the usual *Education of the Greeks*; one on *Sight*; one on the *Whole*; one on *Signs*; one on the *Doctrines of the Pythagoreans*; one on *Things in General*; one on *Styles*; five essays on *Problems relating to Homer*; one on the *Bearing of the Poets*. There is also an essay on *Art* by him, and two books of *Solutions and Jests*, and *Reminiscences*, and one called the *Ethics of Crates*. These are the books of which he was the author.

V. But at last he left Crates, and became the pupil of the philosophers whom I have mentioned before, and continued with them for twenty years. So that it is related that he said, "I now find that I made a prosperous voyage when I was wrecked." But some affirm that he made this speech in reference to Crates. Others say, that while he was staying at Athens he heard of a shipwreck, and said, "Fortune does well in having driven us on philosophy." But as some relate the affair, he was not wrecked at all, but sold all his cargo at Athens, and then turned to philosophy.

VI. And he used to walk up and down in the beautiful colonnade which is called the Priscanactium, and which is also called *poikila*, from the paintings of Polygnotus, and there he delivered his discourses, wishing to make that spot tranquil; for in the time of the thirty, nearly fourteen hundred of the citizens had been murdered there by them.

VII. Accordingly, for the future, men came thither to hear him, and from this his pupils were called Stoics, and so were his successors also, who had been at first called Zenonians, as Epicurus tells us in his Epistles. And before this time, the poets who frequented this colonnade (*stoa*) had been called Stoics, as we are informed by Eratosthenes, in the eighth book of his treatise on the old comedy; but now Zeno's pupils made the name more notorious. Now the Athenians had a great respect for Zeno, so that they gave him the keys of their walls, and they also honoured him with a golden crown, and a brazen statue; and this was also done by his own countrymen, who thought the statue of such a man an honour to their city. And the Cittæans, in the district of Sidon, also claimed him as their countryman.

XVII. He was a man of a very investigating spirit, and one who inquired very minutely into everything; in reference to which, Timon, in his Silli, speaks thus:—

I saw an aged woman of Phœnicia,
Hungry and covetous, in a proud obscurity,
Longing for everything. She had a basket
So full of holes that it retained nothing.
Likewise her mind was less than a simdapsus.

He used to study very carefully with Philo, the dialectician, and to argue with him at their mutual leisure; on which account he excited the wonder of the younger Zeno, no less than Diodorus his master.

XVIII. There were also a lot of dirty beggars always about him as Timon tells us, where he says:—

Till he collected a vast cloud of beggars,
 Who were of all men in the world the poorest,
 And the most worthless citizens of Athens.

And he himself was a man of a morose and bitter countenance with a constantly frowning expression. He was very economical, and descended even to the meanness of the barbarians, under the pretence of economy.

XIX. If he reproved any one, he did it with brevity and without exaggeration, and as it were, at a distance. I allude, for instance, to the way in which he spoke of a man who took exceeding pains in setting himself off, for as he was crossing a gutter with great hesitation, he said, "He is right to look down upon the mud, for he cannot see himself in it." And when some Cynic one day said that he had no oil in his cruise, and asked him for some, he refused to give him any, but bade **him** go away and consider which of the two was the more impudent. He was very much in love with Chremonides; and once, when he and Cleanthes were both sitting by him, he got up; and as Cleanthes wondered at this, he said, "I hear from skilful physicians that the best thing for some tumours is rest." Once, when two people were sitting above him at table at a banquet, and the one next him kept kicking the other with his foot, he himself kicked him with his knee; and when he turned round upon him for doing so, he said, "Why then do you think that your other neighbour is to be treated in this way by you?"

On one occasion he said to a man who was very fond of young boys, that "Schoolmasters who were always associating with boys had no more intellect than the boys themselves." He used also to say that the discourses of those men who were careful to avoid solecisms, and to adhere to the strictest rules of composition, were like Alexandrine money, they were pleasing to the eye and well-formed like the coin, but were nothing the better for that; but those who were not so particular he likened to the Attic tessedrachmas, which were struck at random and without any great nicety, and so he said that their discourses often outweighed the more polished styles of the others. And when Ariston, his disciple, had been holding forth a good deal of readiness and confidence, he said to him, "It would be impossible for you to speak thus, if your father had not been drunk when he begat you;" and for the same reason he nicknamed him the chatterer, as he himself was very concise in his speeches. Once, when he was in company with an epicure who usually left nothing for his messmates, and when a large fish

was set before him, he took it all as if he could eat the whole of it; and when the other looked at him with astonishment, he said, "What then do you think that your companions feel every day, if you cannot bear with my gluttony for one day?"

On one occasion, when a youth was asking him questions with a pertinacity unsuited to his age, he led him to a looking-glass and bade him look at himself, and then asked himself whether such questions appeared suitable to the face he saw there. And when a man said before him once, that in most points he did not agree with the doctrines of Antisthenes, he quoted to him an apophthegm of Sophocles, and asked him whether he thought there was much sense in that, and when he said that he did not know, "Are you not then ashamed," said he, "to pick out and recollect anything bad which may have been said by Antisthenes, but not to regard or remember whatever is said that is good?" A man once said, that the sayings of the philosophers appeared to him very trivial; "You say true," replied Zeno, "and their syllables too ought to be short, if that is possible." When some one spoke to him of Polemo, and said that he proposed one question for discussion and then argued another, he became angry, and said, "At what value did he estimate the subject that had been proposed?" And he said that a man who was to discuss a question ought to have a loud voice and great energy, like the actors, but not to open his mouth too wide, which those who speak a great deal but only talk nonsense usually do. And he used to say that there was no need for those who argued well to leave their hearers room to look about them, as good workmen do who want to have their work seen; but that, on the contrary, those who are listening to them ought to be so attentive to all that is said to have no leisure to take notes.

Once when a young man was talking a great deal, he said, "Your ears have run into your tongue." On one occasion a very handsome man was saying that a wise man did not appear to him likely to fall in love; "Then," said he, "I cannot imagine anything that will be more miserable than you good-fellows." He also used often to say that most philosophers were wise in great things, but ignorant of petty subjects and chance details; and he used to cite the saying of Caphesius, who, when one of his pupils was labouring hard to be able to blow very powerfully, gave him a slap, and said, that excellence did not depend upon greatness, but greatness on excellence. Once, when a young man was arguing very confidently, he said, "I should not like to say, O youth, all that occurs to me." And once, when a handsome and weathy Rho-

dian, but one who had no other qualification, was pressing him to take him as a pupil, he, as he was not inclined to receive him, first of all made him sit on the dusty seats that he might dirt his cloak, then he put him down in the place of the poor that he might rub against their rags, and at last the young man went away. One of his sayings used to be, that vanity was the most unbecoming of all things, and especially so in the young. Another was, that one ought not to try and recollect the exact words and expressions of a discourse, but to fix all one's attention on the arrangement of the arguments, instead of treating it as if it were a piece of boiled meat, or some delicate eatable. He used also to say that young men ought to maintain the most scrupulous reserve in their walking, their gait, and their dress; and he was constantly quoting the lines of Euripides on Capaneus, that—

His wealth was ample.

But yet no pride did mingle with his state,
Nor had he haughty thought, or arrogance,
More than the poorest man.

And one of his sayings used to be, that nothing was more unfriendly to the comprehension of the accurate sciences than poetry; and that there was nothing that we stood in so much need of as time. When he was asked what a friend was, he replied, "Another I." They say that he was once scourging a slave whom he had detected in theft; and when he said to him, "It was fated that I should steal;" he rejoiced, "Yes, and that you should be beaten." He used to call beauty the flower of the voice; but some report this as if he had said that the voice is the flower of beauty. On one occasion, when he saw a slave belonging to one of his friends severely bruised, he said to his friend, "I see the footsteps of your anger." He once accosted a man who was all over unguents and perfumes, "Who is this who smells like a woman?" When Dionysius Metathemenus asked him why he was the only person whom he did not correct, he replied, "Because I have no confidence in you." A young man was talking a great deal of nonsense, and he said to him, "This is the reason why we have two ears and only one mouth, that we may hear more and speak less.

Once, when he was at an entertainment and remained wholly silent, he was asked what the reason was; and so he bade the person who found fault with him tell the king that there was a man in the room who knew how to hold his tongue; now the people who asked him this were ambassadors who had come from Ptolemy, and who

wished to know what report they were to make of him to the king. He was once asked how he felt when people abused him, and he said, "As an ambassador feels when he is sent away without an answer." Apollonius of Tyre tells us, that when Crates dragged him by the cloak away from Stilpo, he said, "O Crates, the proper way to take hold of philosophers is by the ears; so now do you convince me and drag me by them; but if you use force towards me, my body may be with you, but my mind with Stilpo."

XX. He used to devote a good deal of time to Diodorus, as we learn from Hippobotus; and he studied dialectics under him. And when he had made a good deal of progress he attached himself to Polemo because of his freedom from arrogance, so that it is reported that he said to him, "I am not ignorant, O Zeno, that you slip into the garden-door and steal my doctrines, and then clothe them in a Phœnician dress." When a dialectician once showed him seven species of dialectic argument in the *mowing* argument, he asked him how much he charged for them, and when he said, "A hundred drachmas," he gave him two hundred, so exceedingly devoted was he to learning.

XXI. They say, too, that he was the first who ever employed the word duty (*kathakon*), and who wrote a treatise on the subject. And that he altered the lines of Hesiod thus:—

He is the best of all men who submits
To follow good advice; he too is good,
Who of himself perceives whate'er is fit.

For he said that that man who had the capacity to give a proper hearing to what was said, and to avail himself of it, was superior to him who comprehended everything by his own intellect; for that the one had only comprehension, but the one who took good advice had action also.

XXII. When he was asked why he, who was generally austere, relaxed at a dinner party, he said, "Lupins too are bitter, but when they are soaked they become sweet." And Hecaton, in the second book of his *Apophthegms*, says, that in entertainments of that kind, he used to indulge himself freely. And he used to say that it was better to trip with the feet, than with the tongue. And that goodness was attained by little and little, but was not itself a small thing. Some authors, however, attribute this saying to Socrates.

XXIII. He was a person of great powers of abstinence and endurance; and of very simple habits, living on food which required no fire to dress it, and wearing a thin cloak, so that it was said of him:—

The cold of winter, and the ceaseless rain,
 Come powerless against him; weak is the dart
 Of the fierce summer sun, or fell disease,
 To bend that iron frame. He stands apart,
 In nought resembling the vast common crowd;
 But, patient and unwearied, night and day,
 Clings to his studies and philosophy.

XXIV. And the comic poets, without intending it, praise him in their very attempts to turn him into ridicule. Philemon speaks thus of him in his play entitled the Philosophers:—

This man adopts a new philosophy,
 He teaches to be hungry; nevertheless,
 He gets disciples. Bread his only food,
 His best desert dried figs; water his drink.

But some attribute these lines to Posidippus. And they have become almost a proverb. Accordingly it used to be said to him, "More temperate than Zeno the philosopher." Posidippus also writes thus in his *Men Transported*:—

So that for ten whole days he did appear
 More temperate than Zeno's self.

XXV. For in reality he did surpass all men in this description of virtue, and in dignity of demeanor, and, by Jove, in happiness. For he lived ninety-eight years, and then died, without any disease, and continuing in good health to the last. But Persæus, in his *Ethical School*, states that he died at the age of seventy-two, and that he came to Athens when he was twenty-two years old. But Apollonius says that he presided over his school for forty-eight years.

XXVI. And he died in the following manner. When he was going out of his school, he tripped, and broke one of his toes; and striking the ground with his hand, he repeated the line out of the *Niobe*:—

I come: why call me so!

And immediately he strangled himself, and so he died.—Diogenes Laertius.

EPICURUS

EPICURUS was born in Samos about 341 B. C. He visited Athens at eighteen, and after a number of years spent in travel and in teaching at Mitylene, returned to Athens to found his school about 307 B. C. He died in 270 B. C.

His recognition of a higher form of pleasure as the chief good is best given in his own terms as in the letter below. He seems to have been himself virtuous and delightfully amiable. He incorporated something of the atomic theory of Leukippos and Demokritos into his system and its explanation by his disciple Lucretius did much to keep it alive until developed by modern science.

LETTER ON HAPPINESS

"Let no one delay to study philosophy while he is young, and when he is old let him not become weary of the study; for no man can ever find the time unsuitable or too late to study the health of his soul. And he who asserts either that it is not yet time to philosophize, or that the hour is passed, is like a man who should say that the time is not yet come to be happy, or that it is too late. So that both young and old should study philosophy, the one in order that, when he is old, he may be young in good things through the pleasing recollection of the past, and the other in order that he may be at the same time both young and old, in consequence of his absence of fear for the future.

"It is right then for a man to consider the things which produce happiness, since, if happiness is present, we have everything, and when

HERMES

By Praxiteles. In Olympia.

PRAXITELES is supposed to have been born at Athens about 392 B. C. Little is known of his life. He worked for the most part in marble. The Hermes is probably the original statue by his own hand. One of his greatest works was the Aphrodite at Cnidus. He was the greatest sculptor of the second great century of Greek art.



it is absent, we do everything with a view to possess it. Now, what I have constantly recommended to you, these things I would have you do and practise, considering them to be the elements of living well. First of all, believe that God is a being incorruptible and happy; as the common opinion of the world about God dictates; and attach to your idea of him nothing which is inconsistent with incorruptibility or with happiness; and think that he is invested with everything which is able to preserve to him this happiness, in conjunction with incorruptibility. For there are gods; for our knowledge of them is indistinct. But they are not of the character which people in general attribute to them; for they do not pay a respect to them which accords with the ideas that they entertain of them. And that man is not impious who discards the god believed in by many, but he who applies to the gods the opinions entertained of them by the many. For the assertions of the many about the gods are not anticipations, but false opinions. And in consequence of these, the greatest evils which befall wicked men, and the benefits which are conferred on the good, are all attributed to the gods; for they connect all their ideas of them with a comparison of human virtues, and everything which is different from human qualities, they regard as incompatible with the divine nature.

“Accustom yourself also to think death a matter with which we are not at all concerned, since all good and evil is in sensation, and since death is only the privation of sensation. On which account, the correct knowledge of the fact that death is no concern of ours, makes the mortality of life pleasant to us, insomuch as it sets forth no illimitable time, but relieves us of the longing for immortality. For there is nothing terrible in living to a man who rightly comprehends that there is nothing terrible in ceasing to live; so that he was a silly man who said that he feared death, not because it would grieve him when it was present, but because it did grieve him while it was future. For it is very absurd that that which does not distress a man when it is present, should afflict him when only expected. Therefore, the most formidable of all evils, death, is nothing to us, since, when we exist, death is not present to us; and when death is present, then we have no existence. It is no concern then either of the living or of the dead; since to the one it has no existence, and the other class has no existence itself. But people in general, at times flee from death as the greatest of evils, and at times wish for it as a rest from the evils in life. Nor is the not living a thing feared, since living is not connected with it; nor does the wise man think not living an evil; but, just as he chooses

food, not preferring that which is most abundant, but that which is nicest; so too, he enjoys time, not measuring it as to whether it is of the greatest length, but as to whether it is most agreeable. And he who enjoins a young man to live well, and an old man to die well, is a simpleton, not only because of the constantly delightful nature of life, but also because the care to live well is identical with the care to die well. And he was still wrong who said:—

“ ’Tis well to taste of life, and then when born
To pass with quickness to the shades below.

“For if this really was his opinion why did he not quit life? for it was easily in his power to do so, if it really was his belief. But if he was joking, then he was talking foolishly in a case where it ought not to be allowed; and, we must recollect, that the future is not our own, nor, on the other hand, is it wholly not our own, I mean so that we can never altogether await it with a feeling of certainty that it will be, nor altogether despair of it as what will never be. And we must consider that some of the passions are natural, and some empty; and of the natural ones some are necessary, and some merely natural. And of the necessary ones some are necessary to happiness, and others, with regard to the exemption of the body, from trouble; and others with respect to living itself; for a correct theory, with regard to these things, can refer all choice and avoidance to the health of the body and the freedom from disquietude of the soul. Since this is the end of living happily; for it is for the sake of this that we do everything, wishing to avoid grief and fear; and when once this is the case, with respect to us, then the storm of the soul is, as I may say, put an end to; since the animal is unable to go as if to something deficient, and to seek something different from that by which the good of the soul and body will be perfected.

“For then we have need of pleasure when we grieve, because pleasure is not present; but when we do not grieve, then we have no need of pleasure; and on this account, we affirm, that pleasure is the beginning and end of living happily; for we have recognized this as the first good, being connate with us; and with reference to it, it is that we begin every choice and avoidance; and to this we come as if we judged of all good by passion as the standard; and, since this is the first good and connate with us, on this account we do not choose every is likely to ensue from them; and we think many pains better than pleasures, when a greater pleasure follows them, if we endure the pain

“Every pleasure is therefore a good on account of its own nature, but it does not follow that every pleasure is worthy of being chosen; just as every pain is an evil, and yet every pain must not be avoided. But it is right to estimate all these things by the measurement and view of what is suitable and unsuitable; for at times we may feel the good as an evil, and at times, on the contrary, we may feel the evil as good. And, we think, contentment a great good, not in order that we may never have but a little, but in order that, if we have not much, we may make use of a little, being genuinely persuaded that those men enjoy luxury most completely who are the best able to do without it; and that every thing which is natural is easily provided, and what is useless is not easily procured. And simple flavours give as much pleasure as costly fare, when everything that can give pain, and everything feeling of want, is removed; and corn and water give the most extreme pleasure when anyone in need eats them. To accustom one's self, therefore, to simple and inexpensive habits is a great ingredient in the perfecting of health, and makes a man free from hesitation with respect to the necessary uses of life. And when we, on certain occasions, fall in with more sumptuous fare, it makes us in a better disposition towards it, and renders us fearless with respect to fortune. When, therefore, we say that pleasure is a chief good, we are not speaking of the pleasures of the debauched man, or those which lie in sensual enjoyment, as some think who are ignorant, and who do not entertain our opinions, or else interpret them perversely; but we mean the freedom of the body from pain, and of the soul from confusion. For it is not continued drinkings and revels, or the enjoyment of female society, or feasts of fish and other such things, as a costly table supplies, that make life pleasant, but sober contemplation, which examines into the reasons for all choice and avoidance, and which puts to flight the vain opinions from which the greater part of the confusion arises which troubles the soul.

“Now, the beginning and the greatest good of all these things is prudence, on which account prudence is something more valuable than even philosophy, inasmuch as all the other virtues spring from it, teaching us that it is not possible to live pleasantly unless one also lives prudently, and honorably, and justly; and that one cannot live prudently, and honestly, and justly without living pleasantly; for the virtues are connate with living agreeably, and living agreeably is inseparable from the virtues. Since, who can you think better than that man who has holy opinions respecting the gods, and who is utterly fearless with respect to death, and who has properly contemplated the

end of nature, and who comprehends that the chief good is easily perfected and easily provided; and the greatest evil lasts but a short period, and causes but brief pain. And who has no belief in necessity, which is set up by some as the mistress of all things, but he refers some things to fortune, some to ourselves, because necessity is an irresponsible power, and because he sees that fortune is unstable, while our own will is free; and this freedom constitutes, in our case, a responsibility which makes us encounter blame and praise. Since it would be better to follow the fables about the gods than to be a slave to the fate of the natural philosopher; for the fables which are told give us a sketch, as if we could avert the wrath of God by paying him honour; but the other presents us with necessity who is inexorable.

“And he, not thinking fortune a goddess, as the generality esteem her (for nothing is done at random by a god), nor a cause which no man can rely on, for he thinks that good or evil is not given by her to men so as to make them live happily, but that the principles of great goods or great evils are supplied by her; thinking it better to be unfortunate in accordance with reason, than to be fortunate in accordance with reason, than to be fortunate irrationally; for that those actions which are judged to be the best, are rightly done in consequence of reason.

“Do you then study these precepts, and those which are akin to them, by all means day and night, pondering on them by yourself, and discussing them with any one like yourself, and then you will never be disturbed by either sleeping or waking fancies, but you will live like a god among men; for a man living amid immortal gods, is in no respect like a mortal being.”—Diogenes Laertius.

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS-URBANA



3 0112 097608001